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The intertwined relationship between the objectives of banking supervision and 
monetary policy remained for a long-time part of a rather theoretical debate. It took a major 
GFC for the policymakers to realise that there were gaps in the existing regulatory and 
supervisory framework, which subsequently opened the way for the central banks’ 
involvement in both micro- and macro-prudential supervision at international and EU level. 
Prior to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the optimal model of central banking governance and 
institutional framework at both international and EU level, focused on monetary policy 
objectives. Part of the same orthodoxy was the prominence given to central bank 
independence and to institutional arrangements focused primarily on inflation targeting. The 
European Central Bank (ECB), being a creature of its time, was designed as a purely monetary-
stability-oriented central bank and was also granted a high level of independence. However, 
housing monetary policy and banking supervision under the ECB’s roof, has radically changed 
its role and the balance between existing and new powers within the EU banking framework. 
To this end, this thesis critically examines the centralisation of banking supervision in the EU, 
by exploring the nexus between monetary policy and banking supervision, and the 
compatibility of their combination within the existing legislative framework. Having examined 
the historical context of the debate, recent developments and underlying policy concerns in 
the pre- and post- Great Financial Crisis (GFC) era, this thesis concludes that the conferral of 
supervisory tasks on ECB has created a complex system of cooperation between national and 
supranational level, and between existing and newly established tasks and objectives. This 
has resulted in stretching the role of ECB beyond its original mandate as set by EU primary 
law, exceeding the wording of Article 127(6), TFEU. Therefore, drawing on the particular 
synergies involved, this thesis suggests that the only avenue in transforming the ECB into a 
truly supranational supervisor with full discretion, is the amendment of the Treaty and the 
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Motivation, contribution and objectives of the thesis 
Examining the role of central banks has become a key tool in understanding modern 
financial markets. Traditionally, maintaining financial stability was a primary objective of 
central banks. However, the primacy given to central bank independence in the late 1970s 
and the banks’ increasing role in pursuing the goal of price stability, consolidated their place 
as monetary authorities. This resulted in central banks having a narrow mandate, mainly 
focused on inflation targeting as the means to achieve price stability.1 Part of the same 
orthodoxy was a strict separation between central banks’ monetary policy objectives and 
their responsibility for banking supervision. Yet, even when the mandate of central banks was 
aiming solely at maintaining stable inflation, they still played a crucial role in the financial 
stability domain as soon as a financial crisis occurred. As Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa stated, 
financial stability has been always part of the “genetic code” of central banks.2 This is to be 
attributed to the ability of central banks to act as “lender of last resort” and their liquidity 
management duties, making them a dominant player in preventing and managing systemic 
banking crises. To this end, central banks are considered to be the best-suited institutions to 
perform supervision tasks.3   
The intertwined relationship between the objectives of banking supervision and 
monetary policy remained for a long time only part of a rather theoretical debate. It took a 
major GFC for the policymakers to acknowledge the gaps of the existing regulatory and 
supervisory framework, which in turn, opened the way for the central banks’ involvement in 
                                                           
1 Angelini, Paolo, Neri, Stefano, Panetta, Fabio, ‘Monetary and Macroprudential Policies’ (ECB, Working Paper 
Series No 1449, July 2012) 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1449.pdf?b61cbb31d8b42f7c125bde5332c95005> 
accessed 14 July 2017. 
2 Padoa-Schioppa, Tommaso, ‘Central Banks and Financial Stability: Exploring a Land in Between’ (Second ECB 
Central Banking Conference, “The transformation of the European financial system,” Frankfurt am Main, 24 and 
25 October 2002), 6 
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.137.2584&rep=rep1&type=pdf> accessed 14 July 
2017. 
3 Cœuré, Benoît, ‘Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision: The history of central banks and the European 
banking union’ (Speech by a  Member of the Executive Board of the ECB at the Symposium: “Central Banking: 
Where Are We Headed?” in honour of Stefan Gerlach’s contribution to the Institute for Monetary and Financial 
Stability, Goethe University, Frankfurt, 7 February 2013) 
<http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2013/html/sp130207.en.html> accessed 14 July 2017. 
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banking supervision. Namely, the financial crisis 2007-2009 or the Great Financial Crisis (Great 
Financial Crisis) brought the importance of the financial stability mandate of central banks 
back to the fore and placed emphasis on the need to strengthen macro-prudential supervision 
and regulation. To this end, macro-prudential supervision attracted attention, especially in 
the aftermath of the Lehman Brother’s collapse in 2008.4 As a result, policymakers at both 
national and international levels, laid emphasis on the need for a drastic regulatory change 
that would strengthen central banks’ role in both micro- and macro-prudential supervision, 
while maintaining at the same time, a balance between the objectives of financial stability 
and price stability. At EU level, the regulatory response to the financial crisis focused primarily 
on reshaping the supervisory architecture, while the role of the supranational central bank, 
i.e. European Central Bank (hereinafter: ECB), was becoming progressively involved in banking 
oversight.  
The ECB, since its establishment by the Maastricht Treaty, was conceived as a pure 
monetary authority, with its mandate being solely focused on maintaining price stability. This 
was considered to be adequate in safeguarding the stability of the financial system as a whole. 
The ECB was designed on the German Bundesbank model of one authority, one objective and 
one main instrument, which was based on the Tinbergen rule. In addition, in pursuing its 
mandate, the ECB was given a highly independent status, aiming to shield its functioning from 
any external interference. Thus, the institutional framework, the governance structure and 
the legal basis of the ECB’s mandate, were all designed in facilitating the functioning of an 
independent monetary authority that was entrusted with the sole mandate of price stability, 
attained through an inflation targeting regime and a clear separation between monetary 
policy and banking supervision objectives. This is evident from the wording of the Treaty 
provisions, which offer primacy to the price stability mandate and to the bank’s 
independence. As a result, the ECB’s role in banking supervision remained limited, while, one 
could argue that its financial stability mandate was neglected.  
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the GFC challenged the existing conventional view 
and triggered the need for change in the European Union (hereinafter: EU) regulatory and 
supervisory frameworks. Starting with the De Larosière Report and the plethora of legislative 
                                                           
4 Hofmann, Christian, ‘Stabilizing the financial sector’ (2012) 8 (4) European Review of Contract Law 426. 
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reforms to follow, EU financial market regulation and supervision entered an era of change 
that led to a significant expansion of the ECB’s role; an expansion that was moving beyond its 
envisioned mandate. This stretching of the ECB’s mandate reached momentum with the 
establishment of the first pillar of European Banking Union, the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(hereinafter: SSM) in the late 2012, which transformed the ECB into the supranational banking 
supervision authority for the Eurozone financial institutions. This official assignment of 
supervisory powers to the ECB, has been appraised as the most significant restructuring of 
central banking architecture in the EU. Thus, it is hardly surprising that this radical regulatory 
reform was accompanied by an extremely extensive debate in relation to the controversies, 
synergies and conflict of interest involved. 
This debate has been through a variety of disciplines, which is a result of the complex 
implications of the ECB’s changing responsibilities in various fields, including economic, social, 
political and legal. In the legal context, where the focus of this thesis lays, one of the most 
debated topics is whether the newly established supervisory tasks of the ECB are compatible 
with its monetary policy mandate. This is particularly important given the clear hierarchy 
provided by Treaty provisions to the ECB’s objectives and its exclusion from assuming 
supervisory tasks when they do not classify as ‘specific.’5 It is therefore questionable how the 
same Treaty provisions designed to facilitate the functioning of a ‘pure’ monetary policy 
authority, provided an adequate legal basis for the subsequent stretching of the ECB’s 
mandate to supervision and how they delineate the exact limits of the ‘specificity’ of 
supervisory tasks. In addition, ECB involvement in banking supervision raises fundamental 
questions regarding its independence and a possible conflict of interest with its existing price 
stability mandate. This emphasises further the urgent need to address the question of 
whether the marrying of banking supervision and monetary policy under the ECB’s umbrella 
could be adequately addressed only via considering the possibility of Treaty amendment. 
Thus, this thesis seeks to examine the changing role of the ECB by addressing the question: 
“Does the marrying of the objectives of monetary policy and banking supervision under the 
ECB’s umbrella, in its current legislative framework, exceed the wording of EU Treaties 
provisions?” 
                                                           
5 ‘Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’ [2012] OJ C 326/47 (hereinafter: 
TFEU) Article 127(6).  
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In answering this question, this thesis makes a distinct contribution to EU financial 
regulation and supervision literature by critically examining the evolving role of the ECB, 
including the legitimacy of its mandate in the context of both the pre- and post-financial crisis 
regulatory framework. To this end, having highlighted the importance of the topic and laid 
out the main research question, the aim of this thesis is to critically assess the new role of the 
ECB in respect to banking supervision, while taking into consideration current developments 
and the evolution of existing policy frameworks. In particular, the main focus of the thesis is 
to address the nexus between the respective objectives of monetary policy and banking 
supervision, while exploring the synergies involved as a result of their combination within the 
same monetary authority (i.e. the ECB) which operates on a price stability oriented monetary 
policy regime.  
It should be noted that there has been significant coverage in the literature regarding 
the conflict of interest between monetary policies and banking supervision objectives, 
especially during the early 1990’s, but it involved mainly studies concerned with particular 
jurisdictions or comparative studies between various jurisdictions, focused on the economic 
implications. The relevant debate seemed to have faded during the era of central banking 
independence prominence, to only re-emerge again as a result of the increased involvement 
of central banks in banking supervision in the aftermath of the GFC. This thesis focuses on the 
legal perspectives of the debate, while providing a comprehensive analysis of the evolving 
nature of the ECB’s role on pursuing both monetary policy and banking supervision objectives, 
by identifying at the same time the gaps of a newly formulated regulatory and supervisory 
architecture that lays at the heart of a unique regional formation, the EU. 
The all-around analysis of the changing role of the ECB, adds to the existing literature 
by identifying the legal constrains arising as a result of the combination of monetary policy 
and banking supervision objectives under the ECB’s remit. The critical analysis of this topic, 
especially of the legitimacy of the decision to centralise banking supervision at EU level, based 
on the existing Treaty provisions, offers an original legal point of view. As the topic has 
significant economic ramifications, the financial issues in conjunction with economic theories 
are consulted to the extent that help to support the legal argument. An additional 
contribution of this research can be located on the fact that although there are several 
publications that analyse the various aspects of banking supervision centralisation at EU level, 
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the later remains work in progress, with the question of legitimacy and the possibility of 
Treaty amendment being highly controversial, and barely addressed. Therefore, this thesis 
aims to enrich the literature in regard to the ECB’s involvement in supervision during this most 
critical period for Europe, when most of the Banking Union project is still ‘under construction.’ 
In addition, the ECB, being a creature of its time, represents the greatest illustration of a 
central banking institutional design that was highly based on the views of a school of macro-
economic thought, which for a long period of time influenced the policymaking agenda at 
national, regional and international level. Thus, the legal considerations of loopholes during 
the evolution process of the ECB’s role, could equally apply to similar monetary policy regimes 
in other jurisdictions.  The areas of study are chiefly based on the EU Law, EU Banking Law 
and Financial Regulation, and European Common Market Law. 
Outline method/approach 
The methodical approach of this thesis, builds on the realisation that the recent 
financial crisis has led to a radical re-evaluation of existing approaches to financial regulation, 
systemic stability and monetary policy. Methodology can be defined as the ‘branch of 
knowledge’ concerned with method, where method is viewed as a special form of procedure 
or characteristic set of procedures employed (more or less systematically) in an intellectual 
discipline or field of study as a mode of investigation and inquiry, or of teaching and 
exposition.6 Legal research is often described as doctrinal, in the sense that one conducts 
research into the law and legal concepts.7  
On the field of this current research, one has to admit that up until 2008, legal theory 
was only of secondary importance to international financial law. For this reason, a mere 
doctrinal approach is insufficient in explaining the concepts involved. Neoclassical economic 
theory, which offered the explanatory background of global financial regulation, was 
considered to be adequate in informing policy as explained further in this work. Moreover, 
mainstream debate (meaning research not challenging the bases of global capitalism) was 
formulated and directed towards answering questions of efficiency and social welfare. 
                                                           
6 Fisher, Elizabeth, Lange, Bettina, Scotford, Eloise and Carlarne, Cinnamon, ‘Maturity and Methodology: Starting 
a Debate about Environmental Law Scholarship’ (2009) 21 (2) Journal of Environmental Law 213, 226. 
7 Manderson, Desmond and Mohr, Richard, ‘From Oxymoron to Intersection: An Epidemiology of Legal Research, 
Law Text Culture’ (2002) 6 (1) Law Text Culture 159, 159. 
14 
 
However, the aftermath of the GFC brought into the surface the so-called: “macro-prudential 
issues”8 and raised awareness of what is now understood as systemic risk, calling for global 
cooperation and coordination. In addressing these themes, a broader involvement of legal 
theory is needed, as mere neoclassical assumptions no longer suffice. 
This research area is highly topical, as there are numerous contemporary changes to 
the financial sector and new theoretical approaches are being developed. For this reason, this 
research attempts to provide a holistic assessment of the role of the ECB, by evaluating its 
role in supervision and monetary policy making. The main framework for analysis is law and 
economics,9 articulated on a multi-dimensional level,10 including European (mainly) and 
international implications of regulation. The analysis will consider the historical, political and 
socio-economic implications within these levels, in order to explain the background of legally 
based policy-making responses. This ‘law and economics’ approach11 is used in presenting 
recent developments seeking to tease out the dynamic between legal changes, economic 
effects, policy reactions. 
In discussing regulatory reform therefore, it is imperative to recognise that the 
regulation of the economy is not just a matter for law and economics. Regulatory 
interventions, or the lack thereof, can have severe consequences on the political economy of 
a state and changing popular perceptions of the functions of law can have direct effects on 
the democratic legitimacy of institutions.12 For this reason, in conducting this research, a 
socio-legal approach will be included in analysing national and international institutional 
settings before and after the crisis. A ‘socio-legal’ methodology,13 focuses on the links 
between legal frameworks and the evolution of social and political norms. Legal 
developments as well as the influence of international financial regulation to the European 
regulatory framework before and after the crisis are examined both against their socio-
economic origins and as to their socio-legal effects. 
                                                           
8 Prasad, Eswar, ‘Financial Sector Regulation and Reforms in Emerging Markets: An Overview’ in Kawai, Masahiro 
and Prasad, Eswar (eds) Financial Sector Reforms in Emerging Markets (Brookings Institution Press, Asian 
Development Bank 2011) 3.  
9 Marciano, Alain (ed), Law and Economics A Reader (Routledge 2009). 
10 Palmer, Vernon Valentine, ‘From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology’ (2005) 
53 (1) The American Journal of Comparative Law 261. 
11 Posner, Richard, Economic Analysis of Law (9th edn, Wolters Kluwer Law & Business 2014). 
12 Glinavos, Ioannis, Redefining the Market-State Relationship (Routledge 2013) 57. 
13 Perry-Kessaris, Amanda, Socio-Legal Approaches to International Economic Law (Routledge 2013). 
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Despite the fact, that methodologically this research project is mainly focused on law 
and economics, this does not constitute a limitation. The thesis is informed by the view that 
the legal apparatus should not be considered as independent from other fields, but rather 
interconnected with them. This research stems from the belief that the new EU regulatory 
framework and the reshaping of the ECB’s role constitutes a response to the financial turmoil, 
which involved financial, social and political consequences in a complex interlinked 
relationship.  
The structure of the thesis 
This thesis consists of four chapters. Chapter one starts with a presentation of the 
history of central banking, and the genesis and evolution of the idea of central bank 
independence. This is followed by an analysis of institutional evolution in Europe and the early 
years of the process towards integration at EU level. Here, emphasis is placed on the roadmap 
towards the establishment of European Monetary Union (hereinafter: EMU) and the creation 
of the European System of Central Banks (hereinafter: ESCB). This chapter also provides a 
detailed analysis on the independence of the ECB, as established by the provisions of the 
Treaty, while also examining its relationship to the notions of transparency, openness and 
accountability. The study of the existing literature on the history of central bank 
independence at both EU and international levels aims at providing a comprehensive 
presentation of the topic, by examining its background in a broader context. Lastly, chapter 
one outlines the main developments towards the consolidated cooperation of banking 
supervision at international level, by examining the rationale for the creation of the Basel 
Committee in Banking Supervision (hereinafter: BCBS) and its evolution. This analysis intends 
to examine the role of international cooperation in reshaping banking supervisory framework 
through common practices, and their influence at EU level.  
Chapter two is dedicated to the theoretical foundation of the separation principle 
between the objectives of monetary policy and banking supervision. To this end, the second 
chapter firstly attempts to define the notion of monetary policy and its evolution from the 
late 19th century onwards. Then the analysis focuses on examining the possible trade-offs 
arising as a result of the combination of monetary policy and banking supervision objectives. 
Next, the second chapter offers an initial analysis of the ECB’s monetary policy function as set 
by EU law and the bank’s role in financial stability. It should be noted that the examination of 
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the role of the ECB on monetary policy focuses on the legal implications rather than the 
economic dimension of the debate. This chapter intends to provide the reader with a 
comprehensive understanding of the ECB’s objectives as set by EU primary law, by also 
examining the rationale and the legal basis of the ECB’s mandate.   
Chapter three provides a detailed analysis of the evolution of EU financial services, 
with a particular focus on banking regulation and supervision. This analysis starts by outlining 
the early regulatory measures of the process of financial services integration, including the 
main legislative initiatives. The discussion starts with the Lamfalussy Report, which was the 
last attempt to reshape the EU regulatory and supervisory architecture in the pre-GFC era. 
The regulatory response to the GFC at EU level, is addressed in the latter part of chapter three, 
which focuses on the De Larosière Report and the amendments it made to the architecture 
of EU banking supervision.  
The last chapter examines the centralisation of banking supervision at EU level and the 
transformation of the ECB to a supranational supervisory authority, which brings us to the 
core subject of the thesis. Thus, the fourth chapter starts with a critical assessment of the 
genesis of the idea of banking supervision centralisation at EU level and the rationale of 
choosing ECB as the supervisor for financial institutions in the Eurozone. This is followed by a 
thorough exploration of the legal basis for the establishment of the SSM and the scope of the 
ECB’s supervisory mandate. Additionally, given the fact that the expansion of ECB’s tasks has 
not eliminated the role of the National Competent Authorities (hereinafter: NCAs), the 
division of responsibilities between them and the ECB is also closely examined. The next 
section of chapter four advances a detailed analysis on the operational structure of the SSM, 
including the role of existing and new bodies. In addition, the discussion moves into analysing 
the position of the EU supervisory bodies, including the European Banking Authority 
(hereinafter: EBA), the college of supervisors and the European Systemic Risk Board 
(hereinafter: ESRB), within the new supervisory framework and their relationship with the 
ECB. Then, the discussion focuses on the key theme of this thesis, which concerns the 
separation principle between the ECB’s monetary policy and banking supervision objectives 
and the underlying legal constrains and policy concerns. Lastly, the final part of chapter four 
examines how the new role of the ECB in banking supervision has influenced its 
independence, which also constitutes one of the main issues addressed by this thesis.  
17 
 
It should be noted that banking regulation and supervision, especially after the GFC, is 
subject to a body of legal measures that undergo constant modifications. This is particularly 
prominent at EU Level, where the ambitious project of Banking Union remains work in 
progress, aiming at achieving deeper integration of the euro area banking system thought the 
centralising of banking regulation, supervision and resolution. The state of the law as 
discussed in this thesis is up to date as of July 2017. The theoretical connotations of this work 
however will resonate far beyond developments in the year of writing.  
 
Chapter 1: European and International Central Banking 
1.1 Introduction 
Central banks whether acting as the governments’ banks and banknotes issuers (in 
their early years) or operating as politically independent monetary policy authorities (at a 
later stage), have always played a key role in supporting the financial and monetary system, 
and industrial development. Indeed, central banks through their monetary policy,14 can 
determine and control the money supply, influence inflation rates, unemployment and 
economic growth, and affect financial stability and currency exchange rates. Moreover, 
central banks play a prominent role in the supervision of the financial system, either on their 
own or in cooperation with other institutions. However, central banks’ role, objectives and 
functioning, have changed as a result of an evolving process, which often reflected the 
prevailing economic conditions.  
The most recent example of an event (or a series of events) that triggered major 
institutional and legal framework changes in central banking is the GFC.  In essence, the crisis 
brought evidence that challenged existing practices and led to rethinking the role and 
mandate of central banks. If we were to compare the pre- with the post- crisis environment, 
it seems fair to say that during the pre-crisis era, conventional wisdom required central banks 
to operate as monetary authorities, independent from political interference (with price 
stability as their main goal) and with a defined numerical inflation target and regular 
                                                           




adjustment of interest rates (usually the short-term interest rate) as their main policy 
instrument. In the post-crisis environment, major central banks around the world shifted their 
focus from price stability to financial stability, with the latter regaining attention and a 
“priority status” within the set of central banks’ goals.  
One of the most debated topics before and after the GFC is the notion central bank 
independence, the roots of which go back to the period of increased inflation during the 
1970s. It was, therefore, unavoidable that inflation targeting15 and central bank 
independence became parts of the same debate and often considered to be complementary 
to each other, and the main actors of what became to be accepted as the optimal monetary 
policy model. It is worth mentioning here that in order to understand the rationale of inflation 
targeting, it is necessary to explore the historical evolution of monetary policy objectives. This 
requires a separate analysis, which is extensively developed in chapter two. This chapter 
focuses instead on the notion of central bank independence at both international and EU 
level, and the international cooperation in central banking practices at international level.  
There is extensive literature regarding the notion of independence, its 
conceptualisation and optimal models in both legal and economic literature. Hence, the first 
section (1.1) of this chapter attempts to situate the rationale of the idea of independence and 
explains how it has evolved throughout the years. In addition, it is comprised of four sub-
sections, with the first two (1.1.1 and 1.1.2) offering a brief historical background on the 
origins of central banking and the idea of central bank independence respectively. This 
analysis aims at providing the reader with a better understanding of how central banking 
started, evolved and has been reshaped, adapting to the needs of an increasingly challenging 
and complex financial environment. In addition, this is an important introduction to any 
discussion on central banking, as the initial perception and proposed legal framework of the 
ECB itself, is historically grounded, and thus, its institutional arrangements were highly 
influenced by the macroeconomic theories of the time. The following sub-section (1.1.3) 
advances an analysis on the various meanings of central bank independence. The fourth 
subsection (1.1.4), examines the interaction between independence, and three other 
fundamental central banking notions: credibility, accountability and transparency. Lastly, the 
                                                           
15 Inflation targeting, including its rationale and definition, is discussed in great detail in chapter two. 
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first section of chapter one closes with an initial discussion on the contemporary debate 
concerning central bank independence as reshaped in the aftermath of the GFC.  
The second section of chapter one (1.2) offers a background analysis on the 
institutional evolution in Europe and the process of European integration, from its initial 
inception in 1957, as a vehicle to promote peace and regulate trade, to its development into 
the multinational institution we know today. Particular attention is paid to the roadmap 
towards the establishment of European Monetary Union (EMU) and the creation of the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB). This analysis is directly related to the main topic of 
this thesis, which is the changing role of the ECB. To this end, the four subsections of section 
two discuss the process of European Integration, starting with the aftermath of World War 
Two (WWII), continuing with an overview of the creation of the European Monetary System 
(EMS), and moving on to the subsequent adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, as a milestone in 
the EU history. The next subsection provides an overview of the creation of the ESCB, its 
evolving institutional framework and the role of the ECB. This aims at narrowing the 
discussion on providing an analysis regarding the role of the ECB as Europe’s supranational 
monetary policy authority and the guardian of the single currency.  
The third section (1.3) of chapter one focuses on the independence of the ECB, as 
established by the provisions of the EC Treaty. Special emphasis is placed on the ECB’s 
transparency, communication and accountability. This part serves two purposes: firstly, it 
links to a great extent with the discussion on the idea of central banking independence, as 
analysed in section one; and secondly, it provides the basis to the discussion in the following 
chapters, especially in relation to the analysis of the post-crisis regulatory responses and the 
expansion of ECB’s powers beyond its traditional monetary policy tasks and objectives.   
A further aspect (discussed in section 1.4) of European integration is its close 
relationship with international financial institutions, such as the Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS), which also provided a forum for European monetary cooperation in its early 
years. With regard to banking regulation and supervision, BIS hosts the Basel Committee in 
Banking Supervision (BCBS), which represents the international forum providing permanent 
cooperation on banking supervision. To this end, the last section of this chapter includes a 
brief overview of the BCBS’s creation, role and evolution throughout the years. This section 
aims at providing an overview of the international perspective of banking supervision under 
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the BCBS arrangements, exploring the role of international cooperation in reshaping the 
banking supervisory framework through common practices. This will allow us to better 
anticipate the discussion in the coming chapters, especially with respect to the rationale of 
EU initiatives in banking regulation and supervision, which are directly related to or highly 







1.2 The idea of central bank independence: A historical analysis 
 
“The only good Central Bank is the one that can say no 
to politicians.”16 
1.2.1 A brief historical background of the creation of central banking  
The history of central banking, begins around the seventeenth century with the 
establishment of the Swedish Riksbank in 1668, which is considered to be the first institution 
with the characteristics of a central bank as we know them today.17 Riksbank was founded 
initially as a joint stock company with the mandate of lending funds to the government and 
the function of the clearing house of commerce, and was also the first bank to issue banknotes 
in Europe in 1661, before it was taken over by the state in 1668.18 Not far ahead, comes into 
being the most well-known central bank of that period, the Bank of England (1694), which 
was established as a joint stock bank to fulfil governments’ needs, in the same line as its 
                                                           
16 The Economist, February 10, 1990, 10 as cited in Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W. and De Haan, Jakob, ‘The Political 
Economy of Central-Bank Independence’ (Princeton University, Special Papers in International Economics No 19, 
May 1996) <https://www.princeton.edu/~ies/IES_Special_Papers/SP19.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017.  
17 Pohl, Manfred and Freitag, Sabine (eds.), Handbook on the History of European Banks: European Association 
for Banking History (Edward Elgar for the European Association for Banking History E.V. 1994) 989. 
18 Kindleberger, Charles P., A Financial History of Western Europe (George Allen & Unwin 1984) 50. 
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Swedish predecessor.19 A number of other central banks were founded in the following years 
with more or less the same purpose. A typical example is the central bank of France, the 
Banque de France. The latter was founded by Napoleon during 1800s with the aim of 
counterbalancing the currency in the aftermath of high inflation caused by excessive money 
printing during the time of French Revolution, and mainly with the purpose of assisting 
government’s financial needs.20 It is worth mentioning here, that the father of the idea of a 
state bank in France was John Law in 1714, whose proposal was rejected in 1915, because it 
was considered that credit conditions were not auspicious. Regardless, Law built its own 
private bank in 1917, which consisted of two elements: a system operating in public finance 
and another one involving the introduction of fiat money.21 In the US, before the 
establishment of the Federal Reserve System (the Federal Reserve or the Fed, as it is widely 
known), there were two failed attempts to create a central bank, one during 1791-1811 and 
the second one during 1816-1836.22 The establishment of the Fed came in 1913, as a response 
of several financial panics in 1907 and in an attempt to restore the soundness of the financial 
system.23 
From the brief analysis above, it is obvious that the first central banks were created to 
enhance the financial power of governments. However, their role as government banks, 
which intended primarily to address government deficits, has evolved into all-powerful 
financial institutions supporting the banking system as a whole.24 The Fed is a representative 
example of the new generation of central banks of the twentieth century, which were 
founded either to restore monetary stability and the credibility of their currency system in 
the aftermath of financial distress, or at a later stage, to manage the gold standard. The 
changing role and objectives of central banks’ monetary policy is addressed both in this 
                                                           
19 Bordo, Michael D., ‘A Brief History of Central Banks’ (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Economic 
Commentary, 12 January 2007) <https://www.clevelandfed.org/en/newsroom-and-
events/publications/economic-commentary/economic-commentary-archives/2007-economic-
commentaries/ec-20071201-a-brief-history-of-central-banks.aspx> accessed 14 July 2017. 
20 See: Bordo (n 19).  
21 For further reading regarding fiat money and John Law see: Velde, F., Government Equity and Money: John 
Law's System in 1720 France (Princeton University Press 2008). 
22 Cargill, Thomas F. and O’Driscoll, Gerald P. Jr., ‘Measuring Central Bank Independence, Policy Implications, 
and Federal Reserve Independence’ (American Economic Association Meeting, San Diego, January 2012) 6. 
23 The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, ‘Born of a panic: Forming the Federal Reserve System’ (1988) The 
Region <https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/the-region/born-of-a-panic-forming-the-fed-system> 
accessed 14 July 2017. 
24 ‘Issues in the Governance of Central Banks: A report from the Central Bank Governance Group’ ((A report from 
the Central Bank Governance, BIS, May 2009), 19 <http://www.bis.org/publ/othp04.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017. 
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chapter and in chapter two, from two different scopes. Namely, this chapter provides an 
initial overview of central banks’ role, mainly with regard the idea of central bank 
independence, and chapter two provides a further assessment of central banks’ monetary 
policy changing objectives. It is worth noting that although the importance of central bank 
independence has been extensively analysed and there is a vast amount of literature about 
this topic, it is crucial to consider the historical evolution of the notion of independence and 
how this links to the current debate.  
1.2.2 The idea of central bank independence in a historical perspective 
Although there are several dimensions of central bank independence, the idea of 
central bank independence is closely linked with government officials’ interests and their 
responses to political pressures. In addition, the entire concept of central bank independence 
was founded on the presupposition that the state constitutes an institution formed by a 
diversity of components that cooperate with each other, yet, compete for the predominance 
of control and power.25  
From the beginning of the nineteenth century through to the First World War (WWI), 
government intervention in monetary and trade affairs was rather reserved, and central 
banks enjoyed a period of a considerable degree of independence.26 In the years that 
followed, from the WWI until the 1970s, governmental intervention took over the financial 
system. As a result, the majority of central banks were nationalised and operated mainly in 
line with government’s economic plans.27 During this time span, although there was a desire 
to untangle central banks’ operations from the governmental interference (especially right in 
the aftermath of WWI), the occurrence of Great Depression in 1930 and the Second World 
War (WWII) shifted the attention of policymakers into stabilising the financial system.28 An 
interesting example of shifting attitudes is the Fed, which originally, was granted a high 
degree of autonomy, it lost it when the US entered the WWI and then, it regained it when the 
WWI ended, to only lose it again with the participation of the US in WWII.29 Also, advocates 
                                                           
25 Skocpol, Theda, ‘Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research’ in Evans, Peter B., 
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich and Skocpol, Theda (eds), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge University Press 1985). 
26 Capie, F., Fischer, S., Goodhart, C. and Schnadt, N. (eds), The future of central banking: the tercentenary 
symposium of the Bank of England (Cambridge University Press 1994) 49. 
27 Capie et al (n 27) 49. 
28 Capie et al (n 27) 51, 53. 
29 Capie et al (n 27) 53. 
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of central bank independence often point to the hyperinflation experience of Weimar 
Germany in the early 1920s and the occurrence of Great Depression in the 1930s. To this end, 
Germany’s success in dealing with inflation was attributed to Germany’s central bank 
independent status.30  
An influential early advocate of central bank independence, was Milton Friedman, 
who stated that: “a central bank should be an independent branch of government coordinate 
with the legislative, executive and judicial branches, and with its actions subject to 
interpretation by the judiciary.”31 However, this view gained widespread acceptance after the 
world experienced the costly consequences of high inflation rates during the 1970s, which 
was based on both theoretical and empirical grounds.32 From a theoretical standpoint, the 
belief that by having an independent central bank a country is more likely to score lower 
inflation rates is based in three explanatory theories. According to the “public choice” theory, 
which focused on the relationship between politics and economics, the monetary 
policymakers are under considerable political pressure to behave in accordance with 
government’s objectives. Therefore, it was argued that a highly independent central bank 
would reduce the possibility of governmental intervention and would protect the currency 
from political pressure to finance deficits.33  
In the same vein, another explanatory theory of the positive effect of central bank 
independence on inflation, which was developed originally by Sargent and Wallace in 1981, 
is based on the difference between fiscal and monetary policy.34 The authors described two 
                                                           
30 See: 
- Bibow, Jörg, ‘A Post Keynesian Perspective on the Rise of Central Bank Independence: A Dubious 
Success Story in Monetary Economics’ (2010) Levy Economics Institute Working Paper No 625, 7-8 
<http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_625.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017; and 
- Canova, Timothy A., ‘Black Swans and Black Elephants in Plain Sight: An Empirical Review of Central 
Bank Independence’ (2011) 14 (2) Chapman Law Review 237, 241 
<https://www.chapman.edu/law/_files/publications/review-of-central-bank-independence.pdf> 
accessed 14 July 2017. 
31 Friedman, M., ‘Should there be an Independent Monetary Authority?’ in Yeager, Leland B. (ed) In Search of a 
Monetary Constitution (Harvard University Press 1962) 179. 
32 Cukierman, Alex, ‘Central Bank Independence and Policy Results: Theory and Evidence’ (Lecture prepared for 
the International Conference on ‘Stabiltity and Economic Growth: The Role of the Central Bank in 2006) 
<http://www.tau.ac.il/~alexcuk/pdf/theory%20and%20evidence.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017. 
33 See Buchanan, James M. and Wagner, Richard E., Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes 
(Vol 8, Academic Press 1977) 117. 
34 Sargent, Thomas J. and Wallace, Neil, ‘Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic’ (1981) 5 (3) Federal Reserve 




coordination scenarios, one where fiscal policy dominates over monetary policy, and another 
where the latter dominates over the former. In the first scenario, the central bank cannot 
influence the size of government’s deficit, while the quality of money in the economy is 
determined by the economy alone or endogenously, rather than exogenously or 
autonomously by an external authority such as a central bank.35 Simply said, if there is a 
scenario of unsustainable deficits, the central bank might eventually be forced to inflate prices 
in order to fund the government’s deficit. On the contrary, when the central bank is equipped 
with the power to operate its monetary policy objectives independently, the fiscal authority 
will be forced to reduce the deficit. In fact, when monetary policy dominates over fiscal policy, 
the monetary authority: “permanently control inflation in a monetarist economy, because it 
is completely free to choose any path for base money.”36 In sum, according to this view, central 
bank independence enhances a central bank’s ability to withstand government pressure to 
finance government deficits via central bank credit.  
The prevailing and most influential explanatory theory on the link between central 
bank independence and inflation is based in the so-called time-inconsistency theory, as it was 
initially provided by Kydland and Prescott in 1977,37 later strengthened by Calvo,38 and further 
developed by Barro and Gordon.39 According to the time-inconsistency theory, monetary 
policymakers when act under political pressure - which often happens before elections - are 
more likely to foster short-term output gains that eventually will trigger an increase in 
inflation rates, and as a result, building up in an inflationary bias. Simply put, what usually 
happens is that shortly before an election, policymakers are systematically tempted to reduce 
interest rates in order to increase growth and decrease unemployment rates.40 This, in the 
short-run may create a promise of low inflation and may also help the governing party to win 
                                                           
35 See Moore, Basil J., Horizontalists and Verticalists: The Macroeconomics of Credit Money (Cambridge 
University Press 1988); Kaldor Nicholas, ‘The new monetarism’ (1970) 97 Lloyds Bank Review; Kaldor, Nicholas, 
The Scourge of Monetarism (Oxford University Press 1982); and Harcourt, Geoffrey and Kriesler, Peter (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of Post-Keynesian Economics, Volume 1: Theory and Origins (Oxford University Press 2013). 
36 Sargent and Wallace (n 35) 2. 
37 Kydland, Finn E. and Prescott, Edward C., ‘Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans’ 
(1977) 85 (3) The Journal of Political Economy 473. 
38 Calvo, Guillermo A., ‘On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy’ (1978) 46 (6) The 
Econometric Society 1411. 
39 Barro, Robert and Gordon, David B., ‘Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy’ (1983) 
Journal of Monetary Economics 101. 
40 Alogoskoufis, George S., Lockwood, Ben and Philippopoulo, Apostolis, ‘Wage Inflation, Electoral Uncertainty 
and the Exchange Rate Regime: Theory and UK Evidence’ (1992) 102 The Economic Journal 1370. 
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the elections. However, in the long run, this commitment is usually abandoned, and chances 
are that it will result in increased inflation without any real output gains. Hence, central bank 
independence was viewed as a means to mitigate an inflationary bias that may arise under a 
discretionary policy. The main idea of the time-inconsistency theory is that monetary policy 
should not focus merely on the short-run trade-off between unemployment and inflation by 
pursuing expansionary policies. This is based on the belief that this practice would raise the 
expectation of the private sector about inflation, resulting in higher wages and prices; which 
in turn, would trigger higher inflation rates, without increasing output. In any case, the 
optimal monetary policy strategy is time-inconsistent since it cannot be consistently followed 
in the long-run. It should also be mentioned that this is also a problem of credibility, since a 
central bank’s monetary policy is credible only when it does not suffer from the time-
inconsistency problem as described above.41 The discussion about credibility and how it is 
influenced by central bank independence will be further developed in the last sub-sections of 
this part.  
Barro and Gordon in 1983 took further the reasoning of the time-inconsistency theory, 
by providing evidence that discretionary monetary policy would bring to the economy a 
significant inflationary bias, which in turn, would trigger economic instability.42 Moreover, 
Rogoff in 1985,43 argued that economic variables may fluctuate due to changes in economic 
policies pursued by the central bank. According to Rogoff, the solution to fluctuations in 
inflation rates and to the time-inconsistency problem is to grant the central bank a 
considerable independence in pursuing its tasks. Rogoff also argued that inflationary bias can 
be reduced by having a central bank, which focuses mainly on its price stability,44 rather than 
on concerns of the general public. In the same vein, Neumann in 1991,45 Lohmann in 1992,46 
                                                           
41 De Sousa, Pedro A. B., ‘Independent and Accountable Central Banks and the European Central Bank’ (2001) 5 
(9) European Integration online Papers (EIoP), 5 <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001-009a.htm> accessed 14 July 
2017. 
42 Barro and Gordon (n 40).  
43 See: Rogoff, K., ‘The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target’ (1985) 100(4) 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 1169. 
44 Price stability refers to the economic situation where the general price level does not change significantly over 
time, in a way that there is no significant degree of inflation or deflation involved. This is further explored in 
chapter two.  
45 Neumann, Manfred J.M., ‘Precommitment by Central Bank Independence’ (1991) 2 Open Economic Review 
95.  
46 Lohmann, S., ‘Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility’ (1992) 82 (1) American 
Economic Review 273. 
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and Walsh in 1995,47 suggested that an independent central bank has the capacity to 
contribute in decreasing inflation rates. These views formed the theoretical foundation of the 
time-inconsistency theory, which proved to be highly influential and gained widespread 
acceptance as the main explanatory approach to the notion of central bank independence 
and its importance; and to the view that inflation was caused by the state’s failure to convince 
the public about its ability to maintain low inflation.48 A study arguing against the reasoning 
of the time-inconsistency as the theoretical basis of independence, was developed by 
McCallum, who considered it misleading and significantly flawed “by inappropriate 
interpretive mappings between analytical constructs and real-world institution.”49  
However, empirical studies came to bear out the theoretical consensus on central 
bank independence as the optimal monetary policy model. Namely, in line with the 
theoretical debate, the empirical studies brought further evidence that there was an inverse 
correlation between central bank independence over monetary policy and inflation rates. This 
evidence was originally brought by the empirical study of Bade and Parkin in 1982,50 who 
found that the more independent a country’s central bank is, the lower the inflation rates are 
in the economy. From that point onwards, a Pandora’s Box was opened, with a number of 
empirical studies in the late 1980 and early 1990s reaffirming the negative effect of the 
political interference on central bank operations and inflation rates.51 This led to the 
                                                           
47 Walsh, Carl E., ‘Optimal contracts for central bankers’ (1995) 85 (1) American Economic Review 150. 
48 See for instance: 
- Blinder, Alan, Central Banking in Theory and Practice (MIT Press 1998); 
- Eijffinger, Sylvester and Schaling, Eric, ‘Central bank independence: Theory and Evidence’ (1993) Vol. 
1993-25 CentER Discussion Paper <https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/files/1149960/SCWEES5621912.pdf> 
(accessed on 14 July 2017);  
- Schaling, Eric, Institutions and monetary policy: Credibility, flexibility, and Central Bank Independence 
(Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 1995); and 
- Cukierman (n 33). 
49 See: McCallum, Bennett T., ‘Two fallacies concerning central-bank independence, (1995) 85 (2) American 
Economic Review 207, 207. 
50 Bade, R. and Parkin, M., ‘Central bank laws and monetary policy’ (1982) Unpublished Manuscript, University 
of Western Ontario. 
51 Major contributions are the following:  
- Alesina, Alberto, ‘Macroeconomics and Politics’ in Fischer, Stanley (ed), NBER Macroeconomics Annual 
1988 (vol. 3, MIT Press 1988), 13 <http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10951.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017; 
- Alesina, Alberto, Mirrlees, James, and Neumann, Manfred J. M., 'Politics and business cycles in 
industrial democracies' (1989) 4 (8) Economic Policy 55 
<http://homepage.ntu.edu.tw/~kslin/macro2009/Alesina%201989EP.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017. 
- Alesina, Alberto and Summers, Lawrence H., ‘Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic 
Performances: Some Comparative Evidence’ (1993) 25 (2) Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 151 
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predominance of inflation-targeting as complementary to central bank independence and as 
such, the second pillar of optimal monetary policy.  
In sum, the late 1980s and 1990s were dominated by a broad consensus about the 
benefits of having a central bank free of government’s influence or any other political 
intervention.52 This led to a global trend of enhancing central bank independence, which 
marked a fundamental institutional shift from previous practices. New Zealand and Chile were 
the first countries to establish independent central banks – in the modern form – in 1989. In 
the same year, the Delors Report proposed that the projected ESCB should be granted a high 
degree of independence,53 something that was highly reflected in the Maastricht Treaty, as 
will be analysed at the following section. Subsequently, by the mid-1990s the majority of 
industrialised as well as developed countries, adopted a legal framework for their central 
banks, designed to ensure a high level of independence and focused on keeping inflation 
low.54 However, the practical implementation of the independent central bank model, was 
                                                           
<http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~iversen/PDFfiles/AlesinaSummers1993.pdf> accessed 14 July 
2017; 
- Grilli,V., Masciandaro, D. and Tabellini G., ‘Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial 
Policies in the Industrial Countries’ (1991) 6 (13) Economic Policy 341 
<http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~iversen/PDFfiles/Grillietal1991.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017; 
- Cukierman, Alex, Webb, S.B. and Neyapti, B., ‘Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its 
Effect on Policy Outcomes’ (1992) 6 (3) World Bank Economic Review 353 
<https://www.cedeplar.ufmg.br/economia/disciplinas/ecn933a/crocco/Operacao_governanca_Banco
s_Centrais/CUKIERMANAWEBBNEYAPTIMeas.pdf> (accessed on 14 July 2017); 
- Cukierman, Alex, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility and Independence (MIT Press 1992) Chapter 20; 
- Cukierman, Alex, ‘The Economics of Central Banking’ in Wolf Holger (ed) Macroeconomic Policy and 
Financial Systems (The Macmillan Press 1996); 
- Cukierman, Alex, ‘Central bank independence and monetary policymaking institutions: Past, present 
and future’ (2008) 24 (4) European Journal of Political Economy 722; 
- Eijffinger and De Haan (n 16); 
- Eijffinger, S. C. W., Schaling, E., & Hoeberichts, M. M., ‘Central bank independence: A sensitivity 
analysis’ (1998) 14 (1) European Journal of Political Economy 73; 
- Walsh, Carl E., Monetary Theory and Policy (2nd edn, MIT Press 2003); and 
- Dincer, Nergiz, N. and Eichengreen, Barry, ‘Central Bank Transparency and Independence: Updates and 
New Measures’ (2014) 10 (1) International Journal of Central Banking 189. 
52 See: Dincer and Eichengreen (n 52). 
53  ‘Report on economic and monetary union’ (Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union 
chaired by Jacques Delors, 1989) (hereinafter: the Delors Report) 22 
<http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/pages/publication6161_en.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017.  
54 See: Bibow (n 31).  
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not an immediate process adopted by all the countries instantly, but a continuous process 
that entailed a number of factors.55  
The trend of central bank independence was taking place in parallel with significant 
changes in the international and European arena. The collapse of the Bretton Woods System56 
and later, the European Monetary System, brought an immense need to adopt new effective 
frameworks able to safeguard price stability in the long run.57 Furthermore, the highly 
independent Bundesbank in Germany,58 and the Swiss National Bank, and the relatively 
independent Fed, were considered to have been performing well due to their independent 
status.59 Notably, Germany scored first in the list of the countries with lower inflation rates 
after the post-WWII period. Lastly, it is important to note that the rise of the idea of central 
bank independent also links with a number of institutional and ideational changes of that era, 
which came as a result ‘globalisation’ and the predominance of a policy paradigm associated 
with the ‘Washington Consensus.’ 60 The latter was promoted by powerful inter-governmental 
agencies like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and involved a 
number of ‘sound policies’ which were considered to improve economic performance, 
including inter alia opening to trade, financial and commercial liberalisation, judicial reform, 
privatisation of state enterprises, tax reform, deregulation and reduction of entry barriers. 
Central bank independence, although was not explicitly included in this list, became a crucial 
part of it.61 
However, while there seemed to have been a consensus as to the positive effect of 
central bank independence in inflation performance, there were also those who questioned 
                                                           
55 Keefer, Philip, and Stasavage David, ‘When Does Delegation Improve Credibility? Central Bank Independence 
and the Separation of Powers’ (1998) Centre for the Study of African Economies Working Paper WPS/98/18 1 
<http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs/9818text.PDF> accessed 14 July 2017. 
56 The Bretton Woods is discussed in detail in chapter two.  
57 Ivanović, Valentina, ‘Financial Independence of Central Bank through the Balance Sheet Prism’ (2014) 2 Journal 
of Central Banking Theory and Practice 37, 39 <ftp://ftp.repec.org/opt/ReDIF/RePEc/cbk/journl/vol3no2-3.pdf> 
accessed 14 July 2017. 
58 For more details of German’s Deutsche Bundesbank see: Marsh, David, The Bundesbank: The Bank That Rules 
Europe (Heinemann 1993). 
59 Parkin, M., ‘Domestic Monetary Institutions and the Deficit’ in Buchanan, M., Rowley, C.X. and Tollison, R.D. 
(eds), Deficits (Basil Blaekwell 1987); and Alesina and Summers (n 52). 
60 Williamson, John, ‘What Washington Means by Policy Reform’ in Williamson, John (ed), Latin American 
Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? (Institute for International Economics 1990). 




the notion of central bank independence and advocated in favour of the negative correlation 
between central bank independence and inflation performance. For instance, Posen claimed 
that: “…the causal linkage between central bank independence and low inflation is illusory”, 
and thus, a higher degree of central bank independence may not necessarily decrease 
inflation rates.62 In addition, Bibow, argued that the overriding importance given to 
independence as a means to controlling inflation rates was: “largely a myth nourished by 
central bankers to attain and maintain their independence.”63 In the same vein, Canova 
believed that: “the Weimar hyperinflation had little to do with the structure of the central 
bank,” and what caused the financial distress it was rather to be seen as: “the country‘s 
inability to service its huge foreign debt rather than any purported political control of the 
central bank.”64  
In addition, there were arguments claiming that there was a negative correlation 
between low inflation and employment levels. To this end, it was believed that the goal of 
keeping inflation low and the levels of employment high, creates a trade-off between the two 
goals. To this end, it was argued that as long as the inflation rate target is achieved, 
governments tend to prioritise the increase of employment levels, usually, above the natural 
rate, by utilising the temporary trade-off between unemployment and inflation.65 This came 
with the realisation that there was no longer a trade-off between inflation and employment, 
as estimated by the Phillips curve,66 and thus, inflation was not considered to influence any 
long-term real outcomes. On the other hand, there were those who believed that this leads 
to a counterbalancing effect, since the people understand this behaviour and tend to forecast 
inflation, which in turn, neutralises inflation’s fluctuations influence on the level of 
employment.67  
                                                           
62 Posen, Adam, ‘Why Central Bank Independence does not Cause Low Inflation: There is no Institutional Fix for 
Politics’ in O'Brien R. (ed) Finance and the International Economy (Oxford University Press 1993) 41.  
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(1996) 48 (1) Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press 39. 
63 Bibow (n 31) 7. 
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Moreover, while there was clear evidence in regard to the negative relation between 
central bank independence and inflation rates, the relation between central bank 
independence and growth was subject to debate. Namely, while the study of Delong and 
Summers,68 found a positive relation between central bank independence and growth, Grilli 
et al argued about the opposite: “If central bank independence is on average associated with 
lower inflation, there is no systematic impact on real output growth, nor on its variability. 
Thus, having an independent central bank is almost like having a free lunch; there are benefits 
but no apparent costs in terms of macroeconomic performances”.69 Interestingly, although 
Alesina and Summers, agreed with the argument that central bank independence has a 
positive effect on price stability and inflation, they also claimed that there is not any 
significant evidence found, for justifying a fundamental impact on the real economic 
performance and growth.70 In addition,  Stiglitz, by bringing the example of the East Asian 
crisis in the late 1990s, argued that “the Washington consensus fail to provide the right 
framework for understanding either the success of the East Asian economies or their current 
troubles.”71 Namely, Stiglitz opined that although controlling inflation is important to 
macroeconomic stability, should not be considered as the sole component to achieving the 
latter. 72 Instead, he argued that the excessive focus on inflation may not help to achieving 
long-run economic growth; 73 and there were also other indicators of macro-instability, such 
as competition for instance, that should be considered as equally important.  
These counter arguments on the benefits of central bank independence, although 
emphasised the necessity of having central banks free of political influence, raised important 
questions as to the optimal model of independence, what the notion itself entailed and how 
to design a legal framework that would accommodate the highest degree of independence. 
Even the notion of independence itself was questioned by many, since most of the 
aforementioned studies that provided evidence regarding the correlation of central bank 
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independence and growth, employment and most importantly inflation, were criticised of 
focusing on particular ingredients or forms of central bank independence not being 
universally applied.74 The debate against the idea of central bank independence has re-
emerged again on the post-GFC era and will be further discussed on the last part of this 
section. Before this, it is essential to examine the various meanings of central bank 
independence, which have been defined from the aforementioned theoretical models. 
1.2.3 The various meanings of central bank independence  
The notion of central bank independence, was introduced by David Ricardo in 1824.75 
Although Ricardo did not use the term ‘independence,’ he highlighted the dangers that might 
occur when elected representatives are entrusted to issue paper money. Ricardo also argued 
against having central banks to directly financing their governments’ deficits. In Ricardo’s 
words: “It is said that Government could not be safely entrusted with the power of issuing 
paper money; that it would most certainly abuse it; and that, on any occasion when it was 
pressed for money to carry on a war, it would cease to pay coin, on demand, for its notes; and 
from that moment the currency would become a forced Government paper. There would, I 
confess, be great danger of this, if Government-that is to say, the Ministers-were themselves 
to be entrusted with the power of issuing paper money. But I propose to place this trust in the 
hands of Commissioners, not removable from their official situation but by a vote of one or 
both Houses of Parliament. I propose also to prevent all intercourse between these 
Commissioners and Ministers, by forbidding every species of money transaction between 
them. The Commissioners should never, on any pretence, lend money to Government, nor be 
in the slightest degree under its control or influence.”76 
For Friedman, who was one of the first to discuss the notion of central bank 
independence as we know it today, central bank independence concerns the relationship 
between the central bank and the government. He also compared central bank independence 
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with the relationship between the judiciary and the government. In Friedman’s words: “The 
device of an independent central bank embodies the very appealing idea that is essential to 
prevent monetary policy from being day-to-day plaything at the mercy of every whim of the 
current political authorities”, and: “...a central bank should be an independent branch of 
government coordinate with legislative, executive, and judicial branches, and with its actions 
subject to interpretation by the judiciary.”77  
Subsequently, the whole debate about the various meanings of central bank 
independence and what is more likely to influence more the level of inflation, focused on the 
difference between “political” and “economic” independence;78 which were transformed 
later into “goal” and “instrument” independence respectively.79 While the definitions used 
from different authors vary, “goal independence”80 is consider to entail an institutional 
framework that guarantees the freedom of a central bank to determine by its own means the 
final goals of monetary policy.81 This kind of independence involves the ability of central bank 
to decide about its own governors, the length of its mandate, whether or not government 
elected representatives will sit on the board of the bank, whether government authorisation 
is needed for monetary policy arrangements and whether price stability constitutes an 
exclusive responsibility of central bank.82 To this end, it was believed that when the central 
bank is given a number of goals (for instance: low and stable inflation along with employment 
level goals), it benefits from the high degree of goal independence, since it may prioritise the 
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tasks in accordance to their importance each time. To the contrary, when a central bank is 
assigned only the objective of maintaining the price stability, which is often either too broad 
or very specific, its discretionary autonomy is likely to be rather limited.83 
In general, “instrument independence” (which is also known as “functional 
independence” or “operational independence”), involves the ability of central bank to 
implement instruments or means in pursuit of the monetary policy goals, without political 
influence.84 This type of central bank independence is associated with issues such as funding 
the government’s needs in a direct or indirect way. If a central bank is financing the 
government’s debt directly by any means or it requires government approval to implement 
its instruments, it does not enjoy instrument independence. Put differently, instrument 
independence refers to monetary policymakers’ ability to regulate central bank’s budgets and 
the distribution of its profits. This is particularly important because negative results, like 
deficits, may result in troubling scenarios, such as putting into question central bank’s 
credibility to reach its goals, which in turn, increases central bank’s vulnerability to political 
pressure. 85  
However, Debelle and Fischer in 1994,86 and Fischer in 1995,87 advocated that 
instrument independence, i.e. the degree to which the central bank is free to choose its 
monetary policy instruments, is more important than goal independence in defining 
inflationary performance.88  In the same vein, Mishkin supported that having a central bank 
with a legislated mandate and goal dependence is a basic democratic principle, since: “the 
public must be able to exercise control over government actions strongly suggests that the 
goals of monetary policy should be set by the elected government” and as a result: “the 
institutional commitment to price stability should come from the government in the form of 
an explicit, legislated mandate for the central bank to pursue price stability as its overriding, 
long-run goal.”89 In any case, as it will be extensively discussed in the next sub-section, central 
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bank independence does not mean lack of accountability, to the contrary, a higher degree of 
independence must be accompanied by greater accountability and judicial control. 
As pointed out earlier, different authors have given various descriptions to the 
meanings and forms of central bank independence. Namely, Cukierman provided four criteria 
for determining central bank independence: a) the ability of central bank to appoint and 
dismiss all of its members, including the members of governing board; b) the freedom of 
central bank to determine and decide on the goals of its monetary policy mandate; c) price 
stability as the main goal of monetary policy and d) whether there are lending restrictions 
imposed to central bank’s operation.90 Later, Eijffinger and De Haan, incorporated two more 
dimensions into the notion of central bank independence: a) “personnel independence”, 
which relates to the meaning of “goal independence” as described earlier and involves the 
capacity of central bank to have the final authority for the appointment and dismissal of its 
members; and b) “financial independence”, which refers to central bank’s autonomy of any 
kind of credit relation with the state, either directly or indirectly.91 
Eijffinger and De Haan, doubted whether “personnel independence” could be 
achieved, while they also stressed that a central bank that holds the responsibility to provide 
financial assistance to the government through its own credit, lacks both “financial” and 
“instrument” independence.92 In this way, they emphasised that these two types of 
independence differ from each other, with the latter being broader, because it includes the 
power of central bank to define interest rates.93 Lastly, according to Amtenbrink, a central 
bank enjoys a high degree of instrument/operational independence when holds the right to 
appoint and dismiss its governing board members on grounds of serious professional 
misconduct, while dismissal for political reasons classify as restrictive to independence.94 
There is also the distinction between “de jure” and “de facto” independence.95 “De 
jure” or “legal” independence as opposed to “de facto” independence, is enshrined in and 
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determined by a legal framework that outlines the central bank’s functions and the extent of 
government’s authority over them. This kind of independence is protected by law and 
eliminates short-term political interferences on monetary policy decisions.96 Cukierman et al. 
with their study in 1992, provided the components that measure legal independence as 
following: “ the appointment, dismissal, and term of office of the chief executive officer of the 
bank-usually the governor; the policy formulation cluster, which concerns the resolution of 
conflicts between the executive branch and the central bank over monetary policy and the 
participation of the central bank in the budget process; the objectives of the central bank; and 
limitations on the ability of the central bank to lend to the public sector; such restrictions limit 
the volume, maturity, interest rates, and conditions.”97  
It is worth noting here, that the majority of studies which found a negative association 
between central bank independence and inflation, they all have in common the reliance on 
de jure indicators of central bank independence.98 However, the predicted by law standards 
of independence, may not indicate the real relationship between central banks and 
governments, which is even more blurry in states where rule of law is less strongly embedded 
in the political culture. In these cases, as Walsh illustrates it: “there can be wide gaps between 
the formal, legal institutional arrangements and their practical impact. This is particularly 
likely to be the case in many developing economies.”99  
The difference between the various forms of central bank independence, especially 
the two major forms: goal/political and instrument/operational independence, is important 
in order to understand which areas are covered by central bank’s autonomous discretion. 
However, this is not to say that one form exceeds in significance the rest. Although the 
arguments supporting this view were influential in drawing the line between the two major 
                                                           
- Cukierman, Alex, ‘The Economics of Central Banking’ (1996) CentER Discussion Paper 
<https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/files/524048/31.pdf> accessed on 14 July 2017; and 
- Cukierman, Alex, ‘Central Bank Independence and Monetary Policymaking Institutions: Past, Present, 
and Future’ (2006b) Central Bank of Chile Working Papers No 360 
<http://si2.bcentral.cl/public/pdf/documentos-trabajo/pdf/dtbc360.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017. 
96 Koshie, Grace, ‘Has the GFC dented central bank independence?’ (2013) 24 (2) Quarterly Journal of Central 
Banking 37. 
97 Cukierman et al (n 52) 356-357. 
98 For the studies that found a negative association between central bank independence and inflation see 
footnote 30.  
99 Walsh, Carl E., ‘Central bank independence’ (Prepared for the New Palgrave Dictionary December 2005) 5 
<https://people.ucsc.edu/~walshc/MyPapers/cbi_newpalgrave.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017. 
36 
 
forms of central bank independence (goal/political and instrument/operational),100 they did 
not gain widespread acceptance. In fact, the most important contributors on the idea of 
central bank independence,101 suggested that both forms of central bank independence were 
equally important and the difference between the two is insignificant in practice, since even 
when the legal framework is designed to prioritise “instrument independence”, it will also 
affect the levels of “goal independence.”102 It is also, supported that “de facto” independence 
is not determined solely by the “de jure independence.” In fact, there are various institutional 
and non-institutional arrangement that can influence actual central bank independence, such 
as the degree of central banks’ involvement in open market operations or in exchange rate 
management.103  
It is evident from the analysis above, that while central bank independence was 
growing in prominence from the late 1980s onwards, its evolving meaning and the various 
dimensions involved, made its evaluation more complicated. As already depicted in the 
previous subsections, even during this period of time there were a number of studies that had 
started to challenge the “Washington Consensus” orthodoxy, including central bank 
independence and inflation targeting policies. However, as a matter of fact a number of 
empirical studies during the 1990s and the subsequent growing number of countries that had 
reformed their regulatory framework in order to accommodate a higher degree of 
independence for their central banks, had offered enough evidence for the emergence of a 
broadly accepted consensus on the benefits of central bank independence. Thus, the 
consensus that had developed among policymakers, academics and analysts throughout the 
world, was that the objectives and targets of monetary policy, should be set by the 
governments. On the other hand, the de facto management of the monetary policy 
objectives, should be free from any kind of political interference in order to avoid inflation 
bias.104 However, this is not to say that there is a consensus about a perfect kind of central 
bank independence. A conclusion that could be drawn by the discussion above is rather the 
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opposite. There is strong evidence that there is no flawless kind of independence applicable 
to all countries, since a model of central bank independence that might be efficient for one 
country, may not work for another.105  
In addition, the growing prominence of central bank independence along with the 
advent of inflation targeting began to raise awareness of the importance of transparency and 
accountability for credibility. Hence, the following subsection aims at defining the notions of 
credibility, accountability and transparency, while exploring the nexus between them and 
central bank independence.   
1.2.4 The interaction between independence, credibility, transparency and accountability 
A conclusion that can be drawn by the discussion on the evolution of central bank 
independence is that - regardless of its various dimensions - it was considered to be a 
fundamental component in the pursuit of the price stability, which eventually became the 
ultimate goal of central banks’ monetary policy. However, as the trend in favour of central 
bank independence was growing, there was also an increasing awareness of the legal and 
institutional mechanisms that could enhance central bank’s performance by also preventing 
governments infringing on its independence. To this end, as was mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, central bank independence, although necessary, was not to be seen as a single 
element able to boost central bank performance on its own. Instead, central bank 
independence, was considered in conjunction with other components such as increased 
transparency and accountability for credibility. These central bank components are briefly 
discussed below, mainly in relation to central bank independence. 
a) Credibility  
Central bank credibility is a peculiar notion, which may sound straightforward at first, 
although, it is hard to define. Blinder, while highlighting that there was no generally accepted 
definition for credibility, opined that a central bank is credible if people believe it will do what 
it says.106 This practically implies that credibility reflects the ability of central bank to keep its 
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commitment in fulfilling its monetary policy mandate. However, while the modern form of 
credibility is critically linked with communication and commitment, its roots are tied up with 
the history of policy regimes and with the very idea of central banking. In fact, sound central 
bank policy, regardless of the particular objective of each monetary policy regime, is reflected 
and to a large extent, interlinked with central bank’s credibility and commitment to pursue 
its objectives. Thus, it is hardly surprising why credibility has been always considered a pivotal 
component of central bank operations, since a credible monetary authority can greatly 
enhance the virtues of sound policy.  
Although the notion of credibility is older than central bank independence, the issue 
of whether there is a link between them, as Siklos put it: “is a recurrent one throughout the 
twentieth century.”107 In the era of inflation targeting and central bank independence, the 
rationale of credibility, was developed out of neoclassical theories of monetary policy, which 
are largely based on the theory of rational expectations, as was originally developed by Robert 
Lucas (1972, 1973, and 1976) and will be further analysed in chapter two.108 To this end, the 
advocates of rational expectations theory highlight the importance of credibility109 in 
maintaining stable and low inflation, which also finds support in the time-inconsistency 
literature.110  
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The idea behind this, as discussed already, is that when the central bank is viewed to 
be both committed to and effective at keeping inflation controlled, inflation expectations 
tend to be anchored. Conversely, when a central bank is viewed as non-credible in pursuing 
its monetary policy goals, people and the market would be prepared for higher inflation, 
which will eventually result in firms increasing prices and workers demanding wage increases. 
This in turn will affect employment levels and output growth.111 As discussed earlier, 
according to the time-inconsistency theory, this usually happens when monetary 
policymakers neglect the medium-term goal of price stability, and focus instead on short-term 
objectives, usually before elections. This was considered to affect negatively the efficiency 
and credibility of monetary stability, resulting in adverse consequences for the financial 
system.112 The rationale of this reasoning was that the public would soon recognise the risk 
that monetary policymakers are willing to take in pursuing temporary strategies, which is 
often incompatible with the long-term economic growth goals. Consequently, as was 
mentioned in the previous section, central bank independent became not only a necessary 
perquisite for successful monetary policy, but also the standard remedy to the time-
inconsistency problem and the ultimate means to enhance central bank’s credibility.  
In terms of what the term entails, Cukierman defines credibility as the “extent to which 
the public believes that a shift in policy has taken place when, indeed, such a shift has actually 
occurred.”113 Along similar lines, Cukierman and Meltzer defined the notion of credibility as 
“the absolute value of the difference between the policymaker’s plan and the public’s beliefs 
                                                           
- Mishkin, Frederik S., ‘Will Monetary Policy Become More of a Science?’ (NBER Working Paper No 13566, 
October 2007) <http://www.nber.org/papers/w13566.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017); and  
- Walsh, Carl E., ‘The Contribution of Theory to Practice in Monetary Policy: Recent Developments’ in 
European Central Bank, ‘A Journey from Theory to Practice’ (An ECB colloquium held in honour of Otmar 
Issing 16-17 March 2006, Frankfurt, 2007), 142 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/monetarypolicyjourneytheorypractice2007en.pdf?955e
0a69a7c01a3265ab8b19deb448f2> accessed 14 July 2017. 
111 Mishkin, Frederic S., ‘Monetary Policy Strategy: How Did We Get Here?’ (2006a) 53 (4) Panoeconomicus, 
Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia 359 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w12515.pdf> accessed 14 July 
2017. 
112 Amtenbrink, Fabian and Van Duin K., ‘The European Central Bank before the European Parliament: theory 
and practice after ten years of monetary dialogue’ (2009) 34 European Law Review 561. 
113 Cukierman, Alex, ‘Central Bank Behavior and Credibility: Some Recent Theoretical Developments’ (1986) 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 6 
<https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/86/05/Central_May1986.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017. 
40 
 
about those plans.”114 Later, Blinder opined that credibility means “believability and trust”.115 
Lastly, for Bordo and Siklos: “a central bank is deemed credible when it delivers, subject to a 
random error, the implied inflation rate objective conditional on the monetary regime in 
place.”116 Credibility was also one of the main goals of inflation targeting regimes, and it was 
considered that central banks’ credibility has been improved from the widespread adoption 
of inflation targeting monetary policy frameworks.117 Indeed, there is evidence that inflation 
targeting regimes perform better than non-inflation-targeting frameworks in improving the 
credibility of central banks.118 It is worth noting here, that while the importance of credibility 
is well established, its specific role is difficult to measure.119  
b) Accountability and transparency  
As already mentioned, independence does not empower the central bank with an 
indefinite decisive power, but it is rather to be seen as an effective means to achieve 
monetary policy objectives. To this end, there are certain limitation to central bank 
independence, which are usually linked with the notion of accountability and transparency. 
As Siklos put it: “with the battle over autonomy seemingly won, there remained the problem 
that with independence comes with responsibility.”120 In fact, although accountability and 
transparency are considered the reverse side of central bank independence,121 the latter 
would have been counterproductive without adequate accountability and transparency. 
Amtenbrink stressed that independence, transparency and accountability should not be seen 
in isolation from each other, since they constitute the three pillars of central banking 
                                                           
114 Cukierman, Alex and Meltzer, Alan H., ‘A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and 
Asymmetric Information’ (1986) 54 (5) Econometrica 1099, 1108 < 
http://repository.cmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1841&context=tepper > accessed 14 July 2017. 
115 Blinder, Alan S., ‘Central Bank Independence and Credibility During and After a Crisis’ (Federal Reserve Bank 
of Kansas City Economic Policy Symposium, The Changing Policy Landscape, in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 1 
September 2012) 4 <https://www.princeton.edu/ceps/workingpapers/229blinder.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017. 
116 Bordo and Siklos (n 108) 6. 
117 See: Bordo and Siklos (n 108). 
118 Walsh, Carl E., ‘Inflation Targeting: What Have We Learned?’ (2009) 12 (2) International Finance 195 
<https://people.ucsc.edu/~walshc/MyPapers/INFI_1236.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017. 
119 Blinder (n 116) 1. 
120 Siklos, Pierre L., ‘Central Bank Transparency: Another Look’ (2011) Applied Economics Letters 18 (10) 929, 
929. 
121 Brunner, Karl, The art of central banking (Government Policy and Business Working Paper GPB 81-6 University 
of Rochester Center for Research 1981). 
41 
 
governance.122 The rationale of this belief is based on the democratic legitimacy of central 
bank independence itself, which deprives its existence from the notion of accountability. As 
Briault et al. argued: “greater accountability has run hand-in-hand with moves towards 
greater central bank independence: greater accountability is the government's quid pro quo 
for granting greater central bank autonomy.”123  
This also links with the relevant debate on the democratic legitimacy of non-
majoritarian institutions, which flourished in light of the increasing number and importance 
of independent unelected bodies empowered to regulate markets.124 In essence, the idea that 
a considerable level of accountability should accompany the operation of independent central 
banks, was grounded on the potentially anti-democratic implications of delegating 
responsibility to unelected technocrat. Indeed, it is widely accepted that only elected 
representatives should be hold decision making powers concerning government income and 
spending. It follows that when ‘independent’ unelected technocrats are empowered with 
decision making powers in regard to monetary policy objectives, questions of legitimacy will 
arise. Majone refers to a system of a ‘non-majoritarian model pf democracy,’ in which 
governmental institutions are not directly accountable to citizens and democratic legitimacy 
is achieved through the quality of the decisions made – based on technical expertise.125  Thus, 
it was argued that in order to legitimise the role of a central bank within a given constitutional 
system, a substantial degree of accountability is required to insure against a “democratic 
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deficit.”126 Simply said, the main role of accountability is to ensure appropriate democratic 
control and good governance of the delegation of monetary policy powers to unelected 
central bank officials and hence, central banks will be held strictly accountable for their 
actions. Indeed, the case for central bank democratic accountability is based on the 
assumption that independent central banks operate within a democratic system featuring a 
basic division of powers and a system of checks and balances. In a representative democracy, 
this matter because without accountability there can be no legitimacy, and without the latter 
the democratic legitimacy of an independent central banks itself will be put in question.  
When it comes to defining the notion of accountability, although the latter has gained 
wide attention during the last ten years,127 there is no a generally accepted definition as to 
the limits and the content of the term.128 According to Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa: 
“Accountability means that institutions with the power to affect the lives of people are subject 
the scrutiny by the elected representatives of the people. As such it is an essential and 
constituent element of our political order, and indeed this scrutiny is necessary also in those 
fields- such as central banking-where policy decisions ate consciously removed from the day-
to-day influence of the political arena.”129 An assessment of what central bank accountability 
entails, could be done by answering questions such as: for what is the central bank 
accountable for and by whom, and how the accountability is measured? It comes without 
saying that the central bank must be, first and foremost, accountable to the general public 
for its actions. Secondly, the central bank must be also accountable to the state from which it 
derives its statutory authority.130  
In general terms, the notion of accountability could be defined as an evaluation of 
central bank performance, including the achievement of its main goals. In practice, this 
evaluation practice is made by the government, through a parliamentary committee (banking 
committee or a specialised group of parliamentary members), ministers of finance, 
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supervisory board committees or sometimes central banks are obliged to report to the 
legislature. For instance, the ECB reports to Committees of the EU Parliament and Fed reports 
to the Congress' banking committees, while the central banks of Poland, Hungary and Czech 
Republic report to the legislature. 
The means to evaluate the achievement of accountability may vary in accordance with 
the central bank’s objectives. This evaluation, however, might prove difficult to conduct, 
because linking specific - out of many - central bank operations to intended outcomes and 
then evaluating their performance as to how they influence the accomplishment of central 
bank’s goal, is far from being straightforward. A notable difference is between assessing the 
accountability with respect to the price stability objective, which is usually easy measure, and 
evaluating accountability with respect to the financial stability task, which is not easily 
defined. In fact it takes a high level of expertise for such an evaluation; a hierarchical order of 
tasks and objective, which should also be explicitly defined; and a clear delegation structure, 
which specifies the level of involvement and authority of the central bank in decision-
making.131 As it is defined by the IMF Good Transparency Practices: “the broad modalities of 
accountability for the conduct of monetary policy and for any other responsibilities assigned 
to the central bank should be specified in legislation.”132  
Inevitably, in the era of central bank independence, increased accountability raises 
the demand for greater transparency. In turn, transparency (especially with regard to 
monetary policy) facilitates accountability, and as a result increases the effectiveness policy 
decisions and, in many cases, public welfare. However, historically, central bank reputation 
was linked to secrecy,133 while central bank accountability was not necessarily linked to the 
transparent communication of monetary policy objectives.134 In fact, prior to the 1990s, 
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conventional wisdom held that central bankers should not disclose much information 
regarding monetary policy tactics.135 This scenario changed in the era of central bank 
independence, during which the decisive power of central bank’s in choosing its tactics was 
progressively enhanced. In fact, it was the widespread prominence of central bank 
independence along with the adoption of explicit inflation targeting,136 which brought the 
need for mechanisms that will enable the general public to evaluate whether the central bank 
is consistent in accomplishing its policy mandate.137  
A central bank, regardless of being free from political influence, remains a public 
institution and a public authority that should operate under the scope of its mandate and be 
committed to accomplish its principal goals within the context of its obligation for the public 
good.138 This practically means that the central bank has a duty to explain its activities and 
tactics. To this end, both clearer definitions of accountability and greater communication with 
the public, as the means to convincing the latter that the central bank’s operations are 
consistent with a long-term commitment to price stability, became an increasingly important 
aspect of sound operation.139  As a result, from the 1990s onwards (which was the beginning 
of the era of central bank independence), a marked tendency towards a more transparent 
conduct of monetary policy also developed. It started with the Bank of England, which 
pioneered the communication of its monetary policy objectives through the Inflation Report 
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in February 1993,140 and was followed by the central banks of New Zealand, Norway, and 
Sweden.141 Other countries adopted similar practices and transparency grew in prominence, 
becoming the new orthodoxy in central banking. Nonetheless, similar to accountability, a 
definition of transparency, is also difficult to pin down precisely. Lastra defines central bank 
transparency as the degree to which information on policy tactics are available to the 
public.142 
As already emphasised, communication constitutes the key ingredient of transparency 
and as such there has been an attempt to distinguish between the various types of 
communication and their respective importance. Namely, Wadford distinguish four types of 
central bank communication: a) central bank’s interpretation of economic conditions, 
including central bank’s view of the outlook for the future, to the extent that this is shaped 
by factors other than the bank’s intentions with regard to policy; b) the content of the policy 
decisions that are made by the central bank about current operating targets; c) a description 
of the strategy that guides the central bank’s policy decisions in general; and d) statements 
about the outlook for future policy.143  Later, Crowe and Meade in their study in 2008, 
included more dimensions of central bank transparency, such as: a) economic transparency 
(communication on economic data); b) political transparency (communication on policy 
objectives); c) procedural transparency (communication on the decision-making process, 
including the voting procedure); d) policy transparency (communication on the policy decision 
outcome); and e) operational transparency (communication on the actual implementation of 
policy).144 
The rationale for central bank transparency is based on the belief that it reduces 
uncertainty, and thus shaping market actors’ expectations and ensuring the public support 
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for monetary policy goals.145 Simply said, when a central bank communicates openly its policy 
decisions, creates a smooth and predictable business environment, where the market, 
investors and the general public, are knowledgeable in regard to the outcome of policy 
decisions and how this outcome will affect them. For instance, Kuttner’s study found the Fed’s 
policy of announcing a rationale for monetary actions decreased market volatility and 
maximised predictability.146 This is of fundamental importance, especially in times of financial 
distress, when radical reforms are more likely to be adopted. It follows that when the market 
and people become informed in advance in regard to central bank strategies, the possibility 
of efficient monetary policy increases, especially in terms of longer-run interest rates.147 As 
Issing - who was Member of the Executive Board of ECB at the time - highlighted: “when the 
markets correctly anticipate that a new piece of information will lead to a change in official 
interest rates they will do much of the work themselves through a change in the term 
structure.”148  
Lastly, transparency is also seen as a tool to foster not only accountability but also the 
credibility of monetary policy mandate and central banks’ consistency to commit to inflation 
targets.149 In addition, the increasing trend towards central bank independence in the vast 
majority of industrialised states, has also strengthened their authority to choose their tools 
and strategies. It is also, suggested that central bank independence increases the willingness 
of a central bank to communicate its objectives and future plan - hence, central bank 
transparency - due to the central bank’s increased authority and discretionary power over the 
decision making process.150 To this end, central bank transparency became a key tool in 
allowing the public to evaluate whether the commitment of a central bank in pursing the 
stated policy mandate is adequately achieved. This links with idea that openness in regard to 
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the specific details of how central bank’s policy strategy is conducted, is considered to 
facilitate stable inflation rates, which in turn, increases trust as well as central bank 
credibility.151 As Issing emphasised: “In a democratic society, a high degree of transparency 
and accountability in monetary policy making reinforces the legitimacy of the central bank 
and consolidates the public support for its price stability mandate. Moreover, transparency 
imposes discipline on policy makers and is a means to ensure a general understanding of the 
monetary policy strategy. In turn, this may add to the credibility, and thereby the 13 
effectiveness, of monetary policy, hence facilitating the central bank’s effort to attain its 
statutory objectives.”152 Therefore, greater transparency, is likely to decrease uncertainly in 
the market; which in turn, would foster policymakers’ role in affecting positively economic 
growth and stable interest rates.153 
However, there were also those who argued against excessive transparency and 
discretionary monetary policy. For instance, Clare and Cortenay, having considered the 
impact of announcing the minutes of monetary board meetings and the quarterly Inflation 
Report of Bank of England, concluded that the disclosure of such information led to asset-
price volatility.154 They also added that: “any improvement in the transparency of monetary 
policy might bring about a change in the way that both interest rate decisions and other 
macroeconomic announcements are incorporated into securities prices. And it is possible that 
changes in the reactions to these two types of announcements may be in opposite 
directions.”155 In the same vein, Goodhart156 and Mishkin157 argued that increased 
transparency, especially transparency in respect with policy rates, may complicate the 
communication with the public, challenge the committee’s decision-making process and 
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weaken the support towards central bank in achieving their long-run objectives. As Mishkin 
highlighted: “central bank transparency must always be thought of as a means to an end. 
Transparency is beneficial when it serves to simplify communication with the public and helps 
generate support for central banks to conduct monetary policy optimally with an appropriate 
focus on long-run objectives.”158 In summary, although transparency has clearly evolved 
progressively towards a greater degree of “openness,” the relevant literature has not reached 
consensus on an optimal level of transparency,159 and the issue of whether transparency is 
always beneficial, remains elusive and subject to ongoing debate.160  
All in all, pre-GFC central banking was dominated by a strong tendency towards a 
higher degree of central bank independence, as the ultimate means to achieving the 
monetary policy objectives and tasks. Moreover, central bank independence brought the 
need for enhanced accountability and transparency, which apart from helping to align central 
banks with democratic principles, are also major contributors to conducting monetary policy 
successfully. The rationale for greater transparency, as mentioned earlier, is that it ensures 
the communication and clarity of monetary policy decisions with the public and thus, reduces 
uncertainty and promotes a better understanding of monetary policy decisions; while the 
benefit of enhanced accountability is the promotion of a stronger discipline on policymakers. 
Most importantly, accountability was considered as an important component of the 
effectiveness of monetary policy and as a necessary counterpart to central bank 
independence.161 In simple terms, part of the consensus that led to the prominence of central 
bank independence, was that the latter was considered be counterproductive without 
adequate accountability and transparency, since independence requires accountability and 
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accountability entails transparency, and all together were to be complemented by a credible 
operation.  
Therefore, although distinct from one another, the notions of independence, 
accountability and transparency are highly intertwined in promoting better monetary policy 
and as such, tend to interrelate and even overlap. As Bordo and Siklos argued: “autonomy, 
transparency, accountability, and the monetary policy strategy in place each can influence 
both the credibility and reputation of the monetary authority.”162 The difficulty arises when 
the three notions, i.e. accountability, credibility and transparency, are combined within the 
same authority that operates both as the monetary policy and supervision authority. For 
instance, when it comes to disclosing information in respect with financial supervision and 
regulation matters, there might be commercial confidential data and information involved in 
relation to specific financial institutions, which in case of a liquidity problem might cause 
market disturbances and reputational issues. Thus, there is a major difference between 
transparency in monetary policy matters, and transparency in financial supervision 
operations, especially when the two functions are operated by the same institution. In any 
case, although central banks should have some space of discretion (with prejudice to the 
particular kinds of transparency each time) in terms of deciding what information should be 
released or non-released, with the latter being preferably the exception rather than the rule, 
there might be circumstances that an excessive disclosure of information, especially in times 
of financial disturbance, may increase the risk of provoking adverse market reactions. 
This brings us to the main point of investigation of this thesis (the compatibility of 
monetary policy and supervisory functions within the same institution) and links to issues of 
contemporary debate as developed in the post-GFC era. Therefore, the next section of the 
thesis provides an initial analysis of the challenges brought to the theoretical foundation of 
what it was considered as conventional wisdom and the legitimacy of existing notions that 
are pivotal for the smooth operation of major central banks. This is far from being a purely 
theoretical topic, since the combination of various tasks under the existing regulatory 
frameworks, has brought the need for the creation of new mechanisms that would insure 
against negative synergies and conflict of interest between new and existing institutional 
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arrangements. It might be that we have entered a new era in central banking, which require 
cooperation between “conventional” and “new,” or it might be that this cooperation is not 
feasible and that the “new” has come to dominate over the “conventional.” In a nutshell, 
“conventional” stands for inflation-targeting independent central banks and “new” stands for 
a banking supervision focused central bank with the financial stability objective overriding in 
importance the traditional goal of price stability.  
1.2.5 Central bank independence in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis: an initial 
analysis 
In a nutshell, prior to the GFC, a consensus had emerged as to the optimal central 
banking model. This consensus involved regulatory frameworks that were mainly concerned 
with monetary policy; while, flexible inflation targeting and the objective of price stability 
were seen as the most appropriate monetary policy framework.163 Also, from the early 1990s 
onwards, the most crucial component of central bank governance was considered to be the 
degree of independence under which the central bank operates, which was seen as crucial in 
achieving price stability and limiting the inflation bias.164 The idea behind this, was the belief 
that the more independence is granted to a central bank, the greater the chances are to 
conduct effectively its operation in pursuing its goals and objectives. Thus, by the early 2000s 
many central banks had underwent fundamental changes to their governance in order to 
accommodate a high degree of independence, and the conduct of monetary policy seemed 
to had reached what was perceived as its optimal level.165 With regards to banking 
supervision, in the majority of developed countries that were following a price-stability-
focused monetary policy, their central bank’s role in banking supervision was either a shared 
responsibility between the central bank and a distinct body or supervision was assigned to a 
completely separate institution.  
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However, we also highlighted that what was considered to be “a consensus” was also 
highly criticised. Certainly, the topic of central bank independence has regained a vast amount 
of attention, especially in the aftermath of the GFC, and until today, remains high on the 
agenda of relevant ongoing debates. This is to be attributed mainly to the fact that during and 
in the aftermath of the GFC, central banks’ operations have expanded, and their mandate has 
incorporated tasks beyond the traditional monetary policy objectives.166 Moreover, policy 
reforms in the majority of jurisdictions concerning the role of central banks in supervision, 
monetary policy and the degree of their independence,167 have brought historic changes, 
which are comparable to the policy changes that followed Great Depression.168  
Namely, in the wake of the GFC, there has been an increasing amount of government 
intervention in economic policy, often, via the central bank. This is particularly prominent in 
bank bailouts, in an attempt to assist failing financial institutions and to stabilise the financial 
system.169 As a result, central bank involvement, either directly or indirectly in the bailout 
process, blurred the distinction between monetary and fiscal policy.170 This has radically 
challenged the banks’ role, by also challenging the principle of inflation targeting, the limits 
of monetary policy and the extent of their independence.171 Most importantly, this was 
reflected in numerous regulatory reforms around the world, which came to reshape the role 
of central banks, especially, in banking supervision, by challenging the balance between 
existing and new central banks’ tasks.172 This links with one of the main aims of this thesis, 
which tries to shed light on how the new banking supervisory and regulatory framework at 
EU level has influenced the balance between existing and new ECB responsibilities, and 
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whether the resulted complex structure adequately complies with the existing Treaty 
provisions. To this end, central bank independence has been one of the most discussed issues 
in the debate of changing roles and dynamics of central banks’ institutional arrangements at 
both EU and international level.  
The independence of the Bank of England is a recent example of controversy. Jeremy 
Corbyn, the leader of the Labour Party (the Opposition in the House of Commons), proposed 
in 2015 the so-called People's Quantitative Easing (PQE) policy, which required the Bank of 
England (BoE) to print money in order to finance government investment.173 This was to be 
done by purchasing bonds issued by the state-owned National Investment Bank.174 Then this 
National Investment Bank, would use the money to fund public infrastructure projects, 
including housing and public transport. This apart from being a highly politically controversial 
issue, raised questions as to the possible threat that the proposed policies might pose to the 
independent status of the BoE.  
Moreover, in the US, the Senate recently rejected the controversial “Audit the Fed” 
legislation, 175 proposed by Republican Senator Rand Paul’s, who called for tougher audits of 
the Fed. The legislation aimed at eliminating restrictions in the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) audits of the Fed and mandated that the Fed's credit facilities, 
securities purchases, and quantitative easing activities to be subject to congressional 
oversight. In Paul’s words: “nowhere else but in Washington, D.C., would you find an 
institution with so much unchecked power.”176 The Obama White House called Paul’s proposal 
“dangerous” and as Jason Furman, Chairman of President Obama’s Council of Economic 
Advisers, highlighted: “Congress shouldn’t be telling the Fed what to do with monetary 
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policy.”177 Also, this raised many questions regarding the independent status of Fed, with Ben 
Bernake stressing that this would result in a direct involvement of the government in 
monetary policy decisions, calling into question the Fed’s independence.178 Lastly, although 
“Audit the Fed” legislation was rejected in early 2016, Donald Trump expressed support for 
auditing the Fed, which might result in reviving this topic in the future.179 It should be noted 
that in the post-GFC literature, there were also those who supported that the scope of Fed’s 
independence cannot be viewed as far-reaching. For instance, Wray argues that although the 
Fed should be insulated from day-to-day political pressures, since it is a “creature of 
Congress,” created by public law, it is inevitably subject to the will of Congress.180 Wray also 
opines that Fed cannot be truly independent from the Treasury either, “because the Fed is 
the federal government’s bank, with almost all payments made by and to the government 
running through the Fed. As such, there is no “operational independence” that would allow 
the Fed to refuse to allow the Treasury to spend appropriated funds. ”181 
As mentioned earlier, another topic that formed part of the same debate, is a central 
bank’s involvement in banking supervision. This has raised numerous concerns as to whether 
the functions of monetary policy and supervision can be exercised in tandem, while 
maintaining the existing degree of independence. This is particularly problematic in terms of 
instrument/operational independence, which, when referring to monetary policy, implies a 
central bank’s ability to decide independently when adjusting its short-term interest rates to 
achieve its inflation goal; while, when referring to banking supervision, involves decisions such 
as putting financial institutions under statutory management.182 In short, when monetary 
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policy and supervision are conducted by the same authority, i.e. the central bank, they may 
lead to more elastic monetary policy strategies, in an attempt to prevent a banking crisis. This 
brings us to the key theme of this thesis, which focused on the synergies involved when a 
central bank engages in supervision activities, while trying to maintain the same institutional 
structure, i.e. maintaining independence and staying focused on price stability.  
The most representative example of a post-crisis regulatory reform that aimed at 
marrying banking supervision and monetary policy is the creation of the European Banking 
Union and the delegation of supervisory powers to ECB, which inter alia raised serious 
questions in relation to ECB’s independence. However, in order to evaluate the changing role 
of the ECB - including its independence - within the new regulatory regime, it is important to 
examine both the pre- and post-GFC regulatory framework with regards banking regulation 
and supervision at EU level, and the roadmap towards the creation of Banking Union. This 
discussion is developed in chapters three and four of this thesis. Prior to this, it is necessary 
to place the EU integration process in historical perspective, from the initial negotiations and 
the adoption of the first Treaty, to the establishment of the ESCB. Hence, the following section 
briefly presents the first steps towards European Cooperation to the adoptions of the 
Maastricht Treaty. The aim of this discussion is to provide an overview of the basis of the 
ESCB’s legal framework and to explain the rationale of ECB’s objectives, independence, and 
overall role within the EU regulatory framework. This, in turn, will set the ground to our main 
discussion in relation the latest reforms concerning the ESCB structure and the ECB’s new 
supervisory tasks, which is conducted in the fourth chapter of this thesis.  
1.3 The roadmap towards European Integration 
1.3.1 From the Second Wold War to the EMS 
The history of European integration essentially begins in 1945, when European 
economies started their recovery from the losses of WWII. The recovery process resulted in a 
shift towards cooperation over conflict and the desire for economic and political union grew 
stronger in Western Europe.183 It was on 19 September 1946 when Winston Churchill, 
delivered his infamous speech at the University of Zurich about his vision of a ‘United States 
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of Europe,’ calling European countries to form a regional organisation in order to promote 
lasting peace.184 In the same vein, Robert Schuman, who served as the French Foreign 
Minister at the time, gave  a speech on 9 May 1950 in the Salon de l’Horloge of the Quai 
d’Orsay in Paris,185 in which he presented a plan for deeper cooperation that would set up a 
common Franco-German structure for the production of coal and steel under one common 
High Authority.186 Schuman’s speech (or declaration as it is widely known), which was highly 
inspired and for the most part drafted by Jean Monnet, proved to be highly inspirational, to 
the degree that was considered as the founding act of European integration. Henceforth, 9 
May is celebrated as ‘Europe Day.’ It should be noted that the idea of united Europe was not, 
however, new. After the WWI, Aristide Briands, who was the French Foreign Minister and 
President of the Pan-European Union (the latter was founded by the Austrian Count 
Coudenhove Kalergi founded in 1923), organised and gathered together political figures from 
various European countries in the first Pan-European Congress in 1926 in Vienna, calling for a 
federal European Union. These efforts, however, were not successful. 
Schuman’s declaration, opened negotiations and led to the signature of the Paris 
Treaty in 18 April 1951,187 which launched the first step towards a supranational Europe, i.e. 
the European Community of Steel and Coal (ECSC). In the meantime, there was another 
Monnet-Schuman European integration attempt – called the European Defence Community 
(EDC) – involving the creation of a European army, which, however, never came about due to 
failure in reaching an agreement (mainly because the French National Assembly rejected it in 
1954).188 It is important to clarify here that the author is not referring to an actual 
supranationalism, as we mean it today. At that stage, the ‘supranational’ integration had 
rather the meaning of an inter-governmental cooperation and reciprocal assistance. 
However, it is widely considered to be the first step toward a supranational Europe because 
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firstly, it was the first time that European States (six at that stage) agreed to work towards 
integration, and secondly, because, its High Authority had a decision making power with 
binding effect for its Member States. 
The ECSC had legal personality and was administered by a High Authority, which was 
presided by Jean Monnet, a Parliamentary Assembly, a Council of Ministers, a Court of Justice 
and a Consultative Committee.189 The founding members of the ECSC were France, Germany, 
Italy, Luxemburg, Belgium and the Netherlands, and the main goal was the creation of a unity 
that would ensure long lasting peace, security, financial soundness and stability among the 
European countries in the aftermath of WWII. However, the founding fathers of this initiative 
had a forward-looking vision that was beyond the creation of a European setting that would 
merely facilitate cooperation in coal and steel production. This vision involved the creation of 
a true ‘European Federation.’ In Schuman’s words: “The pooling of coal and steel production 
should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic 
development as a first step in the federation of Europe and to open up the longer-term 
prospect of constructing a federal Europe.”190 Moreover, this is evident by the Shuman-
Monnet proposals for the creation of common institutions, as means to facilitate common 
proposals, negotiations and decisions in the best interest of the unity as whole, which 
survived throughout the years and are still in force within the existing EU framework.191  
The creation of the ECSC paved the road to the Treaties of Rome, which were signed 
on 25 March 1957, and entered into force on 1 January 1958. The Treaties of Rome 
established two more Committees: the European Economic Community (EEC)192 or the 
“common market”, where people, goods and services would move freely among Member 
States; and the European Atomic Energy Community (widely known as the EURATOM).193 The 
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major difference between the ECSC and the two latter, was that the EEC and EURATOM were 
concluded with no expiration date,194 which conferred quasi-constitutional status on them. In 
the meantime, the other European countries, including: Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, were reluctant in joining the European 
Communities and preferred instead to create a separate alliance by establishing the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA),195 which was more of a free trade area union rather than a 
customs union. Subsequently, the Community of Six, due to its growing economic 
attractiveness, expanded throughout the years by attracting an increasing number of 
states.196 For instance, at a later stage, all the EFTA Member States, applied for an EU 
Membership. Another significant event that was considered to be the political engine of 
European integration, is the Franco-German Friendship, which was affirmed in January 1963 
with the Joint Declaration of Dr Konrad Adenauer, who served as Chancellor of the Federal 
Republic of Germany at the time, and the President of the French Republic, Charles de 
Gaulle.197 
At the time, the idea of a monetary integration, was not yet part of the European 
integration process. This happened largely due to the fact that European integration was still 
at an early stage; and also, because, the Community of the Six, following the international 
trend, was part of a well-organised global fixed exchange-rate monetary system, i.e. the so-
called Bretton Woods System.198 Accordingly, the authors of the Treaties of Rome did not 
include the idea of a single currency between the Member States, while the objectives of EEC 
were developed only to the extent of a customs union and a common agricultural market.199 
It was only in October 1962, when the EU Commission issued a Memorandum (known as the 
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Marjolin Memorandum), in which it was stressed that a Single Market requires a single 
currency and highlighted the link between economic and monetary integration.200 This led to 
a series of serious discussion on European monetary integration, which in turn, triggered an 
intense debate about the creation single currency and further monetary integration at the 
Community level.201 Despite the fact that there was no action taken under the scope of the 
memorandum, the establishment of the Committee of Governors of the central banks of the 
Member States of the EEC in 1964, proved to be of great importance in fostering the monetary 
cooperation among the Community central banks and in the final move towards the EMU. In 
addition, the Committee was responsible for the preparatory process of the first draft Statute 
of ECB in 1990.202 
By the late 1960s, European integration was showing signs of effectiveness and 
positive progress, including: the prompt completion of the transition period towards the 
establishment of a true customs union; the adoption of a common agricultural policy; and the 
foundation of a system of own resources.203 However, although Europe’s junior integration 
steps were marked by successful achievements, at international level, the Bretton Woods 
system was approaching its collapse. Thus, the last tie to the golden standard was also about 
to end. This brought the need for a mechanism that would replace it at European level. As a 
response, the EU Commission officially introduced the new objective of European integration: 
the EMU. In particular, in 1969, the EU Commission submitted a memorandum to the EU 
Council (known as the Barre Plan or Barre Memorandum),204 which aimed at the promotion 
of economic policy coordination and monetary cooperation among the members of the 
EEC.205 As it was stated at the Barre Plan: “At the present time the Community is an original 
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and complex entity, consisting of both national and Community elements started from the 
observation that the Community was “an original and complex economic entity”.206  
The Barre Plan was followed by the Werner Report (also known as Werner Plan), which 
was created after the Heads of State and Government of the European Community  (as was 
the EU originally called) requested the Council to prepare a plan with a view of furthering the 
European integration through the creation of an economic and monetary union.207 The 
Council, in turn created a Committee, which was chaired by the Prime Minister of 
Luxembourg, Pierre Werner, and provided the aforementioned report (the Werner Report) in 
October 1970.208 In March 1971, following Werner Report, the Members States reached an 
agreement, which was finalised with the establishment of a Community exchange rate system 
(also known as the currency “snake” or the “snake in the tunnel” system) that came into force 
in 1972, and by which, the Community Members agreed to peg their currencies to each 
other.209 It should be noted that not all the Community Members’ currencies were part of the 
system. In fact, the “snake” constituted an exchange rate system only among the Deutsche 
mark, the Dutch guilder, the Belgian and Luxembourg francs and the Danish krone.  
 Along the same lines, in 1973 another mechanism was introduced as an essential part 
of the “snake’s” operation: the European Monetary Fund Cooperation (EMFC). Despite the 
fact that the EMFC was established in order to coordinate the central banks’ cooperation, its 
operation remained limited in technical tasks.210 The “snake” was not considered as 
particularly successful, but it rather raised concerns and politically controversial debates. As 
we will discuss below, the case of United Kingdom’s (hereinafter UK) participation in the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) is a representative example that the objectives set by the 
ERM were far from being achieved. Namely, on 16 September 1992, a day that came rapidly 
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to be known as Black Wednesday, the UK, struggling to maintain the value of its currency 
within agreed limit of EMR floating band, was forced to exit from the EMR in less than two 
years after joining it. The result was a rapid depreciation of pound sterling and an 
instantaneous loss of credibility. This event also seriously undermined the UK’s financial policy 
and damaged the reputation of the Prime Minister, John Major and his Chancellor, Norman 
Lamont.211 After leaving the ERM, however, the UK entered its longest period of continuous 
economic growth.212 The UK adopted inflation targets after exiting from EMR in order to 
restore a nominal anchor and inflation rates.  
From the mid-1970s, the initial tendency to create a more consolidated monetary 
union at Community Level, was weakened and to a high degree, was disorientated due to a 
number of factors, including: the oil shock of 1973; policy divergence at national level and 
weak compliance with the currency “snake”; dollar weakness and the economic 
consequences that followed. Italy withdrew from the 'currency snake' in February 1973; 
France in January 1974, re-joined in July 1975 and withdrew again in March 1976; Denmark 
and the United Kingdom became part of it in May 1972 and withdrew in June 1972. Thus, in 
1979 the snake was abandoned. Simultaneously, Europe entered a period of high inflation 
and increased unemployment rates, which gave priority to national initiative and the 
Community’s role was placed in a secondary position.213   
1.3.2 The European Monetary System 
Following the period of “currency snake,” it was only in 1979 when signs of progress 
towards furthering monetary integration were initiated again. This initiation came with the 
establishment of the European Monetary System (EMS), which came into operation in March 
1979.214 The aim was the creation of an area of monetary stability, by encouraging Member 
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States to coordinate their monetary policies at Community level.215 The EMS involved the 
creation of a fixed exchange rate mechanism (ERM) that was meant to facilitate the creation 
of a single market.216  The main objective of ERM was to enhance the credibility of monetary 
policy through the reductions of increased inflation with minimum effects on unemployment, 
through the setup of a stable exchange rates that would promote trade among participating 
countries. Another mechanism that was adopted within the context of the EMS 
establishment, was the European Currency Unit (ECU)217 that was designed to operate as a 
basket currency.218 It is worth noting that the establishment of the EMS, including all its 
supporting mechanisms, was achieved without the need for formal treaty revision.219 
In contrast with the “snake”, the EMS managed to maintain most of the Member 
States’ currencies within a single exchange rate system. In addition, it has been considered an 
improved mechanism due to the introduction of the ECU (the forerunner of the future single 
currency, the Euro), and the perception of a European Monetary Fund (EMF).220 The 
participation in EMS, also, strengthened cooperation and monetary policy coordination 
among the Member States, and proved to have been a useful tool for countries dealing with 
high inflation rates, fostering in this way exchange rate stability.221 The ECU was meant to be 
at the centre of the system and would be used “as a means of settlement between EEC 
monetary authorities.”222 However, its role within the EMS remained rather limited in 
practice, which was attributed to the absence of an anchor for the ECU.223  
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 The overall satisfactory performance of the EMS in promoting monetary stability, 
inspired confidence and hope for further European integration. As a result, the Single 
European Act (SEA) was adopted in 1986,224 which came into force in 1987 and constituted 
one of the most important amendments of the Treaty since the establishment of the Common 
Market in 1968. The aim of the SEA was the creation of a single market among the European 
Community countries as the first step towards an economic and monetary union.225 The 
importance of SEA lays to the fact that it sets the basis of a common financial market between 
the participating members, and it was the first official attempt to enshrine the plan of an EMU 
into primarily Community law.226 
 In 1988 the Hanover European Council established a Committee, led by Jacque Delors, 
the EU Commission’s President of that time,227 in order to study the European economic and 
monetary union perspective. This produced the so-called the Delors Report in 1989,228 which 
introduced a three-stage plan for the establishment of the EMU and emphasised the necessity 
for a greater coordination at European level in the fields of monetary policy and 
macroeconomic management.229 Notably, Delors expressed is vision for a united Europe even 
beyond a merely economic union, as: “a frontier free economic and social area on the way to 
becoming a political union.”230 Delors Report followed its predecessor’s idea, the Werner 
plan, and supported that in order for the EMU to be established in the basis of a single 
currency, it should be administered by the a supranational monetary policy authority: a 
European System of Central Banks.231 The SEA led to the first Treaty amendment, including 
the introduction of Article 102A, which was used later as the legal basis for the establishment 
EMU.232 The stages of European financial integration is analysed in detail in chapter two. 
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1.3.3 The Maastricht Treaty  
At the same period of time, there were significant political and historical events taking 
place in Europe, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism in the 
majority of Central and Eastern Europe countries. Consequently, the need for cooperation at 
a supranational level was felt more than ever.233 To this end, following the plan set by Delors 
Report, the 1989 Strasbourg European Council requested an intergovernmental conference 
(IGC), in an attempt to identify the necessary amendments of the Treaty able to facilitate the 
creation of EMU. The work of the intergovernmental congress resulted in the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU), which was signed on February 1992 in Maastricht and came into force 
in 1993.234 The TEU (also known as the Maastricht Treaty) constitutes one of the most 
important milestones in the history of the EU, establishing defined rules for the forthcoming 
single currency as well as for a new foreign and security policy framework, within the scope 
of an increased coordination and cooperation among the Member States in regards with 
justice and home affairs.235 As it was stated in the TEU: “This Treaty marks a new stage in the 
process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are 
taken as closely as possible to the citizen.”236  
The TEU was an extensive legal document, which was divided into seven titles and 
included seventeen binding Protocols and thirty-three Declaration attachments.237 With 
regards to monetary union, the TEU specified, that in accomplishing the common objective of 
the EMU, a three stage process - of four years each - should be followed, as it was originally 
envisaged by the Delors Report.238 At the same time, and while the agreement of the common 
goal of the creation of the EMU was reached, the TEU set the so-called “convergence 
criteria”239 as a precondition for the Member States in order to become part of the EMU.240 
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According to Article 140, TEU, the convergence criteria that Member States would have to 
meet, as a precondition to join the EMU, were: a high degree of price stability; sustainability 
of the government financial position; the observance of the normal fluctuation margins 
provided for by the exchange-rate mechanism of the European Monetary System, for at least 
two years, without devaluing against the euro; the durability of convergence achieved by the 
Member State with a derogation and of its participation in the exchange-rate mechanism 
being reflected in the long-term interest-rate levels. Most importantly, the Member States, 
by signing the TEU, were not only committed to institutionalise monetary policy at the 
Community Level; they also agreed, to transfer their national sovereignty in a new 
supranational institution, assigned with a mandate of price stability and the power of acting 
autonomously in deciding and implementing its goals.  
The first stage of the EMU’s implementation plan, began in 1 July 1990 and was 
completed in 31 December 1993, when Europe reached a complete liberalisation of capital 
movements and its Member States became also members of an area of free movement of 
goods, capital, services, and people (these are also known as the EU’s four freedoms). As the 
process had to move further, and in accordance with Article 109e(1), TEU, the 1st of January 
1994 was set the official starting date of the second stage, which had to be completed on 31 
December 1998.241 The second stage introduced a new institution, the European Monetary 
Institute (EMI), which was entrusted with the task of strengthening the cooperation and 
coordination of monetary policies within the participating countries.242 As the President of 
the EMI, Duisenberg, stated: “the main task of the European Monetary Institute (EMI) has 
been to translate into a coherent plan, and to implement, the political commitment to 
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establish a monetary union that the European countries made in signing the Maastricht 
Treaty.”243 EMI, played the role of a transitory institution towards the completion of the EMU 
project, and became responsible for conducting all actions required for the adoption of the 
single currency, until the ECB took over.244 Lastly, the EMI had legal personality and its 
independence, while not at same level with its successor’s (i.e. the ESCB), was granted under 
Article 8 of EMI Statute.245 In particular, Article 8 of EMI Statute gave EMI’s members the 
freedom to act according to their own responsibilities, which can be comparable to Article 7, 
ESCB Statute.246  
 During stage two, various difficulties became evident, which raised doubts as to the 
feasibility of accomplishing the plan for an economically and monetary united Europe. The 
ratification process of TEU was, among the rest, an issue that gathered attention, since it 
proved to be relatively long and not particularly smooth.247 Another greatly discussed topic, 
was the establishment of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), which although was 
discussed since the publication of the Delors plan and was supposed to be part of the second 
stage, in practice, it was not achievable. This happened due to the fact that the preparation 
of transferring national sovereignty in a supranational level, by creating, at the same time, 
the adequate conditions for the new monetary policy coordination framework, was not 
straightforward and took longer than expected. Lastly, the role of EMI, whereas pivotal in 
preparing the ground for the establishment of the ESCB at a later stage, remained to a large 
extend limited. Notably, decisions regarding monetary policy, were still largely a privilege of 
the national authorities, while the EMI was not enjoining any decision-making power.248  
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 The next and final stage in completing the EMU project, started after the Member 
States had fulfilled the convergence criteria, and was completed with the adoption of the 
ESCB and ECB on 1 June 1998. The process reached its peak with the introduction of the single 
currency, the Euro, in 1 January 1999, crowning the vision for EMU’s creation. Henceforward, 
the ESCB, consisting of the ECB and the national central banks (hereinafter: NCBs), is 
entrusted with the responsibility of implementing the common monetary policy 
framework.249 Lastly, it should be noted that the EU Treaties (both the TEU and TEC) 
underwent two notable amendments, including the Treaty of Amsterdam,250 which was 
signed on 2 October 1997 and the Treaty of Lisbon, 251  which was adopted on 13 December 
2007 and entered into force on 1 December 2009. The Lisbon Treaty renamed TEC to TFEU 
(the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union – hereinafter TFEU). In the monetary union 
area, the Treaty of Lisbon, or aimed at strengthening the decision-making authority of the EU 
Council for Member States that have joined the single currency.252     
1.3.4 ESCB Structure 
Although the ESCB structure and objectives are subject to further analysis in chapter 
three, it is important at this stage, to outline some of the main characteristic of its functioning. 
The ESCB, is composed of the ECB and 28 NCBs of the euro participating and non-participating 
European countries. The ECB and the NCBs of the 18 countries that have adopted the Euro 
form the Eurosystem, where the participating Member States have ceded control over 
monetary policy to the ECB and the latter is responsible for defining and implementing 
monetary policy. The NCBs differ from the ECB in so that the NCBs constitute bodies with legal 
personality authorised by the law of each country, whereas the ECB enshrined its legal 
personality under EU Law. The ESCB does not have its own legal personality, thus, it is 
governed by the independent decision-making bodies of the ECB. Nevertheless, the ESCB is 
responsible for promoting and ensuring the values, and the completion of ESCB targets, in 
accordance with the EU Treaties and the ESCB Statute. The main body of the ECB is the 
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Governing Council, which is entrusted with decision-making powers. The Governing Council 
includes the Executive Board of ECB and the central bank governors of the Member States, 
and is empowered with the duty of defining and implementing monetary policy.253  
Although the objectives of the ESCB and its duties are laid down in Article 127, TFEU, 
its status within the Community, in comparison with the rest of EU bodies and institutions, 
remains a puzzled issue. This is partly attributed to the fact that the ESCB consists of internal 
bodies with separate legal personality and the ESCB is operating under an independent status, 
enshrined by EU Law. However, at the same time, the ESCB should act within the scope of the 
common EU objectives while performing its monetary policy’s duties. Moreover, as Smits 
argued: “the ESCB is part of the Community and as such should act in accordance and 
cooperation with the rest of Community’s Institutions, and has to be treated as subject to the 
general rules of the Community.”254 In supporting this argument, Smits refers to Article 5 TEU, 
considering it applicable to relations between both the institutions and ESCB, and the ESCB 
and Member States.255 The question of what powers come under EU jurisdiction is an ongoing 
topic that has been subject to an extensive controversy.   
A good example is a recent case, involving the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), 
which is a permanent bailout EU agency that provides financial assistance, mainly in the form 
of loans, to Eurozone Member States’ financial institutions when facing difficulties. The case 
concerned claims against ECB’s and EU Commission’s role, regarding their involvement in the 
intervention ESM to assist the two biggest Cypriot banks. The problem started when the 
claimants had suffered a substantial decrease in the value of their deposits following the 
forced bank restructure. Thus, the claimants were seeking firstly, the annulment of specific 
parts of the Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality 
concluded between the Republic of Cyprus and the ESM for the restructuring of the banks 
and compensation from the involvement of the ECB and the EU Commission in the adoption 
of the MoU. The ECJ rejected the annulment claims, mainly based on the plea that the MoU 
was adopted by the Republic of Cyprus and the ESM, and since the ESM falls outside the remit 
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of EU law, the legality of its acts cannot be review under Article 263, TFEU. 256 Interestingly, 
however, the ECJ held that the tasks allocated to the EU Commission by the EU Treaty oblige 
the latter to ensure that MoUs concluded by the ESM - which is an international body that 
falls outside of EU remit - are in conformity with EU law.257 A justification of this view was 
provided by the Advocate General Wahl, who opined that: “Given that they were performing 
tasks outside the framework of the EU, the conduct of the EU institutions criticised by the 
appellants in the present cases should be viewed mainly through the lens of public 
international law. Those institutions were in fact acting on behalf of an international 
organisation (the ESM), whose members are sovereign States, with a view to concluding an 
international agreement…Under the rules of public international law…the conduct of agents 
of international organisations is generally imputable to the organisation itself.”258 Therefore, 
this raises an important question, which although exceeds the scope of this analysis, is worth 
mentioning. Is this reasoning to be considered as the EU Commission has the responsibility to 
ensure the conformity with EU Law of every MoU conducted? 
1.4 ECB independence 
1.4.1 Core elements 
The ECB was created in a period, as discussed earlier, when the idea of independence 
was enjoying widespread acceptance at national, regional and international level. There was 
a broad consensus that the independence of the guardian of EU’s common currency was an 
important prequisite in promoting price stability and low inflation. As mentioned earlier, 
there were also several empirical studies, which provided evidence about the link between 
central bank independence and low inflation.259 Following this general trend, the 
independent status of the ECB was guaranteed even before the ECB started to operate and 
was subsequently reflected in both the TFEU and the Statute of ESCB. The statutory 
independence of ECB is enshrined in the EU treaties, forming EU primary law, rather than just 
secondary legislation.260 Therefore, amending the independence of the ECB requires 
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amendment of the TFEU in accordance with Article 48, TEU. The high level of independence 
granted to the ECB, has raised questions of accountability and legitimacy of its decisions, 
which is further explored in the following section.  
In addition, it was a compulsory precondition for the countries that wanted to join the 
euro-area, to have completed the process of granting their central bank full institutional 
independence.261 In particular, Article 130, TFEU, provides that: “The Union institutions, 
bodies, offices or agencies and the governments of the Member States undertake to respect 
this principle [of central bank independence] and not to seek to influence the members of the 
decision-making bodies of the European Central Bank or of the national central banks in the 
performance of their tasks.” Thus, failure to ensure central bank independence would count 
as a breach of EU law, which would justify bringing an action before the ECJ.262 For instance, 
Romania is an example of a new entrant that undertook significant steps to update its banking 
legislation in order to meet the requirements of joining the Eurozone and strengthening 
central bank independence was among the main prerequisites.263  
Having discussed already the main types of central bank independence and their 
theoretical foundation, the following analysis focuses on the various forms of ECB 
independence as provided by EU law.  
A. Institutional Independence 
As previously mentioned, institutional independence refers to the ability of the 
monetary authority to act independently, as a separate, from the other government 
institutions, legal entity.264 Within the ESCB, both members of ECB and NCBs should be acting 
in accordance to their own responsibilities, free of any influence from both national and EU 
level. Moreover, the members of ECB and NCBs are not obliged, while performing their tasks, 
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to seek assistance from any other EU body or the respective governments.265 Thus, the ECB 
acts independently when deciding and implementing the policies that fall within the scope of 
the tasks entrusted to the ESCB under the TFEU and its Statute; while member states and EU 
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and the governments shall respect this 
independence by avoiding to influence the members of the ECB decision making bodies.266  
B. Personnel Independence  
This type of independence refers to the autonomy of the internal bodies’ members of 
the ECB. In particular, the Governors of the NCBs and members of the Executive Board are 
granted, at least, a five and eight year office term respectively.267  However, while the 
members of the Executive Board term office mandate is not renewable,268 the governors of 
the NCBs may be reappointed.269 Furthermore, the members of the Executive Board are 
committed to perform their duties in a full-time basis and exclusively, without the possibility 
to combine it with any other professions.270 In addition, the members of the Executive Board 
can be discharged from their duties only if they no longer fulfil the required conditions for the 
performance of their duties or in case of guilt of a serious misconduct.271 The same principle 
apply to the national procedures concerning the dismissal of the NCBs’ members, which 
should be set in respect with the relevant procedures as are underlined in the Statute of 
ESCB.272 Lastly, the Governors of NCBs are provided with a minimal office term length of five 
years.273 
C. Functional independence 
Functional independence, involves the key powers and tools that should be assigned 
to the monetary authority which would enable the accomplishment of its main goal, i.e. price 
stability. In particular, ESCB holds the power to define and implement monetary policy 
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exclusively,274 and is also, the responsible body for banknote issuance.275 Moreover, the ECB 
holds the exclusive power of controlling the share capital and foreign reserve assets when 
they fall within the scope of the ESCB Statute.276 The ECB power is limited in granting loans or 
any other type of credit facilities or debt instruments in favour of any EU or national: 
“institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, local or other public 
authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States.”277 
The only exception to this rule is the case of publicly owned credit institutions, which, enjoy 
the same privileges as private credit institutions.278 This aims to avoid scenarios that would 
facilitate the ECB strategies and operations to being influenced by important creditors-
members of Eurozone’s associations and arrangements.279  
Lastly, the ECB is assigned regulatory powers to impose binding and non-binding legal 
acts with the status of secondary EU Law, including decisions, recommendations and 
opinions.280 Furthermore, another instrument attached to the powers of the ECB is the ability 
to levy penalty interest and to impose other sanctions with comparable effect against 
Member States’ credit institutions, in case they fail to comply with the required minimum 
reserves. 281 It is important to re-emphasise that these regulatory powers assigned to the ECB 
by primary EU Law, equate the ECB’s regulatory competences with the rest EU institutions. 
Thus, this results in significant power given to unelected officials to produce binding 
legislation. Hence, it is clear where the rationale of this effort to shield ECB’s independence 
by means of primary EU law, finds its basis.   
D. Financial independence 
As discussed earlier, financial independence is related to the autonomy of central 
banks to cover and organise the funding of their operations and activities. At EU level, the ECB 
has the exclusive power to issue the euro and to manage its finances.282 Also, the monetary 
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income, which is the income accruing to the NCBs in the performance of ESCB’s operations, 
is divided among all the NCBs at the end of each financial year.283 This procedure of allocating 
the monetary income in an annual basis, is set by Article 32, ESCB Statute, in order to protect 
the monetary income to become subject to political interference. Lastly, there are external 
auditors, appointed by the Governing Council and approved by the EU Council, with the task 
to examine the books and accounts of both the ECB and NCBs.284 
1.4.2 Transparency, Communication and Accountability of the ECB   
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the ECB operational structure and institutional 
framework was highly based on the German Bundesbank model of central banking.285 The 
justification of the success of this model, was the Bundesbank performed exceptionally well 
in maintaining inflation low during the early 1970s when the Bretton Woods System 
collapsed. Thus, the ECB as a creature of its time, enjoys a highly independent status and a 
wide discretionary space to use its instruments in pursuing the assigned tasks and objectives. 
In fact, since the drafting of the Maastricht Treaty, the ECB – which is not an EU institution 
within the meaning of Article 13, TEU – the power to adopt regulations that become EU and 
national law (of the Member States) without requiring the involvement of national 
parliament, the EU Parliament of other EU institutions.286   
In addition, it has been repeatedly argued that the ECB is more independent than the 
Bundesbank, 287  with some even claiming that “the European Central Bank has been endowed 
with greater powers than any other non-majoritarian Community institution to date.”288 
Indeed, since the independence of the ECB, is enshrined by EU Law, it has a stronger legal 
basis from that of Bundesbank. To this end, the Bundestag, the German Parliament, has the 
power to change the statute of the central bank (i.e. the Bundesbank), which is also 
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embedded in a system of political checks and balances. The European Parliament, on the 
other hand, cannot modify the ECB’s status, objectives and overall mandate.289 This practically 
implies that the institutional framework of the ECB is much more immune to changes, in 
comparison to relevant institutions at national level.290 In essence, the ECB’s independent 
status can be modified only through Treaty amendment, which requires unanimous consent 
of the Member States and ratification at national level.291  As analysed already, such a high 
degree of independence assigned to an institution that falls outside the scope of direct 
parliamentary control seems to pose the potential of a ‘democratic deficit,’ raising issues of 
accountability. Hence, the relevant literature on the ‘democratic deficit’ in the EU, refers to 
the lack of democratic control of the ECB decisions, which are not subject to scrutiny by 
neither national nor the European parliaments.292 For instance, according to Begg and Green, 
the ECB is “to independent’ since it enjoys both instrument and goal independence and 
hence, “there will be a substantial and widely perceived democratic deficit which will 
undermine the credibility of European economic institutions when adverse economic 
circumstances arise.293 A counter argument to the advocates of ECB’s ‘democratic deficit,’ is 
that the Treaty setting the legal basis of the ECB has been agreed, initially by 15 and 
subsequently by 28 national governments, and ratified by the relevant national parliaments. 
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It should, however, be noted that the approval of the Treaty was subject to a take-it-or leave 
it vote on the entire content of the document.294 
In a democratic society, the independence of a decision-making body cannot be 
regarded in isolation from its mandate. Thus, central bank independence is not to be viewed 
as an end in itself, but as a tool in pursuing objectives that are set by law. In fact, as we saw 
earlier, central bank independence needs to be complemented or perhaps, counterbalanced 
by accountability, credibility and transparency. The meaning of each of these notions has 
been largely covered, including how they affect and interact with one another. Therefore, it 
is hardly surprising that the same principles, arguments and empirical evidence come into 
play in regard to the institutional arrangements of the ESCB. To this end, the commitment of 
the ECB to the principle of openness, transparency and accountability has been repeatedly 
emphasised by both the ECB in its annual Reports and its official in various public speeches.  
For instance, in the annual Report of 1999, the ECB highlighted that: “The ECB is committed 
to the principles of openness, transparency and accountability.”295 Additionally, Otmar Issing, 
who served as a members of the Executive Board,  stated that: “the ECB is both accountable 
and transparent” and it “…has a mandate determined by the Treaty, which stipulates how it 
should be accountable to the public at large.296 Similarly, Wim Duisenberg, highlighted that: 
the European Central Bank is fully independent, but also fully accountable to Parliament, 
Ministers and the public.”297 Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, who was another members of the 
Executive Board, explained that: “the ECB fulfils its accountability obligation, inter alia, by way 
of comprehensive dialogue with political bodies,” including the EU Parliament - which is: “the 
institution of Europe's democratically elected representatives, which represents the interests 
of the peoples of Europe” - and other EU bodies that the bodies that play a role in the 
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European political process (e.g. the Council of Ministers, the EU Commission, the Economic 
and Social Committee etc.). Padoa-Schioppa also added that: “at the national level, the 
National Central Banks relate to their national parliaments and entertain links of 
communication with their national governments.”298 
In addition, the decisions of ECB are subject to judicial control by the Court of Justice. 
Namely, according to Article 263, TFEU: “Should the European Parliament, the European 
Council, the Council, the Commission or the European Central Bank, in infringement of the 
Treaties, fail to act, the Member States and the other institutions of the Union may bring an 
action before the Court of Justice of the European Union to have the infringement 
established.” 299 The wording of this Article indicates that in terms of the legality of its actions, 
the ECB is treated identically the same as the EU Commission and the other EU institutions 
and it is subject to the general principle of EU law.300 A fact that has been also confirmed by 
the ECJ in its judgment in the so-called “OLAF case.” Namely, the ECJ while examining the 
constitutional nature of the ECB and the scope of its independence, highlighted that that “the 
ECB, pursuant to the EC Treaty, falls squarely within the Community framework.”301 
As far as transparency is concerned, the ECB is required to publish: reports on the 
activities of the ESCB at least quarterly; a weekly consolidated financial statement of the ESCB; 
and annual reports on the activities of the ESCB and monetary policy operations to the EU 
Parliament, the EU Council and the EU Commission.302 Also, subject to EU Parliament’s 
request, the President of the European Central Bank and the other members of the Executive 
Board, may be heard by the competent committees of the EU Parliament.303 With the 
adoption of the euro in 1999, the ECB has made use of all the aforementioned communication 
tools. In addition, the ECB adopted a Decision in March 2004, aiming to grant public access to 
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documents drawn up by it, but also to documents received by it, with the view to increase 
openness of its decisions.304 All these combined, aim at enhancing transparency, with the 
view to also foster both the accountability and credibility of the ECB’s monetary policy.305 
To this end, in fulfilling its transparency and accountability commitments, the ECB also 
holds press conferences by its President and Vice-President immediately after the first 
Governing Council meeting of the month, which includes a question and answer session that 
is open to various media representatives from inside and outside the Euro-area. In addition, 
the transcripts of the press conferences are made available on ECB’s website. This is followed 
by the publication of a Monthly Bulletin, usually one week after the Governing Council’s 
meeting, which contains detailed and comprehensive evaluation of the economic 
environment, long-term development plans and detailed explanation on monetary policy 
decisions. Moreover, the President of the ECB is invited four times a year before the 
Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, which are open to the public and 
involve questions addressed directly to the ECB President by the Members of the Committee. 
The other ECB officials are also engaged to public speeches, interviews and participation to 
the aforementioned Committee. Lastly, the ECB publishes regularly Working Paper and 
Occasional Paper Series and statistical data.306   
On the negative side, although the EU Treaties and ESCB Statute seem to have created 
a legal framework with a number of provisions aiming to ensure the transparency of ESCB’s 
actions, serious doubts have been raised as to its effectiveness.307 For instance, it has been 
supported that the existing framework lacks the legally binding mechanisms to assure the 
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accountability of the ECB, while the existing provisions provide only for information exchange 
communication between the ECB and EU institutions.308 Indeed, there are no legally binding 
mechanisms that would provide for evaluation procedures in case of misconduct, for 
instance, by the ECB governors. As previously mentioned, the EU Parliament holds the power 
to call the President of the European Central Bank and the other members of the Executive 
Board to be heard in front of the competent committees of the EU Parliament, which 
however, does not constitute a legally binding procedure.309 Furthermore, while the ECB 
regularly publishes its monthly and annual reports, the minutes of Governing Council’s regular 
meetings are not disclosed. This is considerably different than the practice of other central 
banks, such as the Fed for instance, which publishes the minutes of Fed’s Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) meetings.  
In the wake of GFC, greater emphasis was put on enhancing the communication, 
transparency and accountability of the ECB, including new mechanisms that aim at 
strengthening the role of the ECB at both traditional and new task. However, concerns 
regarding the ECB’s monetary policy decisions, have only deepened. For example, the ECB’s 
Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) guidelines, which do not exceed a two pages document, 
cannot be considered as particularly comprehensive, given also the importance of ELA in 
economies that are still experiencing a great hardship, such as Greece.310 In addition, in 2015 
the ECB, repeatedly, decided to limit the ceiling on ELA for Greece’s banks, without, however, 
publicly announcing the relevant decisions. With the advent of the Banking Union, and the 
ability of the ECB to both supervise Eurozone financial institutions and decide on monetary 
policy objectives, a debate on the ECB’s transparency has ensued, largely questioning the 
legitimacy of its decision-making role. This is particularly problematic, especially given the fact 
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that the Treaty remains silent as to the possibility for the ECB’s independence to be 
overridden by the delectated representatives in times of a financial distress. This is examined 
in the last chapter of the thesis, following the legal analysis of the first pillar of the Banking 
Union, i.e. the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM).  
The next chapter moves the discussion from the EU to the international level. At this 
domain, the Basel Committee in Banking Supervision (BCBS) constitutes the main 
international institution that sets standards for prudential regulation of financial institutions. 
As such, the analysis of its role and purpose aims to provide context on the evolution of 
banking supervision and regulation, at both international and EU level. Hence, reference is 
made throughout the thesis to the implementation of BCBS’s main legislation at EU level. It 
should be noted that this exploration does not intent to provide a comprehensive analysis of 
the broader subject of the BCBS rules and their role on EU banking regulation, but it rather 
aims to provide context to the discussion on EU banking framework, by staying focused to the 
core idea of this thesis that is banking regulation and supervision at EU level.  
 
1.5 Basel Committee in Banking Supervision 
1.5.1 Creation and early years 
In the aftermath of WWII, as barriers of exchange control and other restrictions to the free 
movement of financial services were slowly diminished, financial intermediation entered an 
era of increasing interconnection. However, while financial markets and intermediation 
became international, regulation remained at domestic level. This realisation along with the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in 1971/72 and the oil crisis in 
1973/74, led to the establishment of what became latter known as the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS). 311 In addition, there were a number of highly publicised failures 
of international financial institutions in the early 1970s that highlighted the need for 
international convergence of regulatory standards. Namely, in June 1974, the privately owned 
German bank, Bankhaus Herstatt, went bankrupt after the West Germany’s Federal Banking 
                                                           




Supervisory Office intervention, which called for bank’s liquidation due to its problematic 
operation. The bank’s foreign exchange operation exceeded three times the value of its 
capital. The consequences of that incident were not limited within Germany’s financial 
market, but affected banks outside Germany and spread worldwide.312 The collapse of 
Bankhaus Herstatt, was followed by the closure of the British-Israel Bank of London in July 
1974,313 and the failure of Franklin National Bank in the United States (hereinafter: US) in 
1975,314 which were accompanied with global repercussions.315 To this end, the realisation 
that the breakdown of a middle-sized bank could have serious consequences with a cross-
border dimension, was the cornerstone that led to the genesis of a long-term cooperation 
and coordination at global level among the banking supervisory governors of national central 
banks.316  
As a result of these events, and in an attempt to regain control on their central banks 
and to enhance cooperation in banking supervision, the central bank governors of the Group 
of Ten or G10 countries (G10 refers to the group of countries that were signatories to the 
General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB), which was set to enable the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) to borrow specified amounts of currencies in order to increase its lending 
ability),317 met in Basel, Switzerland in January 1975, and established the Standing Committee 
on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practices (CBRSP-the forerunner of Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision) at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). As was stated at the 
first CBRSP meeting in February 1975, the Committee’s main objective was: “…to help ensure 
bank solvency and liquidity”, and “…to give particular attention to the need for an early 
warning system.”318 The aim of the BCBS’s establishment, was not the creation of a 
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supranational body, responsible to supervise banks worldwide, but it was rather an attempt 
to promote general supervisory standards, rules and guidelines at international level. As 
the Director of Supervision of the Bank of England (chairing in 1984 the BCBS), Peter Cooke, 
stated: “The Committee does not undertake a formal supernational supervisory role….it 
formulates and recommends broad supervisory principles and guidelines of best practices in 
the hope and expectation that individual authorities will take steps to implement them 
through detailed arrangements – statutory or otherwise – which are best suited to their own 
national systems”.319 
The first goal set by the BCBS, was to define the responsibilities of home and host 
country supervisors in regard to the subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks; a goal that 
was, accomplished at a later stage by the so-called Basel Concordat. 320 The latter “sets out 
the principles for sharing supervisory responsibility for banks' foreign branches, subsidiaries 
and joint ventures between host and parent (or home) supervisory authorities.”321 The Basel 
Concordat met widespread acceptance, and was gradually implemented by many 
countries.322 In May 1983, the Basel Concordat was replaced by the ‘Principles for the 
Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments.’323 The latter, focused on consolidated 
supervision and was in the form of recommended guidelines for best practice. At the same 
time, at EU Level, highly influenced by the BCBS’s guidelines, the first Directive on 
consolidated supervision was adopted.324  This was followed by a Supplement in April 1990, 
aiming to improve the cross-border flow of prudential information between banking 
supervisors.325 The Basel Concordat underwent another change in June 1992, when it was 
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reformulated in a new document, known as the Minimum Standards, which was published 
in July 1992.326  
The BCBS since the very beginning of its establishment produced a vast amount of 
publications, aiming to outline the rules under which banking supervision should be 
conducted.327 However, the decisions of the BCBS are based on consensus and are not taken 
by voting.  Indeed, the BCBS defines itself as an advisory committee rather than an executive 
committee, with its role being mainly focused on providing recommendations and guidelines 
to the central bank governors on best regulatory practice, which are, however, not legally 
binding. This practically means that the BCBS produces soft law and each governor has to 
present those regulatory guidelines to their respective countries, subject to domestic law 
implementation.328 
Although the BCBS has no legal enforcement power itself, it encourages Member 
States to implement its decisions. The issue of implementation was stressed since the first 
revision of the Basel Concordat in 1983 in form of the following suggestions: “The 
implementation of the second basic principle, namely that the supervision of all foreign 
banking establishments should be adequate, requires the positive participation of both host 
and parent authorities.”329 In addition, the BCBS established a sub-group to consider the 
adequate implementation of the revised Basel Concordat.330 Reference to the need of 
sufficient implementation was also made at a document published in 1992, the Minimum 
Standards, as following: “members of the Committee now recognise that there needs to be a 
greater effort to ensure that these principles can be applied in practice.”331 Interestingly, 
despite the fact that the BCBS regulatory guidelines are not legally binding and the system 
operates based on a highly consensual manner, its recommendations and guidelines have 
enjoyed global acceptance and have been increasingly implemented by many countries.332 In 
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fact, the success of its implementation has been commonly referred to as a good example of 
‘soft law’ with considerably broad influence worldwide.333 
Over time, the BCBS developed into a forum where the central bank governors meet 
on a regular basis to discuss on international supervisory matters, with the view to develop 
supervisory regulation, to foster financial stability and to ensure the soundness of 
international financial markets. The long-term goal of the process towards fostering a closer 
international cooperation and setting the international minimum standards in prudential 
supervision, was the creation of a financial system, able to detect upcoming risks and prevent 
them affecting international financial stability.334 
1.5.2 Basel Capital Accord: Basel I and II 
The initial objective of the BCBS was to ensure that all financial institutions with 
international activity were subject to sufficient and consistent supervision across borders. 
However, this objective was stretched after the experience of the early 1980s, which was 
characterised by falling capital ratios and the crises in Latin America.335  This raised concerns 
and shifted attention to capital adequacy, while it became clear that the BCBS could not focus 
merely on supervisory issues, but also in strengthening banking regulation. Before analysing 
the Basel Capital Accord, which was adopted as a result of this realisation, it is important to 
define the meaning of bank capital and why it is subject to regulation. Bank capital implies: 
“the bank’s financing that comes from shareholder funds, subordinated debt, certain types of 
reserves, and hybrid debt/equity instruments,”336 while: “bank capital regulations were 
introduced in order to redress the natural tendency of banks to hold insufficient capital.”337  
Bank capital has an essential role, especially in times of financial distress, due to the 
increased liquidity risks that might arise as a result of capital inadequacy. Thus, there was an 
emphasis paid on the importance of maintaining an adequate capital - which usually is 
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expressed as a ratio of capital to a bank’s asset, and capital ‘buffers’ - that reflect the amount 
of capital that is required to cover banks’ risks..338 Simply said, bank capital regulation is 
necessary since the banks are exposed to liquidity risks, which in times of instability tend to 
increase. Thus, the higher exposure to liquidity risk, the greater the need for a financial 
institution to maintain a higher amount of bank capital in order to retain its solvency and 
overall stability. A very recent example of how inadequate level of capital can affect the 
entire reputation of a financial institution is the case Deutsche Bank, which is Germany's 
biggest lender and a significant global investment bank. Deutsche Bank from 2014 onwards 
faced serious difficulties as a result of a number of fines imposed from the US regulators, 
strict new rules on bank capital and a fragile European economy. These scenarios affected its 
shares that hit record lows and were worth barely an eighth of what they were in 2007, prior 
to the advent of the GFC.339 Deutsche Bank’s position was also worsen after the Referendum 
in the UK in favour of Brexit, since it has a very strong presence in the City of London. In 
addition, following the failure of its US subsidiary failure to pass the annual stress test, the 
IMF in its Report, in June 2017 named the world's riskiest bank and “the most important net 
contributor to systemic risks in the global banking system."340 On the positive side, in April 
2017 Deutsche Bank has successfully completed the capital increase from authorised capital 
against cash contributions it announced on 5 March 2017.341 
Back to the 1980s, the widespread effects of the Latin American debt crisis brought 
evidence that capital ratios of internationally active financial institutions were influenced 
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negatively when there was a scenario of increasing international risks.342 As a result, the BCBS 
came to the conclusion that there was a need to establish minimum requirements of capital 
adequacy.  This led to the adoption of the first Basel Capital Accord (hereinafter Basel I) in 
1988,343 which implied specific measures that aimed to reduce institutional credit risk with 
two fundamental objectives: “firstly, that the new framework should serve to strengthen the 
soundness and stability of the international banking system; and secondly that the framework 
should be in fair and have a high degree of consistency in its application to banks in different 
countries with a view to diminishing an existing source of competitive inequality among 
international banks.”344 Additionally, Basel I required the supervisory authorities of the host 
and home country, to share data and information, as well as national rules regarding the 
respective responsibilities over branches and subsidiaries. Also, Basel I introduced the 
minimum capital adequacy ratio, initially as a ratio of bank capital to risk-weighted assets for 
credit risk only, which was set at 8% and was to be adopted by 1992.345 Simultaneously, at 
European level, Basel I was adopted in two Directives in 1989.346  
Basel I, since its establishment was designed as an evolutionary framework, so future 
updates were part of the agenda in order to keep pace with the financial sector that was 
constantly developing and changing. Thus, in November 1991,347 its first amendment took 
place, intending to redefine with greater precision general provisions on the general loan-
loss reserves that could be part of capital adequacy calculation.348 In April 1995, Basel I 
underwent another amendment, focusing on the effects of netting in the calculation of the 
add-ons for potential exposure.349 Lastly, in 1996, BCBS issued another amendment of Basel 
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I, in order to incorporate capital requirements for market risks in addition to the existing 
capital requirements for credit risks.350 
In June 1999, the Committee issued a proposal for a new capital adequacy framework 
that was intended to replace the 1988 Accord.351 This led to the adoption of the Revised 
International Capital Framework in June 2004,352 widely known as Basel II. Basel II, from the 
outset, was designed to provide more flexibility in terms of minimum capital requirements, 
by also, highlighting the need to define an effective prudential supervisory framework. This, 
in turn, would enable the sufficient supervision of minimum capital requirements 
implementation.353 Basel II launched a new proposal that was based on three main 
measurements: minimum capital requirements, a supervisory review and a market discipline 
(the so-called three pillars).354 The third pillar on market discipline, was set to support the 
capital framework as to the market risk occurring as a result of banks’ exposure to foreign 
exchange, traded debt securities, equities, commodities and options.355 The innovative part 
of this amendment was that large banks, while calculating their market risk capital 
requirements, would use an internal-rating based model in order to improve their own risk 
system and small banks would use risk-weighted assets for the same purpose. Internal-rating 
based models will, practically, allow large banks to use their own credit risk models to 
generate key inputs into the formulas that determine the capital reserves they must hold.356 
Lastly, the internal rating-based model is also subject to ongoing supervision as to whether it 
fulfils certain criteria, with the view of assessing risk exposures of financial institutions. 357 
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At EU level, one month after Basel II was published, the EU Commission issued a 
proposal,358 which was subsequently adopted on 14 June 2006 in form of two Directives. The 
first Directive amended the existing Banking Directive of 2000,359 while the second one 
amended the existing Capital Adequacy Directive (also known as the Capital Requirements 
Directive Package or CRD I).360 It is worth mentioning that CRD I was published on 30 June 
2006 and entered into force on 20 July 2006, involving almost 600 amendments.361 CRD I 
reflects, to a great extent, Basel II rules, while it differs from the latter as to its legal nature. 
Thus, as mentioned already, while BCBS produces are soft law, subject to a voluntary 
transposition into nation law, EU Directives are legally binding for all EU Member States.362 
Basel II took five years to be published and more than nine years to come into force. 
In addition, during the process of Basel II implementation, a great debate developed as to the 
effectiveness of the new framework. This was also reflected to the reluctance of the Member 
States to transpose it into national law, which was fairly evident if compared with the wide 
acceptability of its forerunner. In general, Basel II was considered not to be adding any 
substantial changes to the original Capital Record of 1988, i.e. Basel I, especially, regarding 
the minimum capital requirements.363 These concerns came to be emphasised by the advent 
of the GFC, which shed light on the importance of liquidity standards. Thus, although the 
loopholes and deficiencies of Basel II, had become apparent even before the eruption of the 
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GFC, the latter opened a new round of discussions concerning Basel II amendments.364 
Notably, the revision version of the “Principles for sound liquidity risk management and 
supervision,”365 came about in the same month that Lehman Brothers collapsed.366 Some 
even advocated that Basel II was among the reasons that led to the GFC since it encouraged 
self-regulation by allowing banks to use their own estimates when calculating capital 
adequacy.367 Ultimately, it was recognised that a more comprehensive overhaul of the Basel 
II rules was needed, which was reflected in a series of amendments that are discussed in the 
following section. 
1.5.3 Basel III 
Basel III comprises a comprehensive set of reform measures that were brought as an 
immediate response to the aforementioned realisation that Basel II needed reconsideration, 
and with the vision to strengthen regulation, supervision and risk management of the 
banking sector in light of the GFC. However, while complex negotiations towards the 
adoption of Basel III were taking place, the BSBS, in July 2009 released a revision of the 
existing framework (i.e. Basel II) as a quick fix of market risks. This is known as Basel 2.5, 
which was drafted with the view to address the growing concern over banks' capital 
requirements, especially regarding banks’ exposure to risky credit derivatives.368 Thus, Basel 
2.5 measures, while maintained the main features of Basel II, targeted to strengthen the 
capital base, by increasing the capital requirements.369 Basel 2.5 was criticised on similar 
grounds as Basel II, resulting in its update on 14 January 2016, when BCBS issued a revised 
framework for market risk capital requirements - also known as the fundamental review of 
the trading book (FRTB) - which will take effect on 1 January 2019.370 At EU level, Basel 2.5 
                                                           
364 Leonard Ng, ‘Changes to Basel II and the EU Capital Requirements Directive: Implications for Securitisation’ 
(2010) 25 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation, 265-74. 
365 ‘Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision’ (BCBS, September 2008) 
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368 See: ‘Revisions to the Basel II market risk framework’ (BCBS, July 2009) 
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369 Sum, Katarzyna, Post-Crisis Banking Regulation in the European Union: Opportunities and Threats (1st edn, 
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370 ‘Standards: Minimum capital requirements for market risk’ (BCBS, January 2016) 
<http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d352.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017. 
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was implemented in a Directive,371 which was later amended accordingly to keep up with the 
relevant revisions as set by BCBS.   
Meanwhile, after a series of protracted negotiations, the Group of Governors and 
Heads of Supervision of the BCBS, had announced on 12 September 2010, that they had 
reached an agreement on the strengthening of existing capital requirements, while 
emphasising that the three-pillar structure of Basel II would remain unchanged.372 In 
December 2010, the first Basel III rules text was issued,373 which was subsequently revised in 
July 2011,374 introducing minor amendments on the credit valuation adjustment (CVA). Credit 
valuation adjustment (CVA), as defined at BIS website, is: “the risk of loss caused by changes 
in the credit spread of a counterparty due to changes in its credit quality (also referred to as 
the market value of counterparty credit risk).” 375 As it was stated at Basel III introductory 
note: “The Committee’s comprehensive reform package addresses the lessons of the financial 
crisis. Through its reform package, the Committee also aims to improve risk management and 
governance as well as strengthen banks’ transparency and disclosures. Moreover, the reform 
package includes the Committee’s efforts to strengthen the resolution of systemically 
significant cross-border banks.”376 
Basel III brought a series innovative measures, mainly at Pillar I of Basel II, including 
inter alia: extensions in capital requirements; a non-risk based leverage ratio and two 
liquidity ratios. In particular, Basel III brought changes in respect with liquidity risk 
management by issuing a separate document on this matter.377 The latter introduced two 
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liquidity rations: liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), aiming to promote short-term resilience of 
the liquidity risk profile of banks, by ensuring  that they have sufficient high-quality liquid 
assets to survive a significant stress scenario lasting 30 calendar days;378 and the net stable 
funding ratio (NSFR), designed to address medium and long-term problems arising from 
illiquidity.379 The specific standards and timelines for the implementation of the LCR were 
sets out by a new document issued in January 2013.380 
Furthermore, Basel III launched the notion of capital conservation buffer, “which is 
designed to ensure that banks build up capital buffers outside periods of stress which can be 
drawn down as losses are incurred.”381 To this end, Basel III included a macro-prudential 
approach, by invoking an added requirement for banks to maintain a specific capital 
conservation buffer of 2.5 percent of common equity,382 while in times of crisis this buffer 
could be decreased as a counterbalance to the damages. Depending on the circumstances of 
each case, the national authorities would be entitled for a further buffer of 0 to 2.5 
percent.383 Furthermore, Basel III introduced a new capital adequacy framework, aiming to 
strengthen the quality of the minimum capital requirements, by increasing it to 4.5 percent 
(compared to the 2 percent of Basel II) and the Tier 1 capital ratio was to be increased from 
4 to 6 percent, while both shall be maintained at all times.384  
In the context of macro-prudential supervision and additionally to capital buffers 
requirements, Basel III, addressed the issue of systemic risk. To this end, Basel III highlighted 
the need to strengthening the resolution for the systematically important financial 
institutions, which were to maintain their loss absorbing capacity beyond the minimum 
standards.385 Initially, the process of regulating systematically important banks was to be 
further developed, subject to the close cooperation of BCBS and the Financial Stability Board 
                                                           
378 BCBS, December 2010 (n 378) at 15. 
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382 Basel III (n 374) at 50. 
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(FSB).386 This was regulated at a later stage, when the BCBS in November 2011, issued the 
assessment methodology for global systemically important banks,387 which was later revised 
in July 2013.388 Lastly, another important innovation brought by Basel III was the introduction 
of the leverage ratio requirements, in an attempt to constrain leverage, model risk and 
measurement error. Thus, leverage ratio intended to supplement the risk-weighted measure 
with a simple, transparent and independent measure, which was deem necessary due to the 
realisation that leverage ratio was considered to be one of the underlying features that led 
to the GFC.389 Within the context of Basel III have been issues a number of documents aiming 
to address various aspect of banking supervision, including the establishment of standards 
for: liquidity coverage;390 stable funding;391 leverage ratio,392 extended disclosure 
requirements;393 
Most importantly, as Walter argues, what differentiates Basel III from its forerunners, 
apart from its comprehensive scope, is that: “it combines micro- and macro-prudential 
reforms to address both institution and system level risks.”394 This is particularly important 
given that one of the elements of banking regulation that was considered to have had a 
negative effect during the GFC, was the extensive focus on micro-prudential supervision, 
which concerns the welfare of individual financial institutions; while the macro-prudential 
aspect seemed to have been neglected. When the latest financial crisis proved to have severe 
effects to the global economy as a whole and not only to particular financial institutions, the 
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ultimate response was to adjust banking regulation in a way that would marry both micro- 
and macro-prudential supervision. Chapter two provides the definition of these notions as 
well as the relevant discussion on the recent debate in relation to their changing role and 
interaction.  
Nonetheless, Basel III has been subject to criticism, mainly because is considered to 
have been following the same pattern as Basel II. As Ambler pointed out in 2011: “since Basel 
III follows the same approach as Basel II, albeit with a higher threshold, we should not be too 
confident that it will assure financial stability.”395 Thus, it is sensible to assume that another 
revision is on the way. In fact, although Basel III has not been fully implemented yet by many 
countries,396 discussion on the perspective of ‘Basel IV’ have been circulating around for the 
last 4-5 years.397 ‘Basel IV’ is not a formal name adopted by the BCBS, but it was rather a term 
increasingly used by the financial industry, after KPMG made reference to ‘Basel IV’ in order 
to describe the work of the BCBS on the revised standards of Basel III. Some others make 
reference to ‘Basel IV’ to indicate the new measures adopted din the context of Basel III. 
However, there is no official announcement as to the stance of BCBS regarding ‘Basel IV’. As 
mentioned earlier, one thing is for certain, Basel rules are designed to be revised in 
accordance with the needs of the evolving financial markets.  
At EU level, Basel III has been implemented largely through the issuing of a Directive 
(Capital Requirements Directive IV - CRD IV)398 and a Regulation (Capital Requirements 
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Regulation-CRR)399 in 2013, which took effect in 1 January 2014 with some of the provisions 
to have been phased in between 2014-2019.400 Special role in the implementation of 
regulation pertaining Basel rules is played by the European Banking Authority (EBA). The EBA 
contributes to the establishment of joint regulatory and supervisory standards in practice in 
the European Union by issuing opinions, developing guidelines and recommendations and 
drafting regulatory and implementing technical standards. 
 
1.5.4 Core principles for effective Banking Supervision 
 
Following the analysis in the previous subsections, it is clear by now that the BCBS has 
focused its work throughout the years on strengthening the regulatory framework by setting 
minimum standards for adequate capitalisation for credit institutions at global level. 
However, the importance of effective supervision, apart from being the initial aim of BCBS 
establishment, was always part of the agenda, 401 since “changing the rules alone cannot 
make the financial system safe. The judgment of banking supervision is crucial”.402 This was 
the rationale behind the introduction of the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 
by the BCBS in September 1997.403 The main objective of the latter was to set global standards 
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for prudential banking supervision. This underwent revision in October 2006,404 and the BCBS 
issued consultative document in December 2011,405 as a basis for its revision in September 
2012.406 It is noteworthy that the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, since their 
introduction has been positively received and implemented by many developed nations, 
while emerging markets and transition economies to a more limited degree.407  
At EU level, banking supervision remained for many years at national level,408 while 
the relevant legislation at domestic level worldwide has been highly influenced by the Core 
Principles for effective Banking Supervision.409  Similarly, the Core Principles Rules have been 
highly influential at EU level. For instance, since the early stage of EU monetary integration, 
this is evident from the rules included at some of the Services Action Plan Directives and 
Regulation, including the Regulation on the application of international accounting 
standards,410 and the Directive on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, 
insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate.411 In the years to 
follow, the EU slowly developed its own supervisory framework, which again has been 
influenced by the Core Principles. A representative example is central bank independence, 
which was generously granted to the ECB, even after the ECB assumed supervisory 
responsibilities. A full analysis of the effect of Core Principles in the EU, goes beyond the scope 
of this thesis. Hence, this basic analysis aimed to provide context to the discussion to follow 
in chapter three with respect to the evolution of the supervisory framework in the EU, rather 
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than providing a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between BCBS rules and EU 
banking legislation.  
1.6 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter provided an initial analysis of the purpose and conceptual framing of 
central banking, with a particular focus on the idea of central bank independence. This aimed 
to set the ground for the discussion to follow in the succeeding chapters, which primarily 
intend to examine the compatibility of monetary policy and banking supervision tasks, under 
the existing Treaty provisions, in light of the decision to assign supervisory powers to the ECB. 
Section one, after providing an overview of the idea of central bank independence and its 
links with the notions of credibility, transparency and accountability, stressed their relevance 
to the recent debate, concerning the conferral of supervisory powers to central banks, which, 
as aforesaid, lies at the heart of this thesis. In addition, section four, narrowed down the 
discussion on the independence of the ECB in light of EU Treaty provisions.  
 The chapter then described the historical background of the process of European 
integration, which aimed at explaining its rationale and its development through a process of 
gradual evolution that has been characterised by an increased trend of further harmonisation 
of rules and practices. Also, although the adoption EU Treaty provisions, goes back to the 
early 1990s, they still provide the legal basis of the ECB’s operation and guarantee the 
legitimacy of its actions, by also offering the base for any future amendments. Thus, looking 
back in history is an integral part of understanding existing regulatory arrangements as well 
as their potential for future changes. The last section, analysed the BCBS initiatives and their 
role in setting minimum standards for supervisory and regulatory practices. It should be noted 
that there is a broad literature regarding the BCBS rules and their implementation at EU level. 
However, a full analysis of this subject goes beyond the scope of this thesis. Hence, the 
discussion remains limited to the provision of a basic analysis of the BCBS, including: a brief 
overview of its creation; the rationale of its role and purpose; the main legislative initiatives 
and their influence at EU level. This chapter has offered the background needed to allow us 
to proceed to an investigation of the interaction of monetary policy and bank regulation in 
the following chapter two. 
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Chapter 2: The interaction between monetary policy and bank 
regulation 
2.1 Introduction  
As discussed in the previous chapter, on 1 January 1999 the ECB assumed 
responsibility for monetary policy in the Eurozone. The Eurozone represents (as of 2016) the 
second largest economy in the world - measured in nominal terms and according to 
purchasing power parity (PPP) - after the US;412 and (as of 2014) the largest economy in the 
world - measured in terms of the goods and services it produces (GDP).413 Almost eighteen 
years on, the ECB enjoys a high degree of credibility worldwide for its effective monetary 
policy, focused primarily on maintaining price stability. The journey towards the creation of 
the EMU, the establishment of the ECB and the introduction of the euro has been already 
outlined in chapter one. Chapter one, also touched upon the notion of price stability as the 
main objective of the ESCB. Thus, this chapter analyses in detail what the notion of price 
stability entails, by also explaining its rationale and how it came to be established as the key 
goal of the ESCB. 
The monetary policy framework of the ECB, similarly to its overall institutional 
framework, is based on historical experience and the parallel evolution of macroeconomic 
thought. Thus, the ECB’s monetary policy model is built upon two important underlining 
principles: the sole mandate of the monetary authority to maintain price stability and a high 
degree of independence in pursuing its mandate. The second principle has been already 
discussed in detail in chapter one and is also subject to discussion in chapter four, as part of 
the analysis regarding the new responsibilities of the ECB in the supervisory domain. Thus, 
this chapter aims firstly, to explore the role of ECB in maintaining price stability as set by the 
provisions of EU law, including the its rationale, evolution and changing nature. However, as 
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briefly discussed in chapter one, in the aftermath of the GFC, the role of ECB has been 
changing radically. This change has been mainly influenced by a plethora of post-crisis 
regulatory measures aimed at strengthening the ECB’s supervisory role by enhancing its 
financial stability mandate. At the same time, there is no intention to change the original 
institutional framework of the ECB and its traditional role in maintaining price stability 
through inflation targeting goals.  
To this end, although, monetary policy and financial stability are two sides of the same 
coin, their incorporation within an existing institutional framework is not straightforward, but 
it rather raises a number of questions regarding potential synergies that remain subject to an 
ongoing debate. With the introduction of the Banking Union ‘project’ at EU level, and the 
establishment of its first pillar (i.e. the SSM), which facilitated the transfer supervisory powers 
from national to EU level, this debate has been only intensified. However, before analysing 
the regulatory measures that paved the way towards the creation of the Banking Union, it is 
important to discuss the rationale of price stability, as the main objective of monetary 
stability, and its interaction with the Bank’s financial stability function.  
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part is comprised of three sub-sections, 
with the first one (2.1.1) aiming to explore the meaning of monetary policy, its evolution at 
international level from the late 19th century to the modern era. The second sub-section 
(2.1.2) examines the interaction between monetary policy and financial supervision, which is 
followed (in 2.1.3) by an investigation of the potential trade-offs between price stability (as 
the main objective of monetary policy) and financial stability (as the fundamental aim of 
financial supervision). The second part of this chapter is divided into two sub-sections, with 
the first (2.2.1) aimed at exploring the ECB’s monetary policy function as set by EU law and 
the second (2.2.2) examining the Bank’s role in financial stability.  
This chapter starts by mapping the concept of monetary policy and its evolving role 
towards what has come to be established as “the optimal model” or more precisely, the 
desired monetary policy framework. This outline sets the ground for the subsequent analysis 
of the changing role of monetary policy in the aftermath of the GFC. In fact, there is evidence 
generated by the GFC that challenged the conventional wisdom on a monetary policy role 
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focused primarily on maintaining price stability. This discussion also links with the debate 
against the notion of central bank independence both in the pre- and post- crisis era.  
 
2.2 The broader monetary and financial framework 
 
2.1.1 Monetary policy: is there an optimal institutional model? 
 
“Having looked at monetary policy from both sides now, I can testify that central 
banking in practice is much art as science. Nonetheless, while practising this dark art, I have 
always found the science quite useful.”414 
Generally speaking, monetary policy comprises the rules and actions adopted by 
central banks to achieve their objectives, which usually concern controlling the money supply 
and interest rates. According to Friedman, monetary policy, together with fiscal policy, 
constitute: “the two principal means by which government authorities in a market economy 
regularly influence the pace and direction of overall economic activity, importantly including 
not only the level of aggregate output and employment but also the general rate at which 
prices rise or fall.”415 The US’s Fed defines its monetary policy as: “the actions undertaken by 
a central bank, such as the Federal Reserve, to influence the availability and cost of money 
and credit to help promote national economic goals,” with maximum employment, stable 
prices, and moderate long-term interest rates, being set as the statutory objectives for 
monetary policy.416 The ECB does not provide an explicit definition for monetary policy, but it 
specifically outlines its main objective, which is to maintain price stability.417  
As one can notice, the views as to what is defined as monetary policy and how it should 
be conducted varies. In fact, there will always be some a grey area in macroeconomic debates 
when it comes to determining a generally accepted definition for “monetary policy” and the 
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meaning of “money”. This happens due to a combination of evolving views in macroeconomic 
theory and the various interpretations given to monetary history. However, if we look at the 
discussion about monetary policy prior to the GFC, we could talk about almost optimal 
monetary policy models – or generally accepted as optimal – and well-functioned institutional 
arrangements, which were primarily based on inflation targeting policies.  
Similarly to the vagueness of the meaning of monetary policy, there is also, no 
generally accepted definition for inflation targeting.418 The rationale for the widespread 
choice of targeting inflation regime from many central banks around the world, dates back to 
a period when inflation rates increased rapidly, i.e. in the 1970s (in the advanced economies) 
and in the 1980s (in emerging economies).419 This increase in inflation brought evidence that 
challenged the existing monetary policy regimes (which were not inflation-driven) and their 
respective explanatory macroeconomic theories. As a result, by the 1990s many countries 
had started to either adopt or considering adopting inflation targeting goals. To this end, and 
in order to understand how the world came to accept inflation targeting as the optimal 
monetary policy framework, it is important to briefly analyse the roadmap towards inflation 
targeting prevalence, including the historical milestones and the evolution of macroeconomic 
thought. However, since there is an extensive literature on the historical evolution of 
monetary policy and a large body of it, is dedicated on inflation targeting, the analysis to 
follow will focus only on the major events that led to inflation targeting predominance.  
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It should be noted that the term “monetary regimes” is used here to describe the set 
of rules governing the institutions (in most of the cases central banks), which finally determine 
the amount of money supplied. Historically, monetary policy regimes could be divided as 
following: a) the classical gold standard (1870-1914); b) interwar gold exchange standard 
(1925-1939); c) the fixed and floating exchanges rates during the Bretton Woods system 
(1944-1971); and d) the present fiat money system.420  
During the classical gold standard era, the majority of countries adhered to the 
principle of convertibility, where the standard unit of domestic currency was a fixed quantity 
of silver or gold or was linked to a fixed quantity of silver or gold.421 The obvious advantage 
of the gold standard was that a fixed asset backed the value of paper money. Each county had 
discretion to define the gold equivalent of its currency, and as a result would print as much 
money as the size of its gold reserve.422 Monetary policy, during that time, was focused on 
preventing price inflation by the excessive issue of paper currency, which is also believed to 
explain the low inflation rates of this period.423 Another benefit of the classical gold standards 
was that it was based upon an automatic self-regulating mechanism of balance of payments, 
wherein a country that had a balance of payment imbalance at the fixed exchange rate, would 
be subject to an automatic adjustment process to correct the imbalance.424  
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Despite these advantages, the gold standards had certain limitations. Namely, the 
convertibility of the currency was limiting for monetary policy to the extent that the only goal 
was to defend the external value of the currency. This happened mainly because it was the 
availability of silver or gold reserves and the marginal cost of their production that determined 
the stock of money. The reserves of gold or silver, in turn, and by default the money supply, 
depended on natural discoveries. Economic growth, however, depends on the availability of 
credit, and an artificial restriction on expanding the money supply (like the gold standard) 
creates a continuous break against the expansion of economic activity.425 With the outbreak 
of WWI in 1914, the gold standard was abandoned, to only return during the interwar period 
(by the late 1920s) as an evolved version, the so-called gold exchange standard. Finally, in 
1931, when the UK decided to abandon the gold standard, its era came to an end.426 Notably, 
many major central banks were established during the gold standard era, including the 
Banque Nationale de Belgique in 1850; the German Reichsbank in 1876; the Bank of Japan, 
which was the first central bank outside Europe, in 1882; and the US’s Fed was created in 
1913. 
After WWI there was a continuous effort to restore the gold value of currencies, a 
stance that shifted radically in the 1930s during the Great Depression.427  Indeed, the collapse 
of the gold standard coincided with the occurrence of Great Depression, which represents 
one of the darkest eras of central banking.428 There is some literature supporting the idea that 
there is a link between the distortions caused by the golden standard and the Great 
Depression. For instance, Temin attributed the Great Depression to the structural pitfalls of 
the exchange gold standard during the interwar period and the respective ineffective policy 
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responses.429 In the same vein, Eichengreen and Sachs, argued that the countries that 
abandoned the gold standard, revived from the Great Depression at a faster pace in 
comparison to those that decided to adhere the gold standard for longer.430 
Undeniably, the Great Depression had a major influence on the development of 
macroeconomic thought of that time. In fact, the implications of the Great Depression and 
the exploration of its underlying reasons are still subject to ongoing research, and continue 
to influence macroeconomic thought.431 As former chair of the Fed, Ben Bernanke typically 
stated: “to understand the great depression is the Holy Grail of macroeconomics.”432 Notably, 
it was during that period of severe worldwide economic downfall that a window to a new 
macroeconomic thought opened. This was particularly important, since what was then 
acknowledged as conventional economic wisdom, proved to be insufficient in dealing with 
the challenges brought by the Great Depression. In the period prior to the Great Depression, 
economic though was highly influenced by classical economics, which represent the school of 
economic thought exemplified by Adam Smith's writings in the 18th century, and David 
Ricardo, John Stuart Mill and Thomas Robert Malthus’s works during the end of the 18th 
century and early years of the 19th century. 
A new order in macroeconomic thought, pioneered by the British economist, John 
Maynard Keynes (considered as the father of modern macroeconomics) came into 
prominence in an attempt to provide answers as to what led to Great Depression and to offer 
possible solutions in showing the way out of it. Keynes’ theory shifted macroeconomic 
thought from aggregate supply to aggregate demand, and its advocates argued that the huge 
fall in aggregate demand ultimately led to the double-digit unemployment rates in the US 
during the 1930s, and subsequently, to deflationary spiral of the Great Depression. The core 
idea of Keynesianism is that the impact of changes in the level of borrowing interest rates 
over spending in the economy, outweighs in importance the respective impact of changes 
over the money supply. Simply said, when there is evidence that a country’s economy is close 
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to distress, the central bank must drive down its interest rates in order to allow banks and 
people to borrow cheaply, which will ultimately allow them to spend more.433  
As mentioned before, Keynesians believed that inadequate monetary policy led to a 
severe economic meltdown. In addition, monetary policy, although necessary, was 
considered to be insufficient to boost the economy and increase investment flows on its own. 
To this end, Keynesian advocates viewed fiscal policy and thus, government intervention, as 
the only possible solution in terminating a financial distress.434 Notably, Keynes highlighted 
the need for a stabilising system and emphasised “the importance of rule-based regimes to 
stabilise business expectations.”435 In addition, Keynes viewed the role of the central bank as 
a governmental organ and an instrument of public policy, which would ensure state control 
over the currency and all the issues related to it.436 
Keynesian theories proved to be determinant in the post-war negotiations for 
international cooperation, especially in the establishment of the new monetary regime in 
1944, i.e. the Bretton Woods System. The latter represented the settlement of lasting peace 
after WWII and an attempt to learn from the lessons of Great Depression,437 by incorporating 
both the benefits of a fixed system (i.e. stability of exchange rates) and the freedom of a 
floating rate system (i.e. monetary and fiscal independence).438 In a nutshell, Bretton Woods 
was a fixed exchange rate international monetary system, during which the world enjoyed 
two decades of growth, low unemployment rates and stable low inflation.439 This perhaps 
explains, the reasons why Keynesian theory came to be established as the best explanatory 
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theory of fluctuations in economic activity, and as a result, many countries pursued domestic 
stabilisation policies, mainly focused on the goal of full employment.440  
It should be noted here, that the Bretton Woods System was not consistently a fixed 
rate exchange system throughout its duration. Originally, it was designed as a flexible 
exchange rate monetary system, which evolved into an international fixed exchange rate 
monetary system. Bordo divides Bretton Woods into two sub-periods: the pre-convertible 
phase (from 1946 to 1958) and the convertible phase (between 1959 until 1970). As Bordo 
explained in relation to the two periods: “the comparison also relates to the theoretical issues 
raised by the perennial debate over fixed versus flexible exchange rates.”441 In short, in the 
post-WWII, monetary policy period was not given equal importance as fiscal policy in terms 
of its ability to deliver the intended macroeconomic goals. Hence, the role of price stability 
was arguably completely neglected. In fact, monetary policy decisions at the time – most 
notably, the implementation of stabilisation policies in the US – were influenced by the 
assumption that there was a trade-off between unemployment and inflation.442  
This assumption was based on the Phillips curve theory, according to which 
unemployment could be addressed by increasing inflation rates, hence, through expansionary 
monetary policy approaches.443 A central bank pursues an expansionary monetary policy 
when it uses its own tools to stimulate the economy, mainly by keeping interest rates low, 
which expands the money supply and increases aggregate demand in order to boost the 
economy.444 It should be noted that the Phillips curve, was originally based on economic 
theories of the late 18th century and further developed by empirical studies regarding money 
wage growth and unemployment during the 19th century. However, according to Humphrey, 
it was not until 1958 that modern Phillips curve analysis begun, with the publication of 
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Phillips’s famous paper, where he argued that there was an inverse correlation between the 
rate of change in money wages and unemployment.445  
The Phillips curve, was later extended to the relation between inflation and 
unemployment, depicting that there was evidence of this inverse trade-off between them. 
Samuelson and Solow in 1960 discussed the long-run trade-off between employment and 
inflation, and whether one of the goals has to be prioritised over the other.446 This approach 
started from being very influential in adopting expansionary policies in the early 1960s in the 
US, to become highly criticised during and in the aftermath of Great Inflation (see below); and 
thus, leading to alternative theories to the Phillips curve analysis. 
Nonetheless, the collapse of the Bretton Woods System (between 1968 and 1971) 
brought an end to monetary regimes based on the “convertibility principle,” and broke the 
last link of money with gold. As a result, the world’s major currencies were left completely 
unanchored, which was followed by a period of increased inflation that brought new evidence 
that questioned both Keynesian theories and the Phillips curve view of inflation. In fact, the 
Philips curve theory along with the low estimate of the natural rate of unemployment, are 
often blamed for the occurrence of the inflationary gap in the years to follow.447 As discussed 
in Chapter one, there was a vast amount of arguments supporting that there was a negative 
correlation between low inflation and employment levels. The notion of an inflationary gap 
was originated by Keynes in 1940, in an attempt to analyse and calculate the main 
determinants that cause an inflationary rise of prices, i.e. the pressure of inflation.448 Keynes 
defined inflationary gap as: “an excess of planned expenditure over the available output at full 
employment,”449 and considered it to be the main cause of inflation. Thus, according to this 
view, inflationary gap is created when in an economy, aggregate demand exceeds the 
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aggregate value of output at the full employment level. However, the inflationary gap 
constitutes a highly controversial notion that has been subject to extensive criticism, 450 which 
exceeds the scope of this analysis. 
The breakdown of Bretton Woods, was combined with a rapid increase of inflation in 
many countries around the world.451 This period is also known as the Great Inflation or 
Inflation Depression, which involved two decades of high inflation; four economic recessions; 
two severe energy and oil crises; a rapid rise in public debts in the 1970s and in particular, in 
the 1980s; and the unprecedented peacetime implementation of wage and price controls.452 
During the Great Inflation, which according to Samuelson begins from the late 1960s and lasts 
until the early 1980s,453 inflation rates in the US reached their 20th century peak, by exceeding 
10%.454 In addition, the annual inflation rates soared to over 10% during the 1970s across 
OECD countries, with a few exceptions (Germany and Switzerland),455 and in 1975 the United 
Kingdom recorded a peak in inflation of 25%.456 Siegel describes the Great Inflation period as 
the greatest failure of American macroeconomic policy during the post-war period,457 which, 
however, did not remain only a US- related event, but was transmitted quickly to other 
countries and in many cases with an amplifying effect.  
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Interestingly, the discussion regarding the reasons that led to Great Inflation, were 
brought to the surface again during the GFC. This, in turn, led to reopening the debate about 
monetary policy, inflation, central bank independence and supervisory regimes. For instance, 
Samuelson, highlighted the existence of parallels between the Great Inflation and this the 
GFC, which made the former a point of comparison and a source of learning for the current 
policy responses.458 Back to the 1970s, Great Inflation significantly influenced change in 
macroeconomic thought, which happened as a result of the realisation that the acute changes 
in real GDP and in price levels could not be explained anymore by the aggregate demand of 
Keynesian economics. Also, higher inflation did not bring about higher employment or faster 
growth, as it was expected. In fact, monetary policy strategies aimed at reaching and 
maintaining full employment by increasing aggregate demand, had rather the opposite effect 
since they created inflationary pressures.459 Lastly, the Keynesian idea that monetary policy 
should not be concerned about inflation, since there were other factors to be considered as 
more important in influencing inflation (such as fiscal deficits, commodity price shocks, 
aggressive labour unions etc.), proved also to be insufficient in explaining the changing 
parameters of the economy.  
As a result, Keynes’s fiscal and monetary policy theories that had won widespread 
acceptance by the majority of governments around the world during the 1960s, were no 
longer sufficient to address the challenges brought by the upward trend in inflation rates 
during the 1970s and after.460 This in turn, brought increased scepticism as to the role of 
monetary authority and monetary policy strategies. Thus, by the late 1960s, against what had 
become the Keynesian orthodoxy stood the monetarist theory, espoused by Milton Friedman, 
Karl Brunner, and Allan Meltzer.461 The main point of disagreement in the debate between 
Keynesian and Monetarist economists, was primarily the effectiveness of policy instruments. 
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Keynesians were insisting on the effectiveness of fiscal policies, and monetarists were 
supporting that monetary policy alone could control inflation without the need for fiscal 
policies, suggesting that aggregate demand was not affected by fiscal policies but rather by 
the money component.462  
Monetarists, also, argued that increased employment and economic growth could be 
achieved only by stable price levels.463 Pioneer monetarists such as Milton Friedman464 and 
Edmund Phelps,465 insisted that there was no long-run trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment (as the Phillips curve suggested originally), and the economy would 
experience some natural rate of unemployment in the long-run despite the level of 
inflation.466 They supported, that, on the contrary, by mobilising monetary policy to foster 
employment and economic growth, inflation rates would rise. As Friedman stated: “Inflation 
is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon”, a famous dictum that had a major 
impact on macroeconomic theory during the 1960s and onwards, since it proved to be true 
in its prediction during the subsequent inflationary rise. In the words of Friedman: “The 
simultaneous decline in unemployment and inflation produced orgies of self-congratulation 
by the powers that be. However, this happy state proved short-lived as inflation once again 
started to accelerate. Needless to say, the political Establishment tried to prolong the happy 
glow by attributing the acceleration of inflation to special events—bad weather, food 
shortages, labour union intransigence, corporate greed, the OPEC cartel, or any straw at which 
they could grasp. Never any sign of mea culpa.”467 
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By early 1973 the major currencies were floating against one another, and inflation 
had started to become the main target of monetary policy agendas, influencing relevant 
policy decisions.468 By that time monetarist theories had become widely acknowledged and 
policymakers around the world came to realise firstly, the importance of monetary policy in 
controlling inflation and the role of aggregate supply, in the long and the short run; secondly, 
the risky costs of inflation; thirdly, the inability of expansionary monetary policy to keep 
unemployment rates low in the long-run; and the value of a strong nominal anchor. Thus, by 
the mid-1970s, a large number of central banks in industrialised countries adopted monetary 
targeting frameworks or a "managed floating" system, including Germany first in 1974; the 
US, Switzerland, Canada and Italy in 1975; and the UK, France and Australia in 1976.469 
Monetary targeting frameworks were an intermediate exchange-rate regime between 
pegged and freely floating rates, which recognised acceptable exchange rates while allowed 
their flexibility within certain bands.470 Also, monetary targeting systems involved pre-
announced monetary targets, which aimed at stabilising the economy, by focusing at the goal 
of price stability in order to promote growth and decrease the levels of unemployment.471 
However, as Mishkin opined: “the instability of the relationship between monetary 
aggregates and goal variables (inflation and nominal income) make monetary targeting 
problematic”, and thus, the relationship between monetary aggregates and inflation, which 
resulted in the abandonment of monetary targeting.472  
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In addition, during this period of uncertainty (i.e. the Great Inflation), there were 
significant developments taking place in central banking theories, which were mainly derived 
from assessing inflation costs on the economy. As was mentioned earlier, Keynesian 
economists focused their analysis on aggregate demand, while monetarist economists 
included in their analysis the individuals’ maximising behaviour regarding money demand. 
However, neither of them incorporated in their analysis the role of individual decisions that 
affect both aggregate demand and supply, which was exactly what was coming next as a new 
approach to macroeconomics.  
This new school of macroeconomic thought was based on the analysis of behaviour 
and individuals’ maximising choices, while focusing on the long-run aggregate supply and the 
economy’s ability to reach this level of output quickly. Robert Lucas,473 one of the most 
important advocates of this idea, took Friedman’s reasoning a step further and developed the 
rational expectations theory, arguing that the public’s and the markets’ expectations of 
monetary authority decisions were able to influence significantly more than one sector of 
economic activity.474 Mishkin argues that, as a result of this realisation, “….the systematic 
component of policymakers’ actions--i.e., the component that can be anticipated--plays a 
crucial role in the conduct of monetary policy”.475 Also, the theory of rational expectations 
provided a comprehensive and feasible analysis as to why there is no longer a long-run trade-
off between inflation and unemployment, by arguing that a decrease in unemployment rates 
lower than the natural rate would eventually result in increased inflation rates.476  
This explanation of inflation is also linked with the notion of central bank 
independence and with the idea that political pressure might affect central banks’ 
expansionary policies and output goals. To this end, elected officials, either in order to win 
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the favour of the electorate or due to misevaluation of short-run economic expansion, may 
be tempted to act according to short-term goals and as a result, to neglect the long-term 
consequences of expansionary policies. It is at this point that the discussion on central bank 
independence and its evolution into the optimal model for central banking governance 
become relevant, as explained in chapter one. 
The rational expectations theory has also influenced the general understanding of 
monetary policy strategy, and most importantly: “made clearer the need for use of a nominal 
anchor, a nominal variable such as the inflation rate or the money supply, which ties down the 
price level to achieve price stability,”477 by also depicting the time-inconsistency problem, 
which has been already examined in chapter one. The notion of time-inconsistency has 
influenced subsequent research, leading to key findings regarding central banks’ institutional 
design and the significance of pursuing institutional means to keep inflation low, and most 
importantly, the contribution of an independent central bank at maintaining the inflation 
low.478  
Friedman’s concept, that there is no long-run trade-off between output and inflation, 
and the time-inconsistency problem, as depicted by Kydland and Prescott, constituted to a 
large extent the basis of what subsequently became known as the inflation targeting regime, 
which proved to be both a popular and durable monetary policy regime.479 However, before 
the world came into a consensus about the benefits of an inflation targeting framework, there 
was another important momentum in the history of monetary policy that influenced that 
belief, which had also even the debate between Monetarist and Keynesians. This happened 
in August 1979 in the US, when Paul Volcker became Chairman of the Fed Board, whose policy 
measures and implications have been subject of a great body of literature.480 Volcker aimed 
at fighting inflation at any cost and focused on the goal of price stability, appraising it as the 
only possible mean to restore inflation expectations and re-establish economic stability and 
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growth.481 In addition, Volcker announced that the policy instrument of Fed would be to 
target reserve growth rather than the Fed’s funds rate. The early years of Volker’s attempt to 
bringing inflation down, by increasing short-term interest rates, depressed economic activity, 
raised unemployment levels and caused two severe recessions in the early 1980s.482 In simple 
terms, a recession is defined as two consecutive quarters of falling gdp. Despite the negative 
consequences, Volcker continued persistently taking radical steps to rein in runaway inflation 
and insisted in his inflation-fighting strategy by combining higher interest rates and even 
slower reserve growth. In Volker’s own words: “My basic philosophy is over time we have no 
choice but to deal with the inflationary situation because over time inflation and the 
unemployment rate go together… isn’t that the lesson of the 1970s?”483  
Volcker’s monetary policy was highly influenced by the monetarist approach, hence, 
he believed that monetary policy could fight inflation on a permanent basis, without the need 
for fiscal policies or control over wages, prices and credit. However, while that resulted in 
increased unemployment in the short-run, the actual unemployment rates were not close to 
those predicted by the Keynesian theories. Thus, Volcker believed that a vigorous rise in short-
term interest rates could decrease inflation expectations and help to restore moderate 
inflation rates without causing a recession.484 Indeed, over time inflation rates in the US 
showed a slow but steady downward trend, although unemployment high rates persisted. 
However, over time, the downward trend in inflation resulted in increasing the Fed’s 
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credibility, which slowly brought a decline in unemployment rates and an overall increase in 
economic growth, and finally brought inflation rates in the desired level. Subsequently, the 
Fed’s monetary policy strategy, under Alan Greenspan’s leadership, who was the successor 
to Volcker, managed to achieve an inflation rate below 2 percent until the early 2000s, which 
was considered by Greenspan as “effective price stability.” At the same period of time, the 
low inflation rates in the US were combined with improved inflation rates worldwide.485 
Volker’s remarkable forward-thinking approach and its perceived successful outcomes in the 
US economy constituted the basis of the new consensus in monetary policy theory.486 As 
Blinder argued, a great lesson Volker taught us is that: “….tight monetary policy can bring 
inflation down at substantial, but not devastating, cost” and “…money-supply targeting can 
be hazardous to a nation’s health.”487  
  As the recession in the US came to an end by 1982, the economy started expanding, 
not only for the US but at a global scale. In the years to follow, recessions occurred, but they 
did not last long, and they were not severe. Notably, in the US, after the Volcker recession era 
and before the GFC, the economy has experienced only two recessions, one in 1990 and 
another in 2001.488 Those years from 1984 to 2007 are also known as the Great Moderation, 
a term fist used by Ben Bernanke in his speech in February 2004.489 Notably, Great 
Moderation was dominated by low real GDP volatility and low interest rates. Interestingly, 
although there is no consensus about the components that ultimately led to this positive 
outcome, monetary policy is often cited as a contributing factor.490 Bernanke attributed the 
Great Moderation to improved monetary policy, by arguing that: “the historical pattern of 
changes in the volatilities of output growth and inflation gives some credence to the idea that 
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better monetary policy may have been a major contributor to increased economic stability.”491 
To this end, it is believed that among the factors that contributed to that positive scenario, 
was the consensus achieved on the factors that were likely to lead to inflation as well as the 
rise of central bank independence. In fact, economists and policymakers believed that 
macroeconomic theory in conjunction with monetary policy were the key to success; an 
approach that incudes elements of Keynesianism, Monetarism, and neoclassical 
economics.492 Neoclassical economics originate in the work of Alfred Marshall, who 
explained, back in 1890, prices such as the intersection of supply and demand curves.493  Since 
then, neoclassical economics had attracted many important economists (including, inter alia: 
George Stigel, Paul Samuelson and Milton Friedman), but have been also subject to extensive 
criticism.494 Nowadays, the term neoclassical economics is used to make reference to 
mainstream economic models that relate to the determination of prices, outputs, and income 
distribution in markers to supply and demand.495  
As a result of this incorporation of ideas, a new school of macroeconomic thought was 
about to evolve: the new Keynesian school, which emerged as the preferred approach to 
modern macroeconomic analysis.496 An important development during the Great Moderation 
was that both economists and policymakers valued the importance of communication and 
transparency of central banks in achieving effectively their monetary policy goals.497 All in all, 
Friedman’s famous quote: “inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon”, 
gained widespread acceptance among economists and remains influential until today.498 
Other components of monetary policy that came to be widely accepted as principle rules for 
a successful monetary policy was what Fed’s monetary policy under Greenspan’s leadership 
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taught us, i.e. the ability of monetary policy to control and maintain low inflation along with 
low unemployment rates, and with infrequent, mild recessions.499 However, it should be 
noted that Greenspan’s monetary policy came into question in 2007, when the housing 
bubble in the US signalled the biggest (finance generated) recession in history. This led many 
observers to blame Greenspan’s loose monetary policy for the expansion of the housing 
bubble and the negative effect of lowering interest rates.500 
Evolution in macroeconomic theory in conjunction with empirical and historical 
evidence (the high costs of inflation, as discussed earlier), and the Fed’s successful monetary 
policy strategy under Volcker,501 led to the evolution of inflation targeting from money 
targeting to a monetary policy focused on the goal of price stability.502 As mentioned already 
in chapter one, during the early 1990s, inflation targeting regimes became a global trend. New 
Zealand was the very first country to have adopted an inflation targeting regime in 1989;503 
which was followed by Canada in 1991; the UK in 1992; and Australia and Sweden in 1993.504 
Despite its widespread acceptance, the actual implementation of inflation targeting has been 
customised in various ways, with some countries announcing an explicit numerical inflation 
target (the prevalent trend) and with some of them to have followed implicit inflation 
targeting505   
If we try to define a general meaning of inflation targeting – including questions such 
as: what does it entail? Which are the general characteristics applied to inflation targeting 
regimes, if any? – the approaches vary. For instance, according to King: “An inflation-targeting 
framework combines two distinct elements: (a) a precise numerical target for inflation in the 
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medium term and (b) a response to economic shocks in the short term. The inflation target 
provides a rule-like framework on which the private sector can anchor its expectations about 
future inflation”.506 Moreover, as Munchau stated: “The purpose of inflation targets is to 
provide a nominal anchor for inflationary expectations.”507 According to Kahn, inflation 
targeting involves the explicit announcement that inflation constitutes the main target of 
monetary policy, and when there is a need to prioritise macroeconomic targets, (for instance: 
if there is a choice between unemployment and inflation, inflation should prevail).508  
Lastly, according to Bernanke: "Inflation targeting is a framework for monetary policy 
characterised by the public announcement of official quantitative targets (or target ranges) 
for the inflation rate over one or more time horizons, and by explicit acknowledgement that 
low, stable inflation is monetary policy’s primary long-run goal. Among other important 
features of inflation targeting are vigorous efforts to communicate with the public about the 
plans and objectives of the monetary authorities, and, in many cases, mechanisms that 
strengthen the central bank’s accountability for attaining those objectives."509 It should be 
noted that inflation targeting is perceived differently in terms of its institutional 
arrangements. Regardless of its various forms, however, the overall performance of inflation 
targeting regimes is considered as generally successful.510 A recent example is the GFC, which 
brought evidence suggesting that central banks with inflation targeting frameworks 
performed better than the rest.511  
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One of the most typical and economically important central banking systems that 
follow an explicit inflation targeting strategy is the Eurosystem, which, as already highlighted, 
comprises the ECB and NCBs of the EU Member States that have joined the Euro. Although 
the Eurosystem does not deem to have a monetary policy strategy solely focused on inflation 
targeting, since it also controls money growth rates; yet its independent status, the 
importance of transparent communication and most importantly, the explicit definition of 
price stability, qualify its monetary policy as inflation targeting. As it could be concluded by 
the analysis above, central banking regulation has always taken shape through periods of 
uncertainty and after legislative interventions responding to crises. Thus, one lesson that 
could be drawn throughout this evolving process, is the that there are no optimal models to 
guarantee the long-term soundness of a financial system. The following section discusses the 
interaction between monetary policy and financial supervision when combined within the 
same authority.   
2.1.2 Monetary policy and financial supervision 
Central bank’s structure and position, unavoidably, influences both monetary policy 
and banking supervision. Even though the two notions are substantially different, including 
the overall motive, intent, the nature of decisions, the information needed to perform 
respective tasks, implementation and the qualifications of the staff needed;512 they are, at 
the same time, closely interlinked and have the ability to influence each other’s performance. 
Historically, governmental structures of monetary policy and banking supervision 
management were divided into two distinct categories, which were based on two models. 
Firstly, the English model, where the central bank was responsible for both monetary policy 
and banking supervision, and secondly, the German model, where there was a clear 
separation or a ‘Chinese Wall’ between these two functions.513 Before exploring the nexus 
between monetary policy and banking supervision, which constitutes the main theme of this 
thesis, it is important to examine the evolution of their objectives in light of the GFC. Having 
presented the history of monetary policy, this section aims to examine changing attitudes 
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towards the existing monetary policy regimes in a way that would incorporate financial 
stability objectives.   
As discussed in great detail above, prior to the GFC, macroeconomic thought had 
reached consensus on an ‘optimal’ model of monetary policy. This involved monetary policy 
strategies designed to maintaining price stability, mainly obtained through inflation targeting 
(explicit or implicit), as the best way to stabilise both macro-economy and the financial system 
as whole.514 As Schwartz advocated in the late 1980s: “a central bank that was able to 
maintain price stability would also incidentally minimize the need for lender of-last-resort 
intervention,”515 since price level instability, i.e. fluctuations in inflation, triggers or 
exacerbates financial disturbances. The same belief remained dominant until recently, with 
most of the pre-GFC literature suggesting that monetary policy focused on promoting stable 
and low inflation (i.e. price stability), was able to maintain financial stability.516 This approach 
was also backed by empirical evidence. For instance, Bordo et al. highlighted in their study 
that: “our results indicate that a monetary regime that produces aggregate price stability will, 
as a by-product, tend to promote stability of the financial system.”517 
However, even before the occurrence of the GFC, there were those who predicted the 
insufficiency of price-stability-oriented monetary policy regimes to achieving simultaneously 
their financial stability goals. For instance, White, while agreeing that the price stability goal 
is of great importance, argued at the same time that: “achieving near-term price stability 
might sometimes not be sufficient to avoid serious macroeconomic downturns in the medium 
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term.”518 In the same line, Borio and Lowe, although supporting the view that stable inflation 
promotes financial stability, they also advocated that: “financial imbalances can and do build 
up in periods of disinflation or in a low inflation environment”, and thus: “achieving monetary 
and financial stability requires that appropriate anchors be put in place in both spheres”, 
which requires: “co-operation between monetary and prudential authorities.”519 An opposing 
view to the conventional wisdom was that of Leijonhufvud who stated in 2007: “I have a 
number of reservations concerning this fashionable policy doctrine. In particular, I maintain 
that stabilising the consumer price index (or its rate of growth) does not guarantee stability of 
the financial system. Moreover, under certain conditions, concentrating on year-to-year 
monetary stability, in the sense of keeping to a CPI inflation target, can lead you to follow 
policies that are inimical to financial stability over the longer run.”520  
These concerns became relevant in the GFC era, when its complex consequences and 
the enormous costs of the unstable financial environment, brought evidence regarding the 
shortcomings of the existing monetary policy framework. The inflation-targeting-focused 
monetary policies proved to be unable to deliver the goal of price stability, and subsequently 
ensure the soundness of the financial system as a whole. In addition, the focus on the sole 
mandate of price stability appeared to pose a high risk to financial stability, and this in turn, 
created severe risks for price stability itself. For instance, Carney advocated that: “Price 
stability is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the stabilization of economic activity, 
and it must be supplemented by a robust macro-prudential regulatory framework,”521 while 
White added that: “price stability was not enough to ensure high, sustained growth.”522 Thus, 
the overriding importance of maintaining price stability was reconsidered when general 
financial instability appeared to be outweighing the sole mandate of price stability. As 
Crockett opined: “…. since the 1980s inflation has been largely conquered, and yet financial 
instability has, if anything, intensified…” adding that: “…. the pursuit of price stability can 
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sometimes allow financial imbalances to arise inadvertently, and can sow the seeds of 
subsequent instability.”523  
To this end, many observers also attributed the occurrence of the GFC to loose 
monetary policy practices, and raised questions about the future of monetary policy and its 
linkages with financial stability, bringing a great deal of attention towards strengthening the 
role of central bank in financial stability, through appropriate mechanism that would mitigate 
systemic risk.524 For instance, De Grauwe, argued that the GFC “unveiled the fallacy of this 
hands-off view,” meaning the inflation targeting orthodoxy.525 Others considered the 
rationale of inflation-targeting strategies itself misleading, since even when inflation-
targeting policies were appropriately applied, low interest rates for extended periods might 
have led financial institutions to excessive risk-taking practices. For instance, Taylor found 
that the policy decisions of Fed, under Greenspan’s lead, to significantly decrease interest 
rates, before the emergence of the GFC, had a major impact to triggering its occurrence.526 
According to Taylor, there is was link between the expansionary monetary policy decisions 
(especially in US) and the emergence of financial crisis, which he attributed to the 
inappropriate application of inflation-targeting polices.527 Taylor also believes that that there 
was a possible correlation between the increase of interest rates in the US and the similar 
policies adopted by the ECB at the same period of time. 
Taylor’s reasoning on the pitfalls of monetary policy decision that led to the GFC, was 
mainly focused what is known as the “Taylor Rule.” The Taylor Rule was created by John Taylor 
in 1993 in an attempt to explain the interest rate decisions of the Fed’s Open Market 
Committee at the time. The Taylor Rule uses a method that describes how central banks 
should set short-term interest rates, as the instrument of monetary policy, in order to deliver 
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both short- and long-term objectives in a changing economic environment. In short, the 
Taylor Rule suggests increasing interest rates when inflation rates exceed their target or when 
the levels of employment are higher than expected; and to lower them in the contrary 
scenarios.528 The Taylor Rule has revolutionised the way many central banking policymakers 
deal with monetary policy and came to be widely influential because it is easy to use in diverse 
monetary policy regimes, including regimes that have a dual mandate (embedding both price 
stability and financial stability), and regimes that are solely focused on price stability goals.529 
Notably, with regards to the GFC, Taylor argued that despite the fact that the price stability 
goal was met, excessive monetary policy decisions of the Fed, which deviated from what the 
Taylor Rule prescribes, resulted subsequently in poor inflation rates.530 A counter argument 
regarding the reasons that led to the crisis, is that there were not inefficient monetary policy 
decisions that triggered it, but rather regulatory and supervisory failures, in combination with 
some special circumstances.531 
However, the consensus that prevailed regarding ‘optimal’ monetary policy models 
and thus, the evolution of monetary policy, did not equally apply to banking supervision. 
During the pre-GFC era, while the primary and often sole mandate of monetary policy was 
price stability, financial stability was the realm of prudential supervision, which was usually 
conducted by a body separate from the central bank. In addition, as previously mentioned 
before, the financial stability of the while system was considered to be maintained by 
mitigating the risks to individual financial institutions, i.e. micro-prudential supervision. In 
order to understand the subsequent change in the aforementioned framework, it is important 
here to define firstly, the difference between supervision and regulation and secondly, the 
notions of micro- and macro-prudential supervision. Simply said, banking regulation refers to 
rule-making, i.e. the legislation that sets the rules for acceptable behaviour and conduct for 
financial institutions. Banking supervision refers to the enforcement of legislation and thus, 
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the oversight of financial institutions’ behaviour. Despite of their distinct features, regulation 
and supervision are often used interchangeably, since their supervisors are also assigned rule-
making powers.532  
As already mentioned in chapter one, the micro-prudential dimension of supervision 
aims at mitigating risks to individual financial institutions and thus, it is primarily concerned 
with the soundness of individual financial institutions. Macro-prudential supervision, on the 
contrary, considers the systemic implications, i.e. systemic risk, of the collective behaviour of 
financial firms, aiming to prevent the build-up of financial imbalances.533 As Crockett pointed 
out: “the macro-prudential objective can be defined as limiting the costs to the economy from 
financial distress, including those that arise from any moral hazard induced by the policies 
pursued. One could think of this objective as limiting the likelihood of the failure, and 
corresponding costs, of significant portions of the financial system. This is often loosely 
referred to as limiting ‘systemic risk’...while…. “the micro-prudential objective can be seen as 
limiting the likelihood of failure of individual institutions.”534  
As noted by Borio and White: “In a nutshell, a ‘macro-prudential’ orientation would 
stress the system-wide perspective of risk in terms of objectives and the way of achieving 
them. It would be less concerned with the failure of individual institutions per se and more 
with the macroeconomic costs of financial distress as the ultimate metric to choose policies. 
And it would fully recognise how financial distress of this type tends to arise from common 
exposures and the mutual interaction between the financial and real economy, with the 
evolution of risk being in part endogenous with respect to the collective behaviour of financial 
players.”535 Thus, macro-prudential supervision focuses mainly on systemic risk implications, 
rather than an individual bank’s risks. The systemic risk phenomenon, while it was known 
even before the latest crisis, was highly underestimated. Blinder defines systemic risk as: “one 
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that is either large enough in size or broad enough in scope that, if things go wrong, it can 
damage a significant portion of the financial system.”536 Also, a definition of what systemic 
risk entails, was provided by the IMF, BIS and FSB on the report to the G-20 Finance Ministers 
and Governors (2009): "a risk of disruption to financial services that is caused by an 
impairment of all or parts of the financial system and has the potential to have serious 
negative consequences for the real economy."537  
It should be mentioned that while macro-prudential supervision became accepted as 
necessary in the course of the GFC, it has a long pedigree. Early discussion on systemic risk 
can be traced to the mid-1970s, when Bankhaus Herstatt collapsed (in 1974). As discussed 
already in chapter one, despite of its small size, the collapse of Bankhaus Herstatt generated 
significant losses and caused chaos in the international financial markets, since it was heavily 
involved in foreign exchange transactions.538 As a result, what became evident was that the 
banking system had entered the era of globalisation, creating a complex system of interlinked 
dynamics that had the potential to trigger systemic risks. On the other hand, what 
subsequently proved to be highly problematic is that regulation and supervision of the 
financial system had remained national, subject to national authorities and domestic 
legislation. This triggered an increased awareness at both national and international level, 
and resulted in the establishment of BCBS, which, as analysed already, is often linked with the 
Bankhaus Herstatt failure and the attempt to create greater cooperation at international level 
through mutual standards in regulations and supervision.539  
The most prominent element when discussing the macro-prudential aspect of central 
banks’ objectives, is financial stability. Financial stability constituted the initial motivation for 
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setting up central banks,540 and thus, has historically been part of the dual mandate of central 
banks (involving both price stability and financial stability objectives).541 However, there is no 
consensus as to what exactly constitutes “financial stability,” and the adequate mechanisms 
and tools needed to foster financial stability, remain until today a highly debated issue. 
Indeed, as Lastra argued, the goal of financial stability is difficult to be defined since it 
constitutes a multidimensional notion (national, regional and international) and involves a 
variety of instruments that are likely to assist in its accomplishment.542 Moreover, Lastra 
suggested that in order to maintain financial stability, there should be measures implemented 
which would go beyond the national borders. As Lastra describes it: “Like a tsunami that does 
not respect national boundaries, episodes of financial instability have a trans-national 
dimension, thus requiring a trans-national solution.”543 Crockett, instead of defining financial 
stability, preferred to describe the negative scenario of financial instability, with the latter 
being an: “economic performance that is potentially impaired by fluctuations in the price of 
financial assets, or in the ability of financial intermediaries to meet their contractual 
obligations.”544  
At EU level, although the term financial stability is not clear and it is not explicitly 
defined in EU primary law  (with the exception of the mention in Article 127(5), TFEU) the ECB 
has explained that financial stability constitutes: “a condition in which the financial system – 
comprising financial intermediaries, markets and market infrastructures – is capable of 
withstanding shocks and the unravelling of financial imbalances in the financial 
intermediation process which are severe enough to significantly impair the allocation of 
savings to profitable investment opportunities.”545 To this regard, Lastra opined that financial 
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stability in Europe constitutes an evolving concept, which concerns various components and 
orientates the functioning of the European financial architecture.546 According to the 2014 
Financial Stability Review of the ECB, “Capturing the complex notion of financial stability is 
not straightforward; the ECB defines it as a condition in which the financial system – 
intermediaries, markets and market infrastructures – can withstand shocks without major 
disruption in financial intermediation and in the effective allocation of savings to productive 
investment.”547  As it could be noticed, financial stability is a complex and elusive notion, and 
the absence of a concrete definition makes it harder to analyse the relationship between 
financial stability and monetary policy.548 One thing its definite, financial stability has always 
constituted a goal that was directly associated with the very nature and purpose of central 
banks. As Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa described: “The role of central banks in financial stability 
was thus part of their genetic code.”549 
In the run-up to the 2007 crisis, financial stability risks grew. This was attributed to the 
prevalent approach to financial stability, according to which the system as a whole can be 
maintained robust by safeguarding the soundness of individual financial institutions, i.e. 
micro-prudential supervision. As discussed already in chapter one, this was the dominant 
view supported in both Basel I and II, which has been, however, subject to a wide criticism. 
For instance, Brunnermeier supported that this view represents a fallacy of composition in 
practice, arguing that: “in trying to make themselves safer, banks, and other highly leveraged 
financial intermediates, can behave in a way that collectively undermines the system. Selling 
an asset when perceived risk increases, is a prudential response from the perspective of an 
individual bank. But if many banks acts in this way, the asset price will collapse, forcing 
institutions to take yet further steps to rectify the situation. Such responses by banks lead to 
generalised declines in asset price, and to enhanced correlations and volatility is asset 
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markets. Risk is endogenous to bank behaviour.”550 Indeed, the GFC reaffirmed the 
aforementioned concerns, by bringing evidence that the whole system behaves differently 
than its individual components and the build-up of financial imbalances have contagious 
effects to the global financial system as whole, creating the known as domino effect i.e. the 
failure of one institutions infected the whole financial system. Perhaps, it was the excessive 
focus on the individual elements/problems that prevented policymakers from seeing the 
bigger picture and the threat that such a narrow view might bring to financial stability, with 
the latter being taken somewhat for granted. Thus, the need to focus on the macro-prudential 
policies in order to safeguard the financial system as whole, gained widespread acceptance.551  
It should be stressed, that despite the facts that financial stability and systemic risk 
implications have been linked with macro-prudential supervision, yet, by targeting solely the 
macro-prudential dimension of supervision and regulation might not prove to be sufficient in 
a long-term basis. In fact, it is believed that macro-prudential measures, while essential, 
should be incorporated with effective monetary policy measures, strong fiscal policies and 
consistent micro-prudential supervision, all in a way that they will complement each other.552 
However, the incorporation of all these objectives under the same institution might create 
risks that could raise questions regarding their interaction and their optimal institutional 
marrying. The most prominent concern that was raised in this regard, stressed the issue of 
interactions between monetary and macro-prudential policies, and more precisely, the 
interconnectedness or perhaps, competitiveness between their respective goals of price and 
financial stability.553 This discussion is also highly relevant to the main idea of this thesis -the 
recently assumed supervisory powers by the ECB with the advent of Banking Union- and the 
relevant debate on the compatibility of this broader mandate with the existing Treaty 
provisions, which is developed in chapter four.  
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To summarise the points made throughout this section, the experience of the GFC 
apart from shedding light on the loopholes of monetary policy instruments, it also brought 
financial stability to the centre of the policy agenda. In addition, the intertwined relationship 
between the goals of financial stability and price stability, triggered discussion on the 
possibility of returning central banks to their roots by re-assuming a broad mandate.554 The 
debate that followed the 2007 crisis, stressed the need for fostering the macro-prudential 
dimension of financial stability, which seemed to have been relatively ignored earlier. As 
already discussed, until then, policymakers were focused more on the traditional micro-
prudential dimension of regulation. Yet, this narrow focus on the safety and soundness of 
individual institutions proved to be insufficient to secure systemic stability, since important 
systemic risk implications seemed to have been disregarded or even triggered negatively by 
some aspects of the micro-prudential approach.555   
In light of this realisation, many governments adopted regulatory responses, including 
a plethora of legislative proposals and reforms, which aimed at reshaping macro-economic 
policies in a way that would create a bridge between monetary policy and financial stability. 
Banking supervision reforms came into prominence, aiming to strengthen the macro-
prudential dimension and to tackle the systemic risk problem. At international level, a good 
example was the introduction of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, in the US, which has been 
considered to be the most extensive financial regulatory reform in the US since the Great 
Depression, by bringing a considerable increase of the supervisory powers of Fed.556 In 
Germany, the governing coalition parties, proposed in late 2010 to dismantle the single 
supervisory authority (the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority-BaFin) and to assign its 
responsibilities to the Bundesbank, which shared supervisory duties with BaFin prior to the 
GFC.557 In the same line, in 2010, the UK introduced a new banking reform, which empowered 
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the Bank of England with supervisory powers.558 Also in 2010, Ireland’s Central Bank Reform 
Act,559 established a new single unitary body- the Central Bank of Ireland - in order to 
undertake both central banking and supervisory duties; replacing the Boards of the Central 
Bank and Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority. The Basel III Accord, as discussed 
already, envisages a stricter capital regulation, including the launching of new parameters, 
such as liquidity requirements.560  
At European level, financial regulation and supervision has been also subject to 
historic changes. The ECB assumed supervisory powers in November 2014, transforming from 
a purely monetary agency to the key supervisory authority for credit institutions in the 
Eurozone. The roadmap towards to adoption of this decision and the creation of Banking 
Union’s first pillar, i.e. the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is discussed in detail in the 
following chapter, while chapter four provides an in-depth legal analysis of the new 
supervisory powers of ECB under new and existing provisions.  
To this end, among the issues that arose during the GFC, was whether to assign 
supervisory task to the central bank and whether financial and price stability are a dual or a 
duelling mandate? However, this topic, is not new, since it has been linked with the very 
existence of central banking, and with the traditional role of the central bank as the 
government’s bank.561 The following section critically examines the combination of monetary 
policy and banking supervision objectives under the central bank’s remit.  
2.1.3 Is there a dichotomy between financial stability and price stability objectives? 
The literature regarding the interaction between financial and price stability goals, and 
the potential trade-offs of their combination under the same authority, has been booming in 
the aftermath of the GFC. However, the following discussion is mainly focused on the legal 
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dimension of the relevant debate, whereas the economic synergies involved are discussed 
only to the extent that they contribute to the legal domain. This discussion serves the main 
topic of this thesis, which aims at exploring the recent broadening of the ECB’s mandate, 
involving the marrying of monetary stability and banking supervision, and its compatibility 
with the existing legal environment. Thus, the examination of the nexus between their main 
objectives, i.e. price stability and financial stability respectively, aims at stressing both the 
advantages and disadvantages of their combination under central bank’s remit, as developed 
by the literature prior and post the GFC era.  
As discussed already, according to the convention view, a successful monetary policy 
is the one that focuses mainly on price stability, while financial variables over and above their 
effects on inflation were considered irrelevant. Thus, maintaining price stability through an 
inflation targeting policy was considered adequate in maintaining at the same time financial 
stability.562 As emphasised in the previous section of this chapter, the roots of these findings 
go back to the predominance of inflation targeting regimes and the belief that monetary 
policy, which credibly preserves price stability, is also able to promote financial stability. In 
line with this doctrine, was also the belief that there is an increased likelihood of policy trade-
offs when particular financial imbalances occur, and the central bank tries to achieve both 
objectives simultaneously, i.e. preserving price stability and safeguarding financial stability. 
This view was also backed by early empirical studies, suggesting that there is a possibility of a 
conflict of interest when the functions of banking supervision and monetary policy are 
combined.563 However, it is worth noting that Goodhart and Schoenmaker, who were the 
early advocates of this view, while suggested that the two functions should be separated, 
since there was historical evidence supporting the benefits of their separation; they also, 
argued that both arguments in favour of their combination or separation, were lacking, and 
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anyways the involvement of the central bank in supervisory issues is unavoidable due to its 
unique role as the lender of last resort when needed.564  
Highly influenced by this view, the majority of inflation-targeting central banks around 
the world were operating under the so-called “separation principle,” with the goals of price 
stability and financial stability being strictly disconnected from one another, which practically 
led to the separation of monetary policy from supervision and regulation. The separation of 
the two objectives is based on the so-called Tinbergen Rule, first formulated by Tinbergen, in 
early 1952.565 In a nutshell, the Tinbergen Rule implies that there should be some consistency 
between instruments and objectives, i.e. at least one separate policy instrument for each 
policy objective.566 Thus, since, in accordance to the Tinbergen Rule, addressing two 
targets/objectives with only one instrument is not feasible, monetary policy cannot deal with 
both price stability and financial stability at the same time, since an authority with more than 
one objectives will tend to misapply its own resources and might disregard one of them or 
more.567 It follows that although, monetary policy can adequately pursue its price stability 
objective with the instrument of interest rates, yet, the same instrument cannot be used to 
pursue the objective of financial stability.568 Therefore, the two policies can be 
complementary to each other only in case their respective objectives are to be equally 
targeted and achieved.569 This practically means that if there are more than one policy 
objectives, there should be available an equal number of independent policy instruments.  
The advocates of the “separation principle” also argue that the two objectives shall be 
pursued with different policy instruments. For instance, Bernanke believed that financial 
stability should be pursued by regulation and supervision, whereas monetary policy is better 
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suited to aim at stability growth and inflation.570 Similarly, Svensson argued that: “each policy 
can be conducted separately, with different objectives and different instruments. This is 
regardless of whether the central bank is in charge of both monetary policy and financial-
stability policy or whether the central bank is in charge of monetary policy only and there is a 
separate authority in charge of financial-stability policy.”571 A counter argument to this belief, 
supports that the Tinbergen rule does not work in practice since “interest rates affect financial 
stability and, hence, real activity”…while…“macroprudential tools impact credit growth and 
external imbalances with consequences for macroeconomic and price stability;” and lastly, 
“rather than viewing the allocation problem as having a corner solution where one instrument 
is devoted entirely to one objective, the macro-stabilization exercise must be viewed as a joint 
optimization problem where monetary and regulatory policies are used in concert in pursuit 
of both objectives.”572  
For those who argue against the dual mandate for central banks, a major problem 
when it comes to the incorporation of price stability and financial stability objectives, rests on 
the fact that they constitute two completely different notions that serve opposite purposes. 
In addition, price stability, since it reflects real shocks, is more predictable and can be explicitly 
determined, whereas financial vulnerabilities are not easily determined, because they are 
often based on legal interpretations and tend to take shape over time. Sometimes, they can 
even retain their negative effect for longer than predicted.573 For instance, Svensson while 
recognised some commonalities between financial stability and monetary policy, highlighted 
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at the same time that they constitute two distinct notions, with different objectives, 
instruments and responsible authorities. Indeed, price stability is the primary objective of 
monetary policy, whereas financial stability is the main goal of macro-prudential 
policies/supervision.574 Thus, for monetary policy the situation is more straightforward – one 
objective-one instrument (price stability-monetary policy) – whereas for financial stability, 
although it primarily involves one objective, the necessary instruments are many (among the 
rest: supervision, resolution and lender of last resort).575  
Indeed, the instruments used by monetary policy in achieving its goals, are 
considerably different when compared to financial stability instruments. In normal times, 
monetary policy operates through policy interest rates and communication, including a 
publicly- announced policy-rate strategy and a forecast of inflation, and the real economy. In 
times of instability, emergency mechanisms might be applied, such as fixed-rate loans at 
longer maturities, asset purchases and foreign-exchange intervention to prevent currency 
appreciation. On the other hand, financial stability operates through instruments such as 
micro- and macro- supervision, regulation and financial stability reports. These instruments, 
should be activated in a timely manner in order to address early warnings of a potential 
financial crisis, by also analysing and predicting possible gaps that might lead to financial 
instability. In times of instability, the available tools are: lender of last resort mechanisms, 
special resolution mechanisms for financial institutions in danger, government capital 
injections, risk management and so forth. As highlighted by Garicano and Lastra, “in an 
environment with multiple tasks that are observable with different difficulty, the setting of 
clear performance criteria in the tasks that are easily measurable deflects agents’ efforts away 
from the tasks that may be valuable but are more difficult to measure.”576  
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Another argument that has been used to lay emphasis to the incompatibility between 
financial and price stability objectives is the risk of undermining central bank independence; 
a belief that is highly based on the time-inconsistency problem.  For instance, a recent study 
by Ueda and Valencia, based on the time-inconsistency problem, found that that a dual-
mandate central bank is not socially optimal, whilst, “the separation of objectives achieves the 
social optimum as long as policy is conducted by politically independent institutions.”577 
Hence, the time-inconsistency problem arises when the two objectives are combined, often 
due to loose monetary policy in an attempt to preserve simultaneously financial stability. As 
a result, as Smets argues, when there is no clear separation between the two domains, i.e. 
monetary policy and macro-prudential supervision and regulation, and macro-prudential 
policy is not explicitly defined, and it becomes subject to political interference, there is a 
greater possibility for the creation of a larger inflation bias than the one that would result 
from the time-inconsistency problem.578 Furthermore, it is argued that the combination of 
these two objectives might pose a serious risks to both independence and accountability of 
central banks. Although this issue is thoroughly examined at the last chapter of the thesis, 
when discussing the ECB’s independence, it is worth mentioning its relevance with the 
aforementioned reasoning. To this end, as central banks’ mandate expands to financial 
stability objectives, their operation also expands into areas that are highly political. Recent 
examples range from the involvement of central banks into housing policy to the conduct of 
gigantic bail-out operations. In addition, in case of a bank collapse within a financial system 
where the central bank is assigned a dual mandate, it is presumed that its public reputation 
might be threatened not only in regard to the supervisory tasks, but also in relation to its 
monetary policy credibility.579 
Notably, both those in favour and against a dual mandate for central banks, suggest 
that when a central bank – which is explicitly mandated to safeguard price stability via 
inflation targeting – assumes macro-prudential supervisory powers, it poses a high risk to its 
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independence, which in turn will put in danger the main mandate of price stability.580 This 
belief seems to be largely justified, since there are obvious incentives as to why a central bank 
might come under increased political pressure when acting as a supervisor, in comparison 
with the scenario when its role is solely focused on price stability targets. Simply said, financial 
institutions are the subjects of central banks’ decisions and thus, directly affected by the 
outcome of changes in policy. As a result, a financial institution will be driven to use all 
available means in order to influence central bankers in avoiding the application of restrictive 
macro-prudential tools, especially during a credit bubble. 581  
A good example, as pointed out by Mishkin, is the case of Basel III Accord, which 
proved that political interference during both its negotiation process and implementation 
stage, may indeed place significant constrains on the adoption of adequate macro-prudential 
decisions. Namely, according to press reports, various complains originated by the German 
Landesbanken, during the negotiation of Basel III, resulted in the adoption of weaker capital 
standards. In addition, its implementation was put off for 10 years, while systemic risk 
measures were largely neglected, including higher capital requirements on systemically 
important banks.582 This explains, as discussed in chapter one, the criticism against Basel III 
based on the realisation that was bringing nothing new to his predecessor, i.e. Basel II. This 
also explains the reluctant and highly selective attitude towards the implementation of Basel 
III at EU level, which was surprisingly different from the traditional receptive approach. 
There are, however, a number of advantages when combining the financial and price 
stability objectives under central bank’s roof. Firstly, it promotes better information exchange 
and cooperation. This proved to be particularly important during the GFC, when it was 
depicted that monetary policy influences both inflation rates and the price of risk taking. It is 
therefore necessary, as Garicano and Lastra argued, that “those in charge of monetary policy 
need to know the amount of risk and instability in the system” and, “the absence of stable 
prices harms the stability of the financial system, while financial fragility in turn, negatively 
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affects monetary stability.”583 This enhanced communication is also likely to foster the 
coordination between the two domains (i.e. monetary policy and banking supervision), which 
in turn, is likely to help efficiency.  In addition, since the majority of price-stability-oriented 
central banks have been granted a high degree of independence, which is often established 
under constitutional law, this can contribute to shield supervision from political 
interference.584 Lastly, the role of central banks to act as lender of last resort, which involves 
the provision of immediate liquidity to the banking system, provides them with enhanced 
tools in dealing with financial imbalances. Indeed, the role of lender of last resort, entails 
obvious advantages in times of instability in avoiding systemic problems, since it assures 
immediate circulating of the relevant information and prompt decision making.585  
As repeatedly emphasised, the GFC, has decisively changed attitudes towards the 
conventional view, with many arguing about the need to include financial stability among the 
set of central banks’ objectives. As Papademos argued: “…price stability and financial stability 
complement and mutually reinforce one another”, adding that: “monetary policy that credibly 
preserves price stability promotes financial stability”, whereas: “a stable financial system 
enhances the effectiveness of monetary policy.”586 This is closely related with the ever growing 
literature in favour the enlargement of monetary policy mandate to include financial stability 
objectives, which is also known as “leaning against the wind.”587 In June 2005, Jean-Claude 
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Trichet, President of the ECB at the time, defined “leaning against the wind” as: “a tendency 
to cautiously raise interest rates even beyond the level necessary to maintain price stability 
over the short to medium term when a potentially detrimental asset price boom is 
identified."588 However, the most controversial part of this debate, is the question as to 
whether the central bank is the most appropriate body to pursue both the financial and price 
stability objectives in an effective manner and most importantly, under which institutional 
framework? This has become highly relevant in the aftermath of the GFC, since many central 
banks are getting involved in both price stability and financial stability functions, either 
directly or indirectly via an independent body.589  
In this context, the literature post-2007 has converged on the view that financial 
stability policy, macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy are highly interlinked, and 
necessary to each other. This is based on the presumption that the inadequate performance 
of one may have negative impact on the other and as Mishkin argued: “the dichotomy 
between monetary and financial stability policy is a false one.”590 Similarly, Bernake supported 
the complementary relationship between the two objectives, by highlighting at the same time 
how “monetary policy, financial supervision, and lender-of-last-resort policies all benefit from 
the sharing of information and expertise.”591 In addition, Lastra by bringing the example of 
Northern Rocks collapse and the Bank of England role, argued that the best placed institution 
to act as the chair of the body responsible for financial stability, should be the central bank.592  
It should also be noted that central banks, regardless of whether are formally assigned 
supervision objectives, cannot be isolated from responsibilities concerning macro-prudential 
risks. Here becomes relevant the, relatively recent, case of Bank of England, which after the 
collapse of Northern Rock was blamed for the failure, regardless of its supervisory role and 
oversight implication in general. It should be noted that the Bank of England was given a 
statutory objective to contribute to financial stability in the Banking Act 2009, which was in 
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the aftermath of Northern Rock’s collapse.593 Indeed, a central bank, despite of being or not 
formally assigned supervisory powers (or not), due to its role as the provider of liquidity when 
acting as the lender of last resort, will have the final word and will eventually get involved 
regardless. It is therefore, more sustainable for a central bank to be institutionally designed 
with macro-prudential tools in order to make full use of its available information and 
resources, both in terms of prevention and subsequently, in case of emergency if there is the 
need. This also links with the discussion developed in chapter one, where it is argued that 
central bank independence, while constitutes an important component for effective 
monetary policy, it should not be considered as an end in itself. To this end, as Lastra argued: 
“Central bank independence is not absolute, but relative. Central bank independence has an 
instrumental nature, as a means to achieve a goal, namely price stability, a goal which is 
desirable for the economic running of the state and for the welfare of society.”594  
In conclusion, the main lesson to be drawn from historical experience and the relevant 
macroeconomic theories developed as a response, is that the central bank’s monetary policy 
goal of price stability, while essential, cannot be seen in isolation from the objective of 
financial stability. As the experience of the GFC depicted, the two objectives are highly 
intertwined and the performance of one affect the other. The problem arises when the two 
objectives are to be performed exclusively by the central bank. On the one hand, when one 
objective is addressed with only one instrument, the central bank will be highly rule-based 
but still in line with the Tinbergen Rule and the time-inconsistence theory. This, however, 
when the objective of price stability is pursued by monetary policy instruments, might lead to 
neglecting macro-prudential implications, posing a great risk to financial stability goals, as 
discussed already. On the other hand, if the two objectives are combined, questions regarding 
central bank independence may arise, or even conflicts of interests between the two 
objectives, which in turn, might pose risks to the main objective of price stability itself. 
However, as became apparent during the GFC, the financial stability goal cannot be 
seen as detached from the set of central banks’ objectives. A central bank should be able to 
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use all its resources and tools to: firstly, if not prevent, at least, minimise the robustness of 
future financial disturbances; and secondly, to tackle the occurrence of financial distress. 
Most importantly, the role of central banks in financial stability is unavoidable, regardless of 
whether or not they are officially assigned supervisory responsibilities. This is linked with 
central banks’ traditional role as lenders of last resort, which ultimately link their tasks to 
supervisory duties. Thus, it would be particularly valuable for both functions of central bank, 
if the conduct of monetary policy becomes informed by consideration drawn by the central 
bank’s analysis of financial stability, and vice versa. This would enable the central bank to act 
appropriately both in times of stability and in times of financial distress. The problem is, 
however, how to combine the two functions simultaneously, by avoiding or reducing 
organisational costs, which, can become a significant concern.  
 
2.3 The price and financial stability objectives of the ECB  
 
2.3.1 Monetary policy and the price stability objective   
 
The creation of the EMU on 1 January 1999 and the establishment of the ESCB, 
introduced a new era for European central banking that one could call highly experimental, 
due to the limited theoretical backing for the endeavour and the lack of any direct precedent. 
Simultaneously, the introduction of the ECB as a new supranational and independent legal 
entity, founded on primarily EU law, marked an historical change to the constitutional balance 
within the EU.595 Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, the 
ECB constitutes an EU institution with its own legal personality.596 The ECB along with the 
NCBs form the ESCB,597 within which lies the Eurosystem or the Eurozone. Apart from the EU 
primary law, which is the applicable law to the ESCB (Articles 127–142 and Articles 282–284 
TFEU, Article 13, TEU and the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks 
and the European Central Bank, ESCB Statute), there is also secondary EU law related to the 
ESCB, including: ECB regulations, decisions, recommendations and opinions; and the 
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guidelines and instructions of the ESCB; the EU Council regulations on the euro, minimum 
reserves, statistical information gathering, sanctions.598 Lastly, the specific division of 
responsibilities within the ESCB are defined in the ESCB statute. The Governing Council and 
the Executive Board are the governing bodies of the ECB. The Executive Board is comprised 
of President, the Vice-President and four board members, and it is responsible to execute the 
decisions of the Governing Council. The latter is consisted of the members of the Executive 
Board and the 12 governors of the NCBs, and it is responsible for implementation of monetary 
policy for the euro area.  
According to Article 127(2) TFEU: “the primary objective of the European System of 
Central Banks shall be to maintain price stability.” As extensively discussed in chapter one, 
according to Article 130, TFEU, the ECB in pursuing its mandate, acts in full independence 
from any EU institution, body, office and agency, and from the governments of Member 
States.599 Thus, the wording of Article 130, TFEU, explicitly forbids the Members of the ESCB’s 
Governing Council from taking instructions from any national or EU body, establishing a high 
level of not only instrument independence but also goal independence, i.e. it is up to the 
Bank’s discretion to decide the definition of price stability and the means to achieving it.  
It is evident, therefore, that the TFEU, sets a clear hierarchy in the objectives of ECB 
by assigning an overriding importance to the maintenance of price stability, i.e. the control of 
inflation. The ECB’s price stability mandate and its operational structure, i.e. one institution 
(the central bank) - one objective (price stability) one instrument (monetary policy), was 
highly influenced by the German Bundesbank Model of central banking,600 which performed 
exceptionally well in maintaining inflation low during the early 1970s when the Bretton 
Woods System collapsed. However, although the institutional framework of the ECB is based 
on the Bundesbank model, its primary mandate of maintaining price stability is incorporated 
in EU primary law, whereas the price stability mandate of Bundesbank is based on its statute. 
The latter makes the Bundesbanks’ mandate changing process substantially more flexible 
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than the process of a Treaty change.601 To this end, both the ECB’s mandate of price stability 
and status are enshrined in the TFEU, i.e. in the constitutional charter of the EU, governed by 
the rule of law. As the ECJ found, the EU is: “…a Community based on the rule of law, inasmuch 
as neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question whether 
the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter, the 
Treaty.602 In addition the ESCB Statute, is a protocol to the TEU and thus, any amendment to 
the Treaty provisions or its protocol would require undergoing a more complex process 
ratification at national level. Simply said, any state can amend their national laws, including 
those that define the legal basis and objectives of their central banks.  
This also links with the discussion developed in chapter one regarding the 
independence of ECB, which is also based on the model of Bundesbank’s independence. 
However, since the independence of the ECB, as highlighted in chapter one, is enshrined by 
EU Law, it has a stronger legal basis from that of Bundesbank. The Bundestag, the German 
Parliament, has the power to change the statute of the central bank (i.e. the Bundesbank), 
which is also embedded in a system of political checks and balances. The EU Parliament, on 
the other hand, cannot modify the ECB’s status, objectives and overall mandate.603 In essence, 
a decision to change the ECB’s independence or price stability mandate would depend upon 
a Treaty amendment, which requires unanimous consent of the Member States and 
ratification at national level.604  
However, the choice of price stability as the optimal monetary policy objective of the 
ESCB was not regarded as a ‘imperative,’ but it rather came as a result of long discussions and 
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negotiations among the Member States.605 The two dominant components that contributed 
directly in the final consensual outcome were: firstly, the political background, with Germany 
playing a key role in the negotiation process of establishing a supranational monetary 
authority (i.e. the ECB) based on “Bundesbank inspired model”; and secondly, the general 
international trend in central banking theories during the time of ECB’s establishment.606 As 
it was thoroughly analysed, at the time of ECB’s establishment there was a widespread 
consensus about the optimal model of monetary policy, i.e. primarily focused on the sole 
mandate of price stability, achieved through inflation targeting and a highly independent 
status.607 Issing et al. develop a comprehensive analysis on how the ECB’s institutional design 
and monetary policy framework reflect the consensus of macroeconomic theory of their 
time.608 Consequently, the ECB was designed to be fully committed to the primary objective 
of price stability, while enjoying a high degree of independence in pursuing this objective, free 
from any political influence.  
Apart from the sole mandate of price stability, there are also other tasks entrusted to 
the ECB, which are also defined by Article 127(2) of the TFEU and are reproduced in Article 
3(1) of the ESCB Statute as following: a) to define and implement the monetary policy of the 
Union, b) to conduct foreign-exchange operations consistent with the provisions of Article 
219, c) to hold and manage the official foreign reserves of the Member States, d) to promote 
the smooth operation of payment systems.609 These tasks have been defined as non-basis 
tasks and as Lastra specified: “There are four other ‘non-basic’ tasks (i.e., not included under 
the umbrella of ‘basic tasks’): (1) issue of banknotes, (2) contribution to financial stability, (3) 
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advisory functions and collection of statistical information and, (4) international co-operation 
and ‘external operations.’”610  
Furthermore, the second sentence of Article 127(2), TFEU, further specifies that: 
“without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general 
economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives 
of the Union as laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union. The ESCB shall act in 
accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition, favouring an 
efficient allocation of resources, and in compliance with the principles set out in Article 119.” 
Article 127(4), TFEU, outlines the advisory role of the ECB towards both the Union and 
national authorities, as regard issues concerning its competences as laid down by the Treaty. 
The wording of the aforementioned provisions, while referring at responsibilities outside of 
ECB’s “basis tasks,” somewhat extend the role of ECB beyond the sole mandate of price 
stability.  
However, the key objective of the ECB is clearly defined by the EU Treaty as the 
guardian of price stability in the euro area. The numerical definition of price stability is not 
included in the wording of the relevant provisions. In fact, the numerical definition of price 
stability was set by the ECB’s Governing Council, and was to be maintained at levels below, 
but close to 2% over the medium term and is measured by the Harmonised Index of Consumer 
Prices (HICP).611 In particular, the Governing Council of the ECB, acting within the context of 
the Treaty provisions as an independent authority, announced in October 1998, the explicit 
quantitative definition of price stability as following: "Price stability shall be defined as a year-
on-year increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below 
2%."612 It should be noted that prior the Governing Council’s definition, EMI - the ECB’s 
forerunner - in its 1994 Annual Report, stated that price stability is translated to inflation level 
close to 2% or less. 613 
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This decision of the Governing Council to publicly announce the numerical definition 
of price stability, derived from a strategic reasoning. Foremost, by explicitly defining the goal 
of price stability, the Governing Council aimed at helping the general public understand the 
monetary policy strategy and thus, making the latter more transparent. Furthermore, the 
explicit definition of price stability meant to promote the accountability of the ECB, enabling 
the public to know exactly what to expect from the European monetary authority. In case of 
any inconsistency in terms of maintaining its price stability objectives, the ECB would then be 
obliged to provide an explanation and an ultimate remedy. Also, the quantitative definition 
of price stability delivers guidance to the public for building expectations of future price 
developments.614 This also links to the discussion developed in chapter one about ECB’s 
transparency, and how this is directly related to its independent status. In the context of this 
discussing, it was also stressed that there were several concerns developed in relation to the 
wide discretion of the ECB in interpreting and defining its price stability mandate, which raises 
legitimacy and accountability questions regarding the operation of the ECB.  
In sum, the monetary policy strategy of the ECB follows an inflation targeting model, 
which incorporates other macroeconomic variables besides money in analysing the possible 
risks to price stability. This means that the ECB’s monetary policy is not entirely focused on a 
forecast inflation figure, but thoroughly considers the underlining sources of these risks.615 As 
discussed already, the history has depicted that despite the efforts of different economic 
theories and various policy-making decisions, the occurrence of inflation or deflation has 
always been part of the story. Furthermore, the precise acceptable level of inflation 
constitutes a peculiar issue, which is highly dependent on the actual economic circumstances. 
However, before the emergence of the GFC, flexible inflation targeting was considered to be 
the most appropriate framework for monetary policy, which also involved its separation from 
the function of fiscal policy and a numerical definition of 0-3% level of inflation as the 
generally accepted safe for the economy.  
The ECB, since its establishment, has been considered to have performed remarkably 
well in delivering its objective and has gained a strong reputation as the guardian of price 
                                                           
614 ECB, 2004b (n 609) 51. 
615 For a comprehensive analysis of the monetary policy strategy (including both economic and monetary 
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stability in the euro area, with inflation expectations appearing well anchored.616 Indeed, the 
average actual inflation rate for many years before the outbreak of the GFC was very close to 
the two percent annual target, with minor fluctuations, and long-term inflation targets were 
at the same level.617 According to Stefan Collignon, who was entrusted the task of assessing 
the ECB’s performance under president Jean- Claude Trichet,: “The ECB was remarkably 
successful in achieving price stability. Except for the peak in energy and food prices in 2006/7, 
actual and core inflation as well as inflation expectations measured by inflation-indexed OATi 
bonds were stable and close to the ECB target below 2 per cent.”618 Also Lopez and Papell 
found that: “euro area inflation is very close to 2% for most of the Euro period with the 
exception of the 2008 financial crisis…”, although they highlighted that: “….at the country 
level, Ireland, Greece, and Spain relax their efforts shortly after the adoption of the single 
currency, ending up with noticeably higher inflation rates than the other Euro countries, 
placing them in a strong disadvantage in term of price competitiveness and susceptible to 
current account deficits and bubbles (real estate: Spain, Ireland, public debt: Greece).”619  
2.2.2 ECB’s role in financial stability: Pre-GFC 
It is evident from the analysis above that, at EU level, there was a clear hierarchy of 
objectives for the ECB, with the task of price stability being the key, if not the sole objective 
of the ECB. In addition, the original legislative framework of the EMU did not consider financial 
instability as a significant risk. This, however, does not imply that financial stability was not 
included among the tasks of ECB. Firstly, ECB, as discussed in the previous section, provides a 
definition for price, which has been outlined by the ECB: “as a condition in which the financial 
system – comprising of financial intermediaries, markets and market infrastructures – is 
capable of withstanding shocks and the unravelling of financial imbalances, thereby 
mitigating the likelihood of disruptions in the financial intermediation process which are 
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severe enough to significantly impair the allocation of savings to profitable investment 
opportunities.”620 Secondly, Article 127(5) of the TFEU specifies that the ECB/ESCB: “shall 
contribute to the stability of the financial system” and the Eurosystem’s Mission Statement 
states that: “we aim to safeguard financial stability.”621   
However, Articles 2-6, ESCB Statute, explicitly outline the objectives (Article 2), the 
tasks (Article 3-5) and the functions in international cooperation (Article 6) of the ECB, but do 
not include financial stability among the core objectives of the ECB. The content of Article 2, 
which highlights the principle objective of ECB, was originally proposed by the Committee of 
Governors of the Central Banks (the “Committee of Governors”) of the EEC, in the draft text 
for the Statute of the ESCB (“the Statute”) and is highly based on this proposal, with minor 
changes. The Governing Council of the ECB in its press release of October 1998, did not include 
any additional objectives of the ECB, but rather highlighted the sole mandate of the ECB in its 
primary and strictly focused commitment to maintain price stability. The Governing Council 
of ECB at the announcement specified that: “…the ESCB's monetary policy strategy will focus 
strictly on this objective.”622 By this statement, the Governing Council seems to have went 
against the wording of the Treaty provisions, since not only has given priority to the mandate 
of price stability but also, has considered it as the single objective of the ECB (see the wording: 
“strictly”). Yet, since the wording of Article 127, TFEU includes additional tasks to the ECB, this 
emphasises that the EU does not follow a sole economic policy, but incorporates a number of 
objectives that are mutually interconnected and co-dependent on each other.  
As a result, despite the fact that the importance of financial stability in pursuing price 
stability was well-recognised, clearly mentioned and desirable, there was no clear mandate 
as to the means and scope of its protection. In fact, a clear distinction or a ‘Chinese Wall’ 
between monetary policy and financial stability policy was largely retained in terms of 
institutional arrangements and policy mechanisms. Again, this strategy, similar to the price 
stability mandate, was a result of macroeconomic theories developed at the time of the ECB’s 
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establishment, which supported the idea that central banks should be focusing in maintaining 
price stability, something that was considered to be enough in lessening both the incidence 
and the severity of financial instability, and to safeguard the financial system and the 
economy as a whole. Moreover, empirical studies based on the historical evidence of some 
developed countries such as the UK, the US, Canada and Japan, also supported the idea that 
in most of the cases when central banks failed to deliver their mandate for price stability, 
there was a severe negative effect on financial stability.623 As George stated: “after many 
years of financial market stability in advanced economies, policymakers seemed to have 
reason to view monetary policy as appropriately focused on macroeconomic objectives.”624 As 
discussed above, a wide consensus has emerged in the post-GFC that the objectives of 
financial and price stability are strongly intertwined. This has resulted in an increasing number 
of regulatory responses around the world aiming at reshaping their financial regulatory 
environment in a way that would accommodate both financial stability and monetary policy 
objectives within the set of central banks’ mandate.  
Similarly, while the ECB was originally designed to serve as a pure monetary authority, 
there were a series of events that triggered the process of broadening the ECB’s mandate 
towards its increasing involvement in banking supervision. This process started with the 
Lamfalussy Report in 2004, which was followed by the De Larosière Report in 2009, leading 
to the creation of the ESRB (in 2011), which was entrusted with the macro-prudential 
oversight of the euro area banks. The analysis of the aforementioned process is subject to the 
following chapter, which examines the roadmap towards the creation of the first pillar of the 
European Banking Union, i.e. the SSM, by outlining the main regulatory reforms that the EU 
financial regulation underwent in light of the GFC. This reformative process reached 
momentum in November 2014, when the ECB became the single supervisor of the euro area, 
assuming regulatory and supervisory responsibilities through the newly established SSM. It 
should be noted that the idea of empowering the ECB with supervisory tasks is not a new 
proposal or an emergency response to the financial crisis. It is rather the opposite, since it has 
been repeatedly considered and officially proposed in the past, but the politics of the 
legislative process at EU level slowed down the achievement of this goal. However, the 
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implementation of the relevant decision and has reopened both old and new debates 
concerning potential policy trade-offs and incompatibility of new and existing objectives. 
Since, its establishment the ECB has played a crucial role in the European arena, and 
its role has been evolving during the last years, becoming increasingly prominent especially, 
during the GFC. The main task of the ECB, including its additional duties came to be enlarged 
in light of its recent involvement in supervisory matters. Times have changed for central 
banking, and the price-stability-focused monetary authorities have been replaced by 
financial-stability-oriented ones. Likewise, the ECB, as a creature of its time, although 
maintaining its price stability mandate, has shifted its emphasis towards the objective of 
financial stability.625 
 
2.4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter provided an analysis on the evolution of monetary policy and the 
theoretical foundation for the prevalence of inflation targeting regimes. However, the 
occurrence of the GFC and its far-reaching consequences, have shaken up the macroeconomic 
policy framework that appeared to have been adequately stabilising the economy during the 
Great Moderation era. Thus, the evidence brought by the GFC experience, has challenged the 
conventional views on how monetary policy should be conducted, as the excessive focus of 
central banks on the price stability objective proved to be inadequate in maintaining financial 
stability, which in turn, led to negative consequences in price stability. These findings placed 
emphasis on the macro-prudential regulatory and supervisory domain, and the relationship 
of the latter with the monetary policy and micro-prudential supervision. As a result, central 
banking, at national, international and EU level, became subject to a plethora of regulatory 
responses aiming to broadening the mandate of central banks, by combining monetary policy, 
macro-prudential and micro-prudential supervision under the same roof.  
At the same time and while searching for the optimal institutional design to facilitate 
the marrying of monetary policy and banking supervision, a number of concerns were raised 
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as to their compatibility and the ‘side effects’ that this combination may entail. The ‘conflict 
of interest’ issue was supported by a large part of the literature, while the time-inconsistency 
problem and the Tinbergen Rule constituted the theoretical basis of views against central 
banks assuming dual mandates. In addition, both those against and in favour, stressed that 
the combination of financial and monetary stability may undermine central bank 
independence. This may prove to be particularly problematic, especially when combining 
macro-prudential and monetary policy objectives. Hence, a strict separation between the two 
is to be maintained, while the tasks and responsibilities of each domain would have to be 
clearly defined.  
At EU level, the process towards further financial integration, harmonisation of rules 
and greater cooperation between national and EU institutions had already started before the 
GFC period. However, the major changes in financial services regulation and supervision came 
to be introduced as “emergency” measures, intended to provide immediate solutions during 
the GFC in order to prevent further damage to the financial system. Thus, layers upon layers 
of regulation started to build on existing structures, combining present and new laws in a 
complex structure of cooperation between national and supranational institutions and 
structures. This created a unique momentum for EU financial integration, expressed in the 
Banking Union project. However, before analysing in detail the legal implications of this 
decision and its compatibility with existing EU law provisions, it is of fundamental importance 











Chapter 3: European Banking Regulation and Supervision: from 
Fragmentation to Integration 
 
“The road Western Europe took from the end of World War II to its current state has been one with 
lots of steep and sometimes blind curves, with harsh speed limits and frequent detours. But still it has 
been one that attracted more and more traffic.”626 
3.1 Introduction  
The last three decades have witnessed increased financial integration, at national, 
regional and international level as a result of the growing trade in financial services and 
technological advances. This process, as discussed in chapter one, has spurred the creation, 
of an international framework of regulatory and supervisory standards. At EU level, the 
concept of financial services integration has been at the core of policymaking since the early 
stages of the EU integration. From the Treaties of Rome to the Maastricht Treaty and the 
introduction of the euro, Europe has moved slowly but progressively towards a single market 
for financial services. It should be noted that financial integration is comprised of three parts, 
including banking, insurance and securities integration. As this thesis focuses on banking 
regulation, with particular emphasis on prudential supervision, the analysis centres on the 
relevant literature concerning banking services integration. Having said this, banking services 
unification, while at the heart of the EU financial services, remained highly fragmented for 
years, which was considered to be in contradiction with the growing globalisation of financial 
markets.  
The hit of the GFC created political momentum for regulatory change and innovative 
amendments at both international and European level, bringing calls for tighter integration 
and stronger cooperation. Having discussed the roadmap towards the creation of the Euro, 
including the establishment of ESCB and its core objectives, in chapter one, this chapter 
moves into the main theme of this thesis, which concerns the centralisation of banking 
                                                           
626 Koop, Michael J. and Siebert, Horst, ‘Institutional competition versus centralization: Quo vadis Europe?’ (Kiel 
Working Paper, No. 548, 1993), 1 <https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/773/1/126396450.pdf> 




supervision and regulation at EU level. To this end, although the substantial discussions that 
led to centralisation of regulation and supervision at EU level, occurred mainly after the 
outbreak of Great Depression, the rationale of its idea finds its roots back to the foundation 
of the EU. Therefore, in order to understand the EU regulatory reforms implemented after 
the outbreak of the GFC, it is crucial to examine their underpinnings. This chapter starts with 
tracing the evolution of EU financial services integration, by outlining the main regulatory 
initiatives. The analysis then focuses on the initial steps towards strengthening regulation and 
supervision at EU level, including the Lamfalussy Report, its impact on reshaping the EU 
regulatory and supervisory architecture, and its main pitfalls. This sets the ground for the third 
part of this chapter, which examines the EU regulatory response in the aftermath of the GFC, 
primarily focused on reshaping the EU banking supervision through a continuous process of 
legislative initiatives. It should be noted that this thesis focuses on the legal implications of 
the GFC, while the economic factors involved are not thoroughly examined as they exceed 
the scope of this analysis. 
At the heart of the EU regulatory response to the financial crisis was the De Larosière 
Report, which signalled the start of the most important financial integration project in the 
history of the EU. Hence, the following analysis places particular emphasis on the supervisory 
architecture, centred by the European System of Financial Supervisor (ESFS), as crystallised 
by the De Larosière Report and the applicable legislative acts. The main aim of this analysis is 
to examine the functioning of the ESFS, by observing its institutional operation and exploring 
the salient features that provided the basis for the ultimate decision of centralising banking 
supervision at EU level.  It should be noted, that the discussion touches upon the Capital 
Requirements Directive amendments, but only to the extent that it contributes to the analysis 
of the legal framework of EU banking regulation and supervision.  
3.2 The historical evolution of EU banking services integration  
Financial integration constituted one of the main objectives of the EU policymakers 
from the initial idea of creating a European Single Market to the first efforts of its 
implementation. It is worth mentioning that the European Single Market (also known as 
common market or internal market) rests on four pillars: the free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital between Member States; and it is defined by the EU Commission 
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website as following: “the Single Market refers to the EU as one territory without any internal 
borders or other regulatory obstacles to the free movement of goods and services. A 
functioning Single Market stimulates competition and trade, improves efficiency, raises 
quality, and helps cut prices. The European Single Market is one of the EU’s greatest 
achievements. It has fuelled economic growth and made the everyday life of European 
businesses and consumers easier.”627  
The starting point and the foundation of the subsequent regulatory response is the 
Treaty of Rome of 1957,628 which laid down the legal foundation for the creation of a Single 
Market in Europe and it also introduced the fundamental EU principles (or 'four freedoms'), 
including the free movement of capital, goods, services and people. Nevertheless, the 
meaning of financial integration in the 1950s was far from what we anticipate today as 
financial integration. In fact, the main goal of the Treaty of Rome was to transform the highly 
segmented Member States’ domestic markets into a single unified market, whilst financial 
integration meant primarily, the elimination of trade barriers and the creation of a customs 
union.629 The actual achievement of this goal was accomplished by the recognition of the right 
of establishment and the coordination of national legislation.630 The relevant provisions on 
the right of establishment and the free movement of services were also supported by a 
General Programme for the abolition of restrictions on freedom of establishment631 and free 
movement to provide services,632 which resulted subsequently into a Council Directive.633 In 
sum, during the 1950s, the six founding countries that established the ECSC, created two 
distinct paths to financial integration. The first path, as analysed in chapter one, involved the 
                                                           
627 See: EU Commission Website <https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market_en> accessed 14 July 2017.  
628 TEC (n 193).  
629 Egan, Michelle P., Constructing a European Market: Standards, Regulation, and Governance (Oxford 
University Press 2001) 1.  
630 Dermine, Jean, ‘European Banking, Past, Present and Future’ (Second ECB Central Banking Conference, 
Frankfurt, 24-25 October 2002) <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/events/pdf/conferences/dermine_comp.pdf> 
accessed 14 July 2017.  
631 General Programme for the abolition of restrictions on freedom of establishment [1962] OJ 2/36 (English 
Special Edition: Series II Volume IX, 7). 
632 General Programme for the abolition of restrictions on freedom to provide services [1962] OJ 2/32 (English 
Special Edition: Series II Volume IX, 3-6). 
633 ‘First Council Directive 73/183/EEC of 28 June 1973 on the abolition of restrictions on freedom of 
establishment and freedom to provide services in respect of self- employed activities of banks and other financial 
institutions’ [1973] OJ L 194/1. 
151 
 
creation of EEC and abolition of obstacles for the free movement of goods mainly in 
agriculture products, whereas monetary integration remained undeveloped at EU level.  
Although there is no a generally accepted or explicit definition to address the notion 
of financial integration, the modern perception of what financial integration entails, focuses 
on a more holistic approach.634 Simply put, financial integration could be defined as the 
situation where financial markets in regional or global level are closely connected with each 
other. At EU level, the ECB has defined financial integration as the situation whereby all the 
potential participant in a market of a given set of financial instruments or services are: “(i) 
subject to a single set of rules when they decide to deal with those financial instruments or 
services, (ii) have equal access to this set of financial instruments or services, and (iii) are 
treated equally when they operate in the market.”635 Also, the ECB highlighted that financial 
integration constitutes a key component for the smooth conduct of monetary policy, the 
general economic policy of the EU and the promotion of financial stability.636 
European financial systems are mainly bank-based, which is evident by the fact that 
stock and bond markets provide a relatively modest share of the financing to the private 
sector in the majority of the Member States.637 Therefore, the implementation of common 
rules on banking regulation and supervision, as already highlighted, was always an integral 
part of the financial integration process. Hence, it is hardly surprising that the four freedoms 
(i.e. free movement of capital, people, goods and services) introduced by the Treaty of Rome, 
constituted the basis for the adoption of the subsequent free movement of banking services 
and the right for establishment for financial institutions. Additionally, during the early 1960s, 
banking regulation and supervision were subject to an active debate at EU level. An early 
instance of the attempt to address the integration of financial regulation and supervision at 
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EU level was the Report of a Group of Experts (commonly known as Segre Report),638 which 
was appointed by the EEC Commission in 1966 to study the process of establishment of a 
European Capital Market.639 Segre Report examined all aspects of capital markets and called 
for implementation of common rules and practices in banking regulation and supervision, by 
also highlighting the need for “certain adjustments in the way economic policies of Member 
States are applied.”640 It should be noted here that Segre Report, although was chaired by 
Claudio Segre, who was a representative of the EEC Commission, did not represented an 
official Commission Policy. It rather constituted a study created with the aim to give an overall 
view of the objectives, methods and implications of the establishment of a European Capital 
Market. Also, as it was stated by the EEC Commission, the Segre Report: “was commissioned 
because of the difficulties encountered in the efforts to make further progress through 
directives based on Article 67” and it “formed the basis for discussions among the Common 
Market’s six members (at the time) measures on measures to be taken.”641  
The EEC Commission’s response to Segre Report, was a series of working documents, 
aiming at producing a Directive that would promote harmonisation of banking regulation and 
supervision. These attempts resulted in a draft Directive proposed by the Commission in 1972, 
which introduced the ambitious idea of creating a Single Banking Market at one stroke; where 
the financial institutions would be regulated by the home state rather than the host state 
authorities and the national authorities would have to closely cooperate.642 Europe, still at a 
premature stage of banking integration, did not welcome the idea of centralising banking 
regulation and supervision at European level. As a result, the Commission withdrew the draft 
Directive, while it became evident that the creation of a fully-fledged single banking market 
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would require more time and a step-by-step approach.643 What came into being instead, was 
the Council Directive of 1973,644 which required the Member States to comply with the 
national treatment principle, which entailed an obligation for equal regulatory and 
supervisory treatment of both foreign and domestic financial institutions.645  
Notably, by 1973, discriminatory restrictions on freedom of establishment and 
freedom to provide services were strictly prohibited among EU Member States. In addition, 
an ambitious transitional period of twelve year to the fully establishment of the Single Market 
(to be completed by 1969) was set by the Treaty of Rome.646  Therefore, one would expect 
that Europe was moving fast towards tighter integration. However, a truly unified single 
market for banking services in Europe was still an aspirational objective. In fact, capital 
controls, major disparities and a general lack of coordination in both banking regulation and 
supervision among Member States persisted for many years to follow,647 while regulation 
continued to be narrowly defined by national boundaries. There are a number of factors that 
may potentially explain this rather slow progress. Among the rest, it was believed that the 
process toward harmonisation of rules throughout Europe could have been easier through a 
positive integration approach, whereas the Treaty of Rome took a rather negative integration 
approach that involved strategies such as the prohibition of discrimination of foreign goods, 
services and so forth.648 Also, strict customs and capital remained a necessity due to different 
domestic laws and regulations in areas such as food safety and hygiene.649  
In summary, although the adoption of common rules in banking practices has been 
part of the European policymaking agenda long before their introduction, the Member States 
were reluctant in unifying and centralising their practices in banking matters. This explains 
why the early banking measures came in the legislative form of Directive, which entails a 
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certain level of flexibility.650 The choice of Directives was specified in a number of occasions, 
including the declaration on Article 101a, TEC in the context of the SEA, in which it was defined 
that: “the Commission shall give precedence to the use of the instrument of a directive.”651 
Also, in the Treaty of Amsterdam it was specified that: “directives should be preferred to 
regulations and framework directives to detailed measures.”652 This clearly indicates a 
willingness to leave some space of discretion at national level, since Directives are not directly 
applicable and are binding only as to the result to be achieved, allowing the Member States 
to retain discretion of choice as to the actual form and methods for their implementation in 
accordance to their local conditions.653 The stringency of Directives was even considered to 
have been “watered down to make them politically acceptable.”654 However, it is worth 
stressing that according to the ECJ there might be cases where Directives are directly 
applicable.655 For instance, in Van Duyn Case in 1974, the ECJ held that Directives can have a 
directly applicable effect.656 On the other hand, Regulations have general application and 
binding power in their entirety, and are also directly applicable in all Member States.657 
However, the use of Directives and their inconsistent implementation in a rapidly changing 
financial market was considered as ones of the reasons that weakened financial 
integration.658  
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Despite the choice of legal instrument (Directives over Regulations) as the means to 
harmonise rules and practices among Member states, the process towards the completion of 
a Single Market for banking services was rather slow. As Gaul argued, the banking industry is 
heavily regulated, thus, the liberalisation of trade and cross-border investment of banking 
services might prove to being extremely challenging.659 Hence, national peculiarities and 
divergent regulatory practices persisted, while the fragmentation of European financial 
markets remained the rule. This was highly contradictory with the increasing expansion of 
cross-border banking activity internationally, and the growing size and importance of major 
European banks.660 This slow progress was also linked with international events that were 
taking place in a parallel pace. Namely, the two severe oil crises and the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system, found Europe of the late 1970s under the largest macroeconomic 
instability, with increased inflation and unemployment rates.661 Notably, the period from 
1970-1985 is known as “Eurosclerosis,” which represents the years of European stagnation 
and was characterised by a lack of desire on part of the Member States to furthering the 
integration process.662 
The shifting point came during the late 1970s, with the emergence of a positive 
attitude and an increasing willingness of the Member States to cooperate at European level. 
This trend was illustrated in numerous legislative measures that followed, aiming to facilitate 
further financial integration and to promote a higher level of harmonisation in banking 
regulation and supervision. The key initiatives that significantly contributed throughout this 
process from the late 1970s until the hit of the GFC, were, in chronological order, the 
following:   
1. The First Banking Directive,663 was adopted in 1977 after twelve years of negations,664 
constituting the first major step towards the creation of Single Market in banking services.665 
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The main aim was to create: “a system whereby credit institutions having their head office in 
one of the Member States are exempt from any national authorisation requirement when 
setting up branches in other Member States.”666 The legal basis of the First Banking Directive 
was Article 57(2) of TEC (now Article 53, TFEU) and provided for elimination of trade barriers 
and coordination in banking supervision. Closer cooperation was to be promoted through a 
newly established Bank Advisory Committee, which would be composed of three 
representatives of central banks, NCAs and finance ministers from each Member State as well 
as of three representatives from the Commission.667  
However, the First Banking Directive was not ground-breaking, in a sense that it did 
not provide with any innovative harmonisation tools exceeding the scope and effect of the 
four EU freedoms.668 In fact the aim was to facilitate the extension of the four EU freedoms 
as set by the Treaty of Rome. Credit institutions were still required to obtain authorisation 
before commencing their activities, subject to the host’s state national regulation and 
supervision legislation.669 Moreover, the First Banking Directive did not require the Member 
States to recognise authorisation licences obtained in another Member State, which posed 
serious branching restrictions and constrains in cross-border activity.670 As it was stated from 
the ECJ in 1995: “The First Banking Directive was no more than a first step, however, towards 
the mutual recognition by Member States of authorizations issued by each of them to credit 
institutions.”671 The only exception to the entry authorisation rule was that authorisation was 
to be evaluated on the basis of the economic needs of the market.672  
2. The White Paper from the EU Commission in 1985673 laid down the program and timetable 
for the completion of a Single Market for Europe,674 and it is considered one of the most 
important milestones of European integration. As it was stated in 1985 at the monthly Bulletin 
                                                           
666 First Banking Directive (n 667) pmbl. recital 10.  
667 First Banking Directive (n 667) Article 11.  
668 De Meester (n 668) 270. 
669 First Banking Directive (n 667) Article 3 (1) (2). 
670 Matthews, Barbara C., ‘The Second Banking Directive: Conflicts, Choices, and Long-Term Goals’ (1992) 2 (1) 
Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law.  
671 Case C-222/95 Societe civile immobiliere Parodi v. Banque H. Albert de Bary et Cie [1997] ECR 1-03899, para 
24. 
672 First Banking Directive (n 667) Article 3. 
673 Commission, ‘Completing the Internal Market’ COM (85) 310 final (hereinafter: White Paper).  
674 White Paper (n 677) paras 1-3.  
157 
 
of the European Communities, the White Paper: “was the first priority of the present 
Commission, and was perhaps the major achievement required of the Commission during its 
term of office; if the programme succeeded, it would fundamentally alter the face of 
Europe.”675 The main objective of completing a Single Market for Europe, was illustrated in 
over 300 legislative proposals, including measures to eliminate a series of physical, technical 
and fiscal non-tariff barriers. The White Paper developed a “new approach” and a “new 
strategy” towards the completion of the Single Market. The “new approach” raised the 
question of how true harmonisation could be accomplished. On the other hand, the “new 
strategy” entailed a process of choosing between the principles of harmonisation and mutual 
recognition.676 This is not to say that the principle of mutual recognition replaced the principle 
of harmonisation, but it was rather that the former was to be applied in case the latter was 
not deem necessary. Harmonisation, for instance, was considered to be still necessary in areas 
such as safety, public health, environmental, consumer protection and so forth.  In fact, the 
principle of harmonisation was regarded as “the cornerstone of Community action in the first 
25 years” and as a principle that “has produced unprecedented progress in the creation of 
common rules on a Community-wide basis.”677 However, the Commission acknowledged the 
fact that the harmonisation principle had proven to be, in many respects, impractical and 
cumbersome in furthering European integration towards the creation of a truly unified Single 
Market by 1992.678 As Leleux was arguing in the late 1960s: “Harmonization presents very 
great difficulties when the actions of the authorities in the various countries are based on 
different ideas, and even if harmonization is achieved, the disadvantages of having parallel 
but multiple procedures that have to be gone through are obvious.” 679  
In the context of banking regulation, the White Paper set out three main principles: 
mutual recognition of financial standards,680 according to which the member states should 
recognise and trust each other’s regulatory regimes and practices;681 minimum 
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harmonisation, which aimed in setting minimum standards to be adopted at national level by 
the Member States (i.e. elimination of barriers); and the principle of home country control, 
according to which financial institutions were to be supervised by the home state.682 
Originally these principles were explicitly based on the landmark ruling of ECJ in Cassis de 
Dijon,683 which drew on the reasoning of Dassonville case.684  
In the Cassis de Dijon, it was found that Germany could not prohibit the import of 
liquor from France, where it was legally manufactured and sold, on the basis that the alcoholic 
content was too low to be considered as liquor under German national legislation. In the 
Dassonville ruling in 1974 it was held inter alia that all measures having affects equivalent to 
quantitative restrictions on trade between Member States were prohibited in accordance to 
Article 34, TFEU.  This was also known as the ‘Dassonville formula,’ which accorded a wide 
definition to measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions and paved the way 
for future very broad interpretations. However, despite the fact that both Cassis de Dijon and 
Dassonville cases were related only to the free movement of goods, their reasoning was 
followed in the White Paper, where it was highlighted that: “…the general principle should be 
approved that, if a product is lawfully manufactured in one Member State, there is no reason 
why it should not be sold freely throughout the Community…What is true for goods, is also 
true for services and people.”685 The same principles were considered to be also applicable to 
                                                           
682 White Paper (n 677) paras 101-103. The principle of home country control was also included in:  
- First Banking Directive (n 667) 16;  
- ‘Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC of 15 December 1989 on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations 
and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking-Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit 
Institutions and Amending Directive 77/780/EEC’ [1989] OJ L386/1, 1 (hereinafter: Second Banking 
Directive); and 
- ‘Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 relating to the 
taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions’ [2000] OJ L 126/1, 1 (hereinafter: Codified 
Banking Directive). 
See also the following ruling: Case C-222/02 Peter Paul, Cornelia Sonnen-Lütte and Christel Mörkens v 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2004] ECR I – 9460.  
683 Case C-120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 1979-00649 
(hereinafter: Cassis de Dijon). For a detailed analysis of the ruling of Cassis de Dijon see: Pelkmans, Jacques, ‘The 
New Approach to Technical Harmonization and Standardization’ (1987) 25 (3) Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 249. 
684 Case C-8/74 Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville [1974] ECR 1974 -00837 (hereinafter: 
Dassonville case).  
For an analysis on the Dassonville case see: Pelkmans, Jacques, ‘Mutual Recognition in Goods and Services: An 
Economic Perspective’ (European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes, Working Paper No. 16, 2003) 
5 <http://aei.pitt.edu/1852/1/ENEPRI_WP16.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017.  
685 White Paper (n 677) para 58.  
159 
 
the free movement of financial services, for which specific reference was made.686 It is worth 
noting that these three principles did not obtain a legal basis in the Treaty, but could only be 
identified in secondary EU law.687  
In general, the White Paper was welcomed and well-received, by most of the Member 
States, apart from Denmark, Greece and the UK that expressed their opposition. This led to 
Intergovernmental Conferences held in Luxemburg and Brussels during late 1985 that 
resulted in the adoption of the SEA in 1986,688 which introduced the most important 
amendments of the Treaties since their adoption.689 
3. The Second Banking Directive, was a key legislative act towards the creation of a single 
banking market for Europe, which was proposed by the EU Commission in 1987690 and finally 
adopted by the EU Council in 1989.691 The Second Banking Directive was considered to be: 
“the essential instrument for the achievement of the internal market, a course determined by 
the Single European Act and set out in timetable form in the Commission's White Paper, from 
the point of view of both the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide financial 
services, in the field of credit institutions.”692 It is important to note that while the Second 
Banking Directive amended, to a great extent, the First Banking Directive, the latter was still 
applicable. 
The Second Banking Directive was highly based on the principles set by the White 
Paper, including minimum harmonisation, mutual recognition and home country control. One 
of the most innovative aspects of the Second Banking Directive was the introduction of the 
‘single banking licence,’ which provided for free movement of financial services and the right 
to establish local branches on the basis of the home state’s authorisation.693 The ‘single 
banking licence’ came to change dramatically the dynamics in the EU financial services 
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market, by allowing a financial institution that had obtain authorisation, in a Member States 
to freely operate in any other Member State without entry authorisation and only subject to 
notification requirements.694 The single banking licence is also known as the principle of 
freedom of establishment or the ‘passporting principle’. It is worth mentioning that the 
meaning of ‘authorisation’ was defined by Article 1, First Banking Directive, as: “an instrument 
issued in any form by the authorities by which the right to carry on the business of a credit 
institution is granted;” and it was also adopted in an identical manner by the Second Banking 
Directive, as explicitly defined in Article 1(2). The main objective of the ‘single banking licence’ 
was to strengthen the cross-border financial activity by enabling the easy establishment of 
the financial institutions across Member States and by limiting at the same time the barriers 
at national level.695 
The rationale of the ‘single banking licence’ was based on the model of the ‘universal 
bank’ and the mutual recognition of national licences.696 This ended the tradition of host-state 
control over branches and enabled the open operation of banking services throughout Europe 
based on home state authorisation. Furthermore, it is widely acknowledged that the 
establishment of the ‘single banking licence’ resulted in an extensive increase of cross-border 
banking activity across Europe, which was intensified by a growing number of cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions.697 Yet, this was not an immediate process but it rather took shape 
over the years and in accordance to the domestic law of each country, the type of institution’s 
activity, and the cooperation ability of the particular institution.698  
The slow pace of this process is to be partly attributed to the fact that, the ‘single 
banking licence’ while it was based on the model of ‘universal bank,’ did not create a uniform 
body of banking law for Europe, but only a mere obligation of the Member States to mutually 
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recognise the laws and licences from other Member States.699 There were still divergences on 
national laws and licenses and most importantly, fundamental limitation on the freedom of 
establishment, with the host county retaining a significant degree of control over financial 
institutions operating within its territory. This was also envisaged by the White Paper, which 
explicitly suggested that national laws and licenses would remain divergent, whereas 
supervisory standards were to be harmonised at national level and thus, driven by the home 
country control principle.700 Thus, foreign financial institutions would still remain subject to 
host country’s capital requirements and other financial regulation measures. Moreover, the 
‘single banking licence’ was not applicable to subsidiaries, which were subject to licencing 
requirements and prudential supervision rules of the competent authority of the host 
state.701 The main right granted to financial institutions or banking group in the host state, 
was that their subsidiaries were subject to the same laws and principles applicable to the 
domestic financial institutions, which was also based on the principles of non-discrimination, 
proportionality and necessity.702 
With regards to banking supervision, the Second Banking Directive provided that it 
would be subject to the principles of home country control and mutual recognition.703 This 
practically meant that supervision remained a responsibility of the competent authorities of 
the home state. Namely, the host state was responsible to supervise the liquidity requirement 
of banks, in close cooperation with the competent authorities of the home state.704 Also, the 
establishment of subsidiaries to the host state was forbidden and the host country could 
oblige a financial institution or an investment firm to comply with regulatory provisions that 
were adopted in the interest of the general good.705 These two principles remained for a long 
time at the heart of EU policymaking towards the completion of a single market for financial 
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services.706 As mentioned earlier, the principle of harmonisation was only applicable on those 
components of prudential regulation where convergence was considered to be vital. More 
substantial harmonisation requirements came with the adoption of two more Directives in 
1989: the Own Funds Directive707 and the Solvency Ratio Directive.708 These Directives, 
drawing largely on the provisions of Basel I on international banking capital adequacy,709 
introduced a minimum ratio of 8% of eligible capital to weighted risk assets. The Second 
Banking Directive, Own Funds Directive and Solvency Directives – also known as the minimum 
package – set the scene for the creation of a Single EU banking market, starting with the entry 
into force of the Second Banking Directive on 1 January 1993 onwards.710 It is also worth 
mentioning that at the same period of time, the EU banking legislation framework was 
enriched by two more directives: the Large Exposures Directive,711 and the Consolidated 
Banking Directive.712  
3. The Maastricht Treaty, which has been of central importance for furthering the integration 
of financial regulation and supervision at EU level. Although “full integration of banking and 
other financial markets,”713 was envisaged earlier by the Delors Report, the Maastricht Treaty 
provided the mechanisms for its practical implementation, including the introduction of the 
euro and the legal basis for the ESCB. The era after the Maastricht Treaty was characterised 
by a prominent priority given to the financial markets integration and the full liberalisation of 
the movement of capital. Furthermore, as already stressed, banking integration took place in 
parallel with international developments, especially with the growing attempt of the BCBS to 
set harmonisation rules and convergence of prudential standards at international level. Thus, 
the BCBS initiatives, as discussed in chapter one, have also contributed in triggering the need 
for further harmonisation, convergence of practices and the centralisation of rules at EU level. 
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In addition, as we mentioned, in chapter one the guidelines of the BCBS have been influential 
into reshaping EU banking regulation. However, as already analysed, the overall process 
towards furthering financial integration at EU level was rather slow and dominated by the 
principle of home country control. It was only after the completion of the internal market in 
1992 that discussions on changing some aspects of the home country control started to 
emerge.  
As mentioned in chapter one and two, the Maastricht Treaty explicitly defined the 
objective of ECB, by providing a clear priority to its price stability mandate. However, this is 
not to say that regulation and supervision were not envisaged within the ECB’s set of 
objectives. In fact, there was a direct reference in Article 105(6) of Maastricht treaty (current: 
Article 127, TFEU), leaving a window open to the possibility of granting supervisory powers to 
the ECB. As we will discuss in detail in chapter four, it was indeed, Article 127, TFEU that would 
serve, at a later stage, as the legal basis for the centralisation of banking supervision at EU 
level.   
4. Another key component of banking markets’ integration was the Financial Services Action 
Plan (FSAP). The FSAP was created in May 1999 and contained a number of measures aiming 
to establish a fully-fledged European banking and capital market.714 The process towards the 
creation of FSAP started with the European Council held in Cardiff in 1998 that called the EU 
Commission to create a framework for action in order: “to improve the single market in 
financial services, in particular examining the effectiveness of implementation of current 
legislation and identifying weaknesses which may require amending legislation.”715 The EU 
Commission as a response, adopted a framework for action,716 which was welcomed by the 
EU Council held in Vienna in December 1998. As it was stated by the EU Council: “It therefore 
welcomes the Commission's initiative for a framework for action and the establishment of a 
High-Level Group. It asks for a Council report to the European Council in Cologne on the 
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necessary steps towards a single financial market. It also underlines the necessity of 
maintaining a high level of consumer protection.” 717  
Furthermore, the FSAP was approved by the Lisbon European Council in 2000, in which 
it was stressed that there was a need to undertake all the steps necessary for the 
implementation of FSAP by 2005.718 One of the core objectives of the FSAP, was to strengthen 
further the integration of financial markets and the abolitions of the remaining barriers in all 
financial services across Europe, without focusing explicitly on a particular market (such as 
banking for instance).719 For the accomplishment of this objective, the FSAP provided a 
timetable for specific measures to achieve three strategic objectives, including: a) a single 
market in wholesale financial services; b) open and secure retail markets and c) stronger rules 
on prudential supervision.720  
As a result of these legislative acts altogether, the process of financial markets 
integration expanded, and the EU regulatory framework progressively started to take shape 
on the basis of convergent standards and harmonised rules. This in turn, led to the creation 
of a highly interlinked system, which apart from changing rapidly, had started to show signs 
of dependency, influence and interconnection, and had the potential to develop risks with 
widespread cross-border effects. The harmonisation process in regard to supervision, was still 
at an infant stage, since the Member States retained the power to regulate the operation of 
financial institutions, while the NCAs were responsible for the supervision of banks across the 
EU.721 This was to be attributed to the prevalence of mutual recognition and home country 
control principles, which seemed to have been lacking the ability to facilitate further 
integration towards the creation of a fully-integrated banking market.722  
This reluctant approach towards regulatory harmonisation became subject to 
criticism, with many arguing that the extensive freedom given to the NCAs, would eventually 
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lead to divergences between national laws and therefore, to inconsistent application of EU 
law. Notably, it was as early as in the 1990s that some observes went a step further by arguing 
that the only way to promote greater cooperation at EU level would be to centralise 
supervision at a supranational level.723 This belief was remarkably summarised by Folkerts-
Landau and Garber, who argued that the ECB should assume supervisory responsibilities. 
Their reasoning was based in two arguments: firstly, the ECB, being granted a highly 
independent status and its own resources, was the best suited body to assess the solvency of 
potential borrowers by protecting at the same time its own resources; and secondly, the ECB 
would be more likely to retain the expertise and information necessary to conduct liquidity 
support operations.724 However, banking integration was still at an early stage, and the idea 
of centralisation was still illusive and politically unreachable.  
3.3 The Lamfalussy Report  
The period to follow the FSAP was dominated by new regulatory initiatives in banking, 
which aimed at developing and implementing new mechanisms that would facilitate and 
achieve a truly united Europe for financial services.725 Another initiative, which was not part 
of the FSAP, but significantly simplified the EU banking framework,726 by consolidating a 
number of directives,727 was the Codified Banking Directive of 2000.728 Meanwhile, financial 
markets were becoming more unified and integrated, as opposed to banking supervision and 
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- Goodhart, Charles and Schoenmaker, Dirk, ‘Fiscal Burden Sharing in Cross-Border Banking Crises’ (2009) 
5 (1) International Journal of Central Banking.  
725 De Meester (n 668) 276.  
726 De Meester (n 668) 277. 
727 Among the rest: the Codified Banking Directive included the First Banking Directive (n 664); Second Banking 
Directive (n 686); Own Funds Directive (n 347); Solvency Ratio Directive (n 347); Large Exposures Directive (n 
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regulation which remained highly fragmented and still concentrated at national level.729 
Therefore, there emerged the need for banking integration to move beyond harmonisation, 
combined with a more active interventionist attitude towards regulation and supervision. As 
a response to this realisation and with the view to reduce market fragmentation, an 
independent and highly specialised Committee was establishment by the ECOFIN of Brussels 
in July 2000.730 The main objective of the Committee was to follow up on the framework set 
by the FSAP and facilitate the practical implementation of the relevant European rules, in 
order to enhance the effectiveness of the regulatory and supervisory architecture.731 It is 
worth noting here, that prudential supervision was explicitly excluded by the set of tasks of 
the Committee.732  
The Committee of Wise Men produced a Report, which is known as the Lamfalussy 
Report,733 and is named after the name of Alexandre Lamfalussy, who chaired the Committee. 
It is worth mentioning that Lamfalussy was the former president of the European Monetary 
Institute and member of the Segre´ Committee on the development of a European capital 
market. The Lamfalussy Report introduced a new perspective to EU financial regulation. The 
process was initially introduced in 2001, in securities and expanded to banking, insurance and 
investment services four years later. The initial Lamfalussy Report concluded that the existing 
EU regulatory framework was “too slow, too rigid, complex and ill-adapted to the pace of 
global financial market change.”734 Moreover, it was argued that the existing regulatory 
framework was incomplete in terms of coverage, but was also lacking the capacity to ensure 
the consistent application of EU law.735 To this end, the slow transmission process of EU law 
to national legislation, was considered as the greatest obstacle on the way towards a unified 
internal market for financial services.736 This was attributed to the choice of Directives instead 
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730 ECOFIN Meeting, July 2000 (n 723). 
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of Regulations,737 which was believed to have offered excessive regulatory space to Member 
States, resulting in uneven transposition and different interpretations of EU law; while 
Directives required at least 18 months for transposition at national level.738 As a solution, the 
Lamfalussy Report proposed a fast-traced procedure, which as defined by the Report: 
“involves early adoption of an act after first reading in the European Parliament – by ensuring 
prior consultation and agreement with the Council of Ministers and the Commission,” and also 
recommended that: “…more use should be made of Regulations, rather than Directives.”739 
Most importantly, the Lamfalussy Report, in an attempt to facilitate an adequate 
regulatory framework for the creation of a truly integrated financial services market, 
proposed a novel four levels governance mechanism (known as the Lamfalussy process).740 
The Lamfalussy process through its four levels mechanism, provided a framework for timely 
decision-making, with the view to speeding up the EU response to market change, and to 
improving the flexibility and quality of EU financial regulation.741 In short, Level 1 referred at 
the initial stage of the legislation process, whereby the adoption of legislative acts was made 
through the normal EU decision-making procedure, which implies that framework legislation 
is adopted by the EU Council and Parliament under the co-decision procedure following the 
EU Commission’s proposal as specified in Article 251, TFEU.742 Level 2 was designed to 
supplement the Level 1 framework by implementing detailed rules and technical standards743 
subject to ‘comitology.’744 The Lamfalussy Report defined “comitology” as: “the delegation of 
implementing powers by the Council to the Commission for the execution of EU legislation.745 
It should be noted here that ‘comitology’ has been established by a Council Decision in 1999, 
while the Lisbon Treaty introduced modifications to the co-decision procedure and the 
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comitology. Namely, the new comitology procedure implied that the EU Commission could 
adopt delegated legislative acts in accordance to Article 290, TFEU or implementing legislative 
acts pursuant to Article 291, TFEU, which are both binding for the Member States.746 Level 3 
aimed to create an environment of cooperation among EU national securities regulators with 
the view to ensure the uniform transposition of EU legislation at national level, as adopted at 
Level 1 and 2.747 Lastly, Level 4 intended to strengthen the enforcement of EU law, especially, 
by increasing the power of the EU Commission to undertake enforcement actions for any 
failure to implement or inconsistent implementation of EU law.748 
In the context of Level 2, the Lamfalussy Report recommended the establishment of 
two new Committees: the European Securities Committee (ESC) and the European Securities 
Regulators Committee (CESR or ESRC), with first one, intended to have a regulatory function 
and the second one, designed to have an advisory character.749 The two Committees (CESR 
and ESC) were adopted by two decisions of the EU Commission in June 2001.750 An important 
innovation that differentiated the Lamfalussy Report form previous Commission initiatives, 
was the cooperative endeavour between the Commission and the security markets’ national 
representatives through their participation in the ESC. In particular, the ESC was composed of 
representatives of the Members States and chaired by a representative of the Commission,751 
and both the Commission and ESC, would have to work together in proposing, outlining and 
finally deciding on the application of technical details of Level 1 measures.  
Furthermore, Level 1 legislative process was complemented by a transparent 
consultation procedure, which was to be conducted before the EU Commission’s proposal for 
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legislation and subject to its recommendation. The process was open to the participation and 
involvement of market participants, end-users (issuers and consumers), Member States and 
their regulators, the EU Parliament and Level 2 Committees.752 This was a pioneering feature 
of the Lamfalussy Process since it provided the EU Commission with the opportunity to take 
advantage of the specific technical expertise of all interested parties prior to forming its final 
view for the drafting of the proposal. In addition, the Lamfalussy Report recommended 
regular monitoring and reporting to the EU Council, Commission, Parliament and the public, 
of both the procedure and the progress towards creating an integrated financial market.753 
As a response, the EU Council, the EU Parliament, the EU Commission and the ECOFIN set up 
an Interinstitutional Monitoring Group (IIMG) in 2002,  which drafted the relevant reports and 
published them in an annual basis.754 The IIMG was mandated by the EU Parliament, the EU 
Council of Finance Ministers and the EU Commission and was composed of six independent 
experts, two of which were nominated by each Institution.755  
With regards to the ESC, this was designed to serve at multiple levels. Firstly, the ESC 
would had an advisory role to the EU Commission in Level 1 legislative initiatives;756 secondly, 
it would advise the EU Commission on matters of Level 2 regarding the CESR;757 and lastly, at 
Level 2 the ESC would to act as a regulatory comitology committee advising the EU 
Commission when taking decisions on implementing measures under Article 202, TEC.758 
Likewise, the CESR would operate in two Levels: in Level 2 would have a general advisory role 
for the EU Commission,759 and in Level 3 would ensure the implementation and consistent 
application of EU law by NCAs.760 At Level 3, the CESR fulfilled this role by producing guidance, 
recommendations and standards, including: administrative guidelines, interpretation 
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recommendations, common standards, peer reviews and comparisons of regulatory practice. 
These guidance, recommendations and standards were intended to address issues that were 
not covered by EU law, provided were consistent with the legislation adopted at Level 1 and 
2. In addition, they had a non-binding character and the Member States would apply them at 
national level on a voluntary basis.761 In sum, the new framework, facilitated a two levels 
legislation process, whereby the first one involved the preparation and creation of regulation 
(Level 1 and 2), whilst the second one involved the drafting of technical details, by special 
Committees consisting of national representatives, for implementing the regulation (Level 3 
and 4).762 Lastly, CESR was composed of high-level representatives from the national public 
authorities competent in the field of securities.763 
Due to the imminent need to cope with fast changing financial markets as well as with 
the EU enlargement,764 in the informal ECOFIN meeting in Oviedo on 11 April 2002 it was 
decided inter alia that further steps should be undertaken in order to: “ensure that the EU 
has appropriate structures in place for financial regulation and supervision in a rapidly-
changing financial environment.”765 Furthermore, the Brussel’s ECOFIN in May 2002 invited 
the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) to draft a report on financial stability, 
supervision and integration.766 The EFC would act as an EU Committee, in accordance with 
Article 134, TFEU (ex-Article, 114 TEC), and operate in an advisory capacity, with the aim to 
promote policy coordination among the Member States for the functioning of the internal 
market. The final EFC report767 was included in Brussel’s ECOFIN meeting on 3 December 
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2002.768 In the latter, the EU Council invited both the Commission and the EFC to review 
arrangements in financial regulation and supervision in EU and most importantly, to extend 
the application of the Lamfalussy process to all financial sectors, including banking, and 
insurance, by establishing as quickly as possible new Committees in each sector by respective 
decisions of the EU Commission.769 It should be noted here, that the extension of the 
Lamfalussy process to banking, insurance and investment services was envisaged since the 
initial inception of the Lamfalussy procedure.770 
As a response, the EU Commission launched a package of seven measures in 
November 2003, including a proposal for a Directive771 and six Commission Decisions.772 
These six Commission Decisions involved the establishment of: the European Banking 
Committee (EBC), which was reconstructed into a Level 2 Committee;773 the European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee (EIOPC) set up for the purposes of Level 2;774 
and the known as Level 3 Committees: the Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
(CEBS)775 and the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors 
(CEIOPS).776 This is not to say that the role of these Committees was limited in Level 3, since 
                                                           
768 ECOFIN, 2471st Council meeting in Brussels, 3 December 2002 (Presse 361) 14368/02 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-02-361_en.htm> accessed 14 July 2017. 
769 For the rationale of the extension of the Lamfalussy process see also: 
- ‘EFC report on financial regulation, supervision and stability, revised to reflect the discussion at the 8 
October meeting of the ECOFIN Council’ 9 October 2002, Brussels; and 
- ECOFIN, 2471st meeting in Brussels, 3 December 2002 (Presse 361) 14368/02 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-02-361_en.htm> accessed 14 July 2017. 
770 Lannoo, Karel and Levin, Mattias and Zurstrassen, Patrick, ‘Pan-European Asset Management: Achievements 
and Regulatory Impediments’ (CEPS Task Force Report on Pan-European Asset Management, No. 44, Centre for 
European Policy Studies 2003), 21.  
771 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council 
Directives 73/239/EEC, 85/611/EEC, 91/675/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 94/19/EC and Directives 2000/12/EC, 
2002/83/EC and 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, in order to establish a new financial 
services committee organisational structure’ COM (2003) 659 final. 
772 See also:  
- ‘Commission package of measures to improve regulation and supervision of banking, insurance and 
investment funds - frequently asked questions’ 6th November 2003, Brussels, MEMO/03/220; 
- ‘Financial Services: Commission presents measures to improve regulation of banking, insurance and 
investment funds’ (European Commission, Press Release, IP/03/1507, Brussels, 6th November 2003). 
773 Commission, Decision 2004/10/EC of 5 November 2003 establishing the European Banking Committee [2004] 
OJ L 3/36. 
774 Commission, ‘Decision 2004/9/EC of 5 November 2003 establishing the European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Committee’ [2004] OJ L 3/34. 
775 Commission, ‘Decision 2004/5/EC of 5 November 2003 establishing the Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors’ [2004] OJ L 3/28. 
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their tasks were divided between Level 2 and Level 3. Namely, at Level 2, the Committees 
were meant to advice the Commission on technical details in implementing measures, subject 
to request or their own initiation; while at Level 3 would aim to foster supervisory 
convergence by promoting the exchange of information between NCAs, while ensuring 
consistency in the implementation of legislation by issuing guidelines, recommendations and 
standards.777  
Also, the EU Commission’s package involved a decision for establishing the CESR, 
which would operate at Level 3 along with CEBS and CESR;778 and an amendment of the 
decision establishing the ESC.779 The ESC would serve at Level 2 along with the EBC and EIOPC 
in their regulatory capacity (at the proposal stage of legislation) and subject to request, could 
act in an advisory capacity for the EU Commission on the proposals for Level 1 legislation.780 
The EU Commission’s proposal for a Directive was subject to a subsequent co-decision 
between the Council and the Parliament. Thus, the political agreement on the final Directive 
was reached in May 2004 and the Directive was enacted in March 2005, whereby the scope 
Lamfalussy process was officially extended to banking, insurance and investment services,  781 
but its application differed in accordance with the financial sector.782  
The EU Commission seems to have given priority to establishing Level 3 Committees, 
but in the end, created a modified legislative framework to that originally proposed. For 
instance, CEBS,783 was designed to undertake extensive responsibilities at Level 3 such as: 
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advising the EU Commission in the preparation of draft implementing measures in the field 
of banking; contributing to the consistent application of Directives and to the convergence of 
Member States' supervisory practices throughout the Community; and enhancing supervisory 
cooperation, including the exchange of information on individual supervised institutions.784 
In practice, however, the CEBS function was limited to bringing together all NCAs, while its 
role remained merely advisory and it was not assigned any actual decision-making powers. 
Likewise, the CEIOPS was also designed as an advisory body on insurance and occupational 
pension matters, while at the same time, aimed at promoting cooperation among national 
supervision practices.785  
The institutional change with the extension of the Lamfalussy process in banking was 
not considered to be ground-breaking, in terms of structural arrangements. Also, while the 
aim was to achieve tighter convergence of regulation and supervision, it did not provide for 
centralisation of supervision and regulation at EU level and it was largely based on the existing 
principles of decentralisation, cooperation and segmentation. As Lastra argued, there was not 
any transfer of responsibilities from national to EU level, given that Level 2 and 3 Committees 
required the cooperation between national and supranational level in supervision.786 On the 
other hand, it was argued that the value of this extension stands to fact that it shifted the 
attitude towards tighter institutional changes and political compromise towards 
centralisation, while it made clear that the existing system was ill-suited for the facilitation of 
a genuine singe banking market.787 
As mentioned earlier, the Lamfalussy process was part of a broader attempt to 
complete the FSAP’s objectives. Thus, the progress of the Lamfalussy process was interlinked 
with the progress towards the completion of FSAP, which at that stage, was approaching its 
due date. To this end, the EU Commission issued a Green Paper788 and a White Paper789 in 
May and December 2005 respectively, evaluating the progress made up to date in meeting 
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785 For a detailed analysis regarding the Committees see: Ferran, Eilis, ‘Understanding the New Institutional 
Architecture of EU Financial Market Supervision’ in Ferrarini, Guido, Hopt, Klaus J. and Wymeersch, Eddy (eds) 
Financial Regulation and Supervision: A post-crisis analysis (Oxford University Press 2012). 
786 Lastra, Rosa M., ‘‘The Governance Structure for Financial Regulation and Supervision in Europe’ (2003) 10 
(1) Columbia Journal of European Law 49, 59.  
787 Dragomir (n 647) 193.  
788 Commission, ‘Green Paper on Financial Services Policy (2005 - 2010)’ COM (2005) 177 final.  
789 Commission, ‘White Paper in Financial Services Policy (2005 - 2010)’ COM (2005) 629 final. 
174 
 
the intended objectives and setting out the policy objectives in relation to financial services 
integration for the following five years to follow. However, the period after the release of 
White Paper seemed to have been characterised by a reluctant attitude towards further 
financial integration and the adoption of relevant legislation was rather limited. As McCreevy, 
who served as the Commissioner for Internal Market and Services at the time, highlighted: 
“The five years of the Financial Services Action Plan have been a time of concentrated 
legislative change. Today it is clear that there is no appetite-or need-for many new regulatory 
initiatives...industry – and not only in the financial services sector - is looking forward to a well-
deserved regulatory pause after the rash of regulatory initiatives in financial services of the 
past years.”790  
Therefore, the EU Commission’s aim, at that time, was the implementation of existing 
rules and the enhancement of co-operation, rather than the proposal of new laws. This is not 
to say, however, that there were no legislative acts undertaken during that period of time. 
For instance, as already mentioned, in the banking sector, the first CRD was adopted in June 
2006, comprising of two Directives791 that incorporated the implementation of Basel II capital 
adequacy framework at EU level.792 However, it should be noted here that the CRD I,793 was 
not a result of the Lamfalussy legislative process and its establishment was envisaged since 
the drafting of FSAP,794 in which it was stated that: “a Directive on capital adequacy setting 
out revised capital requirements for banks and investment firms was included among the 
future priorities the Commission.”  
However, the GFC changed the aforementioned regulatory reluctance, opening an era 
of intense regulatory intervention and a series of measures that would radically change the 
EU banking landscape. In 2007-08, with the spread of the financial crisis, marked the changing 
point that opened an era of intense regulatory intervention and a series of measures that 
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would radically change the EU banking landscape. Before analysing the post-GFC EU 
regulatory response, it is important to address briefly the main gaps of the Lamfalussy process 
which would serve as the basis of the subsequent debate on regulatory reform.  
3.3.1 Shortcomings of the Lamfalussy process: a preliminary assessment  
On the positive side, it has been widely acknowledged that the Lamfalussy process, 
was successful in achieving its main goal which was to shorten the decision-making process.795 
Furthermore, the Lamfalussy process has been considered as highly influential in changing 
the procedures for adopting, implementing and enforcing EU legislation in the financial 
services field.796 The process was also considered successful in terms of its general 
acceptance, since it was well-received by the majority of Member States, markets participants 
and policymakers.797 For instance, the average time for the adoption of the first four 
Directives in the securities sector (including: the Prospectus Directive;798 the Transparency 
Directive;799 Market Abuse Directive800 and Markets in Financial Instruments Directive or 
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MiFID801), through the  Level 4 procedure – from the proposal stage to adoption – did not 
exceed 20 months.802 Thus, as the IIMG evaluated in its final report, the Lamfalussy process 
has been pivotal in the timely adoption of FSAP.803  
Furthermore, the Lamfalussy process was appraised for its important role in fostering 
the multilateral mode for the financial services sector and financial stability policies in Europe, 
which effectively set the scene for further progress in financial integration, cooperation and 
convergence of EU supervisory practices towards the creation of a Single Banking Market for 
Europe.804 To this end, if we were to evaluate whether the Lamfalussy report provided for 
centralisation of supervisory practices in Europe, it could be argued that although the 
Lamfalussy process did not encourage the creation of a purely supranational supervisory 
authority, it set the framework for the centralisation of banking supervision at EU level. 
Namely, the Lamfalussy process has contributed in intensifying the relationship and 
cooperation between EU and national level as well as between NCAs.805 Also, for those 
arguing in favour of creating a pan-European supervisor, the Lamfalussy Level 3 Committees 
(CEBS, CEIOPS and CESR) represented a relevant core.806  
On the more critical side, the Lamfalussy process became subject of a wide debate in 
terms of both its progress and effectiveness, which was further intensified during the GFC. 
There were concerns that the Lamfalussy process would fail entirely to deliver its intended 
                                                           
801 ‘Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial 
instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European 
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802 Commission Staff Working Document (n 800) para 10.  
803 See: 
-  ‘Final Report Monitoring the Lamfalussy Process’ (IIMG, 15 October 2007) para 10 (hereinafter: IIMG 
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<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/committees/071015_final_report_en.pdf> 
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805 See:  
- Lannoo, Karel, Casey, Jean-Pierre and Sutton, Alastair, ‘EU Financial Regulation and Supervision Beyond 
2005’ (2005) CEPS Task Force Report No. 54, Centre for European Policy Studies, 6; and 
- Kern, Alexander, 'Reforming European Financial Supervision: Adapting EU Institutions to Market 
Structures' (2011) 12 ERA Forum 229, 236.  
806 Hartmann et al. (n 809) 39. 
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outcome.807 Such a critique set the scene for the development of literature regarding further 
integration for banking regulation and supervision at EU level.808 Nevertheless, as mentioned 
earlier, it was acknowledged well before the outbreak of the GFC that the existing regulatory 
and supervisory system was ill-suited to facilitate the desired integration. For instance, the 
IIMG review reports, issued in the aftermath of the extension of the Lamfalussy process to 
banking, insurance and investment services,809 explicitly highlighted the need to strengthen 
Level 3 Committees (CEBS, CEIOPS and CESR).810 This is mainly linked with the criticism against 
the non-binding nature of Level 3 Committees’ decisions, which apart from going against the 
vision of the Lamfalussy Report, was also undermining the effectiveness of the Lamfalussy 
process. To this end, the Lamfalussy Report, while highlighting the non-binding nature of the 
decision of Level 3 Committees, it also emphasised that they would have to: “carry 
considerable authority.”811 Such “considerable authority” was never achieved in practice,812 
since the Member States retained enough discretion to substantially deviate from the 
decisions of the Committees. 
This is also in line with the concerns expressed in relation to the potential insufficiency 
of the Lamfalussy process to ensure adequate supervision, which was believed to invoke 
financial stability risks. The rationale of this belief was based on a simple argument: the 
stability of a financial system built on growing cross-border activity, could not be maintained 
in a fragmented supervisory structure. Those fragmentations were not, however, eliminated 
by the Lamfalussy process. This was to be attributed to the reliance of supervision on the 
home country control principle, which proved to be lacking the ability to maintain financial 
stability within a financial system of a common currency and an extensive cross-border 
activity.813 The outcome of this nationally-oriented governance of supervision, was an 
institutional mismatch, whereby NCAs failed to address cross-border externalities due to their 
                                                           
807 Hertig, Gérard & Lee, Ruben, ‘Four Predictions about the Future of EU Securities Regulation’ (2015) 3 (2) 
Journal of Corporate Law Studies 359.  
808 See: Commission, ‘Review of the Lamfalussy process Strengthening supervisory convergence’ 
(Communication) COM (2007) 797.  
809 This was highlighted at all six IIMG review reports produced during 2005-2007. 
810 Erdélyi, Olivia Johanna, Twin Peaks for Europe: State-of-the-Art Financial Supervisory Consolidation: 
Rethinking the Group Support Regime under Solvency II (1st edn, Springer 2016), 52.  
811 The Lamfalussy Report (n 738) 38.  
812 Commission Communication (n 813) 9. 
813 See: Orphanides (n 552) 1. 
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excessive focus on the soundness of their domestic banking system.814 As was illustrated by 
Padoa-Schioppa the EU financial markets, at the time, were characterised by a framework 
consisted of: “European regulation with national supervision.”815 In fact, the Lamfalussy 
process, while it was considered to have shortened the legislative procedure in comparison 
with its predecessor, it proved to be rather slow in responding promptly to the cross-border 
implications of the financial turmoil in 2008.816  
There were some that predicted the problematic nature the national-oriented EU 
financial regulation and supervision, and anticipated the unavoidable inadequacies that 
would eventually occur in a highly integrated system of a common currency, with shared 
responsibilities in both national and EU level. For instance, Lastra argued that the EU financial 
architecture was experiencing “an inevitable tension”, caused by “a national mandate in 
prudential supervision, combined with a single European currency and a European mandate 
in the completion of the single market in financial services.”817 In addition, according to 
Goodhart “the Eurozone is a difficult and fragile halfway house because it combines monetary 
centralism while leaving fiscal and indeed wider political issues to the individual nation 
states.”818 Lastra also predicted that: “It will take the first pan-European crisis to cast some 
light on this issue.”819 
Part of the same debate was the view that there was a general lack of cooperation 
between NCAs as well as between the EU institutions, which resulted in a poor flow of 
information that led to an inability to identify early signs of potential risks.820 Attempts to 
enhance this cooperation were made in the past through several Memoranda of 
                                                           
814 Mortimer-Schutts, Ivan ‘EU Regulatory and Supervisory Convergence: The Case for a Dual System with 
Choice’ (AEI-Brookings Joint Center2005), 8 <http://gem.sciences-
po.fr/content/publications/pdf/IMS_1205_Dual_EU_Reg_Struct.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017. 
815 Padoa-Schioppa, Tommaso, Regulating Finance: Balancing Freedom and Risk (Oxford University Press 2004) 
121. 
816 Ferran, Ellis and Kern, Alexander, ‘Can soft law bodies be effective? Soft systemic risk oversight bodies and 
the special case of the European systemic risk board’ (2010) 35 European Law Review 751, 770.   
817 Lastra (n 547) 298. 
818 ‘The future of economic governance in the EU’ (Charles Goodhart, as quoted at the House of Lords European 
Union Committee Report, the Stationery Office Limited, London) para 30, 15 
<http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-sub-com-
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819 Lastra (n 791) 58. 
820 ‘Euro Area Policies: 2007 Article IV Consultation-Staff Report’ (IMF, Country Report No. 07/260, July 2007) 
18-20 <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07260.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017. 
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Understandings (MoUs), with the first one issued in 2003, aiming to strengthen the 
cooperation between the EU banking supervisors and central banks in crisis management 
situations.821 The next MoU was issued in May 2005, differing in scope from its predecessor, 
since the latter addressed cooperation by incorporating EU Finance Ministries as well.822 The 
MoU of 2005 was replaced by a MoU in June 2008, which was the first to have been released 
publicly.823 However, the MoUs have not been considered particularly successful in achieving 
their objective i.e. to strengthen cooperation, with the view to safeguard financial stability in 
the EU. This weakness became visible during the GFC era, and as the EU Commission 
acknowledged: “The Memorandum of Understanding on financial stability, agreed in June 
2008, was in place during the crisis but failed to provide a sufficient or useful basis for 
cooperation between Member States.”824 
Another issue highlighted as being problematic, was the interrelationship between 
Level 1 and Level 2 and the distribution of powers and tasks.825 Namely at Level 2 the EU 
Commission was delegated extensive rule-making power, being the dominant player at both 
drafting and adopting the measures, whereas the Parliamentary institutional involvement 
was minimal. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that since the initial release of the Lamfalussy 
Report and especially, after the decision of the EU Commission to extend the Lamfalussy 
process to banking, insurance and investment, the EU Parliament had repeatedly displayed 
significant resistance to the Lamfalussy process. The EU Parliament feared that its limited 
participation in the legislative process, could threaten the institutional balance of powers in 
the EU and the transparency of the legislative process.826 It should be noted that these 
                                                           
821 ‘Memorandum of Understanding on high-level principles of co-operation between the banking supervisors 
and central banks of the European Union in crisis management situations’ (ECB, Press Release, 10 March 2003) 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2003/html/pr030310_3.en.html> accessed 14 July 2017. 
822 ‘Memorandum of Understanding on co-operation between the Banking Supervisors, Central Banks and 
Finance Ministries of the European Union in Financial Crisis situations’ (ECB, Press Release, 18 May 2005) 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2005/html/pr050518_1.en.html> accessed 14 July 2017. 
823 ‘Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation between the Financial Supervisory Authorities, central 
Banks and Finance Ministries of the European Union on Cross-border Financial Stability’ (ECB, 1 June 2008) 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/mou-financialstability2008en.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017. 
824 Commission, ‘EU Framework for Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector’ (Communication) 
COM (2009) 561 final.  
825 See: Commission Staff Working Document (n 800).  
826 See for instance: Randzio-Plath, Christa, ‘Report A5-0162/2004 on the proposal for a European Parliament 
and Council directive amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 85/611/EEC, 91/675/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 
94/19/EC and Directives 2000/12/EC, 2002/83/EC and 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, in order to establish a new financial services committee organisational structure  (COM(2003) 659 – 
C5‑0520/2003 – 2003/0263(COD),’ (Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, 17 March 2004) 
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concerns were addressed since the drafting of the Lamfalussy Report.827 An examples is also 
when the EU Parliament voted a resolution in May 2001, calling for a veto right at Level 2, 
since the role of the Members States was reduced to a right to be informed and the EU 
Commission could do no more than express an opinion.828  
Anticipating this criticism, the EU Commission addressed the matter in the Lamfalussy 
Report,829 and it was further illustrated through the adoption of three additional control 
mechanisms at Level 2. Firstly, by the inclusion of the so-called aerosol clause which obliges 
the Commission: “to avoid going against predominant views which might emerge within the 
Council.”830 However, the first IIMG interim report highlighted that the aerosol clause was not 
clearly defined and therefore: “the lack of clarity about what is meant by “predominant,” may 
hamper the legislative process on some future occasion. That said, the Group is not aware of 
any intention, on the part of any Member State, to put the clause into operation.” 831  Secondly, 
in order to ensure the equal role of the EU Parliament in the legislative process, the EU 
Commission, Parliament and Council reached an agreement in February 2002,832 concerning 
the inclusion of a time limit of four years (from the entry into force of a Directive or 
Regulation) to the powers conferred to the Commission by means of a ‘sunset clause,’833 at 
                                                           
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A5-2004-
0162+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=ro> accessed 14 July 2017.  
See also: Moloney, Niamh, ‘The Lamfalussy Legislative Model: A New Era for the EC Securities and Investment 
Services Regime’ (2003) 52 (2) The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 509.  
827 The Lamfalussy Report (n 738) 21, 33-35. See also: Moloney, Niamh, ‘The Lamfalussy Legislative Model: A 
New Era for the EC Securities and Investment Services Regime’ (2003) 52 (2) The International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 509.  
828 See: ‘European Parliament resolution A5-0168/2001on the Treaty of Nice and the future of the European 
Union’ (Brussels Thursday, 31 May 2001, final edition) para 33 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P5-TA-2001-
0302+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN> accessed 14 July 2017. 
829 The Lamfalussy Report (n 738) 25, 28-32.  
830 IIMG First Interim Report (759) 10 para 5, 14, 39, 40. 
831 IIMG First Interim Report (759) para 5, 14, 39, 40. For the aerosol clause see also: Moloney, Niamh, EU 
Securities and Financial Markets Regulation (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2014). 
832 See: Prodi, Romano, ‘Implementation of financial services legislation in the context of the Lamfalussy Report’, 
(Intervention by President Romano Prodi to the European Parliament's plenary session, Strasbourg, 5 February 
2002, SPEECH/02/44) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/dorie/fileDownload.do;jsessionid=SdIKpmvHjAXmMbBvXEoNG1YfoDw4HTOb1CIXR7dbA
9-mbP90smhe!-898031139?docId=199189&cardId=199189> accessed 14 July 2017. 
See also: Von Wogau, Karl, ‘Report A5-0011/2002 on the implementation of financial services legislation’ 
(European Parliament, The Committee on Constitutional Affairs, 23 January 2002) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A5-2002-
0011+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN> accessed 14 July 2017. 
833 For the meaning of sunset clause see also:  
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all legislative acts adopted by Level 1.834 Thirdly, a period of three months was given to the 
EU Parliament in order to react to any draft implementing measure forwarded by the EU 
Commission.835 The issue was readdressed again in 2005, when subject to an agreement 
between the three EU institutions (Commission, Parliament and Council), the co-decision 
procedure was reformed again.836 This reform gave the right to the EU Parliament to reject 
the adoption of the EU Commission’s draft implementing measures following the review by a 
Scrutiny Committee in case: “the measures proposed exceed the implementing powers 
provided for in the basic instrument or that the draft is not compatible with the aim or the 
content of the basic instrument or does not respect the principles of subsidiarity or 
proportionality.”837  
Additionally, the delayed transposition of EU measures at national level was another 
issue that raised scepticism. For instance the ‘Lamfalussy League Table’ that was launched by 
the EU Commission on 6 July 2005,838 and was regularly updated hereinafter, depicted the 
poor progress made by the majority of Member States in implementing the Lamfalussy 
Directives.839 Thus, while the Lamfalussy Process, as mentioned earlier, contributed in 
shortening the legislative process, it does not seem to have had the same effect to the 
transposition in national law.840 This is highly contradictory, if considering that the aim of 
Level 3 was the timely and successful transposition of Level 1 and 2 legislative measure of the 
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834 Grahl, John, Global Finance and Social Europe (Edward Elgar Publishing 2009) 103-104;  
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Lamfalussy process at national level.841 The EU Commission’s response to this delay was an 
announcement for pursuing infringement procedures against Members States that had not 
ratify the EU Directives.842 Furthermore, the IIMG emphasised that the delayed and imperfect 
transposition constituted a major bottleneck in the development of the Single Market and in 
enjoyment of its benefits, and thus, concluded that the Lamfalussy process had not led to the 
expected improvement of transposition performance.843  
If we were to put our discussion in the aftermath of the GFC, with the latter shedding 
light on important regulatory loopholes and fragile governance mechanisms, unavoidably, the 
criticism against the Lamfalussy process was intensified. Since the main problem in the GFC 
started with the banks, it is not surprising that a topic that would gather a vast amount of 
attention was banking supervision. Thus, the need for convergence in banking supervision 
measures, with particular emphasis to prudential supervision, became a priority at both 
international and EU level. As McCreevy highlighted in his speech in July 2007: “closer 
integration is putting pressure on the current system of financial markets regulation as 
territoriality of legislation and supervision does not fit well with global and de-materialized 
capital markets.”844  
However, as we mentioned already, awareness as to the need to promote supervisory 
convergence was intensified during the GFC era, but this does not imply that it is purely a 
creature of the financial crisis. At EU level, as already depicted, the need to strengthen 
supervisory practices was stressed repeatedly even before the emergence of the GFC. A good 
example is the Experts Group on Banking set by the EU Commission in 2004.845 Namely, the 
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Commission called for open consultation reports by four independent groups of experts on 
the state of financial integration in the banking, insurance, securities and asset management 
sectors, as part of reviewing the FSAP progress, in which it was argued that improvements 
were needed in terms of legislation, supervisory arrangements and convergence of 
supervisory practices.846 However, at the time, it was believed that tighter regulatory 
integration would result in convergence of supervisory practices.847 After the occurrence of 
the GFC, it became evident that supervisory convergence was below the desired level, with 
the gap between regulation and supervision integration increasing. This led to a plethora of 
legislative reforms aiming to reshape the existing EU regulatory framework. Thus, in order to 
illustrate the impetus of legal integration of EU banking regulation and supervision, the next 
section analyses the EU regulatory response from the eruption of the GFC onwards.  
3.4 The GFC and the EU regulatory response 
3.4.1 Tighter regulatory response since the outset of The GFC 
Despite the criticisms on the effectiveness of the Lamfalussy process, it has been 
acknowledged that before the occurrence of the GFC, the EU financial market integration had 
reached momentum, representing one of the most consolidated and unified markets in the 
world.848 Also, at that time, as mentioned earlier, the EU banking framework was relatively 
settled and there were no major initiatives towards furthering financial integration, with the 
FSAP deemed completed. However, as analysed in the previous section, the regulatory and 
supervision framework of the financial markets, even prior to the occurrence of the GFC, had 
started to raise scepticism, while the Lamfalussy process, became subject to ongoing reviews 
in order to improve its functioning. As the founding father of the Lamfalussy process, 
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Alexander Lamfalussy, stated, there were signs from 2005 onwards about a build-up of risks 
and a potential crisis.849  
The GFC experience proved those concerns to be highly accurate, and it soon became 
apparent that the level of financial integration was not aligned with the regulatory and 
supervisory integration. The GFC had started to hit global financial markets since the collapse 
of the US sub-prime mortgage market in early 2007, and did not take long until it was felt in 
Europe in mind-2008, turning into a sovereign crisis in 2009/2010,850 which influenced 
severely a number of Member States (especially: Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland). 
As stated in 2011 by the House of Lords: “the interconnection of the sovereign debt and 
banking sectors was one of the principal elements that contributed to the current crisis.”851  
Furthermore, the contagious effect and the systemic consequences were rapidly felt in the 
EU banking system, since many of its banks were heavily involved in international 
transactions. To this end, it was argued that the existing regulatory system led to the eruption 
of the GFC, mainly due to shortcomings related to the nationally-oriented governance of 
banking regulation and supervision.852 Thus, while initially the focus was on the ongoing 
evaluation of the Lamfalussy process, the legal integration impetus in EU financial integration 
was then shifted towards the need to preserve financial stability, especially through 
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strengthening banking supervision.853 This was explicitly addressed by the ECOFIN in October 
2007, where it was concluded that it was necessary to take further steps, both at the EU and 
national level, with the view to strengthen financial stability arrangements in order align them 
with changes in financial markets.854  
In the same vein, the final IIMG report in October 2007 stressed the need to improve 
the performance of Level 3 Committees, concluding that the latter should serve: “as the 
platform to coordinate supervision and regulation, facilitating the development of supervisory 
tools and methods, and strengthening the trust between national supervisors.”855 As 
mentioned above,  the same argument was followed by the Commission, in the Review of the 
Lamfalussy Process on November 2007, by highlighting that: “the recent market turbulence 
has shown how interconnected markets are becoming-and-injecting an added degree of 
urgency to evolve the EU supervisory framework in line with these new market realities,” 856 
and therefore, there was a need to: “adopt a globally convergent approach to regulation and 
supervision, with sound prudential rules and a consistent approach to supervision.”857 
Following the reasoning of both the final IIMG report and the EU Commission’s 
Lamfalussy Process Review of November 2007, the ECOFIN of December 2007, underlined the 
importance of working towards a European supervisory convergence and thus, the 
improvement all four Levels of the Lamfalussy Process was essential for this purpose.858 Also, 
the ECOFIN of December 2007 invited the EU Commission to propose possible ways that 
would enhance the role of Level 3 Committees, without however, changing the non-binding 
nature of their decisions.859 Shortly after, the ECOFIN in May 2008 adopted conclusions on 
supervision and financial stability arrangements, and provided updated roadmaps with 
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timetables for: the improvement of the Lamfalussy process; the enhancement of the EU 
financial stability arrangements; the upgrade of deposit guarantee schemes; and specific 
actions to be taken in response to the GFC. 860 
Following these findings, a new wave of legislative action began, aiming to address the 
gaps of the existing framework and to promote further regulatory and supervisory 
convergence. On 23 May 2008, the EU Commission launched a consultation paper, proposing 
various mechanisms that Level 3 Committees could use in order to achieve their main 
objective to enhance supervisory cooperation and convergence, with the view to also 
achieve: “the consistent and timely implementation of Community legislation in the Member 
States.”861 Furthermore, the EU Commission stressed the importance of facilitating an 
improved role of the Level-3 Committees in a way that would ensure financial stability at both 
European and international level.862 Later in October 2008, the EU Parliament called the EU 
Commission to submit official proposals on: the minimum criteria for effective arrangements 
on regulation and supervision; the adoption of measures to safeguarded financial stability 
and address systemic risk implications; and the reform of the supervisory framework by 
enhancing the role of Level 3 Committees.863  
As a response, the EU Commission in its communication in 29 October 2008, launched 
work concerning the EU supervisory arrangements which was to be carried out by a high level 
expert group or the so-called De Larosière Group, chaired by Jacques De Larosière, who had 
previously served as the managing director of IMF.864 In November 2008, the EU 
Commission’s President Barroso mandated the De Larosière Group to start working on: 
“strengthening European supervisory arrangements covering all financial sectors, with the 
                                                           
860 ECOFIN, ‘2866th Council Meeting on Economic and Financial Affairs in Brussels, 14 May 2008’ (Presse 113) 
8850/08, 13 <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ecofin/100339.pdf> 
accessed 14 July 2017. 
861 Commission, ‘Public Consultation Paper on Amendments to Commission Decisions establishing CESR, CEBS & 
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862 Commission, May 2008 (n 866) 10-11. 
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objective of establishing a more efficient, integrated and sustainable European system of 
supervision and also of reinforcing cooperation between European supervisors and their 
international counterparts.”865 In the mandate, it was also acknowledged that the national-
based supervisory arrangements, as promoted by the Lamfalussy process, although have 
evolved into promoting further convergence in supervisory practices, performed poorly in 
addressing and/or identifying the causes of the GFC. At the same period of time, the Level 3 
Committees published an updated version of their joint protocol in 19 December 2008, with 
the view to further cooperate and coordinate their operations and tasks.866 It is peculiar how 
the ECOFIN in December 2008, considered that the improvements necessary to EU banking 
supervision had reached a completion point,867 while the De Larosière Report, which came 
two months later, explicitly emphasised that the EU supervisory infrastructure needed a 
radical change. The following section examines in detail the content of the De Larosière 
Report and the changes brought to the Lamfalussy process and the EU regulatory and 
supervisory architecture. 
3.4.2 The De Larosière Report 
As already highlighted, the GFC triggered a growing trend towards Europeanising 
banking regulation and supervision. Thus, the rationale of the De Larosière Group was clear, 
it aimed at reshaping the EU regulatory and supervisory environment in order to create a 
comprehensive, more efficient and integrated legal framework. Following the EU 
Commission’s mandate in November 2008, the De Larosière Group published its Report in 25 
February 2009,868 including 31 recommendations. In May 2009 and in June 2009, the EU 
                                                           
865 ‘High Level Expert Group on EU financial supervision to hold first meeting on 12 November’ (Commission 
Press Release IP/08/1679, Brussels, 11 November 2008 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-08-
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342) 16231/08, 9 
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868 The De Larosière Group, ‘The High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU’ (Brussels, 25 February 
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Commission869 and Council,870 respectively, endorsed the Report. The main objective of the 
De Larosière Report was to set a blueprint towards the creation of an improved institutional 
framework for supervision, whereby both micro- and macro-prudential supervision would be 
enhanced. As it was analysed in chapter two, in light of the GFC the macro-prudential 
dimension of supervision came into prominence. This is not, however, to say that micro-
prudential supervision was to be neglected. The regulation of micro-prudential supervision 
was considered as equally important, especially given that financial distress usually starts with 
individual cases before spreading to the whole financial system.871 In fact, the importance of 
the De Larosière Report Report’s lies on the fact that apart from highlighting the main 
weaknesses of the existing regulatory regime, it provided an innovative approach to dealing 
with the relationship between macro-prudential and micro-prudential supervision. This was 
considered to be instrumental in promoting the cooperation in monitoring systemic risks at 
EU level.872  
From the outset, the De Larosière Report recognised that the GFC was a complex 
phenomenon, which resulted in severe losses that could not be instantly compensated. 
Therefore, preventing another financial crisis from happening was set as an immediate 
objective. This objective would rely on the cooperation of both European and international 
monetary authorities, including the regulatory and supervisory financial authorities.873 Hence, 
the first chapter of the De Larosière Report, examined the causes that led to the GFC, by 
raising awareness on the implications with both European and international dimension. 
Namely, the areas that were identified to have embodied contributing factors that caused the 
GFC, included: macroeconomic issues (such as ample liquidity and low interest rates;874 risk 
                                                           
869 Commission, ‘European financial supervision’ (Communication) COM (2009) 252 final 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/committees/supervision/communication_may2009/C-
2009_715_en.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017.  
870 ECOFIN, ‘2948th Economic and Financial Affairs, Council conclusions on Strengthening EU financial 
supervision’ (Luxembourg, 9 June 2009) 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/108389.pdf> accessed 14 July 
2017.  
871 See: Borio, Claudio, ‘Towards a macroprudential framework for financial supervision and regulation?’ (BIS 
Working Papers No 128, February 2003).  
872 Saccomanni, Fabrizio, ‘Fact finding for the examination of the Communication of the European Commission 
on the European financial supervision’ (A Testimony of the Director General of the Bank of Italy-Finance 
Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, Rome 2009) <http://www.bis.org/review/r091006e.pdf> accessed 14 
July 2017. 
873 The De Larosière Report (n 873) introduction, para 4.  
874 The De Larosière Report (n 873) 8.  
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management and a failure in assessing potential risks);875 weaknesses in terms of the role of 
Credit Rating Agencies (CRA);876 corporate governance failures;877 regulatory, supervisory and 
crisis management failures;878 and dynamics of the financial crisis.879 It could be argued, that 
these findings go in line with the relevant arguments that prevailed during that time in the 
literature arguing against the conventional wisdom, and hence, the discussion in chapter two 
on this matter becomes highly relevant.   
The second chapter of the De Larosière Report, named “Policy and regulatory repair”, 
set out the proposed changes in the regulatory framework for financial services with the view 
to foster financial stability and prevent the re-occurrence of such a severe financial crisis.880 
Within this context, the De Larosière Report differentiated between regulation and 
supervision, since the two, often tend to be used in an interchangeable manner, while 
clarified that they were assessed together in the Report. Namely, regulation was considered 
to be the set of rules and standards that govern financial institutions, with the main aim to 
ensure financial stability and protect customers; whereas, supervision was consider the 
process of overseeing financial institutions that aimed to ensure the consistent application of 
rules and standards.881 Furthermore, there was an explicit emphasis given to the macro-
prudential oversight of financial institutions, with the involvement of the ECB on this matter 
being deemed as highly important.882 It should be noted that at chapter three, it was 
highlighted that the involvement of ECB was considered pivotal in both micro- and macro- 
prudential supervision.883 However, the De Larosière Group, after carefully considering the 
views in favour of delegating micro-prudential supervision responsibilities to the ECB,884 
advocated against of such an involvement.885 Within the context of chapter two, the De 
Larosière Report inter alia stressed the impact of Basel II measures and how they have dealt 
with the challenges of the GFC, concluding that there was a need for a fundamental review of 
                                                           
875 The De Larosière Report (n 873) 8.  
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877 The De Larosière Report (n 873) 10. 
878 The De Larosière Report (n 873) 10-11. 
879 The De Larosière Report (n 873) 11-12.  
880 The De Larosière Report (n 873) 13.  
881 The De Larosière Report (n 873) 13 para 38.  
882 The De Larosière Report (n 873) 15 para 49. 
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884 The De Larosière Report (n 873) 43 para 169-171.  
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Basel II rules.886 This also links with the reluctance of EU to implement the latest Basel, i.e. 
Basel III, as discussed in chapter two.  
The following chapter, named “EU supervisory repair,” proposed a number of both 
short and longer term changes in the EU institutional governance for supervision, by 
highlighting the strong interdependent relationship between regulation and supervision. In 
the words of the Report: “competent supervision cannot make good failures in financial 
regulatory policy; but without competent and well-designed supervision good regulatory 
policies will be ineffective. High standards in both are therefore required.”887 To this end, the 
De Larosière Report draw the difference between the macro- and micro- prudential 
supervision, by emphasising their respective importance and their intertwined nature both in 
substance and in operational terms.888   
The new supervision architecture involved the creation of a decentralised network, 
called the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), which aimed at strengthening 
both micro- and macro-prudential supervision. The rationale for the establishment of ESFS 
was based on the realisation that the role and structure of Level 3 Committees were not 
sufficient enough to ensure financial stability, as mentioned earlier.889 Therefore, at micro-
prudential level, the ESFS intended to replace the existing Level 3 Committees, with a system 
of supervisors consisted of both European supervisors and NCAs. The European supervisors 
would undertake specific tasks that were considered to be better performed at EU level, 
whereas the NCAs would carry out day-to-day supervision.890 The bodies or the so-called 
Authorities, that came to replace Level 3 Committees were: the European Banking Authority 
(EBA), the European Insurance Authority (EIA) and the European Securities Authority 
(ESA)).891 The adoption of the ESFS was proposed to take place through a two stage process. 
The first stage would be the preparatory stage for ESFS (to be completed by 2009-2010) and 
                                                           
886 The De Larosière Report (n 873) 15-19.  
887 The De Larosière Report (n 873) 38 para 144.   
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at the second stage, the ESFS would be implemented (to be completed by 2011-2012). 892 
Lastly, the ESFS was meant to be subject to review, three years after its entry into force.893 
The macro-prudential pillar implied the establishment of the European Systemic Risk 
Council (later renamed as ESRB) which represented the first formal attempt to regulate 
macro-prudential supervisory arrangements at EU level. The ESRB would replace the Banking 
Supervision Committee of the ECB and would be under the auspices and logistical support of 
the ECB.894  To this end, the De Larosière Report stressed the need for developing early macro-
prudential risk warnings mechanisms to be mainly run by the ESRC, while working in close 
cooperation with the FSF.895 The ESRB, however, was envisaged to remain a merely advisory 
body, since the responsibility to take actions would remain at national level. Also, the ESRB 
was not granted any decision-making powers and the NCAs would only have to take into 
account the finding of the ESRB in a voluntary basis.896 The response of the NCAs to the ESRB’s 
findings would then be reviewed by the ESRB and when necessary report to the EFC.897 The 
ESRB was also assigned with the responsibility to inform the global supervisory system (the 
IMF, the FSF and the BIS) in case an issue was evaluated as having global implications.898  
The last chapter was named “Global Repair” and focused on the promotion of financial 
stability at international level, through enhancing: regulatory consistency;899 the cooperation 
among supervisors;900 macroeconomic surveillance and crisis management mechanisms;901 
crisis management and resolution mechanisms;902 EU's representation at the global 
institutions;903 and EU’s bilateral financial relations.904 In order to raise regulatory 
consistency, the De Larosière Report proposed to enhance the role of the FSF,905 which would 
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have to cooperate with the BCBS and report regularly to the IMF and the International 
Monetary and Finance Committee (IMFC).906   
Following the recommendations of the De Larosière Report, the EU Commission 
released a package of draft legislation in 23 September 2009,907 including proposals for 
regulations establishing the so-called European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) including: a 
European Banking Authority (EBA);908 a European Insurance and Occupation Pensions 
Authority (EIOPA);909 a European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)910 and a ESRB;911 
and a proposal for a Council decision entrusting the ECB with specific tasks concerning the 
ERSB.912 The ECOFIN on 20 October 2009 reached agreement on a draft regulation 
establishing the ESRB,913 while on 9 December 2009, approved the establishment of the three 
ESAs.914 
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The EU Commission’s proposals were welcomed by the EU Parliament that gave the 
green light for the new supervisory framework on 22 September 2010.915 This was followed 
by the EU Council’s response, announcing on November 2010 that it had adopted legal texts 
setting out a reform of the EU framework for supervision of the financial system, which aimed 
at eliminating deficiencies that were exposed during the GFC.916 Shortly after, the relevant 
Regulations were issued by the EU Council and thus, the new EU supervisory framework took 
shape. This resulted in a network of new institutions with specific tasks and division of 
responsibilities, intended to address both dimensions of prudential supervision i.e. micro- and 
macro-prudential. This set of reforms was generally welcomed and has been considered as 
instrumental in changing the way Europe perceived banking regulation and supervisions until 
then. Hence, the analysis to follow examines in detail the institutional structure and the role 
of the relevant institutions in each pillar.  
3.4.2.1. The Macro-prudential pillar: the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) 
As mentioned earlier, the need to strengthen the macro-prudential dimension of 
financial regulation and supervision, by focusing on the financial system as a whole as 
opposed to the soundness of individual financial institutions, became a core element of the 
policy response to the GFC at both EU and international level. This discussion also links with 
the analysis advanced in chapter two as to how macro-prudential policies came into 
prominence in light of the GFC. At EU level, as analysed already, the Lamfalussy process was 
criticised for neglecting the importance of macro-prudential issues, while it remained focused 
on individual firms.917 Hence, the EU Commission in late 2008 highlighted that there was a 
need to: “redefine the regulatory and supervisory model of the EU financial sector, particularly 
for the large cross border financial institutions. The current national-based organisation of EU 
supervision limits the scope for effective macro-prudential oversight.”918  
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Similarly, Adair Turner, who was serving as the Chairman of FSA at the time, 
highlighted in his speech in late 2009, that the most crucial things that went wrong in the run-
up to the GFC was the excessive focus on micro-prudential risks, while there was a lack of 
awareness in term of macro-prudential risks to financial stability. Turner also added that for 
this reason there was a need to establish: “a body at European level, focused specifically on 
identifying these big picture risks….and this body will need input from both central banks and 
from national supervisors - so it has both a ‘top-down’ and a ‘bottom-up’ perspective. But 
creating such an institution will be the easy bit; making sure it really adds value will be more 
challenging.”919 
Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the De Larosière Report and the subsequent 
regulatory response focused on enhancing the macro-prudential dimension of supervision. 
Part of this attempt was the establishment of ESRB in December 2010 on the basis of Article 
114, TFEU.920 The ESRB, as discussed above, represented the macro-prudential pillar of ESFS 
and intended to replace the existing Banking Supervision Committee of the ECB. Also, the 
ESRB regulation was complemented by a regulation conferring specific task upon the ECB.921 
The ESRB became operational on 1 January 2011 and its regulation is divided in four chapters, 
where chapter one addressed its establishment, definitions, and objectives;922 chapter two 
outlined its institutional and structural organisation; 923  chapter three specified its tasks; 924 
and chapter four set out the final provisions regarding accountability and reporting, its review 
and entry into force.925 The main objective of the ESRB was to develop a macro-prudential 
perspective, with the view to solve the problem of nationally fragmented micro-prudential 
risk assessment.926  
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Furthermore, the ESRB aimed to strengthen the early warning mechanisms, by 
monitoring and assessing systemic risk with the view to safeguard financial stability.927 This 
early warning mechanisms were highly based on information evaluation through cooperation 
with the micro-prudential pillar,928 which allowed for greater interaction and cooperation 
between micro- and macro-prudential pillars.929 To this end, the ESRB would be responsible 
to issue warnings in case systemic risk is identified as well as issue recommendations for 
remedial action,930 which would include, when necessary, recommendations for legislative 
initiatives.931 The addressees of the warnings and recommendations could be: the Union as a 
whole; or one or more Member States; or one or more of the ESAs; or one or more of the 
NCAs.932 It should be noted that the individual financial institutions were excluded from the 
scope of the ESRB’s warnings and recommendations.933 Lastly, in line with the Larosière 
Report recommendations, the ESRB was designed to work closely with international 
institutions, which hold similar responsibilities to issue early warnings of macro-prudential 
risks, including IMF and the Financial Stability Board (FSB).934  
With regards to the institutional framework, as it was explicitly stated in its regulation, 
the ESRB, despite from being an independent body, was not granted a legal personality and 
thus, its decisions were not legally binding.935 As it was highlighted by the EU Commission in 
the ESRB’s regulation proposal, the ESRB would draw its legitimacy from its reputation for 
independent judgements, high quality analysis and sharpness in its conclusions.936 Particular 
attention was paid to the ESRB formation, which should reflect: “an appropriate composition 
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(bringing together the ECB, the national central banks, the new Supervisory Authorities as well 
as national supervisory authorities) that would create valuable synergies, ensure an 
appropriate level of representation, and have a mutually reinforcing impact on the stability of 
the financial system.”937 This was also illustrated in a number of entities that were to 
accompany the ESRB’s operation, including: a General Board (GB), a Steering Committee, an 
Advisory Scientific Committee (ASC), the Advisory Technical Committee (ATC) and a 
Secretariat.938 The General Board, chaired by the President of ECB and composed of 65 
members, would serve as the main decision-making body of the ESRB.939 The ESRB members 
would be divided into 37 voting and 28 non-voting. The voting members would include: the 
President and Vice-President of the ECB; the governors of the national central banks of the 
EU Member States; the Chairs of the three ESAs; a member of the EU Commission; the Chair 
and the two Vice-Chairs of the ASC and the Chair of the ATC. The non-voting members would 
include: the President of the EFC and one high-level representative per EU Member State 
from the competent NCAs authorities. The Steering Committee would consist of 14 members 
of the General Board and intended to support the decision-making process of the ESRB by 
preparing the meetings of the General Board and monitoring the progress of the ESRB’s 
operations.940 The Advisory Scientific Committee and the Advisory Technical Committee 
aimed in assisting the operation of the ESRB subject to Chair’s request.941  
This organisational structure created a complex institutional framework consisted of 
three layers of macro-prudential decision-making (ESRB, ECB’s Governing Council and NCAs), 
which combined with the highly integrated nature of EU financial markets, required a high 
level of cooperation between all components involved.942 In fact, there was a mandatory 
obligation for cooperation and information exchange between NCAs and the ECB/ESCB, as 
envisaged by the De Larosière Report.943 This was also illustrated in Article 15(1),(2), ESRB 
Regulation, according to which the actors of both micro- and macro-prudential pillars would 
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have to cooperate in exchanging information and data with each other. Namely, the ESRB 
would have to provide the ESAs with all necessary information for risk assessment,944 while 
the ESAs along with the ESCB, the EU Commission, the national authorities and national 
statistical authorities, would have to provide the ESRB with all necessary information as 
well.945 This obligation to cooperate was considered of fundamental importance since it 
implied that: firstly, micro-prudential supervision has been now complemented by a macro-
prudential perspective, which practically meant that the focus had shifted from the 
soundness of individual financial institutions to wider macroeconomic risks that could 
threaten the soundness of the financial system as a whole;946 and secondly, an innovative 
involvement of the ECB in macro-prudential supervision, which paved the way for enhancing 
the participation of the ECB in banking supervision.  
In general, the role and operation of the ESRB met with approval, and was considered 
to be a key element towards creating a centralised credible framework to identify and 
mitigate risks to financial stability at EU level.947 However, there were certain aspects that 
have been subject to criticism, especially regarding its governance. For instance, there were 
doubts as to the effectiveness of the ESRB in addressing systemic risk due to the lack of an 
adequate understanding of what systemic risk entails. However, as Kern argued: “the absence 
of a consensus view on the sources of systemic risk…does not preclude the design of effective 
cross-border institutional structures to monitor and measure systemic risks in European 
financial markets.”948  
                                                           
944 The ESRB Regulation (n 925) Articles 15 (1).  
945 The ESRB Regulation (n 925) Articles 15 (2). 
946 ‘Economic Crisis in Europe: Causes, Consequences and Responses’ (Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs, European Commission 2009) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/pages/publication15887_en.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017.  
947 For a detailed analysis of the ESRB see: Andenas, Mads and Deipenbrock, Gudula (eds), Regulating and 
Supervising European Financial Markets: More Risks than Achievements (1st edn Springer 2016), 43-66.  
See also: Darvas, Zsolt, Schoenmaker, Dirk and Véron, Nicolas, ‘Reforms to the European Union Financial 
Supervisory and Regulatory Architecture and their Implications for Asia’ (Asian Development Bank Institute 
Working Paper No. 615, 27 November 2016), 27 
<https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/212176/adbi-wp615.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017.  
948 Kern (n 807) 242.  
198 
 
There was also controversy as to the composition of ESRB for being: “ludicrously 
lopsided in favour of central banks in general and of the ECB in particular.” 949 This assertion 
was based on the experience of the GFC, which questioned the ability of central banks to 
address macro-prudential risks. As a response, a number of central bankers argued in favour 
of the view that their role is pivotal in macro-prudential oversight, due to their informational 
advantage position, the independence of their operation as well as technical expertise.950 
Other concerns regarding the composition of the ESRB, were based on arguments supporting 
that it facilitated more favourable treatment towards Eurozone Member States, while it 
excluded the participation of the non-euro area financial markets.951 The latter was addressed 
by the ESRB Regulation in Article 11(1), which required the participation of both Eurozone 
and non-Eurozone Member States.952  
 Part of the same debate was another highly controversial issue, which refers to the 
role of the ECB in providing administrative support and participating in macro-prudential 
supervision within the ESRB. The composition of ESRB raised eyebrows in countries, mainly, 
outside the Eurozone. For instance, concerns were expressed by the UK, which feared that 
the interests of the City of London, as the financial centre of Europe, would not be adequately 
taken into consideration by the proposed macro-prudential supervisory arrangements since 
most of its members were to be central bankers from only Eurozone Member States. In 
addition, the UK was of the position that ECB’s role should remain as an observer.953 This also 
                                                           
949 Buiter William, ‘The proposed European Systemic Risk Board is overweight central bankers’ (Financial 
Times, October 28, 2009) <http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2009/10/the-proposed-european-systemic-risk-
board-is-overweight-central-bankers/#axzz4cnyolZke> accessed 14 July 2017.  
950 See among the rest: 
- Wellink, Nout, ‘Supervisory arrangements-lessons from the crisis’ (Speech at the 44th SEACEN 
Governors’ Conference: “Preserving monetary and financial stability in the new global environment”, 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 6 February 2008) <https://www.dnb.nl/en/news/news-and-archive/speeches-
2009/dnb212157.jsp> accessed 14 July 2017; 
- Landau, Jean-Pierre, ‘Bubbles and macro prudential supervision’ (Remarks by Mr Jean-Pierre Landau, 
Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, at the Joint conference on “The Future of Financial Regulation”, 
organised by the Bank of France and the Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), Paris, 28 January 2009) < 
http://www.bis.org/review/r090327e.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017; and 
- Thomopoulos, Panayotis, ‘The role of central banks as financial supervisors’ (Speech at ‘The Economist 
Conferences 8th Banking Forum: Banking and the Economy in Turbulent Times’ Athens, 26 January, 
2009) <http://www.bis.org/review/r090203c.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017.   
951 Begg, Iain ‘Regulation and Supervision of Financial Intermediaries in the EU: The Aftermath of the Financial 
Crisis’ (2009) 47 (5) Journal of Common Market Studies 1107, 1120-1121.  
952 The ESRB Regulation (n 925) Article 11 (1)(c). 
953 ‘The future of EU financial regulation and supervision’ (House of Lords, 14th Report of Season 2008-09, The 
Stationery Office Limited, 17 June 2009) 39-40 and para 141.  
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goes in line with the wording of Article 127(6), TFEU, which requires unanimity for conferring 
macro-prudential tasks to ECB. However, given the composition of the ESRB, the ECB was 
envisaged to play a very active role within ESRB. Namely, the ESRB would be chaired by the 
ECB President, supported by the Secretariat of the ECB and would be composed mainly of the 
members of ECB/ESCB General Council (along with the chairpersons of Level 3 Committees as 
well as one representative of the EU Commission),954 drawing on technical advice from all EU 
national central banks and supervisors.955  
Therefore, it could be argued that the establishment of ESRB constituted the first 
official attempt to assign prudential supervision tasks to the ECB, drawing its legal basis by 
Article 127(6), TFEU. Namely, the ECB’s involvement in supervision was limited to specific 
macro-prudential oversight tasks, following closely the wording of Article 127(6), TFEU, which 
was made use of for the first time.956 Notably, Article 127(6), TFEU,957 prohibits the ECB from 
assuming micro-prudential supervisory tasks unless such a delegation is made through 
unanimous vote by the Council after consultation with the EU Parliament. The ECB’s exclusion 
from micro-prudential tasks was already stressed by the De Larosière Report, with the latter 
providing an exhaustive list of reasons against delegating micro-prudential supervisory 
powers to ECB.958 However, the ECB’s enhanced role within the ESRB structure implied its 
potential access to micro-prudential information due to the obligation of cooperation 
between the macro-and micro-prudential pillar. This, although proved to be pivotal in 
opening the way for further involvement of the ECB in micro-prudential supervision at a later 
stage, it raised question as to the legitimacy of the ESFS supervisory architecture. 
Another issue that was believed to undermine the role and efficiency of the ESRB in 
achieving its objective was the fact that its operation was based to a great extent on voluntary 
                                                           
954 See: The De Larosière Report (n 873) 44 para 178 and the ESRB Regulation (n 925) recital 6, 24; Article 5(1), 
(2), (7); Article 6(1)(a); Article 11(1); Article 13(1).  
955  See: González-Páramo, José Manuel, ‘The regulatory and supervisory reform in Europe’ (Speech by Member 
of the Executive Board of the ECB, Presentation of the Report, Madrid, 22 January 2010) 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2010/html/sp100122.en.html> accessed 14 July 2017. 
956 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Community macro 
prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board’ COM (2009) 499 
final, 4. 
957 An extensive analysis of Article 127(6), including the enabling clause, is developed in chapter four when 
examining the legal basis of the SSM.  
958 The De Larosière Report (n 873) 44 para 172. See also: Smits, René, ‘Europe’s Post-crisis Supervisory 
Arrangements: A Critique’ (2010) 1 (2) Revista de concorrência e regulação 125.  
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compliance, since the ESRB was designed to operate without legally binding powers.959 As 
previously mentioned, the ESRB was not granted legal personality and as a result, its decisions 
would be soft law, i.e. not enforceable, as there was also no mechanism to impose legal 
sanctions.960 However, this is not to say the ESRB warning and recommendations were  
completely to be ignored. ESRB recommendations would be subject to a ‘comply or explain’ 
regime, or as defined by the ESRB Regulation: ‘act or explain’ mechanism. This mechanism 
would entail an obligation for NCAs to report to the ESRB their willingness to comply or to 
provide an inadequate explanation as to the reasons of non-compliance.961 Moreover, under 
the strict rules of confidentiality, warnings and recommendations would, in principle, be 
confidential. However, they could be transmitted to the EU Commission, Council and in some 
cases to the ESAs,962 or even made public under particular circumstances, which would be 
decided on a case-by-case basis.963 Therefore, despite the fact that the ESRB 
recommendations and warning would not be legally binding, the “comply or explain” 
mechanism, combined with the “threat” that actions against non-compliance could become 
public, reflects an objective of enhancing the enforceability of the relevant soft law 
decisions.964 It should also be noted that the added benefit of the transmission of non-
compliance information between the EU institutions, was that it had the potential to 
strengthen the cooperation of EU institutions on macro-prudential matters. Deutschbank has 
highlighted in its Report in 2010, that while the ESRB had only soft powers, those should not 
be underestimated; adding that, sound analysis and communication to the markets were 
fundamental in the success of ESRB.965   
                                                           
959 See: Ferran and Kern (n 821). 
960 ‘The European Systemic Risk Board: from institutional foundation to credible macroprudential oversight’ 
(Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report April 2012) 12, 37 
<https://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Downloads/Publications/Monthly_Report_Articles/2012/2012_0
4_esrb.pdf?__blob=publicationFile> accessed 14 July 2017. 
961 Commission (n 961) 19, 37; and The ESRB Regulation (n 925) recital 17, 20.  
962 The ESRB Regulation (n 925) recital 19, 20 and Article 16(3).  
963 The ESRB Regulation (n 925) Article 18.  
964 Dombret, Andreas and Lucius, Otto R. (eds) Stability of the Financial System: Illusion or Feasible Concept? 
(Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 2013) 40.  
965 Speyer, Bernhard, ‘Financial supervision in the EU’ (Deutsche Bank Research, August 4, 2011) 6 
<https://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000276501.PDF> accessed 14 
July 2017.  
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The ESRB’s role to date has been very active in macro-prudential oversight and its 
general performance has been appraised as satisfactory.966 As for February 2017, the ESRB 
has issued 10 recommendations in total;967 15 Reports;968 7 stress test;969 2 opinions;970 35 
responses and letters;971 1 survey;972 1 handbook providing detailed assistance for macro-
prudential authorities on how to use the instruments for the banking sector,973 including an 
Addendum on macro-prudential leverage Ratios;974 a flagship report providing an overview 
of the macro-prudential policy framework in the European Union for the banking sector;975 
and two decisions.976 Also, on 22 September 2016 the ESRB issued warnings to eight Member 
States on medium-term vulnerabilities in the residential real estate sector,977 and a 
                                                           
966 ‘European Union: Publication of Financial Sector Assessment Program Documentation—Technical Note on 
Macroprudential Oversight and the Role of the ESRB’ (IMF Country Report No. 13/70, March 212), 12. 
967 For all the ESRB recommendations see ESRB website: 
<https://www.esrb.europa.eu/mppa/recommendations/html/index.en.html> accessed 14 July 2017.  
968 For all the ESRB reports see ESRB website: <https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/reports/html/index.en.html> 
accessed 14 July 2017.  
969 For all the ESRB stress tests see ESRB website: 
<https://www.esrb.europa.eu/mppa/stress/html/index.en.html> accessed 14 July 2017.  
970 For all the ESRB opinions see ESRB website: 
<https://www.esrb.europa.eu/mppa/opinions/html/index.en.html> accessed 14 July 2017.  
971 For all the ESRB responses and letters see ESRB website: 
<https://www.esrb.europa.eu/mppa/responses/html/index.en.html> accessed 14 July 2017.  
972 For all the ESRB surveys see ESRB website: 
<https://www.esrb.europa.eu/mppa/surveys/html/index.en.html> accessed 14 July 2017.  
973 ‘The ESRB Handbook on Operationalising Macro-prudential Policy in the Banking Sector’ (ESRB) 
<https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/140303_esrb_handbook_mp.en.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017.  
974 ‘The ESRB Handbook on Operationalising Macroprudential Policy in the Banking Sector - Addendum: 
Macroprudential Leverage Ratios’ (ESRB, June 2015) 
<https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/150625_esrb_handbook_addendum.en.pdf> accessed 14 July 
2017.  
975 ‘The ESRB Flagship Report provides an overview of the macroprudential policy framework in the European 
Union for the banking sector’ (ESRB, 2014) 
<https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/140303_flagship_report.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017.  
976 See: 
- ‘Decision of the European Systemic Risk Board of 27 January 2014 on a coordination framework 
regarding the notification of national macro-prudential policy measures by competent or designated 
authorities and the provision of opinions and the issuing of recommendations by the ESRB’ [2014] 
ESRB/2014/2 C98/03; and 
- ‘Decision of the European Systemic Risk Board of 16 December 2015 on a coordination framework for 
the notification of national macroprudential policy measures by relevant authorities, the issuing of 
opinions and recommendations by the ESRB, and repealing Decision ESRB/2014/2’ [2015] ESRB/2015/4. 
977 ‘The ESRB issues eight Warnings on medium-term residential real estate vulnerabilities and a 
Recommendation on closing real estate data gaps’ (ESRB, Press Release, 28 November 2016) 
<https://www.esrb.europa.eu/news/pr/date/2016/html/pr161128.en.html> accessed 14 July 2017. For the 
report see: ‘Vulnerabilities in the EU residential real estate sector’ (ESRB, November 2016) 
<https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/reports/161128_vulnerabilities_eu_residential_real_estate_sector.en.
pdf> accessed 14 July 2017.  
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recommendation on closing real estate data gap.978 The role of the ESRB has been further 
strengthened with the assumption of micro-prudential supervisory tasks from the ECB in 
2014. This is subject to further discussion in chapter four, wherein the role of the ESRB within 
the new supervisory framework and the possible synergies involved are analysed in detail. 
3.4.2.2. The Micro-prudential pillar: European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the micro-prudential pillar of the new supervisory 
architecture involved the establishment of three ESAs. The organisation of the ESAs was 
based again on a sectoral approach and with one ESA for each sector i.e. one for the banking 
sector (EBA),979 one for the securities sector (ESMA),980 and one for the insurance and 
occupational pensions sector (EIOPA).981 The ESAs were established with the view to replace 
the existing Level 3 Committees (CESR, CEBS, and CEIOPS), to address their main 
weaknesses,982 and to create a stronger network of close cooperation and information 
exchange between NCAs in order to ensure effective micro-prudential supervision.983 The 
ESAs became operational on 1 January 2011 and their regulations are supported by the so-
called Omnibus I Directive984 and later by the Omnibus II Directive in respect of the ESAs 
powers.985 The responses as to this decision to strengthening the role of Level 3 Committees 
                                                           
978 ‘Recommendations European Systemic Risk Board of 31 October 2016 on closing real estate data gaps’ 
[2017] ESRB/2016/14 C 31/1.  
979 ‘Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 
716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC’ [2010] OJ L331/12 (hereinafter: EBA Regulation). 
980 ‘Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision 
No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC’ [2010] OJ L331/84 (hereinafter: ESMA 
Regulation).  
981 ‘Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), 
amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/79/EC’ [2010] OJ L331/48 
(hereinafter: EIOPA Regulation).  
982 Clausen, Nils Jul, ‘An Overview of a New Regulatory Regime in EU Financial Market Regulation’ (2015) 4 (1) 
Ricerche Giuridiche, 17.  
983 Darvas et al (n 952) 5.  
984 ‘Directive 2010/78/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24  November 2010 amending 
Directives 98/26/EC, 2002/87/EC, 2003/6/EC, 2003/41/EC, 2003/71/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2004/109/EC, 2005/60/EC, 
2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and  2009/65/EC in respect of the powers of the European Supervisory Authority 
(European Banking Authority), the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority) and the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority)’ 
[2010] OJ L331/120.  
985 ‘Directive 2014/51/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 amending Directives 
2003/71/EC and 2009/138/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009, (EU) No 1094/2010 and (EU) No 1095/2010 
in respect of the powers of the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
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were mixed, with some Member States to have favoured this step, whereas other Member 
States feared the fiscal burden implications and limitations to sovereign powers that this 
decision might imply.986  
The ESAs were granted legal personality987 as well as administrative and financial 
independence from the other EU institutions.988 The regulatory responsibilities of ESAs 
referred to the development of draft regulatory standards989 and implementing technical 
standards990 in the areas specified in each ESA Regulation. The regulatory technical standards 
aimed at assuring the consistent harmonisation of basic legislative acts and would become 
legally binding after the EU Commission’s endorsement by means of delegated acts pursuant 
to Article 290, TFEU.991 The implementing technical standards intended to ensure the 
consistent implementation of legally binding EU legislative acts and would become legally 
binding by means of implementing acts pursuant to Article 291, TFEU.992 For anything that 
was not covered by regulatory or implementation technical standards, the ESAs could issue 
guidelines and recommendations towards NCAs or financial institutions,993 whereas NCAs or 
financial institution would have to make every effort to comply with those guidelines and 
recommendations.994  
                                                           
Authority) and the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority)’ [2010] OJ 
L153/1. 
986 See: Spendzharova, Aneta, ‘Is More ‘Brussels’ the Solution? New European Union Member States’ 
Preferences about the European Financial Architecture’ (2012) 50 (2) Journal of Common Market Studies 315. 
987 EBA Regulation (n 984): recital 14 and Article 5; ESMA Regulation (n 985): recital 14 and Article 5; EIOPA 
Regulation (n 986): recital 13 and Article 5.  
988 EBA Regulation (n 984): recital 45, recital 59, Article 1(5), Article 42, Article 46, Article 49, Article 52, Article 
59; ESMA Regulation (n 985): recital 45, recital 52, Article 1(5), Article 42, Article 46, Article 59; EIOPA Regulation 
(n 986): recital 44, recital 58, Article 1(6), Article 42, Article 46, Article 59.   
989 EBA Regulation (n 984): recital 22, Article 8 (1)(a), Article 8(2)(a), Article 10; ESMA Regulation (n 985): recital 
22, Article 8 (1)(a), Article 8(2)(a), Article 10; EIOPA Regulation (n 986): recital 21, Article 8 (1)(a),Article 8(2)(b), 
Article 10. 
990 EBA Regulation (n 984): Article 8 (1)(a), Article 8(2)(b), Article 15; ESMA Regulation (n 985): Article 8 (1)(a), 
Article 8(2)(b), Article 15; EIOPA Regulation (n 986): Article 8 (1)(a), Article 8(2)(b), Article 15. 
991 EBA Regulation (n 984): recital 23 and Article 10(1); ESMA Regulation (n 985): recital 23 and Article 10(1); 
EIOPA Regulation (n 986): recital 22 and Article 10(1).  
992 EBA Regulation (n 944): recital 25 and Article 15 (1); ESMA Regulation (n 985): recital 25 and Article 15 (1); 
EIOPA Regulation (n 986): recital 24 and Article 15 (1). 
993 EBA Regulation (n 984): recital 26, Article 8(1)(a), Article 16; ESMA Regulation (n 985): recital 26, Article 
8(1)(a) and Article 16; EIOPA Regulation (n 986): recital 25, Article 8(1)(a) and Article 16.  
994 EBA Regulation (n 984): Article 16 (3); ESMA Regulation (n 985): Article 16 (3); EIOPA Regulation (n 986): 
Article 16 (3).  
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In case an addressee would fail to comply with EU law or applies it incorrectly, 
amounting to a breach, the ESAs may investigate the alleged breach or non-application of 
Union law and address a recommendation to the NCA concerned, while setting out the actions 
necessary to comply with EU law.995 Furthermore, the ESAs were entitled to adopt legally 
binding decisions in case of disagreements between supervisors, including the colleges of 
supervisors, on the application of EU rules.996 The intended outcome of the ESAs operation 
was that by preparing uniform standards and ensuring supervisory convergence and 
coordination, the ESAs would contribute to the further development of the Single Rulebook 
applicable to all financial institutions of the Single Market.997 The ESAs could also act in 
emergency or settlement situations affecting the stability of a financial institution.998 
However, the decisions taken by ESAs should not impinge on the fiscal responsibilities of 
Member States,999 while national authorities would be given the right to refuse following 
decisions taken by ESAs in justified cases.1000 
It is worth discussing here the notion of the Single Rulebook since the enhancement 
of which was among the key objective of ESAs. As defined by Andrea Enria, the Chairman of 
the European Banking Authority, the Single Rulebook constitutes: “a comprehensive set of 
common standards for banks’….’introduced to restore a legal framework consistent with such 
ultimate goal.”1001 The creation of a Single Rulebook, was not a new idea introduced with the 
establishment of ESAs in the post-GFC era. The notion of a Singe Rulebook finds its roots back 
in 2004, when Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa described it as: “a streamlined, uniform and flexible 
regulatory framework across the EU,”1002 proposing its adoption within the Level 2 
                                                           
995 EBA Regulation (n 984): recital 29 and Article 17; ESMA Regulation (n 985): recital 29 and Article 17; EIOPA 
Regulation (n 986): recital 26 and Article 17.  
996 EBA Regulation (n 984): recital 32, Article 8(1)(b), Article 19, Article 20; ESMA Regulation (n 985): recital 32, 
Article 8(1)(b), Article 19, Article 20; EIOPA Regulation (n 986): recital 31, Article 8(1)(b), Article 19, Article 20.  
997 EBA Regulation (n 984): recital 5 and 22; ESMA Regulation (n 985): recital 5 and 22; EIOPA Regulation (n 986): 
recital 5 and 21.  
998 EBA Regulation (n 984), ESMA Regulation (n 985) and EIOPA Regulation (n 986): Articles 18 and 19.   
999 EBA Regulation (n 984), ESMA Regulation (n 985) and EIOPA Regulation (n 986): recital 5, recital 50 and Article 
38. 
1000 Commission (n 961) 16, 50. 
1001 Enria, Andrea, ‘The Single Rulebook in banking: is it ‘single’ enough?’ (EBA, 28 September, 2015) 
<https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1208645/2015+09+28+-
+Single+Rulebook+at+UniPadova.pdf/4ee29f76-c8ab-4cc3-afc2-d613aeac0b14> accessed 14 July 2017. 
1002 Padoa-Schioppa, Tommaso, ‘How to deal with emerging pan-European financial institutions?’ (Member of 
the Executive Board of the ECB, Speech at the Conference on Supervisory Convergence organised by the Dutch 
Ministry of Finance, Hague, 3 November 2004) 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2004/html/sp041103.en.html> accessed 14 July 2017 
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Committees as was originally introduced by the Lamfalussy process. Since then, the concept 
of the Single Rulebook has evolved and has gathered more attention as the process towards 
further financial integration was progressing towards tighter harmonised rules and 
coordinated practices across the EU. In 2009 the EU Council, following the recommendations 
of the De Larosière Report, used the term Single Rulebook to illustrate the goal of an 
integrated EU regulatory framework that would enable the completion of a Single Market in 
financial services.1003 The term was later adopted by the ESAs Regulation, as analysed above, 
to describe the consistent application of EU rules in financial services by NCAs. 
In line with the recommendations of De Larosière Report, ESAs Regulations imposed 
a cooperation obligation between all ESFS components pursuant to the principle of sincere 
cooperation under Article 4(3), TEU.1004 The rationale of the cooperation approach is based 
on the belief that each component of the new supervisory architecture constitutes an integral 
part of it and as such, is closely intertwined and dependant to the other components.1005 To 
this end, in the micro-prudential pillar, the ESAs, in order to ensure cross-sectoral consistency, 
would have cooperate in a regular basis and closely with each other through a Joint 
Committee.1006 Along with the obligation to cooperate with each other, the ESAs would have 
to work in close cooperation with the ESRB.1007 Namely, both the ESAs1008 and the ESRB1009 
would have to exchange all necessary information for the achievement of their respective 
tasks. Furthermore, the ESAs are obliged to take the utmost account of the warnings and 
recommendations of the ESRB,1010 and could also become the addressees of ESRB’s warning 
and recommendations.1011 Also, the ESRB Secretariat would draw on technical advice - apart 
from the national central banks and NCAs - from the ESAs as well.1012  
                                                           
1003 See: ‘The Single Rulebook’ (EBA website)  <http://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/single-
rulebook> accessed 14 July 2017. 
1004 EBA Regulation (n 984), ESMA Regulation (n 985) and EIOPA Regulation (n 986): Article 2(4).  
1005 The ESRB Regulation (n 925) recital 30. 
1006 EBA Regulation (n 984): recital 57, Article 2(3) and Articles 54-57; ESMA Regulation (n 985): recital 57 and 
Articles 54-57; EIOPA Regulation (n 986): recital 57 and Articles 54-57. 
1007 ESRB Regulation (n 925): Article 3(2)(g); EBA Regulation (n 984): recital 47, Article 2(3), Article 8 (1)(d), Article 
36; ESMA Regulation (n 985): recital 47, Article 2(3), Article 8 (1)(d), Article 36; EIOPA Regulation (n 986): recital 
47, Article 2(3), Article 8 (1)(d), Article 36.  
1008 EBA Regulation (n 984), ESMA Regulation (n 985) and EIOPA Regulation (n 986): Article 8(1)(b). 
1009 The ESRB Regulation (n 925) Article 15(1). 
1010 EBA Regulation (n 984), ESMA Regulation (n 985) and EIOPA Regulation (n 986): Article 36(6).  
1011 The ESRB Regulation (n 925) Article 16(2). 
1012 The ESRB Regulation (n 925) Article 4(4). 
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As mentioned earlier, the ESAs’ main tasks would focus on assisting the NCAs in the 
consistent interpretation and application of EU law. Additionally, ESAs were also designed to 
contribute to the mutual goal of safeguarding financial stability, through identifying early risks 
and vulnerabilities at micro-prudential level and inform accordingly the EU institutions, the 
other ESAs and the ESRB1013 To this end, the ESAs, along with the ESRB, were also tasked to 
initiate and coordinate an EU-wide stress test in order to assess the resilience of financial 
institutions to adverse market developments.1014 The ESRB would also be highly involved in 
the composition of the ESAs, since: the Chairperson of the Joint Committee would be a Vice-
Chair of the ESRB;1015 a representative of the ESRB should be invited to the meetings of the 
Joint Committee;1016 the composition of the Board of Supervisors should include a 
representative of the ESRB, with a non-voting participation.1017 The main difference between 
the micro-prudential pillar and the macro-prudential pillar, is that ESAs constituted separate 
legal entities and may adopt legally binding decisions, whereas the ESRB, as highlighted 
earlier, was not granted a legal personality and may only adopt soft-law decisions and 
recommendations.1018   
The principal decision-making organ of the ESAs would be the Board of Supervisors, 
consisted of a Chair and the heads of the relevant NCAs,1019 which would decide in simple 
majority.1020Also, a Management Board would be operating within each ESA, composed of 
the Chair of the respective ESA and of a representative of the EU Commission and NCAs, and 
tasked with management tasks such as: to propose the annual and multi-annual work 
programme, to exercise certain budgetary powers, to adopt the Authority’s staff policy plan, 
to adopt special provisions on the right to access to documents and to propose the annual 
report.1021 Responsible for preparing the work of the Board of Supervisors would be a 
                                                           
1013 EBA Regulation (n 984), ESMA Regulation (n 985) and EIOPA Regulation (n 986): recital 17, Article 2(1). 
1014 EBA Regulation (n 984): recital 43, Article 22(2), Article 23, Article 32; ESMA Regulation (n 985) recital 43, 
Article 23; EIOPA Regulation (n 986): recital 42, Article 23.  
1015 EBA Regulation (n 984), ESMA Regulation (n 985) and EIOPA Regulation (n 986): recital 57 and Article 55(3). 
1016 EBA Regulation (n 984), ESMA Regulation (n 985) and EIOPA Regulation (n 986): Article 55(2). 
1017 EBA Regulation (n 984), ESMA Regulation (n 985) and EIOPA Regulation (n 986): Article 40(1)(d). 
1018 Nagy, Zoltan B. and Csiszar, Anett S., ‘Aspects of the European System of Financial Supervision’ (2016) 50 (3) 
Zbornik Radova 977, 984. 
1019 EBA Regulation (n 984), ESMA Regulation (n 985) and EIOPA Regulation (n 986): recital 52, Article 6(1), Article 
40-44.  
1020 EBA Regulation (n 984), ESMA Regulation (n 985) and EIOPA Regulation (n 986): recital 53, Article 44(1).  




Chairperson appointed in a full-time basis by the Board of Supervisors, who would also chair 
the meetings of the Board of Supervisors and the Management Board.1022 The Chairperson’s 
appointment would be subject to hearing by the EU Parliament, which can object the 
designation.1023 This is comparable with the process of appointment of the Members of ECB’s 
Executive Board.1024 Lastly, there is also an Executive Director appointed to conduct 
management duties, who can participate in meetings of the Board of Supervisors and 
Management Board as a non-voting party.1025  
Within the framework of micro-prudential pillar, the ESAs were designed to play the 
most important role. Their role, however, was complemented by the colleges of supervisors, 
which would work in close cooperation with the ESAs. The colleges of supervisors constitute 
an important component for effective financial supervision, which is evident from their 
progressively enhanced role at both EU and international level. Hence, in order to understand 
their updated tasks within the ESFS structure, it is important to examine their meaning, role 
and historical evolution.  
3.4.2.3. The colleges of supervisors under the ESFS’s regulation 
 The college of regulators or college of supervisors are not a new concept, or an idea 
that emerged only in the aftermath of the GFC. In fact, their use can be traced to the 1980s, 
when a group of bank regulators from the UK and other European countries became involved 
in the supervision of Bank of Credit and Commerce International (“BCCI”).1026 The raison 
d'etre of their creation was based on the need to improve information exchange mechanisms 
regarding banks with international activity. This need emerged as a result of the realisation 
                                                           
1022 EBA Regulation (n 984), ESMA Regulation (n 985) and EIOPA Regulation (n 986): recital 55, Article 6(3), 
Articles 48-50.  
1023 EBA Regulation (n 984), ESMA Regulation (n 985) and EIOPA Regulation (n 986): recital 55. 
1024 Smits (n 963) 146.  
1025 EBA Regulation (n 984), ESMA Regulation (n 985) and EIOPA Regulation (n 986): recital 56, Article 6(4), 
Article 40(7), Article 45(2), Articles 51-53. 
1026 See: Kerry, John and Brown, Hank, ‘The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations’ 
(General Accounting Office Washington, United States, 1993).  
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that BCCI, which had extensive cross-border activity, was not sufficiently supervised by the 
national supervisory authorities.1027  
The crisis of BCCI broke out in 1991 after BCCI was forced into liquidation, following 
the discovery of pervasive fraudulent practices by BCCI's senior managers, board members, 
and representatives of major shareholders.1028 Prior to its official closure, the situation 
became chaotic: national regulators were either restricting or blocking the activity of BCCI 
branches that were operating within their jurisdictions, and by mid-July 1991 forty-four 
jurisdictions had closed BCCI branches. The BCCI was worth roughly 20 billion dollars and its 
operations extended to sixty-nine countries, with most of its capital being located in the UK. 
At the time, international rules did not provide for the resolution of banks with international 
activity, and as a result, national supervisors took actions pursuant to their domestic laws. 
The interesting part about BCCI’s failure, was that national supervisors had expressed their 
concerns about the reliability and long-term soundness of BCCI years before the scandal 
became known to the public.1029 
The BCCI failure is considered to be the biggest banking failure of the twentieth 
century1030 and as such, has attracted a significant amount of international attention.1031 
However, while details of the fraudulent activities might have been forgotten shortly after 
the scandal, the lessons in regard to the legal implications had a long-term impact on the way 
international banking is perceived. In fact, the case of BCCI has been considered as a 
milestone in raising awareness about challenges of the cross-border operations of financial 
institutions and the respective role of supervision and regulation.1032 With regards to banking 
supervision, the part that drew considerable attention was the role of college of supervisors. 
                                                           
1027 ‘Foreign Bank: Initial Assessment of Certain BCCI Activities in the U.S’ (Report to the Honorable Robert H. 
Michel, Republican Leader, House of Representatives General Accounting Office United States, September 
1992), 3 <http://www.gao.gov/assets/220/216951.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017. 
1028 For more details on the history of BCCI see: Truell, Peter and Gurwin, Larry BCCI, The Inside Story of the 
World's Most Corrupt Financial Empire (Bloomsbury Publishing PLC 1992).  
1029 For a detailed analysis on BCCI failure see: Alford, Duncan E., ‘Basle Committee minimum standards: 
International regulatory response to the failure of BCCI’ (1992) 6 (2) George Washington Journal of International 
Law and Economics. 
1030 See: Arnold, Patricia J. and Sikka, Prem, Globalization and the state-profession relationship: The case of the 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International’ (2001) 26 (6) Accounting, Organizations and Society 475. 
1031 Zhang, Peter G., Barings bankruptcy and financial derivatives (World Scientific Publishing Company 1996).  
1032 Kern, Alexander, ‘The Role of the Basle Standards in International Banking Supervision’ (ESRC Centre for 
Business Research, University of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 153, 2000), 9. 
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The college of supervisors were not involved in supervisory duties per se, but constituted 
rather an informal, ad hoc body which facilitated the exchange of information and established 
a forum for dialogue between NCAs, with the view to identify and address risks involved from 
cross-border banking activity.  
The subsequent closure of the BCCI proved that their use was ineffective, which was 
to be attributed to a number of factors, including cooperation among them in information-
exchange regarding the BCCI’s activities.1033 However, the college of supervisors raised 
awareness about the importance of supervisory cooperation at both international and EU 
level, given also the fact that the BCCI closure did not have severe spillover effects to the 
financial system.1034 As Callum McCarthy (the Head of the FSA at the time) stated in respect 
with the effectiveness of the college of supervisors: “I do not doubt their individual quality, 
nor their willingness, but in some cases the resources are simply not up to the task of acting 
as the home regulator for a large group.”1035  
This led to reconsidering prudential supervisory practices, with the role of supervisory 
colleges to have gathered renewed attention: at international level, within the context of the 
BCBS and at EU level, through the regulatory initiatives calling for cooperation among NCAs 
of banks with cross-border activity.1036 At EU level, CEBS played an active role in enhancing 
the role of colleges of supervisors, by issuing explanatory and non-binding guidelines on their 
functioning.1037 Therefore, it is hardly surprising that at the dawn of the GFC, the regulatory 
                                                           
1033 See: Laifer, Daniel M., ‘Putting the Super Back in the Supervision of International Banking, Post-BCCI’ (1992) 
60 (6) Fordham Law Review.  
1034 Herring, Richard J. and Litan, Robert E., Financial Regulation in a Global Economy (Brookings Institution 1994) 
105.  
1035 McCarthy, Callum, ‘How should international financial service companies be regulated?’ (Speech, FSA, 22 
Sep 2004) para 13 <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2004/sp196.shtml> accessed 14 
July 2017. 
1036 Among the legislative acts regulating the colleges of supervisors in a more formal way were: Directive 
2006/49/EC (n 362); Directive 2006/48/EC (n 362); Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as regards banks affiliated to 
central institutions, certain own funds items, large exposures, supervisory arrangements, and crisis 
management’ COM (2008) 602/3; ‘Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
December 2002 on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment 
firms in a financial conglomerate and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 79/267/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 
92/96/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 93/22/EEC, and Directives 98/78/EC and 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council’ OJ L 35/1, Article 5-17; Commission, ‘Amended Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance 
(SOLVENCY II)’ COM(2008) 119 final, Article 251-263. 
1037 CEBS published two documents in December 2007 regarding the supervisory colleges function: 
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initiatives aiming to strengthen the role of supervisory colleges were only intensified. This was 
also evident by the views developed by various international institutions, reflecting a 
consensus as to the importance of college of supervisors and the need to strengthen their 
role as part of a general attempt to promote convergence and cooperation among NCAs. For 
instance, the G-20 in its November 2008 Summit, highlighted the importance of colleges of 
supervisors and called for the adoption of measures to facilitate and strengthen their role. As 
it was highlighted in the G-20 Summit: “…supervisors should collaborate to establish 
supervisory colleges for all major cross- border financial institutions, as part of efforts to 
strengthen the surveillance of cross-border firms. Major global banks should meet regularly 
with their supervisory college for comprehensive discussions of the firm’s activities and 
assessment of the risks it faces.”1038 
Prior to that the IMF had underlined in 2007 that: “ongoing efforts at coordination 
through international colleges of supervisors and codes of conduct will certainly help.”1039 In 
the same vein, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) in 2008 highlighted that: “Supervisors should 
build on existing examples of supervisory colleges, both in the Basel II framework and in 
regional arrangements such as the EU, to establish an international college of the most 
relevant supervisors for each of the largest global financial institutions by end-2008.”1040 Also, 
the report of FSA on March 2009 (known as: the Turner Review), recommended to enhance 
the role of supervisory colleges, by arguing that they constitute: “a much more unified 
approach to global financial supervision and even fiscal support…” that can “…ensure better 
flows of information between NCAs and achieve the voluntary coordination of NCAs actions 
                                                           
- ‘Range of Practices on Supervisory Colleges and Home-Host Cooperation’ (CEBS, 27 December 2007) 
<https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/16166/CEBS+2007+75+(Range+of+practices)%20final.pdf
> accessed 14 July 2017; and 
- ‘Template for a Multilateral Cooperation and Coordination Agreement on the Supervision of XY Group (CEBS, 
27 December 2007) 
<https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/16166/CEBS+2007+177+rev+2+(template+for+written+ag
reements)%20final+2.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017. 
1038 ‘Declaration Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy’ (G-20 Summit, 15 November, 2008) 
<https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/g7-
g20/Documents/Washington%20Nov%20Leaders%20Declaration.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017. 
1039 ‘Initial Lessons of the Crisis for the Global Architecture and the IMF’ (Prepared by the Strategy, Policy, and 
Review Department, Approved by Reza Moghadam, IMF, February 18, 2009), 10 
<https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/021809.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017. 
1040 ‘Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience’ (FSF, 7 April 2008), 
42 <http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_0804.pdf?page_moved=1> accessed 14 July 2017. 
For the same approach see also: ‘Financial Reform: a Framework for Financial Stability’ (Working Group on 
Financial Reform) <http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/Policy%20page/G30Report.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017. 
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which will reduce the likelihood of firms coming close to crisis.”1041 In furtherance of this 
objective, the BCBS issued a set of principles in 2010 which aimed to codify general rules for 
colleges of supervisors in order to promote and enhance their functioning.1042 The principles 
were to be reviewed after a period of two years, with the aim to draw up on lessons learned 
from their practice until then. Thus, in January 2014, the BCBS published a Consultative 
Document,1043 setting out an updated version of principles on colleges of supervisors. The 
final revision on the principles regarding the functioning and operation of colleges of 
supervisors was published in June 2014.1044 
At EU level, as discussed already, the post-GFC process of reshaping the supervisory 
architecture was signalled by the De Larosière Report, which inter alia envisaged the 
enhancement of the role of supervisory colleges in the context of micro-prudential 
supervision.1045 Following the recommendations of the De Larosière Report, the CRD II, 
introduced a mandatory obligation to establish supervisory colleges for banks with significant 
activity in order to coordinate NCAs in a more effective manner and to facilitate the handling 
of ongoing supervision and emergency situations.1046 Also, Article 131a of CRD II provides the 
legal basis for the creation of a single college for global EU based banks. Following the 
recommendation of CRD II,1047 the CEBS, in 2010, issued guidelines for the functioning of the 
                                                           
1041 ‘The Turner Review: A regulatory response to the global banking crisis’ (FSA, March 2009) 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017.  
1042 ‘Good practice principles on supervisory colleges’ (BCBS, October 2010) 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs177.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017. 
1043 ‘Revised good practice principles for supervisory colleges’ (Consultative Document of BCBS issued for 
comment by 18 April 2014 January) <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs276.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017. 
1044 ‘Principles for effective supervisory colleges’ (BCBS, June 2014) <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs287.pdf> 
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1045 The De Larosière Report (n 873) 51 para 203.  
1046 ‘Directive 2009/111/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 amending 
Directives 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2007/64/EC as regards banks affiliated to central institutions, certain 
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L94/97; 
- Commission Directive 2009/83/EC of 27 July 2009 amending certain Annexes to Directive 2006/48/EC of the 
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L196/14. 
1047 Directive 2009/111/EC (n 1051) recital 2 and 8.  
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colleges of supervisors, including their organisational operation, information exchange 
among them and communication with the supervised institutions and other specific tasks.1048 
 It follows that the colleges of supervisors were also included within the new 
supervisory architecture as formed by the ESFS. Within the new structure the college of 
supervisors, as defined by EBA are: “permanent, although flexible, coordination structures 
that bring together regulatory authorities involved in the supervision of a banking group.”1049 
In order to strengthen their role, the ESAs were tasked to promote and monitor the function 
of the colleges of supervisors as well as to foster coherence of the application of EU law 
among them.1050 Furthermore, ESA’s were designed to have an active participation in 
colleges’ activities. For instance, ESMA would conduct on-site verification or investigations, 
carried out jointly by two or more competent authorities.1051 EBA would also participate in 
colleges’ operations as it deems appropriate, having the role of the NCA, while there is also 
an obligation for cooperation between EBA and the NCA participating in the colleges of 
supervisors.1052 The EBA could develop draft regulatory technical specifying the general 
conditions of colleges’ functioning and draft implementing technical standards in order to 
determine their operational functioning.1053  
At this stage, the colleges of supervisors were not mandated with any direct 
supervisory powers, but they were rather designed to be coordination structures that would 
facilitate information exchange and cooperation among NCAs.1054 This was clearly stated in 
Article 131a(1), Directive 2009/111/EC as following: “The establishment and functioning of 
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1050 EBA Regulation (n 984): recital 36, Article 8(1)(b), 8(1)(b)(i), Article 21; ESMA Regulation (n 985): recital 36, 
Article 8(1)(b), 8(1)(b),(i), Article 21; and EIOPA Regulation (n 986) recital 35, Article 8(1)(b), (i), Article 21. 
1051 Directive 2010/78/EU (n 989) 136 recital 22. 
1052 Directive 2010/78/EU (n 989) 151 recital 35. 
1053 Directive 2010/78/EU (n 989) 146 recital 15, and 151 recital 35.  
1054 See also: Alford, Duncan, ‘The Use of Colleges of Regulators under European Union Banking Law’ (2009) 24 
(7) Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 355, 360. 
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colleges of supervisors shall not affect the rights and responsibilities of the competent 
authorities under this Directive.”1055 This rather consultative role and the lack of direct 
supervisory powers or any power to resolve or mediate disputes between NCAs, raised 
question as to their effectiveness to promote cooperation and regulatory convergence. 
However, with the subsequent regulatory measures, the role of the supervisory colleges, 
including their relationship with ESAs, ESRB, ECB and NCAs, has been reshaped, especially 
with the establishment of SSM and new CRD IV package. The role of the college of supervision, 
being an integral part of the new structure, is also to be assessed in conjunction with the 
relevant legislative measures as discussed in chapter four.  
3.5 The way forward: a step closer towards the centralisation of supervisory practices? 
Having discussed the evolution of EU banking regulation, it could be argued that the 
process towards centralisation was initiated with the Lamfalussy process and the introduction 
of ‘four level’ governance. The Lamfalussy process, along with evidence brought by the GFC 
led to the De Larosière Report, which proved to be pivotal in changing the thinking and 
general attitude towards more integrated regulatory and supervisory arrangements.1056 
Furthermore, the transformation of the Level 3 Committees to Authorities (i.e. ESAs) with 
legal personality entitled to adopt legally binding decisions on the consistent implementation 
of EU law, has been considered as a crucial step towards furthering the integration of 
regulation and prudential supervision.1057 As discussed earlier, the new ESAs, if compared to 
Level 3 Committees, constituted enhanced, more specialised and technically modified 
supervisory structures, which were tasked with a more sophisticated responsibility in the 
harmonisation process: the creation of a Single Rule for financial services.1058 However, there 
was still a considerable amount of divergence of supervisory practices across Europe. In 
                                                           
1055 Directive 2009/111/EC (n 1051). 
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addition, the scope of powers that ESAs held, in terms of both their operational and regulatory 
functioning, remained rather limited.  
As already discussed, the ESFS supervisory structure was highly based on the existing 
decentralised national supervisory regime, while the principles of mutual recognition and 
home country control retain their applicability.1059 Financial supervision was to be exercised 
on the basis of detailed harmonised rules, through a system of two different layers of 
protection (i.e. national and supranational) and a complex distribution of responsibilities 
between home states, host states and college of supervisors, under the coordination of the 
respective ESAs.1060 Within this institutional framework, ESAs operational functioning was 
highly influenced and constrained by the role of NCAs, given firstly, the prominent role of the 
NCAs on the Board of Governors and secondly, the great emphasis put in retaining a certain 
degree of Member State’s fiscal discretion. As already mentioned, the ESAs would have to 
operate without impinging on the fiscal responsibilities of Member States. 
The ESAs, as already analysed, were mainly focused on coordinating and monitoring 
the operation of NCAs and were not assigned any per se supervisory powers. Thus, they 
cannot be considered as creating any form of a supranational platform for centralisation of 
supervision at EU level. 1061 As CESR explained: “by strengthening the Committees you would 
arrive at something which is, on the one hand, not a European single regulator, a body written 
in the Treaty, you would have a more flexible thing which is based on the coordinating role of 
the committees and on the existence of the national supervisors.”1062 In other words, within 
this structure, the NCAs of 28 EU Member States would remain in charge of day-to-day 
supervision, with the only difference that now the NCAs would have to be accountable to the 
relevant ESA. This implied a high level of regulatory arbitrage, comprised of various 
divergences in terms of supervisory approaches, methods or the level of oversight rigidity, 
which in turn, led to fragmentation of supervisory practices instead of unification. To this end, 
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it could be argued that this fragmentation of supervisory practices could favour distortions in 
the operation of financial institutions with cross-border activity, while a comprehensive view 
and evaluation of systemic risk implications were highly restricted.   
Similar to their operational role, the regulatory functioning of ESAs, was also narrow. 
The main decision-making powers of ESAs would be to develop regulatory and implementing 
technical standards, which will have no legally binding power. The process of making them 
enforceable would start with open public consultations and Banking Stakeholder Group 
opinion, followed by the EU Commission endorsement, and then finally for approval to the 
EU Parliament and Council. As explicitly stated in Articles 11 and 15 of each ESA Regulation, 
the regulatory and implementing technical standards would not: “imply strategic decisions or 
policy choices and their content shall be delimited by the legislative acts on which they are 
based.” Thus, the ESAs would practically be entitled only to develop the standards while, the 
EU Commission would hold the main discretionary power and the final word on their 
endorsement, partly endorsement or their amendment.1063 
The reason behind this limited enforceability of ESAs decision finds its legitimacy in 
the so-called Meroni doctrine. The Meroni doctrine derives from the principle of upholding 
the balance of powers among institutions as created by the Treaties, and thus, limits the 
possibility of delegating tasks to regulatory agencies that go beyond the stricto sensu wording 
of the existing Treaty provisions. Thus, the ESAs were constrained from obtaining more 
powers than a delegating authority has under the provisions of the EU Treaty without Treaty 
amendment. This argument builds on the ruling of ECJ on the Meroni case, which concerned 
the delegation of powers to a non-institutional body.1064 In the Meroni case, ECJ clarified that 
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the delegation of power could not imply a wide margin of discretion,1065 and could: “only 
relate to clearly defined executive powers, the use of which must be entirely subject to the 
supervision of the High Authority.”1066  
The Meroni doctrine was constitutionalised by Article 290, TFEU and created a 
precedent that was followed in various subsequent ECJ jurisprudence. For instance, the ECJ 
in the Romano case (where the bodies in question was the Administrative Commission of the 
European Communities on Social Security for Migrant Workers), emphasised that Article 155 
of the Treaty and the judicial system created by the Treaty, and in particular by Articles 173 
and 177 thereof, prohibit the EU Commission to delegate powers to the aforementioned 
bodies to adopting acts having force of law.1067 Thus, according to the Meroni doctrine, EU 
agencies are not entitled to exceed the limits of their powers, which in case of ESAs, would 
be to develop and propose regulatory and implementing technical standards.  
The Meroni doctrine has been also used as the basic justification for those who have 
questioned the constitutionality of establishing a supranational body on the basis of Article 
114, TFEU, which is a debate that predates the establishment of ESAs.1068 For instance, in the 
Smoke Flavouring case, the United Kingdom questioned the adoption of Regulation 
2065/2003,1069 on the basis of Article 114, TFEU. Those claims were dismissed by the ECJ, with 
the latter confirming the legitimacy of the EU institutions’ decisions to adopt harmonisation 
measures under Article 114, TFEU.1070 This reasoning was taken even further in the so-called 
ENISA ruling, wherein the United Kingdom doubted the constitutionality of creating the 
European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) on the basis of Article 114, TFEU. 
The Court, however, held that the establishment of ENISA fell within the scope of Article 114, 
TFEU, confirming in this way, the legality of ENISA’s decisions.1071 Thus, according to the ECJ, 
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1069 ‘Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 November 2003 on 
smoke flavourings used or intended for use in or on foods’ [2003] OJ L 309/1. 
1070 Case C-66/04 United Kingdom of Great Britain v. European Parliament and Council [2005] ECR I-10553. 
1071 Case C-217/04 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. European Parliament and Council 
of the European Union [2006] ECR I-3771 (hereinafter: ENISA ruling).  
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Article 114, TFEU, provides not only as a legal basis for harmonisation but also as the legal 
basis for the establishment of a new supranational body as long as its operation and decisions 
contribute to the implementation of a process of harmonisation.1072 
Therefore, building on the ENISA ruling, it is hardly surprising that Article 114, TFEU, 
at a later stage, served as an adequate legal basis for the establishment of ESAs.1073 There is 
also an explicit mention of the ENISA case on the preamble of ESAs regulations.1074 In a recent 
case (known as: ESMA short-selling case),1075 concerning the ESAs and their delegated 
powers, the ECJ ruling came to introduce a new delegation doctrine regarding EU agencies 
that seems to have departed from the stringent interpretation of the Meroni doctrine. 
Namely, in ESMA short-selling case, wherein the United Kingdom questioned the delegated 
powers of ESMA, the ECJ held that the ESAs can exercise discretionary powers only when this 
discretion is limited, confirming, in this way, ESMA’s compatibility of delegated powers with 
the EU Treaty provisions and the ECJ’s case law.1076 In particular, the ECJ observed that while: 
“the bodies in question in Meroni v High Authority were entities governed by private law, the 
ESMA is a European Union entity, created by the EU legislature.”1077 Also the ECJ pointed out 
that: “unlike the delegation of quasi-legislative powers, which is expressly governed by Article 
290 TFEU, there is no mention in the Treaties as to whether or to what extent executive powers 
may be delegated. In regard to executive powers, Articles 17 TFEU and 291 TFEU do not rule 
out the possibility that the EU legislature or the Commission may, in principle, delegate such 
powers to a non-institutional body.”1078 
                                                           
1072 Enisa Ruling (n 1076) para 44. See also: Shuibhne, Niamh Nic and Gormley, Laurence W. (eds), From Single 
Market to Economic Union: Essays in Memory of John A. Usher (Oxford University Press 2012) 65. 
1073 For a detailed interpretation of TFEU (n 5) Article 114 as the legal basis for the establishment of 
supranational bodies and as the most commonly used legal basis to harmonise laws in order to further the 
internal market see: Van Cleynenbreugel, Pieter, ‘Meroni Circumvented? Article 114 TFEU and EU Regulatory 
Agencies’ (2014) 21 (1) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 64. 
See also: Fahey, Elaine, ‘Does the Emperor Have Financial Crisis Clothes? Reflections on the Legal Basis of the 
European Banking Authority’ (2011) 74 (4) The Modern Law Review 58, regarding Article 114 as the legal basis 
for the establishment of EBA.  
1074 See: EBA Regulation (n 984) and ESMA Regulation (n 985): recitals 17; EIOPA Regulation (n 986): recitals 16.  
1075 Case C-270/12 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council of 
the European Union [2014] ECR 1-0 (hereinafter: the ESMA-short selling case). For a detailed analysis on the 
constitutionality of the delegation of powers to EU agencies and in particular the ESMA-short selling case see: 
Scholten, Miroslava and Van Rijsbergen, Marloes, ‘The ESMA-Short Selling Case: Erecting a New Delegation 
Doctrine in the EU upon the Meroni-Romano remnants’ (2014) 41 (4) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 389. 
1076 ESMA-Short selling case (n 1080) para 76. 
1077 ESMA-Short selling case (n 1080) para 43. 
1078 ESMA-Short selling case (n 1080). 
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From the analysis above, it could be seen that the scope of ESAs’ discretionary powers, 
although was stretched due to the broad interpretation of Article 114, TFEU, in the recent ECJ 
rulings, has not overcome the limits of the Meroni doctrine, which is still applicable.  Namely, 
in the ESMA-short selling ruling, the ECJ clarified that: “It should be observed that the bodies 
in question in Meroni v High Authority were entities governed by private law, whereas ESMA 
is a European Union entity, created by the EU legislature.”1079 Thus, it can be argued that the 
ESAs are allowed to adopt legally binding decisions, as long as these remain within the limits 
of the delegating powers. To this end, the existing European prudential supervisory 
architecture as formulated by the ESFS, while contributing to strengthening the cooperation 
at both national and EU level, failed to eliminate the diversity among Member States. At this 
stage, the creation of a supranational supervisory body assigned with direct supervisory tasks, 
existed only in the context of a debate among policymakers. This discussion grew in 
prominence in light of the GFC, with many supporting the creation of a single supranational 
body assigned with direct supervisory tasks across all financial services sectors: banking, 
insurance and securities.1080 Some called for greater centralisation, but suggested the NCAs 
to retain their active role.1081 There were also strong arguments advocating against the 
establishment of such a body, while supporting that this would exceed the scope of the 
existing Treaty provisions. For instance, according to Antonio Sáinz de Vicuña, who served as 
the General Counsel of the ECB at the time: “to create a new agency with new powers is in 
my view across the line of what is permissible under the internal market’s legal basis.”1082 
However, there were also views developed form the EU officials proposing the ECB as the 
most appropriate body to undertake supervisory tasks.1083 
                                                           
1079 ESMA-Short selling case (n 1080) para 43. 
1080 See: Avgerinos, Yannis V., ‘The Need and the Rationale for a European Securities Regulator’ in Andenæs, 
Mads and Avgerinos, Yannis V. (eds) Financial Markets in Europe: Towards a single regulator (Kluwer Law 
International 2003). 
1081 See: 
- Lannoo, Karel, ‘Concrete Steps towards More Integrated Financial. Oversight: The EU's Policy 
Response to the Crisis’ (Centre for European Policy Studies, Task Force Report 2008) 
<http://aei.pitt.edu/11471/1/1762.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017; and   
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and Watson, Max (eds), Europe: A Proposal for a New Architecture’ in Building the Financial Foundations 
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1082 House of Lords (n 958) 12 para 165. 
1083 Smaghi, Lorenzo Bini, ‘Regulation and supervisory architecture: Is the EU on the right path?’ (Member of the 
Executive Board of the ECB, Speech at 2009 ECON meeting with national parliaments: ‘Financial crisis: Where 
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It is evident from this brief analysis that the possibility of centralising supervision at 
EU level met with significant criticisms and push-back, which will be further examined within 
the context of the debate on assigning supervisory tasks to the ECB through the establishment 
of the SSM. The creation of this authority under the ECB’s umbrella, has brought substantial 
changes to the existing supervisory and regulatory structure as formed by the ESFS, including 
the role of ESRB, ESAs, college of supervisors and NCAs. The discussion of the role, tasks and 
specific responsibilities of each component of ESFS as well as their interaction with each 
other, apart from shedding light to the rationale of the institutional framework and regulatory 
functioning of the financial supervision architecture, set the ground for the core discussion of 
this thesis on the centralisation of banking supervision at EU level.  
3.6 Conclusion  
The idea of creating an adequate regulatory and supervisory framework that would 
facilitate the enhancement of banking services integration, can be traced back to the very 
creation of the EU. With various regulatory initiatives aimed to achieving this long-declared 
goal, the process of making a Single Banking Market was officially signalled in 1985 by the 
White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market, which provided for the free 
movement of people, goods, services and capital across the EU. The process was further 
developed through a continuous wave of deregulation, which included milestone legislative 
acts such as the SEA, the Second Banking Directive, and the Maastricht Treaty. The peak of 
this integration process was reached with the introduction of the euro, the establishment of 
ESCB and the FSAP in the early 2000s. Throughout this process, European banking 
policymaking, starting with the core objective of opening the domestic markets of Member 
States, moved forward through the principle of minimum harmonisation, which was followed 
by a period that incorporated mutual recognition, harmonisation and the principles of home 
country control.  
Despite these efforts, Europe came again to the realisation that the integration of 
financial market had outpaced regulatory integration. This in turn, brought the need for an 
institutional change that was initiated on the basis of the Lamfalussy Report, which 
                                                           
does Europe stand?’, Brussels, 12 February 2009) 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2009/html/sp090212.en.html> accessed 14 July 2017 
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introduced an innovative 4 Level decision-making process. The 4 Level process brought 
substantial changes to financial regulation and supervision, without however, creating a truly 
supranational mechanism. Therefore, when the GFC hit the European market, the 
shortcomings of the existing regulatory framework were brought into the surface, while the 
need to strengthen further cooperation and convergence at both national and EU level, 
became a matter of priority. Prudential supervision was identified among the areas that were 
lacking an adequate regulatory framework for both micro- and macro-prudential oversight of 
EU financial markets.  
As a response, the De Larosière Report, introduced an updated version of the 
Lamfalussy process through the establishment of the ESRB and the three ESAs, with the view 
to enhance cooperation and promote the consistent application of EU law. However, the new 
regulatory and supervisory architecture, while contributed to changing the attitude towards 
more centralisation, it was lacking the institutional and structural means to unify the 
regulation of EU financial markets. At macro-prudential level, the ESRB remained an advisory 
body with no enforceable decision-making powers. The ESAs, on the other hand, while 
designed as bodies with a separate legal personality entitled to produce enforceable 
decisions, remained within the limits of the Meroni ruling, which significantly constrained the 
exercise of effective prudential supervisory powers. Thus, divergent approaches on prudential 
supervision rules persisted, generating fragmentation in the European financial markets.   
In light of the above, a new wave of regulatory reforms started with particular focus 
on the banking sector. Hence, in order to create a truly unified European Banking Market, 
there emerged the need to create a supranational mechanism to undertake the coordination, 
monitoring and the oversight of financial institutions operating within the European Single 
Market. Thus, the creation of a single supervisory authority in 2014 came to complement the 
existing structure but also to strengthen the role of the ECB in banking supervision. As we 
discussed in this chapter, the ECB’s role within the ESFS was already enhanced, but mainly 
focused on the macro-prudential supervision pillar. This initial, but ‘indirect’ involvement of 
the ECB in banking supervision was question and many have started to argue in favour of  the 
possible synergies involved, especially, with respect to the monetary policy tasks of the ECB. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the decision to delegate supervisory tasks to the ECB, only 
deepened these concerns.  
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Following this discussion, the next chapter examines the rationale behind this 
decision, by providing a comprehensive analysis of the legal implications and the possible 
synergies involved. In particular, the establishment of the new supervisory framework, links 
the monetary policy and supervisory functions under the same umbrella, creating a complex 
structure wherein new and existing bodies become closely involved, while multiple 
instruments and interlinked tasks interact and perhaps overlap with each other. This has 
raised many questions as to the division of tasks and objectives between the two domains 
(i.e. monetary policy and banking supervision); – especially, whether their respective tasks 
and objective are compatible or conflicting – the limit of powers; availability of tools; and as 
to the possible implications that this might pose to the goal price stability, as the main 
mandate of ECB, while the ECB is also aiming to retain its independent status and 
accountability.   
Chapter 4. From the ESFS to the establishment of the EU Banking 
Union: The Single Supervisory Mechanism   
“The structure of the regulatory system needs to reflect the 
structure of the markets that are regulated.”1084 
4.1 Introduction: the era in-between 
Having discussed the historical evolution of European financial integration in the 
previous chapters, it could be argued that the creation of a Single Market for financial services 
was considered to be part of a broader political mission which started from the EU’s inception. 
However, the process of creating a fully-fledged European financial market, with harmonised 
rules and practices, started to take shape in the early 1970s, while the White Paper in 1985 
signalled the beginning of a new era, during which significant progress was made towards 
creating a ‘level playing field’ for banks, insurance and securities markets. This was followed 
by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which created the Single Market, laid down the legal 
foundation of the ESCB and paved the way to the introduction of the euro in 1999. 
Henceforth, financial services integration has undergone a long, yet slow process, with the 
introduction of a plethora of legislative measures that enabled the liberalisation of capital 
                                                           
1084 Abrams and Taylor (n 568) 3.  
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movement, the free establishment of subsidiaries and branches, and the harmonisation of 
rules among the EU Member States. However, financial services integration, although was 
considered as one the main components of the Single Market, experienced the slowest 
progress; in fact, certain of its aspects remain until today “work in progress.”  
The Member States had shown strong reluctance in transferring their sovereignty in 
financial matters at EU level; a reluctance, however, that was slowly diminished as a result of 
a patchwork of regulatory responses to the GFC. This was a consequence of a number of gaps 
in the existing regulatory and supervisory framework that were revealed by the GFC, as 
extensively discussed in chapter three, and the severe implications brought in the financial 
markets. Namely, it soon became evident that the EU financial system was lacking the legal 
and institutional capacity to deal effectively with financial institutions that were operating 
extensively across borders. This was mainly related to the interlinkages created within a 
complex system of national and supranational cooperation. To this end, although the 
regulation of EU financial market was progressively moving towards tighter integration, its 
supervision remained nationally-oriented. In addition, the EU internal market of a common 
currency, was characterised by financial institutions that were heavily involved in cross-
border operations, which resulted in an interconnected financial system of complex 
interlinkages and mutually dependant market players. Therefore, the GFC exposed the 
fallacies of the existing legal framework and created momentum for regulatory reform mainly 
aimed at reshaping financial regulation, with special focus on supervision. Starting with the 
Lamfalussy Process and followed by the De Larosière Report, the EU banking landscape 
entered the era of Europeanisation. 
This process led to the establishment of the SSM, which became fully operation on 4 
November 2014, conferring specific tasks to the ECB concerning the prudential supervision of 
credit institutions. Thus, pursuant to the SSM, the ECB became the central prudential 
supervisor of financial institutions in the Eurozone. The SSM represents the first pillar of the 
wider European Banking Union project, while the other two are a common framework for 
recovery and resolution (the Single Resolution Mechanism – SRM), and for deposit protection 
(The European Deposit Insurance Scheme – EDIS). The SRM was implemented in July 2014 
and came into force in August 2016, whereas the EDIS was subject to the EU Commission’s 
proposal in November 2015 but has not been implemented yet. It should be noted here that 
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this thesis does not intent to dwell on the SRM and the EDIS, since this exceeds the scope of 
the analysis, which focuses on examining the dual mandate of the ECB, i.e. monetary policy 
and banking supervision, and its compatibility with the existing Treaty provisions.   
As discussed in chapter three, the establishment of the ESFS, including the 
establishment of the ESRB and the three ESAs, created a complex system of multiple layers, 
where the various elements that comprise it would have to cooperate and coordinate with 
one another. Thus, when the establishment of a single supervisory body, i.e. the SSM, came 
to be introduced in 2012, it became apparent that old and existing regulatory arrangements 
would have to be re-examined through the lenses of centralisation. This chapter aims to 
provide a comprehensive analysis of the SSMR, while critically assessing the role of the ECB 
within the changed institutional environment.  
Thus, the analysis starts with an historical background on the genesis of the idea of 
centralising supervision in Europe and the impetus of the decision to choose the ECB as the 
supranational supervisor. This is followed by a critical examination of the legal basis of 
conferring these supervisory tasks to the ECB. Next, the discussion moves to addressing the 
mandate and scope of the ECB’s supervisory role. The third part advances a discussion on how 
the balance and the division of responsibilities between the ECB and NCAs has been reshaped 
after the SSM establishment. The fourth part offers a detailed exploration of the operational 
structure of the SSM, including the role of the existing and new bodies. The next part, 
examines the coordination of supervisory powers between the ECB and the other supervisory 
institutions, including EBA, the college of supervisors and the ESRB. The tenth part of this 
chapter critically analyses the ‘separation principle’ and the underlying legal constrains, which 
comes to the core idea of this thesis. In conclusion, the last part examines whether the ECB’s 
independent status has been challenged under the new regulatory and supervisory 
framework.  
 
4.2 The centralisation of supervision in Europe  
It is well known that the impetus for banking supervision centralisation at EU level 
came from the events surrounding the occurrence of the GFC. Indeed, the first half of 2012 - 
right before the introduction of the SSMR - found Europe in the middle of one of the most 
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severe economic disruptions in its history. Namely, many EU countries were experiencing 
major sovereign debt crises1085 and major banking groups were facing liquidity problems and 
were unable to meet their short-term liabilities. Thus, the need to deepened Europe’s 
Economic and Monetary Union came into the fore, while any political resistance of the past 
was slowly diminished. Part of the same trend, was the great emphasis given to strengthen 
the institutional design for banking supervision in a way that would reflect transparency, 
cooperation, and convergence. This was also linked with the need to rebuild confidence of 
depositors and investors, and to weaken the nexus between sovereigns and banks. 1086 
As a response to this realisation, in June 2012, the President of the EU Council at the 
time, Herman Van Rompuy, announced that the EU was willing to move towards the 
establishment of a genuine Banking Union.1087 The intention behind the creation of a Banking 
Union was to elevate supervision, recapitalisation, resolution and deposit protection at EU 
level, all based on a Single Rulebook. As was mentioned by Herman Van Rompuy Report: “…an 
integrated financial framework should have two central elements: single European banking 
supervision and a common deposit insurance and resolution framework.”1088 Shortly after, the 
Euro Area Summit Statement specified the mandate given to the EU Commission to present 
a proposals on the basis of Article 127(6), TFEU for the creation of a Single Supervisory 
Mechanism, which was to undertake supervisory duties at EU level.1089 The EU Commission’s 
response came in September 2012, by introducing: a Communication, explaining the rationale 
for the creation of a Banking Union for Europe, while setting the ground for its completion;1090 
                                                           
1085 In early 2010 the Greek sovereign debt crisis became apparent and many countries were experiencing 
serious financial circumstances: Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain. 
1086 Mersch, Yves, ‘The Banking Union - a European perspective: reasons, benefits and challenges of the Banking 
Union’ (Speech by Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the seminar ‘Auf dem Weg zu mehr Stabilität 
– Ein Dialog über die Ausgestaltung der Bankenunion zwischen Wissenschaft und Praxis’ organised by Europolis 
and Wirtschaftswoche, Berlin, 5 April 2013) 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2013/html/sp130405.en.html> accessed 14 July 2017. 
1087 ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’ (Report by President of the European Council Herman 
Van Rompuy, Presse 296, Brussels, 26 June 2012), (hereinafter: Herman Van Rompuy Report) 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131201.pdf> accessed 14 July 
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1088 Herman Van Rompuy Report (n 1093) 4. 
1089 ‘Euro Area Summit Statement’ (Brussels, 29 June 2012) 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131359.pdf> accessed 14 July 
2017. 
1090 Commission, ‘A Roadmap towards a Banking Union’ (Communication) COM (2012) 510 final. 
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a proposal for the creation of SSM,1091 which would be centred by the ECB and NCAs;1092 and 
a proposal for the amendment of EBA Regulation,1093 which intended to amend the existing 
role of EBA in accordance with the new supervisory framework.  
The idea for the SSM establishment was supported by the EU Council in its meeting in 
18-19 October 2012, calling for a legislative proposal for its establishment as a “matter of 
priority.”1094 However, the SSMR before being finally approved by the EU Council in October 
2013,1095 underwent several revisions and amendments by the EU Council and Parliament: at 
first stage by the Cyprus Council Presidency in December 2012 and later by the EU Parliament 
in March 2013. The SSMR entered into force on November 2013, and on 4 November 2014, 
the SSM became fully operational.1096 The establishment of the SSM has effectively 
empowered the ECB with prudential supervision tasks, enhancing the complexity of an 
already entangled supervisory architecture, which, as we analysed in chapter three, consisted 
of multiple layers and interlinked tasks and responsibilities. However, before analysing the 
institutional and legal framework of the new supervisory framework, it is important to 
examine the origins of the idea of centralisation, the choice of the ECB and the legal basis of 
transforming the latter into a supranational body entitled with prudential supervisory tasks.  
 
4.3 The idea of supervision centralisation at EU level and the choice of ECB as the 
supranational supervisor  
Undeniably, the centralisation of banking supervision at EU level represented a drastic 
regime shift and a complete remodelling of the institutional supervisory framework for EU 
financial markets. Historically, the question of whether banking supervision should be 
                                                           
1091 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank 
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions’ COM (2012) 511 final.  
1092 Commission (n 1097) 7.  
1093 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Regulation 
(EU) No 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) as regards its 
interaction with Council Regulation (EU) No…/… conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank 
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions’ COM (2012) 512 final.   
1094 ‘Conclusions of the European Council, 18/19 October 2012’ (European Council, EUCO 156/12) para 6 
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%20156%202012%20INIT> accessed 14 July 2017. 
1095 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central 
Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions [2013] OJ L 287/63 
(hereinafter: SSMR).  
1096 SSMR (n 1101) Article 33(2). 
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included among the ECB’s tasks and responsibilities, has constituted one of the most 
controversial, questionable and debated topics. Namely, in 1989 the Delors Report when 
referring to establishment of the ESCB, specified that it would participate in banking 
supervision by coordinating the national supervisory authorities.1097 Similarly, during the 
Maastricht Treaty negotiations in the early 1990s, the belief that a strong monetary union 
should be complemented with a supranational supervisory mechanism, constituted an 
integral part of the discussions throughout the drafting process.1098 However, this idea was 
still premature and failed to reach political agreement since the EU Member States were 
highly reluctant in giving away part of their regulatory space, as we discussed in chapter 
three.1099  
At a later stage, the FSAP while touching upon the issue of banking supervision by 
emphasising that there was a need for convergence and harmonisation of practices,1100 did 
not result in any concrete discussion or proposals for potential scenarios for centralisation. 
As was discussed already, at the time, the focus was on developing a set rules aimed at 
harmonising practices across the EU, rather than centralising supervision at EU level. 
However, the idea of integrating supervision at EU level, was always a major concern and 
although seemed to have been a politically unreachable goal, found official support by the EU 
Parliament in many instances. In fact, the EU Parliament expressed ‘guarded satisfaction’ on 
FSAP measures, due to the fact that it considered inter alia that: “greater formal centralisation 
of supervision of all credit institutions through the ECB as provided for in the Treaty (Article 
105) should be pursued and, if not, how and by whom centralised action should be 
implemented, if such a need should arise because of technological change and a new 
competitive environment, which are both pervasive factors.”1101 
                                                           
1097 The Delors Report (n 54) 22 para 32.  
1098 James, Harold, Caruana, Jaime and Draghi Mario, Making the European Monetary Union (Harvard 
University Press 2012) 313-317. 
1099 Constâncio, Vítor, ‘The nature and significance of Banking Union’ (Speech by Vice-President of the ECB, at 
the conference ‘Financial Regulation: Towards a global regulatory framework?’ , Chatham House City Series, 
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The Lamfalussy Report took a similar stance with the FSAP and the idea of creating a 
supranational supervisor for Europe, not only did not find any support again, but it was 
explicitly highlighted that the reasons against centralisation outweighed the reasons in 
favour.1102 Thus, the Lamfalussy Report, as we analysed in detail in chapter three, illustrated 
the actual implementation of the harmonisation rules through the establishment of an 
institutional mechanism (the Level 4 Committees). This intended to simplify the process of 
coordination, implementation and consistent application of EU law by the NCAs, rather than 
creating a system of integrated supervision at EU level. In fact, what came into being instead, 
was a legislative process that aimed to achieve most of the benefits of a single supervision 
authority through a network of national supervisors and the 4 Level Committees. Thus, as 
highlighted already, the role of the 4 Level Committees was merely focused on the 
preparation of regulation, while their decision-making power remained limited.  
This exclusion of supervisory tasks from the new supervisory architecture was in line 
with the specific mandate that the Committee of Wise Men - which produced the Lamfalussy 
Report - was given by the relevant ECOFIN in 2001 that excluded prudential supervision from 
the Committee’s working agenda. As Alexander Lamfalussy clarified later, this limitation on 
the mandate could be explained by the fact that the focus, at that time, was on regulating the 
securities market, while the extension to banking and insurance came at a later stage (in 
2005).1103 Nevertheless, the Lamfalussy Report provided with a clear indication, leaving an 
open window for the creation a supranational body in the future, in case the proposed 4 Level 
mechanism would fail to achieve its intended objectives by 2004. As it was explicitly stated: 
“it might be appropriate to consider a Treaty change, including the creation of a single EU 
regulatory authority for financial services generally in the Community.”1104 The EU Parliament, 
in its Lamfalussy follow-up recommendations, argued about the ultimate need to strengthen 
the role of the ECB in prudential supervision.1105 Lastly, it is worth mentioning that apart from 
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ds.sipr.ucl.ac.be/cps/ucl/doc/cehec/documents/The_Belgian_Financial_Forum_and_the_Robert_Triffin2.pdf> 
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this reference in the Lamfalussy Report, there was also some sporadic mention in other EU 
legislation initiatives that implicitly indicated the possibility of supervisory centralisation in 
the future. For instance, Directive 2003/71/EC, envisaged the possibility of creating a 
European Securities Unit.1106 
Furthermore, as explicitly highlighted in chapter three, the Lamfalussy Process, 
although did not provide for centralisation of supervision and despite its lapses in terms of 
reaching the intended objectives, set the ground for further integration in both financial 
regulation and supervision. However, it was only after a series of events – originating mainly 
from the GFC – that the loopholes in the existing regulatory and supervisory architecture 
came to view, bringing the need for deepening financial integration beyond the 4 Levels 
Lamfalussy process. This was clearly illustrated in the De Larosière Report, which led to the 
establishment of an updated supervisory structure with the view to strengthen both micro-
and macro-prudential supervision through the establishment of ESRB and the three ESAs. In 
regard to the role of the ECB within this structure, this remained within the borders of the 
framework created since its establishment. Namely, the ECB since its creation was designed 
to serve solely the goal of monetary policy, while banking supervision was concentrated at 
national level. Indeed, there was a clear separation between the two functions, with the first 
(monetary policy) being highly centralised, since it was entrusted to the ECB, and the second 
(supervision) remaining decentralised, with the national authorities remaining responsible for 
day-to-day supervision and enforcement.  
However, as analysed in chapter three, the 4 Level mechanism, as updated by the De 
Larosière Report, empowered for the first time the ECB with some limited macro-prudential 
supervisory tasks through its participation in the ESRB. To the contrary, micro-prudential 
oversight remained a responsibility of NCAs and the colleges of supervisors, coordinated 
through the ESAs. With the establishment of the SSM, the ECB effectively assumed direct 
micro-prudential supervisory powers over the euro area financial institutions, exceeding the 
vision of the De Larosière Report.1107 Indeed, the De Larosière Report while referred at the 
views suggesting the ECB’s involvement in both macro- and micro-prudential supervision, 
                                                           
1106 Directive 2003/71/EC (n 803) Recital (47), 
1107 Lastra, Rosa M., ‘Banking Union and Single Market: Conflict or Companionship?’ (2013) 36 (5) Fordham 
International Law Journal 1195, 1196. 
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explicitly excluded the ECB from micro-prudential supervision.1108 Also, in order to support 
this approach, the De Larosière Report provided an extensive list of arguments against the 
ECB’s involvement in micro-prudential oversight, including the possible impingement that this 
could create on its monetary stability mandate. In addition, a strong argument was linked 
with the possible implications that may arise as a result of a dual mandate for the ECB’s 
independence: “in case of a crisis, the supervisor will be heavily involved with the providers of 
financial support (typically Ministries of Finance) given the likelihood that taxpayers’ money 
may be called upon. This could result in political pressure and interference, thereby 
jeopardizing the ECB’s independence.”1109 
All in all, as seen in the previous chapter, all the efforts to centralise supervision at EU 
level with the creation of the ESAs, the ESRB and the enhanced role of ECB, did not lead to 
any ground-breaking changes. In fact, the prudential supervision regime remained 
unchanged, and highly based on the principle of home country control and mutual 
recognition. Thus, the Single Market for banking services, whilst, it became highly centralised 
on certain aspects, remained decentralised to a large extend in regard to its supervisory 
framework. Practically, before the establishment of the SSM, supervision was performed at 
national level subject to various practices that were varying from State to State. Namely, in 
some Member States, the NCBs were responsible to supervise directly the financial 
institutions; in some other States, accountable for supervision was an independent from the 
NCB public authority; and some Member States combined the supervisory operation of a 
competent authority with the involvement of the NCB. Here becomes relevant Lastra’s 
description of the pre-Banking Union EU supervisory framework as characterised by elements 
of decentralisation, cooperation and segmentation.1110 
In light of the above, it seems that while the discussion on supervision centralisation 
was well-developed, it took a major financial crisis for a political agreement to be reached. 
Thus, while the De Larosière Report and the regulatory framework to follow opened the door 
to the involvement of the ECB in macro-prudential oversight, EU policymakers maintained a 
position strictly against the assignment of micro-prudential supervisory task to the ECB. Thus, 
                                                           
1108 The De Larosière Report (n 873) 44 para 172. See also: Smits (n 963). 
1109 The De Larosière Report (n 873) 44 para 171. 
1110 Lastra (n 791) 50.  
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it did not come as a surprise that the conferral of supervisory powers to the ECB, three years 
later, raised various social, political, economic and legal questions that led to an enormous 
multi-dimensional debate. The ECB played a prominent role during the GFC, without, 
however, acting as the official banking supervisor, while the possibility of assigning 
supervisory tasks, as extensively discussed, remained part of a rather theoretical debate. 
However, with the introduction of the SSM, the ECB is entrusted with explicit supervisory 
responsibilities, leaving space for discussion as to how the ECB from “an option” became the 
“ultimate choice.” 
An alternative option was to transform EBA into the supranational supervisor, since it 
was already carrying out some supervisory tasks.1111 Transforming EBA into the supranational 
supervisor was strongly supported by the EU Commission.1112 Even after the support in favour 
of the ECB seemed to be prevailing, the EU Commission still attempted to draft a proposal in 
favour of conferring supervisory tasks on EBA.1113   
The argument against using EBA was based on the view that a decision to confer 
supervisory powers on EBA without Treaty amendment would have been both politically and 
legally unachievable for a number of reasons.1114 Firstly, as analysed in chapter three, EBA’s 
role was not extended in covering supervisory responsibilities, but was focused merely on 
coordinating the NCAs, while its decision making power remained limited. Secondly, such a 
decision would go against the Meroni doctrine as analysed in chapter three. Indeed, according 
                                                           
1111 For the view supporting the choice of EBA as the supranational supervisor see: 
- Schoenmaker, Dirk and Gros, Daniel, ‘A European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund’ (2012) Centre 
for European Policy Studies No. 364, 8 
<https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/WD364%20European%20Deposit%20Insurance.pdf> accessed 14 
July 2017. 
- Ferrarini, Guido and Chiodini, Filippo, ‘National fragmented supervision over multinational banks as a 
source of global systemic risk: a critical analysis of recent EU reforms’ in Wymeersch, Eddy, Hopt, Klaus 
J. and Ferrarini, Guido (eds) Financial Regulation and Supervision: A post-crisis analysis (Oxford 
University Press 2012) 193- 231. 
- Goyal, Rishi, Brooks, Petya Koeva, Pradhan, Mahmood, Tressel, Thierry, Dell’Ariccia, Giovanni, Leckow, 
Ross, Pazarbasioglu, Ceyla and an IMF Staff Team, ‘A Banking Union for the Euro Area’ (IMF, February 
13, 2013) <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2013/sdn1301.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017. 
1112 Barker, Alex, ‘Backing grows for one EU bank supervisor’ (Financial Times June 18, 2012) 
<https://www.ft.com/content/1c94e34e-b958-11e1-a470-00144feabdc0> accessed 14 July 2017. 
See also: Ferran, Eilis and Babis, Valia, ‘The European Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (University of Cambridge 
Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 10 2013) 2.  
1113 Chang, Michele, ‘The Rising Power of the ECB: The Case of the Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (Paper 
prepared for the biennial conference of the European Union Studies Association, 5-7 March 2015, Boston). 
1114 Ferran and Babis (n 1119) 2.  
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to the Meroni doctrine, any delegation of powers from an EU institution to other bodies that 
are not clearly defined and involves a wide margin of discretion, would be likely to threaten 
the balance of powers between the EU institutions and would eventually lead to Treaty 
amendment that would require several years to be completed.1115 To the contrary, it was 
supported that the delegation of supervisory powers to the ECB would not require a Treaty 
amendment, since the interpretation of the existing provisions of the Treaty (Article 127(6), 
TFEU) would allow the ECB to undertake supervisory powers.1116 A Treaty amendment was 
not desirable at that stage, since immediate action was needed to rebuild confidence in the 
EU financial markets. The EU recent experience during ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, which 
proved to be a lengthy process, was enough evidence that the implementation of the EU 
Banking Union would have been subject to significant delays, which, given the emergency 
character of the situation, was not an option.   
In additional, the ECB’s strong reputation both at EU and international level, provided 
a good ground in favour of assigning supervisory tasks to the ECB.1117 Especially, considering 
that there was a strong need to rebuild market trust and confidence in a timely manner, a 
body with strong reputation, credibility and a background of positive achievements, would be 
in a favourable position to serve this purpose, in comparison to a newly established 
institution, which would have to prove its reputation over time. Another argument in favour 
of entrusting the ECB with supervisory powers was the comprehensive knowledge and 
information that the ECB obtained during the GFC in its role as the lender of last resort. These 
information and expertise were considered as an advantage in strengthening the operation 
of future supervisory tasks.1118 Moreover, by empowering the ECB with supervisory tasks, 
would bring at EU level the three ultimate objectives of a central bank: price stability, financial 
                                                           
1115 See: Yataganas, Xénophon A., ‘Delegation of Regulatory Authority in the European Union, The relevance of 
the American model of independent agencies’ (Jean Monnet Working Paper 3/01 2001). 
1116 See: 
- Ferran and Babis (n 1119) 2-3; and 
- Wymeersch, Eddy, ‘The European Banking Union, a First Analysis’ (2012) Financial Law Institute 
Working Paper Series WP 2012-07, 6-9. 
1117 Ruding, Onno H., ‘The Contents and Timing of a European Banking Union: Reflections on the differing views’ 
(2012) CEPS Essay No. 2, 4.  
1118 Sibert, Anne (2012), ‘Banking Union and a Single Bank Supervisory Mechanism’ (EU parliament DG for 
Internal Policies 2012) 11 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201210/20121004ATT52935/20121004ATT52935
EN.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017. 
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stability and payment systems.1119 Lastly, the ECB was both praised and criticised during the 
GFC for its role and crisis management duties, especially, in times when the Member States 
were struggling to deal with the issues arose. It seems, however, that despite the criticism, 
the ECB’s role remained pivotal throughout the GFC, placing it in the best suited position to 
be proposed for the assignment of supervisory tasks.1120  
 All in all, the credibility and the strong reputation of the ECB; the Meroni ruling that 
prevents the delegation of powers to a new body; the pressure of time that did not allow for 
complex procedures and Treaty amendments; and the role of the ECB during the GFC, all 
combined explain the final institutional structure of the SSM and the new tasks of ECB. Thus, 
the new supervisory body - the SSM – was established as a special mechanism that would 
work under the ECB’s wings, rather than a single supervisory institution that would imply the 
establishment of a new EU institutions. The latter, i.e. establishment of a new EU body, in 
order to be a legitimate option would have required the amendment of the Treaty, since 
Article 127(6), TFEU, does not provide an adequate legal basis to such an extent. The idea that 
the ECB would be given the power to oversight Eurozone’s financial institutions was 
welcomed from the ECB sometime before the political agreement was reached. In 2009 
Trichet, who served as the president of the ECB during that time stated that: “The ECB and 
the Eurosystem have the technical capacity to assume a stronger role in macro-prudential 
supervision. Indeed, it would be a natural extension of the mandate already assigned to us by 
the Treaty, namely to contribute to financial stability.”1121 Also, in 2009, Smaghi (who served 
as member of the Executive Board of the ECB at the time) pointed out that: “strengthening 
the role of the ECB in the field of supervision has some important advantages which, in my 
view, outweigh the disadvantages.”1122 
                                                           
1119 Zavvos, George, S., ‘Towards a European Banking Union: Legal and Policy Implications’ (Speech delivered at 
the 22nd Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference: ‘Building a Financial Structure for a More Stable and Equitable 
Economy’ Levy Economics Institute Bard College, New York, April 18 2013) 4 
<http://www.levyinstitute.org/conferences/minsky2013/Zavvos_speech.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017. 
1120 Yiangou, Jonathan, O’keeffe, Mícheál and Glöckler, Gabriel, ‘Tough Love: How the ECB’s Monetary 
Financing Prohibition Pushes Deeper Euro Area Integration’ (2013) 35 (3) Journal of European Integration 223.  
1121 Trichet, Jean-Claude, ‘Remarks on the future of European financial regulation and supervision’ (Keynote 
address by the President of the ECB at the CESR, Paris, 23 February 2009. 
<http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2009/html/sp090223.en.html> accessed 14 July 2017. 
1122 Smaghi, Lorenzo Bini, ‘Regulation and supervisory architecture: Is the EU on the right path?’ (Speech by a 
Member of the Executive Board of the ECB in ECON meeting with national parliaments: ‘Financial crisis: Where 
does Europe stand?’ Brussels, 12 February 2009 
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 However, the empowerment of the ECB to oversee the major banks of the Eurozone, 
opened a Pandora’s box and raised questions concerning the ECB’s accountability; a possible 
trade-off between monetary policy and supervisory tasks, and the likelihood of sacrificing the 
independent status of the ECB. However, before analysing the legal implication of these 
issues, it is worth examining the legal basis of the SSM establishment, and the conferral of 
supervisory tasks to the ECB.  
 
4.4 The legal basis of the SSM and the conferral of supervisory tasks on the ECB  
The SSM constitutes the mechanism through which the ECB will exercise its new 
supervisory powers, and this is facilitated through the creation of a new Single Supervisory 
Board (SSB) which is designed to operate within the ECB.1123 The legal basis for the SSM 
establishment and the assumption of supervisory tasks from the ECB, was a key aspect of the 
decision to furthering supervisory integration and as such, came into the spotlight, albeit 
gathering mixed responses. In short, the legal bases of the SSM establishment are: Article 
127(6), TFEU, which confers regulatory power on the ECB; the SSMR, which assigns the ECB 
with specific regulatory duties; and the SSM Framework Regulation (SSMFR),1124 which aims 
at regulating the cooperation and coordination between the ECB and the national supervisors. 
Although the SSMR and SSMFR were newly adopted, Article 127(6), TFEU, finds its roots back 
to the creation of the EMU. Also, Article 127(6), TFEU, although served as the legal basis of 
the ECB’s newly adopted supervisory power, its wording does not allow for a direct delegation 
of supervisory power to the ECB. In fact, starting with the EU primary law, there is no provision 
that empowers the ECB with the any direct supervisory tasks. Thus, in order to understand 
the use of Article 127(6), TFEU, as the legal basis for the SSM establishment, it is important 
understand the intended meaning of the provision, which arises from the rationale behind its 
adoption, the historical background of its formulation and the reasoning behind its wording.  
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As was mentioned already, the centralisation of supervision at EU level has been 
subject to discussion long before the establishment of the SSM. A specific mention of this fact 
was made in the SSMR, emphasising the long-standing existence of the view in favour of 
centralisation, which strengthens even further its rationale and importance. According to the 
SSMR: “The European Parliament called on various occasions for a European body to be 
directly responsible for certain supervisory tasks over financial institutions, starting with its 
resolutions of 13 April 2000 on the Commission communication on implementing the 
framework for financial markets: Action Plan, and of 21 November 2002 on prudential 
supervision rules in the European Union.”  
Putting the discussion back to the genesis of the EMU, the draft Report of Delors 
Committee defined in that: "the system would participate in the coordination of banking 
supervision policies of the national supervisory authorities". However, in the final Report, 
although prudential supervision was included among the basic tasks of the ESCB, the term 
"national" was removed as following: “the System would participate in the coordination of 
banking supervision policies of the supervisory authorities,”1125 which indicates the possibility 
that supervisory authorities would be European.1126 Furthermore, the ESCB was assigned 
prudential supervisory responsibilities in the first draft Statute,1127 defining that the ESCB shall 
(note: not the ECB alone): “participate as necessary in the formulation, co-ordination and 
execution of policies relating to prudential supervision and the stability of the financial 
system.”1128 However, the final version of the ESCB Statute, did not include prudential 
supervision as the one of the basic tasks of the ESCB.1129 This can be also explained by the 
strong opposition faced, which was led primarily by the German Bundesbank, with the latter 
stressing the issue of a possible conflict of interest between the supervisory and monetary 
policy task of the central bank.1130 Thus, the intention to include prudential supervision 
                                                           
1125 The Delors Report (n 54) 22 para 32.  
1126 James, Harold, ‘International Cooperation and Central Banks’ in Cassis, Youssef, Grossman, Richard S. and 
Schenk, Catherine R. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Banking and Financial History (2nd edn. Oxford University 
Press 2016) 364, 381-382.  
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1129 See basic tasks of the ESCB: TFEU (n 5) Article 127(2). 
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among the basic tasks of the ECB was clearly expressed by the EU policy makers; an intention, 
however, that never came to be implemented due to failure in reaching a political agreement.  
As a result, neither Article 127(6), TFEU nor Article 25, ESCB Statute, assigned to the 
ECB direct prudential supervisory duties. According to Article 25, ESCB Statute, the ECB was 
only granted consulting and advisory duties in relation to prudential supervision and financial 
stability issues,1131 and “the performance of specific tasks concerning policies relating to the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial institutions with the exception 
of insurance undertakings (Article 25(2), ESCB Statute).” However, according to Article 127(6), 
TFEU: “The Council may, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the ECB and after receiving the assent of the European Parliament, confer upon the 
ECB specific tasks concerning the policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions and other financial institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings;”1132 
the wording of which leaves space for further interpretation as to the potential expansion of 
the ECB’s prudential supervisory powers.1133 This is also known as the enabling clause, which 
was used to confer specific prudential supervision tasks upon the ECB within the context of 
ESRB; and was also, activated recently when the Member States acting unanimously pursuant 
to Article 127(6), TFEU, adopted the SSMR and assigned supervisory tasks to the ECB. 
However, the interpretation of Article 127(6), TFEU, is far from being straightforward. 
Views are divided between those supporting the narrow interpretation of the provision and 
those advocating a wider reading. Namely, in the first category belonged those who 
supported that the ECB’s role in prudential supervision has to remain advisory1134 and on the 
second group, those who advocated that the enabling clause of Article 127(6), TFEU, leaves 
space for broader interpretation, allowing for a possible conferral of supervisory tasks on the 
ECB.1135 Arguments against the idea that Article 127(6), TFEU, constitutes a sufficient legal 
basis for the establishment of the SSM, concentrate on the wording of the provision. In 
particular, according to the wording of Article 127(6), TFEU, the ECB could only be conferred: 
                                                           
1131 ESCB Statute (n 243) Article 25(1).  
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“specific tasks concerning the policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions.” According to this interpretation, “the specific tasks” refer to limited 
responsibilities and did not intent to leave space for a possible conferral of prudential 
supervisory responsibilities on the ECB.  Moreover, since the wording of Article 127(6), TFEU, 
clearly refers to “tasks”, the conferral of “powers”, seems to exceed the intended meaning of 
the provision.  
This view finds further support to the wording of Article 25, ESCB Statute, which, as 
mentioned earlier, entrusts the ECB with advisory and consultancy duties in regard to 
prudential supervision, yet without providing for any direct supervisory competence. Indeed, 
this provision, if read in conjunction with Article 127(6), TFEU, suggests that the role of the 
ECB in prudential supervision remains advisory and supportive. Moreover, according to 
Article 127(5), TFEU: “the ESCB shall contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by 
the competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the 
stability of the financial system.” Hence, it could be argued that since this provision refers to 
the conduct of “policies”, it practically makes reference to the Reports and Studies published 
by the ECB and the examination or review of prudential supervisory operation undertaken by 
other entities (i.e. NCAs, EBA, EFC and FSC). Accordingly, the “specific tasks” of Article 127(6), 
TFEU,  are to be interpreted as closely related to the conduct of those policies, which serve 
mainly a supportive and advisory role, rather than a supervisory role.1136 Moreover, according 
to Article 13(2), TEU: “Each institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred on it 
in the Treaties, and in conformity with the procedures, conditions and objectives set out in 
them,”1137 and since the ECB was not granted with any direct supervisory powers by the EU 
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Treaties, it is questionable whether the intention of Article 127(6), TFEU, can be considered 
as an adequate legal basis for the assignment of supervisory tasks to the ECB.  
On the contrary, among the arguments supporting that Article 127(6), TFEU, 
constitutes an adequate legal basis for the conferral of supervisory powers on the ECB, were 
those who supported that the wording of the provision, in fact, suggests a broader 
interpretation. Namely, it has been supported that Article 127(6), TFEU, contains an enabling 
clause, which allows the conferral of supervisory powers on the ECB without requiring a 
formal amendment of the Treaty.1138 Another argument in favour, is the fact that the 
supervisory powers conferred to the ECB with the SSMR are limited and thus, compatible with 
the wording of the provision. To this end, firstly, the supervisory tasks of the ECB are limited 
geographically, since they apply only to financial institutions of Eurozone Member States; and 
secondly, they are limited in scope, since the ECB is entrusted only with prudential supervisory 
tasks.1139  
Given the historical background of Article 127, TFEU, its rationale and the first draft of 
the ESCB Statute (with its intention to include prudential supervision among the basic task of 
the ECB), it would be unrealistic to accept a narrow interpretation of its meaning. Even if one 
focuses only on the vaguely formulated wording of the provision, although it reflects a limited 
scope of the intentional meaning, it could be said that it leaves indeed, space for broad 
interpretation. Furthermore, provided the importance of the issue of prudential supervision 
in the EU financial architecture, which is evident from the reference made even during the 
very early discussions of the EMU creation – since the drafting of the Maastricht Treaty – it 
would be sensible to believe that the EU policymakers’ intention was to empower the ECB 
with supervisory tasks. This idea, however, at the time, was immature and subject to political 
tensions that made its final implementation unachievable. This perhaps explains the vague 
formulation of Article 127(6), TFEU that leaves “space” for broad interpretation. To this end, 
there are strong arguments supporting the view that this “space” was intentionally neglected 
in order to leave the option open for the consideration of this matter from the EU Council in 
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1139 See: Lackhoff, Klaus, ‘How will the single supervisory mechanism (SSM) function? A brief overview’ (2014) 
29 (1) Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 13.  
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the future.1140 This was also confirmed by the recent use of Article 127(6), TFEU as the legal 
basis for conferring specific macro-prudential tasks on the ECB with the establishment of the 
ESRB in 2010.1141 
Apart from the doubts raised in relation to Article 127(6), TFEU and its adequacy as 
the legal basis for the ECB’s involvement in banking supervision, when interpreting the new 
supervisory tasks of the ECB, the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality should be taken 
into consideration. Specifically, according to Article 5(2), TEU: “Under the principle of 
conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by 
the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. Competences not 
conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States.” Thus, competences 
of the ECB should be interpreted within the limits its objectives as were set by primary EU 
law, and in accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.1142 Moreover, 
Article 5(3), TEU specifies the principle of subsidiarity as following: “Under the principle of 
subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only 
if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason 
of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.”1143  
As a result, it is not surprising that the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 
were applied accordingly to the conferral of supervisory powers to the ECB. Thus, it could be 
argued that, the supervisory powers conferred to the ECB may apply only to the extent that 
cover aspects that cannot be sufficiently monitored at national level or because it has been 
acknowledged that the common objectives of the conferred powers can be achieved better 
at EU level. Accordingly, the SSMR has endorsed the principle of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, by pointing out that the objectives of the conferred powers: “cannot be 
sufficiently achieved at the Member State level and can therefore, by reason of the pan-Union 
structure of the banking market and the impact of failures of credit institutions on other 
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Member States, be better achieved at the Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 TEU. In accordance with the 
principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article”, by emphasising also that the SSMR: 
“does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.”1144 Furthermore, 
the compliance of the conferral of supervisory task to the ECB with the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionally, was affirmed by the Report of the Joint Committee for EU 
Affairs.1145  
 
4.5 Mandate and scope of the ECB’s supervisory power 
 Having discussed the legal basis for conferring supervisory tasks to the ECB, it is crucial 
to examine the content of the Banks’ supervisory mandate and scope. According to Article 
1(1), SSMR, the main objective of the ECB is to ensure the safety and soundness of the 
Eurozone credit institutions, the stability of the financial system as a whole as well as the unity 
and integrity of the internal market. The ECB’s supervisory powers apply to all Eurozone 
Member States, and to non-Eurozone Member States, subject to their decision to enter into 
a ‘close cooperation’ with the ECB,1146 as defined in Article 7, SSMR. In regard to other EU 
Members States, i.e. EU Member States that have not adopted the euro and have not 
established a close cooperation with the ECB as defined by Article 7, SSMR (hereinafter: non-
participating Member States), their participation is subject to contracts, administrative 
arrangements and memoranda of understanding between the ECB and the respective NCAs; 
which would be coordinated by EBA, but would not create legal obligations for the Member 
States.1147 This arises from the wording of Article 2(1), SSMR which defines “participating 
Member State” as Member States whose currency is the euro or a Member State whose 
currency is not the euro which has established a close cooperation in accordance with Article 
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7, SSMR.1148 Hence, the non-participating Member States are the EU Member States that have 
not adopted the euro and have not established a close cooperation with the ECB as defined 
by Article 7, SSMR. 
As mentioned earlier, the ECB did not assume responsibility immediately after the 
SSMR was adopted. It was on 4 November 2014 that the ECB became the official pan-
European banking supervisor, with the SSM getting involved in the supervision of around 6000 
entities within the participating Member States, while 120 of them fell under the direct 
supervision of the ECB.1149 The SSMR sets out criteria that should be meet by a financial 
institution in order to be supervised by the ECB. Namely, in the order a financial institution to 
become subject to ECB’s direct supervision should fulfil two criteria: firstly, they should fall 
within the definition of “credit institution” as defined by EU law; and secondly, they should 
be “significant," as defined by Article 6(4) SSMR. The banks that do not meet the criteria of 
Article 6(4) SSMR, would be considered less significant and would remain under the 
supervision of the NCAs. Regarding the meaning of a “credit institution” the SSMR makes 
reference to the respective definition as provided by the Capital Requirement Regulation 
(CRR), Article 4(1): “credit institution means an undertaking the business of which is to take 
deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own.”1150 In 
relation to other credit institutions that do not meet the requirements of the aforementioned 
definition, these do not seem to be subject to the SSMR’s remit, although the wording of 
Article 127(6), TFEU: “other financial institutions” indicates otherwise. Similarly, insurance 
firms, despite their considerable significance in the financial market, are also excluded from 
the SSMR. The same applies to investment firms and securities depositories.  
An issue that has raised concerns and has been considered as one of the limitations of 
SSMR, is the fact that the majority of the banks operating in the euro area will escape direct 
supervision by the ECB. This happens because there are many credit institutions that although 
they are considered as financial institution within the country of their operation, do not 
                                                           
1148 SSMR (n 1101) Article 2(1) and Article 7.  
1149 ‘ECB assumes responsibility for euro area banking supervision’ (ECB, Press Release of 4 November 2014) 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr141104.en.html> accessed 14 July 2017. 
1150 ‘Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential 
requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012’ [2013] 




formally qualify as ‘credit institutions’ under EU law. This happens due to their operation as 
businesses that do not receive credit, and as such, despite their size and importance, they fall 
outside the scope of the SSMR and remain subject to NCAs. This may prove to be problematic 
long term, since many of these financial institutions, while do not qualify as ‘credit 
institutions’ according to EU law, could be considered as systemically important in terms of 
size and operation, and would still will remain excluded from the supervision of the ECB unless 
they are part of a supervised group.1151 
The second criterion for determining whether a financial institution will be supervised 
by the ECB, is the ‘significance’ component. This was another controversial aspect of ECB’s 
supervisory powers’ scope, which constituted part of an extensive debate during the drafting 
of SSMR. Within this context, it was questionable whether the ECB should be entrusted to 
supervise all Eurozone banks or only the systemically important ones.1152  Germany, which 
was in favour of the second view, supported that the NCAs should retain their power to 
supervise the less significant banks, since their size and importance was unlikely to impose 
any significant risk to the EU financial market; and even in case of default, every country 
should be responsible to resolve the situation by its own means.1153 This finds further support 
by those arguing that the assignment of the responsibility to supervise all the Eurozone banks 
to the ECB, would be difficult in practice. As Schäuble characteristically pointed out, the ECB: 
“should focus its direct oversight on those banks that can pose a systemic risk at a European 
level. This is not just in line with the tested principle of subsidiarity. It is also common sense; 
we cannot expect a European watchdog to supervise directly all of the region’s lenders – 6,000 
in the Eurozone alone – effectively.”1154 Indeed, it would have been almost unmanageable for 
the ECB to undertake the supervision of almost 6000 banks, and since a quick solution was 
                                                           
1151 Wymeersch, Eddy, ‘The single supervisory mechanism or “SSM”, part one of the Banking Union’ (National 
Bank of Belgium Working Paper No 255, Brussels, April 2014) 27. 
See also: Veron, Nocolas, ‘Europe’s Single Supervisory Mechanism: Most small banks are German (and Austrian 
and Italian)’ (Bruegel, September 22, 2014) <http://bruegel.org/2014/09/europes-single-supervisory-
mechanism-most-small-banks-are-german-and-austrian-and-italian/> accessed 14 July 2017. 
1152 Zavvos, George S., ‘Towards a European Banking Union: Legal and Policy Implications’ (Speech delivered at 
the 22nd Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference: “Building a Financial Structure for a More Stable and Equitable 
Economy, New York, April 18 2013) 
<http://www.levyinstitute.org/conferences/minsky2013/Zavvos_speech.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017. 
1153 Ruding, Onno H., ‘The Contents and Timing of a European Banking Union: Reflections on the differing 
views’ (Centre for European Policy Studies 2012) 2 
<http://aei.pitt.edu/58425/1/Essay_No_2_European_Banking_Union.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017. 
1154 Schäuble, Wolfgang, ‘How to protect EU taxpayers against bank failures’ (Financial times, August 30, 2012). 
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needed in order to restore confidence in the markets, the decision to focus on the most 
significant banks came into prominence. However, one may argue that even smaller banks, 
that would not normally fall under the scope of Article 6, SSMR, have proved to play a 
significant role during the GFC, and thus, their systemic effect should not be underestimated. 
Good examples are the Northern Rock and the Spanish savings banks or cajas (especially: 
Bankia, Catalunya Caixa y Novagalicia Banco), which despite their relatively small size, proved 
to have significant negative effect for the financial system as a whole during the GFC. The 
importance of smaller credit institutions is also highlighted in the SSMR as following: “smaller 
credit institutions can also pose a threat to financial stability,”1155 hence, the possibility of the 
ECB’s intervention is left as an option when necessary. As it is clearly outlined: “…the ECB 
should be able to exercise supervisory tasks in relation to all credit institutions authorised in, 
and branches established in, participating Member States.”1156 To this end, the ECB in its 2014 
Guide to Banking Supervision added that: “These objectives can only be achieved through: 
collaboration in good faith between NCAs and the ECB; an effective exchange of information 
within the SSM; and a harmonisation of both processes and consistency of supervisory 
outcomes.”1157  
When it comes to determine the ‘significance’ component, the SSMR provides four 
elements that would qualify a credit institution as significant, including its size, its importance 
to the EU economy or the Member State’s economy and the significance of its cross-border 
operations. As ‘significant’ in terms of size, are considered financial institutions with assets 
that exceed EUR 30 billion;1158 or when they hold 20% of the participating Member State GDP, 
but in any case, their assets should exceed EUR 5 billion;1159 or their size is considered of 
significant importance for the domestic economy, subject to the ECB’s confirming decision, 
following the relevant notification of the NCA and a comprehensive assessment by the 
ECB.1160 Also, significant by default, are considered the financial institutions that are the 
                                                           
1155 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (16). 
1156 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (16). 
1157 ‘Guide to banking supervision’ (ECB, September 2014b) 39 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ssmguidebankingsupervision201409en.pdf> accessed 14 July 
2017. 
1158 SSMR (n 1101) Article 6(4) (subparagraph 2)(i). 
1159 SSMR (n 1101) Article 6(4) (subparagraph 2)(ii). 
1160 SSMR (n 1101) Article 6(4) (subparagraph 2)(iii). 
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largest of the participating Member State and those that have been subject to the EFSF’s or 
the ESM’s financial assistance.1161  
In addition, the ECB, on its own initiative, holds the right to determine whether a 
financial institution, which is considered as ‘less significant’ according to Article 6(4), SSMR, 
should be deemed as significant: “where it has established banking subsidiaries in more than 
one participating Member States and its cross-border assets or liabilities represent a 
significant part of its total assets or liabilities subject to the conditions laid down in the 
methodology.”1162 Lastly, the ECB is entitled to decide the direct supervision of a less 
significant financial institution, either on its own initiative or after the request of the 
concerned NCA, subject to the ECB’s final decision, when the criteria set in Article 67, SSMFR, 
are met, and: “when necessary to ensure consistent application of high supervisory 
standard…on its own initiative after consulting with national competent authorities or upon 
request by a national competent authority, decide to exercise directly itself all the relevant 
powers for one or more credit institutions.”1163 The decision to directly supervise a financial 
entity pursuant to Article 6(5) (b), SSMFR, could be terminated if the conditions of Article 47, 
SSMFR are met.  
In regard to the scope of ECB’s supervisory power, this is defined by Article 1, SSMR, 
and it covers only the prudential dimension of supervision. However, the exact definition of 
the term ‘prudential supervision’ has not been explicitly provided by the SSMR. Thus, the 
intended meaning of SSMR’s reference to prudential supervision, should be drawn by the 
provisions outlining the scope of the ECB’s supervisory mandate and by the intended aim of 
the mandate. To this end, according to the ECB, the latter shall contribute “to the safety and 
soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system within the Union and 
each Member State, with full regard and duty of care for the unity and integrity of the internal 
market based on equal treatment of credit institutions with a view to preventing regulatory 
arbitrage.”1164  
                                                           
1161 SSMR (n 1101) Article 60(4) (subparagraphs 4-5). 
1162 SSMR (n 1101) Article 6(4) (subparagraph 3).  
1163 SSMR (n 1101) Article 6(5) (b), SSMR (n 1101) Articles 39(5) and 68. See also: SSMFR (n 1131) Articles 37-39 
for the criteria and the procedure that the ECB shall follow when adopting the decision of Article 6(5)(b). 
1164 SSMR (n 1101) Article 1(1). 
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Furthermore, the SSMR specifies that the prudential supervisory tasks conferred on 
the ECB, include both micro-prudential and macro-prudential responsibilities.1165 Namely, 
Article 4, SSMR, outlines the specific tasks involved in the micro-prudential supervisory 
mandate of the ECB, including inter alia: the authorisation and the withdrawal of 
authorisation of credit institutions;1166 the assessment of acquisitions of qualifying 
holdings;1167 the responsibility to ensure compliance with prudential measures;1168 the task 
to run supervisory reviews, including stress tests when appropriate and in coordination with 
the EBA;1169 the competence to operate supervisory tasks in relation to recovery plans and 
early interventions under specific circumstances.1170 The rationale of entitling the ECB 
responsible to assess and decide upon the authorisation of credit entities is laid down in the 
SSMR as following: “prior authorisation for taking up the business of credit institutions is a key 
prudential technique to ensure that only operators with a sound economic basis, an 
organisation capable of dealing with the specific risks inherent to deposit taking and credit 
provision, and suitable directors carry out those activities. The ECB should therefore have the 
task of authorising credit institutions that are to be established in a participating Member 
State and should be responsible for the withdrawal of authorisations, subject to specific 
arrangements reflecting the role of national authorities.”1171 The authorisation and 
withdrawal of authorisation, along with the assessment of acquisitions of qualified holdings, 
are referred by the SSMFR as common procedures, upon which: “the ECB has an overall and 
exclusive competence,”1172 with applicability to all financial entities, including both significant 
and less significant.1173 Thus, the division between significant and less significant financial 
institutions does not apply to these tasks. 
                                                           
1165 ECB, ‘Public consultation on a draft Regulation of the European Central Bank, establishing the framework for 
cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central Bank and national 
competent authorities and with national designated authorities (SSM Framework Regulation)’ [2014] 
(ECCO/2014/030), 3. 
1166 SSMR (n 1101) Articles 4(1)(a) and 14; SSMFR (n 1131) Articles 73-84.  
1167 SSMR (n 1101) Articles 4(1)(c) and 15; SSMFR (n 1131) Articles 85-87. 
1168 SSMR (n 1101) Article 4(1)(d)(e). 
1169 SSMR (n 1101) Article 4(1)(f). 
1170 SSMR (n 1101) Article 4(1)(i).  
1171 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (20). 
1172 SSMFR (n 1131) Article 2(3). 
1173 ECB (n 1166) 17. 
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The second set of tasks conferred to ECB by the SSMR concerns macro-prudential 
measures,1174 which, as the SSMFR clarifies, should not be addressed to individual institutions 
and thus, do not qualify as supervisory procedures of the ECB or the NCA.1175 The macro-
prudential supervisory tasks of the ECB are specified by Article 5, SSMR and Article 101, 
SSMFR, and are to be conducted in cooperation with NCAs of the participating Member 
States, and as the SSMR defines: “the ECB’s tasks should include measures taken in pursuance 
of macro-prudential stability, subject to specific arrangements reflecting the role of national 
authorities.”1176 However, since macro-prudential supervision is not among the explicit 
responsibilities of the ECB, its analysis should be incorporated with the ECB’s interaction with 
the NCAs and the ESRB. Namely, the involvement of ECB in macro-prudential supervision, has 
to be examined firstly, in relation to the respective macro-prudential powers of the NCAs, 
since the latter retain the main role in the implementation of macro-prudential measures in 
accordance with EU law; and secondly, in respect with the ESRB, which is the existing EU body, 
already assigned with macro-prudential tasks. Both cases, will be further explored in the 
relevant sections in this chapter.1177  
The key element in ensuring the soundness of individual financial institutions as well 
as the stability of the financial system as a whole, is the compliance with the prudential 
requirements imposed by the ECB. Thus, with the view to ensure this compliance, the SSMR 
empowers the ECB to directly address its supervisory measures to the supervised financial 
entity in the form of a request to take early measures.1178 In particular, the ECB can ask any 
financial entity within the Eurozone to take early measures in case one of the following 
scenarios arise: a) non-compliance with the relevant prudential requirements as set by 
measures of the ECB based on EU Law (either Directive or Regulation); or b) there is evidence 
that such a breach (i.e. of the relevant prudential requirements) is likely to happen within the 
following 12 months; or c) following a supervisory review, the ECB finds out that there are 
issues in terms of the soundness of management and coverage risks adequacy that could 
                                                           
1174 SSMR (n 1101) Article 5.  
1175 SSMFR (n 1131) Article 101(2). 
1176 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (15). 
1177 For the relation of the ECB and NCAs see section 4.6, whereas for the ECB and ESRB see section 4.9.3. 
1178 The specific supervisory measures that the ECB is entitled to require from the NCAs are listed in SSMR (n 
1101) Article 16(2) (a-m). 
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threaten the viability of the credit institution.1179 The aim of this power of the ECB to request 
early measures from the NCAs, is to empower the ECB’s supervisory tasks with some kind of 
enforceability.1180 However, the ECB in its Guide to Banking Supervision, suggests that the ECB 
before exercising the right to require early measures from the concerned financial entities: 
“may consider first addressing the problems informally, for example by holding a meeting with 
the management of the credit institution or sending a letter of intervention,”1181 which in turn, 
may prove to pose a limitation to this supervisory power of the ECB to require directly early 
measures from the supervised financial entity.  
Furthermore, the SSMR provides the ECB with enforceability measures in case a 
significant financial institution fails to comply with prudential requirements or with the 
measures adopted within the context of SSMR. Namely, the ECB in order to ensure that the 
prudential supervisory requirement are adequately applied, can issue instructions, guidelines 
and general instructions to NCAs concerning the adoption of decisions by the latter in respect 
to ECB’s conferred supervisory powers upon significant institutions, except from the cases 
related to the authorisation and assessment of an acquisition and disposal of qualifying 
holding.1182 The ECB may also address instructions in cases it has required early stage 
measures from NCAs in accordance with Article 16 SSMR.1183 Also, the SSMR entitles the ECB 
to impose effective, proportionate and dissuasive administrative penalties against a 
supervised financial entity1184 including: a) administrative pecuniary penalties in case of an 
intentional or negligent breach of: “a requirement under relevant directly applicable acts of 
Union law in relation to which administrative pecuniary penalties shall be made available to 
competent authorities under the relevant Union law;”1185 and b) sanctions (i.e. fines and 
                                                           
1179  SSMR (n 1101) Article 16(1) and ECB (n 1061) 30. 
1180 SSMR (n 1101) Article 16(2).  
1181 ECB (n 1166) 37. 
1182 SSMR (n 1101) Article 6(5) (a) (subparagraph 1).  
1183 SSMR (n 1101) Article 6(5) (a) (subparagraph 2). 
1184 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (36) and Article 18(3). 
1185 SSMR (n 1101) Article 18(1) and ‘Council Regulation (EU) 2015/159 of 27 January 2015 amending Regulation 
(EC) No 2532/98 concerning the powers of the European Central Bank to impose sanctions’ [2015] OJ L 27/1 
(hereinafter: ECB Amended Sanctions Regulation), Recital (3).  
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periodic penalty payments) in accordance with the ECB Sanctions Regulation1186 in case of a 
breach of ECB regulations or decision.1187  
In addition, according to Article 34 (3), ESCB Statute, the ECB can also impose fines or 
periodic penalty payments on undertakings for failure to comply with the obligations under 
its regulations and decisions. However, it could be argued that the power of the ECB to impose 
sanctions has been stretched beyond the wording of ECB Sanctions Regulation, since it covers 
cases that are not only directly related with a breach of ECB regulations and decisions. For 
instance, the CRD IV provides that effective, proportionate and dissuasive administrative 
penalties and other measures could be imposed in relation to national provisions transposing 
both CRD IV and CRR.1188 Lastly, it is worth mentioning that the sanctions could also be 
imposed to less significant financial institutions in case of an infringements of ECB regulations 
or decisions.1189 
Any penalty imposed, regardless of whether it has been appealed or not, and after the 
concerned financial entity has been informed (except from the cases of Article 132(1), 
SSMFR), shall be published on the ECB’s website and remain published for 5 years.1190 
According to Article 132, SSMFR, when the decisions regarding administrative penalties: (a) 
jeopardise the stability of the financial markets or an on-going criminal investigation; or (b) 
cause, insofar as it can be determined, disproportionate damage to the supervised entity 
concerned, it shall be published on an anonymised basis.1191 Moreover, all fines imposed by 
the ECB in the exercise of its supervisory tasks are subject to the same upper limits of all fines 
the ECB may impose on an undertaking for a breach of directly applicable EU law, in order to 
ensure consistency in the treatment of equally serious infringements; subject to the same 
                                                           
1186 Regulation (EC) No 2532/98) ‘Council Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 of 23 November 1998 concerning the 
powers of the European Central Bank to impose sanctions [1998] OJ L 318/4 (hereinafter: ECB Sanctions 
Regulation).  
1187 TFEU (n 5) Article 132(3); ESCB Statute (n 243) Article 34; SSMR (n 1101) Article 18(7); ECB Sanctions 
Regulation (n 1195) Article 2; and ECB Amended Sanctions Regulation (n 1194) Article 1a (1).  
1188 ‘Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the 
activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending 
Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC’ [2013] OJ L176/338 (hereinafter: 
CRD IV), Articles 65(1), 66(2)(c)-(e) and 67(2)(e)-(g). 
1189 SSMFR (n 1131) Article 122(b). 
1190 SSMR (n 1101) Article 18(6); SSMFR (n 1131) Article 132; and ECB Amended Sanctions Regulation (n 1194) 
Article 1a (3). 
1191 SSMFR (n 1131) Article 132. See also: ECB Amended Sanctions Regulation (n 1194) Recital (7), Article 1a (3). 
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upper limit are also all periodic penalties imposed.1192 However, the Amended ECB’s Sanctions 
Regulation, acknowledging the complexity of the investigation of infringements in the 
supervisory field, provided that the ECB’s power to impose and enforce sanctions relating to 
its supervisory tasks will be subject to longer time limits in comparison to the sanctions 
relating to the non-supervisory tasks.1193 It should be noted that the enforceability measures 
should be exercised within the limits of the principles of effectiveness and proportionality.1194 
Lastly, the SSMR in order to support the sufficient exercise of ECB’s supervisory tasks, 
empowers the ECB with specific investigation and on-site competences, which are applicable 
on significant financial entities or less significant under the conditions of Article 138, 
SSMFR.1195 Namely, the ECB may require all necessary information directly from the natural 
or legal persons listed in Article 10 (1) (a-f), SSMR, who are obliged, regardless of professional 
secrecy provisions, to provide the information requested.1196 Also, under specific 
circumstances and when it is required, the ECB may operate on-site inspections without prior 
announcement.1197 For the purposes of the on-site inspection the ECB shall establish on-site 
inspection teams in accordance with Article 144, SSMFR.1198 
All in all, the ECB shall perform its prudential supervisory tasks within the SSM and has 
to work closely with NCAs.1199 Thus, the SSM is comprised of the ECB and NCAs,1200 which 
shall exchange all necessary information, and cooperate closely and in good faith when 
exercising their supervisory and investigatory powers.1201 The ECB is entitled, when exercising 
prudential supervisory rules, to apply the relevant EU law, including directly applicable 
Regulation or Directives; when these rules are based on EU Directives, the national legislation 
transposing them, is accordingly applicable and when they are based on Regulations, the 
                                                           
1192 ECB Amended Sanctions Regulation (n 1194) Recitals (8) and (9). 
1193 ECB Amended Sanctions Regulation (n 1194) Recital (11), Article 4a and Article 4c. See also: Article 4b. 
1194 ECB Sanctions Regulation (n 1195) Article 2(2). See also: ‘Enforcement’ (ECB, Banking Supervision) 
<https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/tasks/enforcement/html/index.en.html> accessed 14 
July 2017. 
1195 SSMR (n 1101) Article 10 and 12.  
1196 SSMR (n 1101) Article 9(1) (subparagraph 2), Article 10 (1), (2); SSMFR (n 1131) Article 139(1). See also: 
CRD IV (n 1197) Article 53.  
1197 SSMR (n 1101) Article 12(1). 
1198 SSMFR (n 1131) Article 143.  
1199 SSMR (n 1101) Article 6(1)(2). 
1200 SSMR (n 1101) Article 6(1); SSMFR (n 1131) Recital (2). 
1201 SSMR (n 1101) Article 6(2) and 9(2). 
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national legislation executing the explicitly granted options is also applicable.1202 Lastly, where 
the SSMR does not explicitly confer prudential supervisory tasks on the ECB, the latter acting 
within the context of its conferred powers and to the extent necessary, may address 
instructions to NCAs requiring them to exercise the supervisory powers as set by their national 
legislation, while NCAs shall keep the ECB informed.1203 
 
4.6 The division of supervisory tasks between the ECB and the NCAs of the 
participating Member States 
As analysed earlier, one of the reasons that brought centralisation of supervision at 
EU level was the realisation that the existing supervisory framework proved to be inadequate 
in coordinating supervisory practices in times of instability, which was attributed to the fact 
that supervision was mainly performed at national, level while financial institutions were 
operating internationally. This created increased fragmentation, while the goal of creating a 
truly unified and integrated supervisory framework was far from being accomplished. With 
the creation of the SSM, as the first step towards a European Banking Union, one would 
expect that fragmentation would be replaced by integration, and the ‘national’ component 
would be replaced by the ‘European.’ However, although the new supervisory framework 
confers important supervisory tasks to the ECB, there are still major aspects of the ECB’s 
supervisory discretion that remain dependant on the involvement of national level. Namely, 
the whole structure of the new mechanism operates subject to the close cooperation and 
coordination between the ECB and NCAs.  
As it is defined by the SSMR, Recital (5): “the competence for supervision of individual 
credit institutions in the Union remains mostly at national level.” This creates a complex 
system of supervision that is divided between national and EU level, which may pose potential 
limitations to ECB’s supervisory powers. Hence, it is questionable whether the centralisation 
of supervision in Europe has been fully achieved or remains a national responsibility 
coordinated by a supranational supervisor (i.e. the SSM). Therefore, the supervisory tasks of 
the new legal framework are to be divided into two categories: shared tasks between the ECB 
and the NCAs, and explicit ECB supervision responsibilities. According to SSMR, the ECB is 
                                                           
1202 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (34), Article 4(3) (subparagraph 1). 
1203 SSMR (n 1101) Article 9(1) (subparagraph 3). 
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deemed to be exclusively competent for specific conferred supervisory tasks, as defined by 
Article 4, whereas other tasks that fall outside its scope would remain with national 
authorities.1204 However, as mentioned earlier, according to Article 6(4), SSMR, even the 
supervisory tasks conferred on the ECB are to be divided between the ECB and NCAs. The 
legal basis for this coordination of supervisory tasks between the ECB and the NCAs is laid 
down in the SSMR, the SSMFR and the ECB Rules of Procedure.1205   
The main criterion to determine whether a financial entity falls within the ECB’s 
supervisory scope or remains under the umbrella of its NCA, is the significance of the financial 
institution. As already mentioned, the SSMR entitles the ECB to supervise all the significant 
financial institutions and leaves the less significant or the ones that do not fall within the 
scope of the ECB’s supervisory powers, under the supervision of the NCAs of participating 
Member States. As the SSMR outlines: “supervisory tasks not conferred on the ECB should 
remain with the national authorities.”1206 However, even when the NCAs serve as the 
legitimate supervisors, this does not imply that they can operate freely and merely based on 
their own discretion. Namely, NCAs operation shall follow the framework set by the ECB,1207 
and this operations is also subject to the ECB’s oversight.1208 Moreover, the ECB, is eligible to 
issue regulations, guidelines or general instructions to the NCAs, when they adopt supervisory 
decisions.1209 Most importantly, the ECB holds the right to decide on its own initiative, 
whether a less significant institution should be subject to its direct supervision.1210 Thus, while 
the ECB shall share its duties with the NCAs, it holds the right to take over, at any time, the 
oversight of a credit institutions that is already under the NCA’s remit. Moreover, as discussed 
                                                           
1204 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (15). 
1205 ‘Decision of the ECB of 19 February 2004 adopting the Rules of Procedure of the ECB (ECB/2004/2)’ [2004] 
OJ L 80/33 (hereinafter: ECB Rules of Procedure) as amended by: 
- ‘Decision of the European Central Bank of 22 January 2014 amending Decision ECB/2004/2 adopting 
the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank (ECB/2014/1)’ [2014] OJ L 95/56. 
- ‘Decision (EU) 2015/716 of the ECB of 12 February 2015 amending Decision ECB/2004/2 adopting the 
Rules of Procedure of the ECB (ECB/2015/8)’ [2015] OJ L 114/11. 
- ‘Decision (EU) 2016/1717 of the ECB of 21 September 2016 amending Decision ECB/2004/2 adopting 
the Rules of Procedure of the ECB (ECB/2016/27)’ [2016] OJ L 258/17. 
1206 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (28). 
1207 SSMR (n 1101) Article 6(7); ECB Rules of Procedure (n 1214) Article 13j.  
1208 SSMR (n 1101) Article 6(5)(c). 
1209 SSMR (n 1101) (Article 6(5)(a).  
1210 SSMR (n 1101) Article 6 (5)(b).  
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above, the ECB is eligible to issue regulations, guidelines or general instructions to the NCAs 
when the latter adopt supervisory decisions.  
As was mentioned already, the authorisation and authorisation withdrawal of financial 
institutions, fall within the explicit responsibilities of the ECB,1211 regardless of whether they 
are considered significant or less significant.1212 Also, the ECB retains the right to withdraw 
the licence of financial institutions that have already been authorised by a NCA.1213 Therefore, 
the role of NCA in the authorisation process is limited to the following tasks: a) the assessment 
of an application for authorisation, which should be based on national law;1214 b) the rejection 
of an application for authorisation when the relevant conditions set in national law are not 
met;1215 c) the preparation of a draft decision proposing that the ECB grant the applicant 
authorisation, subject to the ECB’s assessment and final decision;1216 d) the proposal for 
withdrawal, when the NCA has proposed the authorisation and subject to ECB’s final 
decision;1217 e) the right to object a withdrawal decision of ECB in case the NCA: “remain 
competent to resolve credit institutions” and “considers that the withdrawal of the 
authorisation would prejudice the adequate implementation of or actions necessary for 
resolution or to maintain financial stability”, which is again subject to the ECB’s final 
decision;1218 f) the withdrawal of an authorisation when the conditions of Article 18, CRD IV 
are met; while, in cases the authorisation lapses pursuant to Article 18(a), CRD IV, the NCA 
should act in cooperation with the ECB and in accordance with Article 79, SSMFR. In any case, 
the ECB when deciding upon an authorisation or an authorisation withdrawal, except from 
Union Law, should take into consideration the relevant existing national law that might be 
providing additional rules; and thus, take action only in cases of non-compliance with national 
law, after the concerned NCA’s proposal.1219 In conclusion, it could be argued that 
authorisation, while it is highlighted as one of the explicit powers of the ECB, constitute a 
                                                           
1211 SSMR (n 1101) (Article 4(1)(a). 
1212 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (20) and Article 14.  
1213 SSMR (n 1101) Article 14(5)(subparagraph 1). 
1214 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (21) and Article 14(1); SSMFR (n 1131) 74. 
1215 SSMR (n 1101) Article 14(2); SSMFR (n 1131) Article 75. 
1216 SSMR (n 1101) Article 14(2); SSMFR (n 1131) Articles 76-78. 
1217 SSMR (n 1101) Article 14(5) (subparagraph 2). 
1218 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (56) and Article 14(6). 
1219 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (21). 
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rather shared and interlinked duty between the ECB and NCAs, especially given the right of 
the latter to object when the resolution is national.  
Similarly, the assessment of acquisitions of qualifying holdings is subject to close 
cooperation between the ECB and NCAs, whereas the final decision remains with the ECB, 
except cases of bank resolution.1220 The process of assessment starts with the receipt of 
notification for the acquisitions of a qualifying holding by the NCA,1221 which is entitled to 
assess the notification,1222 and to decide upon its validity in accordance with the relevant 
Union and national law.1223 Following this assessment, the NCA holds the responsibility to 
notify the ECB within 5 days from the acknowledgement of receipt1224 and send the draft 
decision to oppose or not to oppose the acquisition to the ECB within 15 working days before 
the expiry of the assessment period.1225 In turn, the ECB decides on the acquisition: “on the 
basis of its assessment of the proposed acquisition and the NCA’s draft decision.”1226 
The ECB’s investigation and on-site inspection tasks, while they are listed among the 
exclusive responsibilities of the ECB, are also, subject to close cooperation between the ECB 
and NCAs where appropriate.1227 Namely, the ECB, prior to require information from  the legal 
or natural person pursuant to Article 10(1), SSMR, should make use of the existing information 
available within NCAs,1228 while informing the NCAs about the decision to request 
information.1229 However, the NCA should assist the ECB by all means in exercising the 
investigation tasks and on-site inspection, in case the concerned person opposes to 
cooperate.1230 Also, the ECB and NCAs shall cooperate when using the NCA resources 
concerning the on-site inspection teams.1231 The cooperation of the ECB and the NCA 
involving investigation task, is also based on the principle of general cooperation set by Article 
                                                           
1220 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (22) and Article 4(1) (c); SSMFR (n 1131) Article 87. 
1221 SSMR (n 1101) Article 15(1), (2); SSMFR (n 1131) Article 85.  
1222 SSMFR (n 1131) Article 86. 
1223 SSMR (n 1101) Article 15(1), (2); SSMFR (n 1131) Article 86(1). 
1224 SSMFR (n 1131) Article 85(1). 
1225 SSMFR (n 1131) Article 86(2). 
1226 SSMR (n 1101) Article 15(3); SSMFR (n 1131) Article 87. 
1227 SSMR (n 1101) (Recital (47) and Article 9(2).  
1228 SSMFR (n 1131) Article 139(2). 
1229 SSMR (n 1101) Article 10(3); SSMFR (n 1131) Article 139(3). 
1230 SSMR (n 1101) Article 11(2), 12(5); SSMFR (n 1131) Article 142. 
1231 SSMFR (n 1131) Article 144.  
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21, SSMFR and the general obligation of NCAs to report to the ECB in accordance with Article 
99, SSMFR.1232 
As regard the power of ECB to impose administrative penalties, in case of a breach 
that is not covered by the wording of Article 18(1), SSMR. Namely, the ECB, in pursuing its 
prudential supervisory tasks, is entitled to require the NCAs to open proceedings in order take 
actions that will ensure the imposition of penalties in an proportionate and dissuasive 
manner, and in accordance with any relevant EU law and national law that regulate powers 
that are not conferred by EU law.1233 The opening of a proceeding could be initiated only after 
the explicit request of the ECB, or after the NCA asks the ECB to request the opening of a 
proceeding.1234 It should be noted the SSMR requires that the powers of ECB to impose 
penalties is strictly limited to credit institutions, financial holding companies or mixed 
financial holding companies, and should not be extended to natural or legal persons.1235  
There is, however, an exception from this rule, which implies that in case the 
proceeding that has been opened by the NCA and is subject to ECB’s request pursuant to 
Article 15(5)(subparagraph 1), involves a breach of national law transposing an EU directive, 
administrative penalties may be imposed to members of the management board of the 
concerned financial entity: “who under national law are responsible for a breach by a credit 
institution, financial holding company or mixed financial holding company.”1236 This is 
explained by the fact that, the ECB holds the right to impose penalties on its own initiative, 
only to the extent and within the limits of its supervisory power, which are to be applied in 
accordance with EU law. For breaches concerning explicit tasks of the ECB as set by the EU 
Treaties and ESCB Statute, the ECB may initiate an infringement procedure on the basis of 
ECB Sanctions Regulation, regardless of national law provisions that may provide for different 
procedures; while for infringements that fall outside the ECB’s conferred tasks, the right to 
initiate an infringement procedure is, again, independent of any right of the NCAs to initiate 
separate procedures.1237 As regard national law enforceability, even when this concerns the 
                                                           
1232 ECB Public Consultation (n 1174) 16.  
1233 SSMR (n 1101) Article 18(5) (subparagraph 1). 
1234 SSMFR (n 1131) Article 134(2).  
1235 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (53).  
1236 SSMR (n 1101) Article 18(5)(subparagraph 2); SSMFR (n 1131) Article 134(1) SSMFR).  
1237 ECB Amended Sanctions Regulation (n 1194) Article 3(10).  
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transpositions of EU Law, the NCAs retain their discretion to decide. This is repeated many 
times in the SSMR provisions, and it is also included in the imposition of penalties part. In 
particular according to Recital (36), SSMR: “the National authorities should remain able to 
apply penalties in case of failure to comply with obligations stemming from national law 
transposing Union Directives. Where the ECB considers it appropriate for the fulfilment of its 
tasks that a penalty is applied for such breaches, it should be able to refer the matter to 
national competent authorities for those purposes.”  
When it comes to macro-prudential supervision,1238 the ECB and the NCAs would have 
to act in close cooperation and by sharing their responsibilities accordingly. However, Article 
1 (subparagraph 6), provides that the rules of SSMR shall apply: “without prejudice to the 
responsibilities and related powers of the competent or designated authorities of the 
participating Member States to apply macro-prudential tools not provided for in relevant acts 
of Union law.” This practically means that the NCAs are entitled to undertake all macro-
prudential tools available at national level, when needed, regardless of their inclusion or not 
in the SSMR. This also links with NCAs’ right to set the requirements for capital buffers,1239 in 
accordance with EU law and with respect to the CRD IV minimum standards, after notifying 
the ECB 10 days before any action is taken.1240  
Nevertheless, while macro-prudential supervision seems to remain a key 
responsibility of NCAs, the ECB is entitled to reject the relevant decision of the concerned 
NCA.1241 Also, the ECB, in order to address systemic or macro-prudential risks, may require 
higher requirements for the capital buffers and stricter measures on its own initiative, but in 
close cooperation with the NCA, or after the request of the NCA concerned.1242 In any case, 
the NCA shall be notified by the ECB, 10 days before the adoption of the final decision. The 
NCA holds the right to file a written and reasoned objection within 5 working days following 
the decision, subject to the ECB’s assessment.1243 From the wording of the aforementioned 
                                                           
1238 The macro-prudential tools are outlined in Article 5, SSMR. For the explicit definition and application of the 
macro-prudential tools and the procedure of cooperation between the ECB and the NCAs see: SSMFR (n 1131) 
Article 101-105. See also: SSMR (n 1101) Recital (24). 
1239 For the definition of capital buffers see: CRD IV (n 1197) Article 128. 
1240 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (24) and Article 5(1). 
1241 SSMR (n 1101) Article 5(1). 
1242 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (24), Article 5(2), (3), (4); SSMFR (n 1131) Article 105(1). See also: ECB Public 
Consultation (n 1174) 15. 
1243 SSMR (n 1101) Article 5(4); SSMFR (n 1131) Article 105(2). 
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provisions, it is clear that the role of the ECB in the context of macro-prudential supervision 
is very limited. Namely, the ECB is not entitled to direct or influence the decision of a NCA to 
increase capital buffers, since the ECB may only request an increase of capital buffers and/or 
express its objection against a decision of the NCA. In this respect, provided that the ECB and 
NCAs shall act in close cooperation, and each may decide in increasing the capital buffers, 
who has the overall responsibility for them? Secondly, what happens in case of conflicting 
decisions? These are questions that have not been addressed by the existing regulatory 
framework and may potentially lead in conflicting supervisory measures or in overlapping 
powers. 
One conclusion that could be drawn by the analysis above is that despite the 
prominent, and in most of the cases, decisive role of ECB regarding prudential supervisory 
tasks, the NCAs retain a strong presence throughout, with their tasks being highly interlinked 
with those of the ECB. This makes their role necessary within supervisory structures and the 
ECB, dependent upon their cooperation in order to exercise adequately the conferred 
supervisory tasks. In this respect, can we really talk about a truly unified and centralised 
system, or do we have an even more fragmented structure? The existing supervisory structure 
has been a revolution and a stepping stone towards further integration, but it is far from 
forming a truly integrated supervisory structure. It seems that this was the most convenient 
and feasible choice at the time, given the fact that its institutional arrangements are based 
on the existing EU legal framework. As a result, the NCAs involvement is unavoidable since 
the existing Treaty provisions do not provide for extensive conferral of prudential supervisory 
tasks on the ECB. As analysed already, the wording of Article 127(6), TFEU refers to specific 
supervisory tasks, which from the outset poses restrictions to the scope of the ECB’s 
supervisory powers. Hence, anything beyond ‘specific’ should be covered by the NCAs. This 
complex cooperation between the ECB and NCAs may give rise to practical problems. For 
instance, the difference between prudential and conduct supervision is blurred in many EU 
countries were both are tasks are conducted by the same national authority. Therefore, it 




4.7 The operational structure of the SSM 
As it has been discussed already, the SSM is designed to operate within the ECB, with 
the latter sharing its duties with the NCAs. In the centre of the SSM is operating the Single 
Supervisory Board (SSB), assisted by a Steering Committee,1244 and the Joint Supervisory 
Teams (JST). The SSB operates within the ECB, encompassing the specific expertise of national 
supervisors, while serving as the main body responsible for preparing decisions on 
supervisory matters.1245 As it is highlighted by the SSMR, the SSB would undertake the 
supervisory tasks that have been traditionally subject to national discretion.1246 Thus, given 
the importance of SSB within the new supervisory framework, the analysis of the operational 
structure of SSM starts with a detailed examination of the SSB’s role, including its internal 
composition and its interaction with the Governing Council and the new bodies established 
with the view to strengthen the ECB’s supervisory mandate, and its decision-making 
procedure. This is then followed by a discussion on the other SSM bodies, the rationale of 
their creation, and their respective tasks and duties.  
 
4.7.1 The Single Supervisory Board  
 The EU Treaties contain a set of provision concerning the decision-making procedure 
within the ECB. However, the relevant provisions in both the TFEU and the ESCB Statute, were 
created when the ECB was meant to serve solely the mandate of price stability. Therefore, 
after conferring supervisory task on the ECB, the decision-making framework was altered 
accordingly in order to accommodate the operation and implementation of the new 
supervisory rules. The two main supervisory decision-making bodies of the new SSM include: 
the newly created SSB, and the existing ultimate decision-making body of the ECB, the 
Governing Council. Under EU Law, the ultimate decision-making body of the ECB is the 
Governing Council,1247 which consists of the members of ECB’s Executive Board and the 
Governors of NCBs of the Eurozone Member States.1248 One may question that since the 
                                                           
1244 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (71).  
1245 SSMR (n 1101) Recitals (67), (69).  
1246 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (69).  
1247 According to ESCB Statute (n 243) Article 9(3), which is based in TFEU (n 5) Article 129, the decision-making 
bodies of the ECB are the Governing Council and the Executive Board.  
1248 TFEU (n 5) Article 283(1) and ESCB Statute (n 243) Article 10. 
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Governing Council is the ECB’s decision-making body, what is the purpose of having the SSB 
and what the rationale of its creation? This question comes to one of the most discussed 
issues during the drafting of the SSMR and the core idea of this thesis: the principle of 
separation between monetary policy and supervisory tasks.  
To this end, although the Governing Council constitutes the main decision-making 
body of ECB, it would have been contradictory to be assigned the responsibility to prepare 
the ECB’s supervisory decisions, while at the same time having the power to guide those 
decisions. This apart from the potential of raising conflict of interest issues between the two 
ECB mandates (i.e. monetary policy and banking supervision), would have also posed a serious 
risk to the principle of separation between the ECB’s competences in the pursuit of their 
respective objectives (i.e. price and financial stability) as provided by Article 25, SSMR. As a 
result, the creation of the SSB, aimed at creating a balance, organisational separation and 
impartial cooperation between the two functions of the ECB. However, the SSB, hierarchically, 
stands below the Governing Council, since it does not have any legally binding decision-
making powers. The SSB is rather established to serve as the internal body of the SSM, 
responsible for the planning and preparation of draft decisions on supervisory matters. The 
latter are subject to the final decision of the Governing Council, which remains the body that 
produces the legally binding decisions of the ECB.1249 This is also highlighted by the ECB Rules 
of Procedure, Article 13a as following: “any tasks of the Supervisory Board shall be without 
prejudice to the competences of the ECB decision-making bodies.” 
In regard to its composition, the SSB would consist of: a Chair and a Vice-Chair; four 
representatives of the ECB; and one representative of each NCBs or other NCA,1250 who would 
be all subject to SSB’s Code of Conduct, including any participating, accompanying and 
alternates participants in the SSB meeting.1251 This practically means that the SSM is governed 
by a Supervisory Board, which consist of 25 members in total, including 6 ECB staff members 
and 19 representatives from national supervisors.1252 An interesting aspect of SSB is the 
                                                           
1249 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (67) and Article 26 (8); ECB Rules of Procedure (n 1214) Article 13a.  
1250 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (67), (69) and Article 26; ECB Rules of Procedure (n 1214) Article 13a. 
1251 ‘Code of Conduct for the Members of the Supervisory Board of the European Central Bank’ [2015] OJ C 93/2 
(hereinafter: SSB Code of Conduct) Article 1(1).  
1252 Schoenmaker, Dirk, ‘Firmer Foundation for a Stronger European Banking Union’ (Bruegel Working Paper 
2015/13, November 2015) 17 <http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/WP-2015_132.pdf> accessed 
14 July 2017. 
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appointment of the Chair and Vice Chair, which in the initial proposal of the EU Commission 
was listed among the responsibilities of the Governing Council.1253 However, this was changed 
in the final version of SSMR, which provides that the Chair and the Vice Chair of the SSB, would 
be appointed by the EU Council. This clearly reflects an attempt to enhance further the 
separation between the monetary policy and supervisory tasks of the ECB.  
The process of appointing the Chair and the Vice Chair of SSB, starts with the relevant 
proposal of the ECB. Namely, the Chair is to be selected in an open selection procedure and 
the Vice Chair, among the members of Executive Board.1254 The ECB forwards the proposal to 
the EU Parliament, after hearing the Supervisory Board,1255 while the EU Parliament and 
Council shall be kept informed at all times throughout the selection procedure. The final 
decision for the appointment is to be taken by the EU Council with qualified majority, and 
with the non-participating Member States having no voting right.1256 The selection of both 
the Chair and the Vice Chair of the SSB, shall be based on the principle of gender balance, 
experience and qualification.1257 Furthermore, the Chair and Vice Chair of the SSB, should be 
highly independent figures, with a specific timeframe for their office term, which may not 
exceed the 5 years and is not renewable.1258 Also, based on the principle of separation 
between the monetary policy and supervision functions of the ECB, the SSMR excludes the 
members of the Governing Council to be appointed as the SSB’s Chair.1259 For the same 
purpose, the four representatives of the ECB, which are appointed by the Governing Council, 
would have voting rights but shall not be involved directly to monetary policy tasks.1260 Lastly, 
in case the NCA of the participating Member State is not the central bank, the concerned 
participating Member State is entitled to bring a representative from the central bank, who 
should sign a declaration of compliance with the Code of Conduct prior the participation,1261 
whose vote together with the vote of the NCA representative will count as one.1262 
                                                           
1253 COM (2012) 511 (n 1153) Recital (36) and Article 19 (2).  
1254 SSMR (n 1101) Article 26(3).  
1255 ECB Rules of Procedure (n 1214) Article 23(3) and 13b (3).  
1256 SSMR (n 1101) Article 26(3).  
1257 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (67) and Article 26(2).  
1258 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (70); ECB Rules of Procedure (n 1214) Article 13b(5).  
1259 SSMR (n 1101) Article 26(3).  
1260 SSMR (n 1101) Article 26(5); ECB Rules of Procedure (n 1214) Article 13b(6).  
1261 ECB Rules of Procedure (n 1214) Article 13e(2); SSB Code of Conduct (n 1260) Recital (4).  
1262 ECB Rules of Procedure (n 1214) Article 26(1) (subparagraph 2) and Article 13b(2). 
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The SSB is complemented by another body called the Steering Committee, with no 
decision-making power and a role limited to carrying preparatory and supportive to the SSB 
tasks, and a main responsibility to prepare the meetings of the SSB.1263 Its composition is also 
limited and includes eight Members of the SSB: the Chair and the Vice-Chair of the SSB, one 
representative of the ECB and five representatives of the NCAs.1264 The five representatives 
of the NCAs should be appointed for one year, and their allocation should be made in fare 
balance and by rotating them between the four groups that are set according to a ranking 
based on the total consolidated banking assets in the relevant participating Member State, 
and with each group having a minimum of one representative in the Steering Committee.1265 
The four ECB representatives are to be appointed by the President among the four ECB 
representatives on the SSB, with a term office to be determined also by the President. The 
Steering Committee members should carry out their task: “solely in the interest of the Union 
as a whole, and work in full transparency with the Supervisory Board.”1266 
The members of the SSB and the Steering Committee are granted a highly 
independent status. Their independence is enshrined in both the SSMR and the SSB Code of 
Conduct. Namely, the members of SSB when performing supervisory task shall act 
independently, objectively, in the interest of the Union as a whole and are not permitted to 
seek or take any instructions from any EU body or institution, or from any government of a 
Member State, or any other public of private body; while they are all obliged to respect this 
independence.1267 Furthermore, Article 4, SSB Code of Conduct extends independence 
beyond the Members of SSB, including all the participants in the meetings of the SSB. Namely, 
all the participants in SSB meetings are required to perform their supervisory tasks: “free from 
undue political influence and from commercial interference,”1268 while they should avoid or 
even resign from positions that: “could hinder their independence or present them with the 
possibility of using privileged information.”1269 
                                                           
1263 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (71) and Article 26(10); ECB Rules of Procedure (n 1214) Article 10.  
1264 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (71) and Article 26(10)(subparagraph 1); ECB Rules of Procedure (n 1214) Article 
11(1). 
1265 ECB Rules of Procedure (n 1214) Article 11(2), (3).  
1266 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (71).  
1267 SSMR (n 1101) (Recital (71) and Article 19(1) (2); SSB Code of Conduct (n 1260) Recital (1) and Article 4(1). 
1268 SSB Code of Conduct (n 1260) Article 4(2). 
1269 SSB Code of Conduct (n 1260) Article 4(3).  
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Private financial transactions of the Members and participants of the SSB, including 
their personal assets are also subject to the notion of independence. Namely, confidential 
information arising from private financial transactions, to which they have access either 
directly or via third parties, at their own risk and at their own account or at the risk and on 
the account of a third party, are not permitted to be used by the members or any participant 
of the SSB.1270 Moreover, their personals assets, which go beyond those required for family 
use, shall be organised in a way that would ensure their independence and would be also 
subject to the rules on private transactions adopted by the ECB for its members of staff; or if 
the members or participant of the SSB represent the NCAs, they would be subject to the 
relevant national rules.1271 Lastly, Article 2(2) outlines the principles applied on the operation 
of supervisory tasks, including: “honesty, independence, impartiality, discretion and 
regardless of self-interest.”  
The independence of the SSB Members’ and any other participant’s is subject to 
cooling-off periods, after their office term has finished, and appropriate compensation.1272 In 
particular, the Members and any participant in the SSB meetings should wait one year and six 
months, respectively, after their office term termination, in order to get involved in 
occupational activities concerning credit institutions directly supervised by the ECB, or in 
relation to financial institutions non-directly supervised by the ECB, but “where a conflict of 
interest exists or could be perceived to exist”; or six months for the SSB members or three 
months for any other participant in the SSB meetings, when the occupational activity involve 
a non-credit institution, “save where a conflict of interest exists or could be perceived to 
exist.”1273 The cooling-off period of occupational activities concerning banks directly 
supervised by the ECB, are subject to an extension of two years maximum for the SSB 
members and one year maximum for any other participant, after the relevant 
recommendation of the ECB’s Ethics Committee: “where the possibility of conflicts of interest 
resulting from subsequent occupational activities cannot be excluded for longer periods.”1274 
In any case, the members of SSB and any other participant to the SSB meetings, are obliged 
                                                           
1270 SSB Code of Conduct (n 1260) Article 5(1).  
1271 SSB Code of Conduct (n 1260) Article 5(2),(3). 
1272 SSB Code of Conduct (n 1260) Article 8. 
1273 SSB Code of Conduct (n 1260) Article 8(1)(a-c) and (2),(a-c). 
1274 SSB Code of Conduct (n 1260) Article 8(4). 
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to inform the President of ECB for their intention to get involved in any occupational activities 
in one year period, for any other participant or in two years period, for the SSB members, post 
their office term termination, including the non-profit activities.1275 
Furthermore, the members and other participant in SSB meetings are subject to strict 
rules in order to avoid any conflict of interest situations, concerning private or personal 
factors that may influence the objectivity of their performance. These shall be disclosed in 
writing, in order to exclude them from their voting rights.1276 The same restrictions apply to 
their spouse or recognised partner, which should be reported to the Ethics Committee.1277 
The objectivity of the members or other participant in the SSB meetings is also subject to 
specific rules in regard to the acceptance of gifts of other benefits, which should be done in 
accordance with Article 10, SSB Code of Conduct. The members and any participant in the SSB 
meetings, should also, pay particular attention to: a) their public appearances, including the 
prudence of their invitation, in conferences, receptions, cultural events, connected 
entertainment and appropriate hospitality, which should comply with the principle of 
independence;1278 b) the activities undertaken in their personal capacity, which should 
comply with their professional obligations, the reputation of the ECB, excluding the academic 
activities.1279 Moreover, according to Recital (74), SSMR, the members or participants in the 
SSB Meetings, shall comply with the professional secrecy rules.1280  
 
4.7.2 The decision-making procedure 
The decision-making procedure of the SSB, is based on the Governing Council’s 
prototype of the simple majority, with the members having one vote each and the Chair a 
casting vote,1281 while qualified majority is only required for draft regulations.1282 
Furthermore, the decision-making process is designed on the basis of a ‘non-objection’ 
                                                           
1275 SSB Code of Conduct (n 1260) Article 8(1),(2). 
1276 SSB Code of Conduct (n 1260) Article 9. 
1277 SSB Code of Conduct (n 1260) Article 13. 
1278 SSB Code of Conduct (n 1260) Article 11 (1). 
1279 SSB Code of Conduct (n 1260) Article 12. 
1280 ESCB Statute (n 243) Article 37; SSMR (n 1101) Article 27(1); ECB Rules of Procedure (n 1214) Article 23a; 
SSB Code of Conduct (n 1260) Article 14(1).  
1281 SSMR (n 1101) Article 26(6). 
1282 SSMR (n 1101) Article 26(7). For the specific rules applied in regard to qualified majority see also: ECB Rules 
of Procedure (n 1214) Article 13c.  
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procedure,1283 which implies a negative decision of the Governing Council. In the absence of 
the negative decision, the draft decision of the SSB shall be deemed adopted. In particular, 
when a draft decision of the SSB refers to micro-prudential tasks pursuant to Article 4, SSMR, 
it should be forwarded to the Governing Council along with explanatory notes, stressing the 
background and its reasoning, and from there to the concerned NCA.1284 If the Governing 
Council does not object the draft decision of the SSB within a maximum of ten working 
days,1285 it would be considered as an approved decision, and thus, as adopted.1286 
When the draft decision of the SSB concerns macro-prudential powers as conferred 
on the ECB by Article 5, SSMR, the decision is considered as adopted when the Governing 
Council does not object it within a period of three working days, after the receipt of the 
concerned NCA’s notification to the Secretariat of the SSB, expressing an intention to 
undertake a macro-prudential measure, which is followed by the relevant proposal of the 
SSB.1287 Lastly, in case the draft decision of the SSB is based on the ECB’s intention to impose 
stricter macro-prudential measures pursuant to Article 5(2), SSMR, the NCA should be 
informed of such an intention ten days before the Governing Council adopts the decision, and 
the NCA hold the right to object it within five working days.1288 
In any case, an objection decision of the Governing Council against a draft decision of 
the SSB that concerns micro-prudential tasks, shall be justified by providing written reasons, 
which should ‘in particular stating monetary policy concerns’1289 and should be forwarded to 
both the SSB and NCAs.1290 Moreover, the President of ECB holds the responsibility to explain 
to the Chair of the EU Parliament’s competent committee, the reasoning of the objection.1291 
                                                           
1283 ‘Guide to banking supervision’ (ECB, November 2014c), 14 
<https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssmguidebankingsupervision201411.en.pdf> 
accessed 14 July 2017. 
1284 ECB Rules of Procedure (n 1214) Article 13g.  
1285 In emergency circumstances 48 hours, see: SSMR (n 1101) Article 26(8) and ECB Rules of Procedure (n 1214) 
Article 13g (2).  
1286 SSMR (n 1101) Article 26(8); ECB Rules of Procedure (n 1214) Article 13g(2). 
1287 ECB Rules of Procedure (n 1214) Article 13h. 
1288 ECB Rules of Procedure (n 1214) Article 13h (2). 
1289 SSMR (n 1101) Article 26(8); ECB Rules of Procedure (n 1214) Article 13g(2). 
1290 ECB Rules of Procedure (n 1214) Article 13g (2). 
1291 ‘Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament and the European Central Bank on the 
practical modalities of the exercise of democratic accountability and oversight over the exercise of the tasks 
conferred on the ECB within the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism 2013/694/EU’ [2013] OJ L 
320/1, para 4.  
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An objection decision of the Governing Council that refers at macro-prudential tasks should 
also be written and reasoned, and should be forwarded to the NCA within five working days 
following the notification to the ECB.1292  
 
4.7.3 The Mediation Panel  
Another tool that was created by the SSMR with the view to enhance further the strict 
line drawn between monetary policy and banking supervision objectives of the ECB, is the 
Mediation Panel.1293 The main responsibility of the Mediation Panel, is to resolve the 
differences that might arise between the Governing Council and the SSB.  As discussed 
already, the Governing Council’s holds the right to object a draft decision proposed by the 
SSB.1294 In case this happens, the concerned NCA is given the right to express its opposite view 
on Governing Council’s objection decision before the Mediation Panel.1295 The Mediation 
Panel would be chaired by the Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board1296 and would be 
composed by one representative from each participating Member State. These 
representatives would be chosen among the members of the Governing Council and SSB, and 
would decide in simple majority with one vote each.1297 The composition should be set in a 
way: “to ensure that it resolves differences of views in a balanced way, in the interest of the 
Union as a whole.”1298 The Mediation Panel Regulation includes a set of rules that govern the 
meetings, organisation and voting procedure.1299 
The NCA interested in appealing the objection decision of the Governing Council,1300 
holds the right to request from the SSB the initiation of a mediation process within five 
working days from the receipt of the objection decision, and with: “a view to ensuring 
                                                           
1292 ECB Rules of Procedure (n 1214) Article 13h. 
1293 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (73).  
1294 SSMR (n 1101) Article 26(8). 
1295 SSMR (n 1101) Article 25(5). 
1296 ‘Regulation (EU) No 673/2014 of the European Central Bank Concerning the Establishment of a Mediation 
Panel and its Rules of Procedure ECB/2014/26’ [2014] OJ L 179/72 (hereinafter: Mediation Panel Regulation), 
Recital (4) and Article 3(1).  
1297 SSMR (n 1101) Article 25(5); Mediation Panel Regulation (n 1305) Article 4(1). For the specifics of the voting 
procedure see also: Mediation Panel Regulation (n 1305) Article 7.  
1298 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (73). See also: Mediation Panel Regulation (n 1305) Article 4(3). 
1299 Mediation Panel Regulation (n 1305) Article 5-7. 
1300 An objection decision by the Governing Council can be appealed only once. See: Mediation Panel Regulation 
(n 1305) Article 8(3).  
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separation between monetary policy and supervisory tasks.”1301  The concerned NCA shall file 
a notice to the SSB, including a statement with the reasoning of the request and by identifying 
the objection decision. After the request for mediation has been received from the 
Secretariat, the latter shall inform the Members of the SSB.1302 The SSB’s Secretariat, within 
ten working days after receiving the notice of the NCA requesting mediation - submitted 
within the deadline set by Article 8(1) - shall file the notice with the Governing Council’s 
Secretariat, in which, the draft decision of the SSB and the Governing Council’s decision 
objecting it, shall be annexed.1303 
Also, any other participating Member State that disagrees with an objection decision 
of the Governing Council, but holds a different view from the participating Member State that 
has already expressed its disagreements, is given the right to submit a separate request for 
mediation against the same objection decision or join an existing request within five working 
days from the notification of the initial request for mediation.1304 In regard to the non-Euro 
participating Member States, when their NCA, pursuant to Article 7(7), SSMR,1305 have 
notified the ECB of their reasoned disagreement with the objection decision of Governing 
Council concerning a draft decision of SSB, cannot request for meditation.1306 In case the NCA 
has requested already for meditation regarding an objection decision of the Governing 
Council, and then notifies the ECB of its reasoned disagreement in accordance with Article 
7(7), the mediation shall be deemed withdrawn. 
Following the filing of a notice requesting mediation, the Chair of the Mediation Panel 
shall forward it to the Mediation Panel Members.1307 The Mediation Panel, within five working 
days from the filing date, has to establish a Case Committee, the main aim of which is to 
create a balance between the Members of the Governing Council and the SSB.1308 The Case 
Committee’s responsibility is to provide a draft opinion to the Chair of Mediation Panel, within 
15 working days (or faster in urgent circumstances) from the receipt of the notice requesting 
                                                           
1301 Mediation Panel Regulation (n 1305) Article 8(1).  
1302 Mediation Panel Regulation (n 1305) Article 8(1). 
1303 Mediation Panel Regulation (n 1305) Article 8(5).  
1304 Mediation Panel Regulation (n 1305) Article 8(2).  
1305 See also: ECB Rules of Procedure (n 1214) 13g(4).  
1306 Following the aforementioned procedure of Mediation Panel Regulation (n 1305) Article 8(1), regarding 
the same objection decision.  
1307 Mediation Panel Regulation (n 1305) Article 9(1). 
1308 Mediation Panel Regulation (n 1305) Article 9(2),(3).  
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mediation by the Mediation Panel, analysing whether the request for mediation is admissible 
and legally founded. The Chair of the Mediation Panel, after receiving the draft opinion, shall 
forward it to the Mediation Panel and calls for a meeting.1309 The Case Committee would 
consist of the Chair of the Mediation Panel, and four members among the Mediation Panel 
Members.1310 The members of participating Member States, whose NCA has expressed an 
opposing view against an objection decision of the Governing Council in accordance with 
Article 8(1) or has joint an existing request for mediation following the procedure of Article 
8(2), would be excluded from becoming part of the Case Committee.1311  
The final procedure following the submission of the draft opinion by Case Committee, 
which would eventually lead to the adoption of the decision by the Mediation Panel, is 
outlined in Articles 10-11, Mediation Panel Regulation. In particular, the Mediation Panel has 
a deadline of 20 days, (or in urgent circumstance less days) from the receipt of the notice 
requesting mediation, to provide a written opinion upon the request for mediation, explaining 
its reasoning. The draft opinion is to be submitted to the SSB and the Governing Council, but 
does not have any binding effect on them. Within ten days from the submission of the 
Mediation Panel’s draft opinion, the SSB, holds the right to submit to the Governing Council a 
new draft decision, and the objection of the latter from the Governing Council cannot be 
subject to a request for mediation. However, in urgent circumstances, the Chair of the SSB 
could decide for a shorter deadline.1312 
 
4.7.4 Administrative Board of Review 
The Administrative Board of Review (hereinafter: Administrative Board) constitutes 
body established by the ECB,1313 with the main responsibility to run internal reviews upon 
decision of the ECB concerning its conferred supervisory tasks. The rationale of the 
Administrative Board’s establishment and the internal review procedure, while may challenge 
the decisions of ECB concerning supervisory findings, is not meant to intervene to ECB 
                                                           
1309 Mediation Panel Regulation (n 1305) Article 9(5).  
1310 Mediation Panel Regulation (n 1305) Article 9(4). 
1311 Mediation Panel Regulation (n 1305) Article 9(3). 
1312 Mediation Panel Regulation (n 1305) Article 11(2). 
1313 ‘Decision of the ECB of 14 April 2014 concerning the establishment of an Administrative Board of Review and 
its Operating Rules (ECB/2014/16)’ [2014] OJ L 175/47 (hereinafter: Administrative Board Decision).  
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conferred supervisory task and its discretion to adopt decisions upon supervisory matters. 
The main objective of the internal review is to provide the possibility, to any person who 
wishes to challenge a decision of the ECB that concerns supervisory matters, to request for 
internal review, either because the decision in question addresses them or it affects them 
individually and directly.1314 Furthermore, the scope of Administrative Board’s review is 
limited on the: “procedural and substantive conformity” of the contested decision with the 
SSMR, while at the same time should act: “respecting the margin of discretion left to the ECB 
to decide on the opportunity to take those decisions.”1315  
In terms of composition, the Administrative Board would consist of five members, who 
can be replaced temporarily by two alternates, in case of incapacity, death, resignation, 
removal from the office or conflict of interest.1316 The conflict of interest case, as defined by 
Article 3(3), Administrative Board Decision occurs: “where a member of the Administrative 
Board has a private or personal interest which may influence, or appear to influence, the 
impartial and objective performance of their duties.” Moreover, the members of 
Administrative Board and the two alternates, shall be appointed from the Member States 
based on the following criteria: high reputation, proven record of relevant knowledge and 
professional experience, high level of supervisory experience in banking or other financial 
services.1317 The members of the Administrative Board and the two alternates, are appointed 
by the Governing Council, including the terms and conditions of their appointment,1318 
following the submission of the nominees selected by the Executive Board, two months 
before the start of the meeting of Governing Council that would adopt the final decision for 
their appointment. The selection of the nominees by the Executive Board to the Governing 
Council is subject to a public call announcement in the EU Official Journal, and after the 
Executive Board hears the SSB.1319  
The staff of ECB, or NCAs, or any other staff from national or Union institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies, who are involved in supervisory tasks, cannot be nominated to be 
                                                           
1314 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (64) and Article 24(1),(5); Administrative Board Decision (n 1322) Article 7(1). 
1315 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (64) and Article 24(1); Administrative Board Decision (n 1322) Article 10(1). 
1316 Administrative Board Decision (n 1322) Article 24(2) and Article 3(1),(3).  
1317 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (64) and Article 24(2); and Administrative Board Decision (n 1322) Article 3(2). 
1318 Administrative Board Decision (n 1322) Article 4(5). 
1319 SSMR (n 1101) Article 24(2); and Administrative Board Decision (n 1322) Article 4(1),(2). 
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appointed as Administrative Board members or alternates.1320 The appointment of the 
Administrative Board members is made by the Governing Council, based on a geographical 
and gender balance across the Member States, for a term office of five years, renewable only 
once.1321 Moreover, the members of Administrative Board and the alternates, would be 
granted a highly independent status. Namely, they should: “not be bound by any 
instructions,”1322 but should “…act independently and in the public interest,” and “…shall not 
be subject any instruction and shall make a public declaration of interests indicating any direct 
or indirect interest which might be considered prejudicial to their independence or the absence 
of any such interest.”1323 Also, except from the members, two alternates, the Chair and Vice-
Chair,1324 the Administrative Board would be assisted from the Secretary of SSB, which would 
serve as its Secretary, and the ECB, which is required to provide appropriate support and legal 
expertise in supervisory matters.1325 
As mentioned already, the review procedure can be also initiated by the directly 
concerned natural or legal persons. The wording of the provisions in both the SSMR and the 
Administrative Board Decision, i.e. the applicants for the internal review shall be of “direct 
and individual concern”, does not clearly define whether or not the intention was to qualify 
the representatives of the Member States or NCAs as eligible applicants to the request for 
review. However, the latter does not seem to be the option, since the Member States are 
entitled to submit their request to the ECJ,1326 while the NCAs have already been part of the 
adopted decision due to their participation on the voting procedure in the SSB.  In any case, 
in order the procedure of internal review to start, the concerned person shall request for 
review by filing a written notice with the Secretary within a month from the day the 
concerned person was notified for the decision or if there is no notification, one month from 
the day it came to the knowledge of the concerned person.1327 The notice requesting the 
review shall include: a statement of grounds on which the request is based or statement of 
grounds of the suspensive effect review, if the latter was requested; any document related; a 
                                                           
1320 SSMR (n 1101) Article 24(2); Administrative Board Decision (n 1322) Article 3(2).    
1321 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (64) and Article 24(2); Administrative Board Decision (n 1322) Article 4(1),(3). 
1322 SSMR (n 1101) 24(2). 
1323 SSMR (n 1101) Article 24(4); Administrative Board Decision (n 1322) Article 4(4).   
1324 For the duties of the Chair and Vice-Chair see: Administrative Board Decision (n 1322) Article 5. 
1325 Administrative Board Decision (n 1322) Article 6(1),(3). 
1326 See: SSMR (n 1101) Article 24(11); Administrative Board Decision (n 1322) Article 19.  
1327 SSMR (n 1101) Article 24(1),(5),(6); Administrative Board Decision (n 1322)  Article 7(1),(2). 
268 
 
summary of all the rest if the notice of review exceeds ten pages; and the contested decision 
annexed to it.1328 Moreover, the notice shall be written in one of EU’s official languages, 
including also, the contact details of the applicant.1329 Although, the notice requesting the 
review does not have suspensory effect on the contested decision, the Governing Council, has 
the discretion to suspend the contested decision. The decision of Governing Council to 
suspend the contested decision shall be taken on grounds of an admissible and not obviously 
unfounded request for review, and when: “immediate application of the contested decision 
may cause irreparable damage.”1330  
Within a deadline that does not exceed two months from the receipt of notice 
requesting for review, the Administrative Board shall formulate a written and reasoned 
opinion1331 upon the review, and forward it to the SSB, with the latter having to provide a new 
draft decision.1332 The Administrative Board before defining whether a request for review is 
legally founded, would have to examine the admissibility of the request for review,1333 but in 
any case, the opinion of the Administrative Board does not have a binding effect for neither 
the SSB, not the Governing Council.1334 A notice requesting a review against the new decision 
of the Governing Council that has been taken on grounds of Article 24(7) would be considered 
admissible.1335  
In case the Administrative Board, reasons that the request for review is wholly or 
partly inadmissible, this: “shall be recorded in the Administrative Board’s opinion pursuant to 
Article 17.”1336 This practically leads, to the preparation process of a new draft decision from 
the SSB, with the latter having two options: a) either to submit a new draft decision replacing 
the initial decision with a one of identical content, within 10 days from the receipt of the 
Administrative Board’s opinion or b) to submit a new draft decision within 20 days abrogating 
                                                           
1328 SSMR (n 1101) Article 24(6); Administrative Board Decision (n 1322) Article 4(a),(b),(c),(d). 
1329 Administrative Board Decision (n 1322) Article 7(1),(5).   
1330 SSMR (n 1101) Article 24(8); Administrative Board Decision (n 1322) Article 9(1),(2). 
1331 The opinion of the Administrative Board should be adopted with a majority of at least three members of the 
Administrative Board (SSMR (n 1101) Article 28(3); Administrative Board Decision (n 1322) Article 16(3)). 
1332 SSMR (n 1101) 24(7); Administrative Board Decision (n 1322) Article 16(1),(4). 
1333 Administrative Board Decision (n 1322) Article 11(1).  
1334 Administrative Board Decision (n 1322) Article 16(5). 
1335 SSMR (n 1101) (24 (5); Administrative Board Decision (n 1322) Article 11(2). 
1336 Administrative Board Decision (n 1322) Article 11(1).  
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or amending the initial decision.1337 The assessment of the opinion of Administrative Board 
by the SSB, shall not remain only within the scope of the notice requesting for review, but 
may also consider other elements on its new draft proposal.1338 The new draft decision of SSB 
shall be deemed adopted, if within a maximum period of ten days the Governing Council has 
not objected it.1339 As it was mentioned already, the Governing Council’s decision is not 
subject to further review requests and if any is submitted, would be considered non 
admissible. Thus, the only option left for appealing the decision of Governing Council, is to 
bring the claim before the ECJ.   
However, the opinions of Administrative Board, the new decisions of SSB and the final 
decisions of Governing Council, should include the reasons they are based on and forwarded 
to the parties.1340 This implies that the review procedure differs from the general decision-
making procedure, especially in regard to the final decision of the Governing Council, which 
regardless of resulting in objection or not, the Governing Council would have to provide its 
reasoning. The same applies to the draft decisions of SSB and the Administrative Board 
opinions, which have the potential to lead to further judicial review, since the right to request 
for internal review: “is without prejudice to the right to bring proceedings before the Court of 
Justice in accordance with the Treaties.”1341  
 
4.7.5 The Joint Supervisory Teams 
In 30 September 2014, the Chair of Supervisory Board, Danièle Nouy, as part of the 
SSM’s operational structure and in an attempt to create: “a truly pan-European supervisor 
operating without national bias or prejudice”, announced that the SSM would be 
accompanied by Joint Supervisory Teams (JSTs).1342 The JST would, practically, be the vehicle 
of NCAs in assisting the ECB’s supervisory tasks. This is in line with the relevant responsibility 
                                                           
1337 SSMR (n 1101) Article 24(7); Administrative Board Decision (n 1322) Article 17(2). 
1338 Administrative Board Decision (n 1322) Article 17(1). It should be noted that the wording of this Article is not 
quite clear, as to the exact meaning of the other elements. 
1339 SSMR (n 1101) Article 24(7).  
1340 SSMR (n 1101) Article 24(9); Administrative Board Decision (n 1322) Article 18. 
1341 SSMR (n 1101) Article 24(11); Administrative Board Decision (n 1322) Article 19.   
1342 Nouy, Danièle, ‘One more step towards a better Europe: building banking supervision’ (Opinion piece by  the 
Chair of the Supervisory Board of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, 30 September 2014) 
<https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/interviews/date/2014/html/sn140930.en.html> accessed 
14 July 2017. 
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of NCAs that is embedded in Article 6(3), SSMR as following: “Where appropriate and without 
prejudice to the responsibility and accountability of the ECB for the tasks conferred on it by 
this Regulation, national competent authorities shall be responsible for assisting the ECB.” The 
JST would be the body to replace the colleges of supervisors and would consist of both ECB 
and NCAs representative, serving as the main form of cooperation between the ECB and 
NCAs.1343 The main responsibility of JSTs would be the day-to-day supervision of each 
significant financial institution of the participating Member States or Member States into 
close cooperation,1344 and would consist of representatives from both the ECB and the NCAs. 
Each JST would be led and coordinated by a designated ECB member (JST coordinator) and 
one or more sub-coordinators from the NCAs.1345  
The JST coordinator should hold a different nationality from the supervised financial 
institutions and is to be appointed for three to five years, subject to the risk profile and 
complexity of the bank.1346 The main responsibility of the JST’s coordinator is to coordinate 
the work among the members of JST - who are obliged to follow his/her instructions1347- and 
to implement supervisory tasks and activities.1348 The sub-coordinators are given a supportive 
role to JST coordinators and the responsibility to define the: “thematic or geographic areas of 
supervision……reflecting the views of the relevant NCAs.”1349 The composition and 
appointment of the JSTs members are among the responsibilities of the ECB,1350 while the 
NCAs are responsible for appointing one or more members of JST from their own staff, among 
which the sub-coordinator will be chosen.1351 The appointment decision of NCAs is subject to 
modification request by the ECB.1352 Both members of the JSTs and the coordinators should 
rotate periodically.1353  
                                                           
1343 ‘Joint Supervisory Teams’ (ECB Banking Supervision website)   
<https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/approach/jst/html/index.en.html> accessed 14 July 
2017. 
1344 SSMR (n 1101) Article 3(1); SSMFR (n 1131) Article 115.  
1345 SSMFR (n 1131) Article 3 (1). 
1346 ECB (n 1161) 17. 
1347 SSMFR (n 1131) Article 6(1).  
1348 ECB (n 1161) 17. 
1349 ECB (n 1161) 17. 
1350 SSMFR (n 1131) Article 4(1). 
1351 SSMFR (n 1131) Article 4(2) and Article 6(2). 
1352 SSMFR (n 1131) Article 4(3).  




4.9. The supervisory coordination of ECB with the other EU institutions  
 According to SSMR, Article 3(1): “the ECB shall cooperate closely with EBA, ESMA, 
EIOPA and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), and the other authorities which form 
part of the ESFS, which ensure an adequate level of regulation and supervision in the Union.” 
Also, as ECB’s Guide to Banking Supervision outlines that: “the SSM will not “reinvent the 
wheel”, but “aims to build on the best supervisory practices that are already in place. It works 
in cooperation with the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Parliament, the 
Eurogroup, the European Commission, and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), within 
their respective mandates, and is mindful of cooperation with all stakeholders and other 
international bodies and standard-setters.”1354 This means that the SSM, is not an 
‘independent’ unit within the union, eligible to act separately from the other units, but it is 
rather the missing part of a puzzle. As mentioned already, along with the adoption of the 
SSMR, came EBA’s amending regulation,1355 which reinforced the need for cooperation 
between the ECB and the other EU institution, and reflected the attempt to rebalancing the 
powers between EBA and the ECB.  
Therefore, it could be argued that the conferred supervisory task on the ECB by the 
SSMR, are not to be exercised solely, but they constitute a natural extension of what already 
existed at both EU and national level. Thus, it is important to examine the interlinkages 
between the ECB tasks and their interaction with the tasks and objectives of the other EU 
institutions; especially the way the ECB, as the common supranational supervisor, would have 
to cooperate, rely and interact with the existing EU bodies. The EU bodies that are directly 
affected by the ECB’s supervisory mandate, include EBA and ESRB, due to their role in micro- 
and macro-prudential supervision respectively. ESMA’s and EIOPA’s roles, since they cover 
areas of responsibilities that do not fall within the scope of SSM, have remained in general 
                                                           
1354 ECB (n 1292) 4. 
1355 ‘Regulation (EU) No 1022/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 amending 
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) in 
regard to the conferral of specific tasks on the European Central Bank pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) No 
1024/2013’ [2013] OJ L 287/5 (hereinafter: EBA Amended Regulation). 
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unchanged, with only one exception: EIOPA’s tasks in respect with the bank-led financial 
conglomerates, which may involve some supervisory interference from the ECB.1356   
 
4.9.1 The ECB and EBA 
As extensively discussed already, EBA was one of the bodies that received a great deal 
of attention when discussing the centralisation of supervisory powers at EU level, and it was 
even considered of becoming the single European supervisor. The principle objective of EBA 
is to contribute to the creation of the European Single Rulebook in banking, which aims at 
providing a single set of harmonised prudential rules for financial institutions throughout the 
EU. This in turn, intents to help the creation a level playing field in the EU financial markets 
and to provide high protection to depositors, investors and consumers.1357 Also, EBA, in order 
to achieve the adequate operation of its tasks, and to ensure supervisory convergence and 
consistency of supervisory measures throughout the EU, is entitled inter alia to issue 
guidelines and recommendations;1358 technical standards;1359 and individual decisions, 
addressing either the NCAs1360 or financial institutions pursuant to Article 35, SSMR.1361 EBA’s 
guidelines and recommendations, however, are not legally binding; and the draft regulatory 
technical standards and draft implementing technical standards, in order to become legally 
binding should be endorsed by the EU Commission pursuant to Article 290 and 291, TFEU, 
respectively.1362 These standards constitute a tool, aiming to contribute into the development 
of the Single Rulebook,1363 but at the same time, form part of the EU banking regulation. 
Moreover, EBA, is also empowered with micro-prudential supervisory task such as: the 
                                                           
1356 SSMR (n 1101) Recitals (26),(34) and Article 4(1)(h). 
1357 EBA Regulation (n 984) Recital (22).  
It should be noted that when referring at EBA’s Regulation, the author means the initial EBA Regulation: 
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing 
a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and 
repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC’ [2010] OJ L 331/12. 
For EBA’s task and missions see also: EBA website: <http://www.eba.europa.eu/about-us/missions-and-tasks> 
accessed 14 July 2017. 
1358 EBA Regulation (n 984) Article 16.  
1359 Including both the responsibility to develop draft regulatory technical standards and draft implementing 
technical standards, pursuant to EBA Regulation (n 984) Article 10 and 15 respectively.  
1360 In the cases set out in EBA Regulation (n 984) Articles 18(3) and 19(3). 
1361 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (32); EBA Regulation (n 984) Article 8(2). 
1362 EBA Regulation (n 984) Recitals (23),(25) and Articles 10, 15. 
1363 Witte, Andreas, ‘The Application of National Banking Supervision Law by the ECB: Three Parallel Modes of 
Executing EU Law?’ (2014) 21 (1) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 89, 91.  
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collection of the necessary information from the NCA;1364 to run stress test;1365 and its 
involvement within the colleges of supervisors.  
It has been acknowledged that EBA’s role, along with the other ESAs, has significantly 
contributed in improving cooperation of NCAs and has also helped in promoting convergence 
of supervisory practices.1366 With the creation of the SSM, the EBA’s regulatory role overall, 
remained unchanged, including its role in regard to the development of the Single Rulebook 
and common regulatory practices.1367 The EBA’s supervisory tasks have not changed either, 
and the relevant amendments have only altered its voting procedure. As it has been clearly 
stated by the SSMR, Recital (32): “the ECB should not replace the exercise of those tasks by 
EBA, and should therefore exercise powers to adopt regulations in accordance with Article 132 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and in compliance with Union 
acts adopted by the Commission on the basis of drafts developed by EBA and subject to Article 
16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.” On the contrary, the ECB, when exercising its 
supervisory powers, should act in compliance with the binding regulatory and implementing 
technical standards developed by EBA.1368 Moreover, according to Recital (31), SSMR: “the 
conferral of supervisory tasks on the ECB should be consistent with the framework of the ESFS 
and its underlying objective to develop the single rulebook and enhance convergence of 
supervisory practices across the whole Union.”   
The SSMR inter alia designated the ECB with duties to cooperate with international 
bodies in relation to supervision, with the view to strengthen international supervisory 
coordination.1369 This was a task, which was originally conferred to EBA,1370 and for this reason 
the SSMR provides that while the ECB should exercise its task “in respect of international 
standards and in dialogue and close cooperation with supervisors outside the Union”, this 
should be done in way “without duplicating the international role of EBA” and “while 
coordinating with EBA and while fully respecting the existing roles and respective competences 
                                                           
1364 EBA Regulation (n 984) Article 8(2)(h). 
1365 EBA Regulation (n 984) Articles 23(1) and 32(d). See also: Articles 21(2)(b) and 22(2)(subparagraph 2). 
1366 This was also reaffirmed by the SSMR (n 1101) Recital (7). 
1367 ‘EBA Work Programme 2014’ (EBA short report, 13 September 2013) 1 
<https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/425836/EBA+2014+Work+Programme.pdf/a6d9ed92-fd17-
479a-bd43-3284a12d9f80> accessed 14 July 2017. 
1368 SSMR (n 1101) Article 4(3)(subparagraph 2). 
1369 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (80) and Article 8. 
1370 EBA Regulation (n 984) Recital (44),(66), Article 1(5)(c), Article 33. 
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of the Member States and the institutions of the Union.”1371 Thus, the role of EBA in promoting 
international supervisory convergence is not anymore an explicit task of EBA, but has 
transformed into a shared responsibility between the latter and the ECB. 
As highlighted earlier, the main amendments in EBA Regulation targeted the voting 
procedures within the SSB. These changes aim at enabling cooperation between the 
participating and non-participating Member States, and hence, to prevent the predominance 
of the former over the latter. Namely, EBA’s technical standards are to be decided by qualified 
majority, from both participating and non-participating Member States.1372 Accordingly, 
EBA’s Management Board shall include in its composition at least two representatives of non-
participating Member States.1373 Moreover, when there will be four non-participating 
Member States, the EU Commission shall review and report to the EU Parliament and 
Council.1374  
The EBA is also provided the right to participate in discussions concerning supervisory 
matters, since SSB may invite the latter in its meetings as an observer along with the EU 
Commission and the Chair of European Resolution Authority.1375 Accordingly, the ECB is 
entitled to participate in EBA’s Board of Supervisors,1376 with one representative nominated 
by the SSB, but with no voting right.1377 To this end, Recital (52), EBA Regulation, states that 
the EBC’s representative shall have the status of the observer:  “Representatives of the 
Commission, the ESRB, the European Central Bank, the European Supervisory Authority 
(European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) and the European Supervisory 
Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) should participate as observers.” The 
ECB’s representative may also attend discussions within the Board of Supervisors concerning 
individual financial institutions.1378 Also, one representative of the ECB, with expertise on 
central banking tasks, may complement the participation of the representative nominated by 
the SSB.1379 The SSMR goes one step further in deepening the ECB’s involvement in EBA’s 
                                                           
1371 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (80) and Article 8. 
1372 EBA Amended Regulation (n 1364) Article 44 (1).  
1373 EBA Amended Regulation (n 1364) Article 45(1)(subparagraph 3). 
1374 EBA Amended Regulation (n 1364) Article 81a. 
1375 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (70). 
1376 SSMR (n 1101) Article 3(2). 
1377 EBA Amended Regulation (n 1364) Article 40(1)(d). 
1378 EBA Amended Regulation (n 1364) Article 44(4). 
1379 EBA Amended Regulation (n 1364) Article 44(4)(a). 
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supervisory activities, by stating that: “Where necessary the ECB shall contribute in any 
participating role to the development of draft regulatory technical standards or implementing 
technical standards by EBA in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 or shall draw 
the attention of EBA to a potential need to submit to the Commission draft standards 
amending existing regulatory or implementing technical standards.”1380 
To this end, although EBA is the main EU body involved in the regulatory process, the 
analysis above indicates a clear participation of the ECB to this process. This participation has 
raised questions in regard to the division between regulatory and supervisory powers. As 
already, mentioned, ‘regulation’ and ‘supervision’ are two different notions, which differ 
mainly in terms of responsibilities rather than in terms of scope. In theory, ‘regulation’ is 
generally anticipated as entailing the written rules that define the commonly accepted 
standards, while ‘supervision’ refers to the enforcement of these standards.1381 In practice, in 
many jurisdiction, such as the UK, regulation and supervision are usually two terms that are 
used interchangeably. However, the SSMR treats ‘regulation’ and ‘supervision,’ as two distinct 
notions, which are two be carried out in a different way. To this end, as repeatedly 
emphasised in SSMR, the regulation of credit institutions shall remain a competence of 
national authorities guided by EU law, while the ECB, through the SSM, is entrusted with the 
prudential supervision of EU financial market. Furthermore, EBA’s legally binding technical 
standards form part of the EU banking regulation, whereas the ECB shall be subject to 
“binding regulatory and implementing standards developed by the EBA.” 
However, provided the fact that the ECB is given an active participating role in the 
internal procedures of EBA – drafting technical standards – it could be said that the ECB’s role 
does not remain within the limits set out by its conferred supervisory tasks, but it rather 
expands the ECB’s involvement into the regulatory process. This is particularly problematic 
given that the SSMR does not confer rulemaking powers to the ECB in relation to its 
supervisory tasks, but it only empowers the ECB to issue recommendations and decisions 
pursuant to EU law and within the limits set by EU law. However, Recital (32), SSMR states 
that the ECB may: “exercise powers to adopt regulations in accordance with Article 132 of the 
                                                           
1380 SSMR (n 1101) Article 4(3)(subparagraph 4). 
1381 For more on the differences of regulation and supervision see: Lastra, Rosa M., Central Banking and Banking 
Regulation (London School of Economics 1996) Chapter 2. 
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Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in compliance with Union acts 
adopted by the Commission on the basis of drafts developed by EBA and subject to Article 16 
of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.”  
Thus, the wording of this provision indicates that the ECB is entrusted with rulemaking 
power by default. The legal basis of such rulemaking powers, could perhaps find a legitimate 
justification in Article 132, TFEU, which confers rulemaking powers to the ECB in relation to 
its monetary policy mandate, including the powers: “to make regulations  to the extent 
necessary to implement the tasks defined in Article 3.1, first indent, Articles 19.1, 22 and 25.2 
of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB in cases which shall be laid down in the acts of the 
Council referred to in Article 129(4); to take decisions necessary for carrying out the tasks 
entrusted to the ESCB under the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB; and to 
make recommendations and deliver opinions.” It is evident from the wording of Article 132, 
TFEU, that the rulemaking powers of the ECB, aim at helping the latter to carry out its tasks 
entrusted to the ECB by EU Law, and thus, should be applied only within the limits of the 
conferred tasks as set out by the ESCB Statute and the EU Treaties. To this end, the wording 
of Article 132, TFEU although provides for rulemaking powers only with respect to the 
monetary policy mandate of ECB, at the same time, does not exclude the supervisory tasks. 
Thus, Article 132, TFEU can be interpreted as providing rulemaking powers to the ECB in the 
supervisory domain as well, but only as long as this is done in accordance with the provisions 
of the SSMR, ESCB Statute and EU Treaties. However, the SSMR limits the ECB’s supervisory 
tasks to the extent that the EU allows for, and in respect with the responsibilities set to the 
other EU bodies by EU law. Therefore, since the SSMR does not allows for rulemaking powers, 
the legitimacy of ECB’s involvement in the regulatory domain is highly questionable.  
Another linking point between the supervisory powers of ECB and EBA is the stress 
test duties. As discussed already, one of the core responsibilities of the ECB, as part of its 
supervision mandate, is to carry out stress test in coordination with EBA.1382 The run of stress 
tests is also among the EBA’s tools aimed at addressing and identifying systemic risk.1383 
Furthermore, EBA is entitled to initiate and coordinate a Union-wide assessment of the 
                                                           
1382 SSMR (n 1101) Article 4(f). 
1383 EBA Regulation (n 984) Article 22(2)(subparagraph 2) and Article 23(1). 
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resilience of financial institutions, in cooperation with the ESRB.1384 However, it is sensible to 
consider that this Union-wide test is distinct from the stress test that requires the 
incorporation of ECB, since the wording of provision on Union-wide test explicitly mention 
the cooperation between EBA and ESRB, while there is no mention on ECB.  
 Furthermore, the EBA in pursuing its main task of collecting information, is entitled 
to address the relevant request to the NCAs.1385 In case the response from the NCA is not 
received in a timely fashion, EBA may address the request directly to the financial institution, 
its holding companies or branches, and the non-regulated operational entities within a 
financial group or conglomerate that are considered of being significant.1386 In addition, if the 
response to the request does not: “provide clear, accurate and complete information 
promptly”, there is the option for EBA to refer to the ECB and NCAs for assistance.1387 These 
amendments have clearly stretched out EBA’s data collection power, since EBA could request 
information directly not only from the NCA and financial institutions, but also, from holding 
companies, branches and non-regulated entities. Moreover, EBA’s responsibilities have been 
extended in the area of its participation within colleges of supervisors, including the right to 
promote joint supervisory plans and joint examinations, while its staff may participate in the 
activities of the colleges of supervisors, including on-site examinations.1388 Lastly, another 
involvement of EBA within the SSM structure, is on the process of establishing the close 
cooperation, since the concerned non-Eurozone Member State, in order for its request for 
close cooperation to be considered, should not only notify the other Member States and ECB, 
but EBA as well.1389 
On the critical side, some observers have stressed that the coexistence of ECB and EBA 
within this complex system that blends together cooperation and independence in the name 
of effective supervision, might create: firstly, a possible overlapping of their respective 
responsibilities; secondly, a conflict between the respective mandates of ECB and EBA, and 
thirdly, duplicating in reporting. For instance, in October 2014, the EBA conducted a Union-
                                                           
1384 EBA Amended Regulation (n 13564) Article 22(1a) and Article 32(3a). 
1385 EBA Regulation (n 984) Article 35(1-5). 
1386 EBA Amended Regulation (n 1364) Article 35(6).   
1387 EBA Amended Regulation (n 1364) Article 35(7a).   
1388 EBA Amended Regulation (n 1364) 21(1). 
1389 SSMR (n 1101) Article 7(2)(a). 
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wide stress test,1390 which was based on 123 banking groups, whereas, in November 2014, 
the ECB published a list of 130 banks that underwent a comprehensive assessment.1391 Thus, 
the overlap between the groups of banks monitored by the cross-border supervisors was 
difficult to be avoided, since the three-quarters of banking groups that underwent the stress 
test by EBA fell under ECB’s supervisory umbrella shortly after. However, while both EBA’s 
Union-wide test and ECB’s comprehensive assessment, used the same methodology and data, 
and thus, resulted in a coordinated outcome, which was well-received by the markets.1392 To 
this end, and in order to avoid possible overlapping, duplicating or even, conflicting in future 
reports, further emphasis should be paid in strengthening the cooperation between the ECB 
and EBA, by clearly defining their role both for when cooperating and when they act 
independently.  
 
4.9.2 The role of college of supervisors  
The role of colleges of supervisors, as already analysed in the previous chapter, aims 
at facilitating the cooperation between home and host supervisors. With the creation of SSM, 
the home-host state supervision has fundamentally changed. For the Eurozone Member 
states that fall within the SSM remit, home and host state authority has vanished. Namely, 
the role of college of supervisors in coordinating of Eurozone cross-border banking groups, 
has been entrusted to the JSTs, which are coordinated by the ECB. It is important to note here 
that the role of college of supervisors is substantially different than the role of JSTs, since the 
former are focused on coordination, whist the later constitute operational structures of the 
SSM.  
The SSM Regulation and the shift of supervisory powers of significant financial 
institutions in Eurozone Member States from NCAs to the ECB, have fundamentally changed 
the role and responsibilities of college of supervisors, including the participation of NCAs, ECB 
and EBA within them. In addition, the implementation of CRD IV package has also brought 
                                                           
1390 See for further details on the stress test: EBA’s website <http://www.eba.europa.eu/-/eba-publishes-2014-
eu-wide-stress-test-results> accessed 14 July 2017. 
1391 ‘Results of the 2014 comprehensive assessment’ (ECB, Banking Supervision website, 2014) 
<https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/comprehensive/2014/html/index.en.html> 
1392 Lannoo, Karel, ‘ECB Banking Supervision and Beyond’ (CEPS Task Force Reports, December 11, 2014) 15 and 
37 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2561205> accessed 14 July 2017. 
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changed in the operation of college of supervisors. This revised version of CRD, involves apart 
from the adoption of a Directive,1393 as the traditional legal means to set common rules in 
financial services, also the adoption of a Regulation,1394 introducing a new ‘maximum 
harmonisation’ approach with the aim to enhance harmonisation and contribute towards the 
completion of a Single Rulebook.1395 It should be noted that the new Regulation and one 
Directive, which would form the legal framework governing the access to the activity, the 
supervisory framework and the prudential rules for credit institutions and investment and 
thus, should be read in conjunction. 
College of supervisors retained their important role in supervision after the 
establishment of SSM, while EBA full participation rights.1396 Moreover, EBA’s role, after the 
SSM establishment, within colleges of supervisors has been increased in order to ensure the 
coherent, effective and consistent functioning of the colleges, with the view to promote 
supervisory convergence and consistent application among them.1397 The CRD IV package 
came also to enhance EBA’s role within college of supervisor, which is entrusted with the task 
to develop draft regulatory technical standards laying down specifics of the functioning of 
colleges of supervisors, and draft implementing technical standards determining their 
operation functioning.1398 In December 2014 EBA has published its draft Regulatory Technical 
Standards (RTS) and Implementing Technical Standards (ITS), which lay down the conditions 
for the establishment and operational functioning of colleges of supervisors and outline the 
cooperation between the consolidating supervisor and the relevant NCA, which are to 
participate within college of supervisors under the status of ‘members’ or ‘observers’.1399 
                                                           
1393 CRD IV (n 1197). 
1394 CRR (n 1158). 
1395 CRR (n 1158) premb 9. 
1396 EBA Regulation (n 984) Recital (36) 
1397 EBA Regulation (n 984) Articles 8(1)(b),(i) and 21.  
1398 CRD IV (n 1197) Article 51(4),(5),116   
1399 ‘FINAL draft regulatory and implementing technical standards on colleges of supervisors in accordance 
Articles 51 and 116 of Directive 2013/36/EU (Capital Requirements Directive)’ (EBA, 19 December 2014) 
<http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/935300/EBA-RTS-2014-16+and+EBA-ITS-2014-
07+%28Final+draft+RTS+and+ITS+on+Colleges+of+Supervisors%29.pdf/9543ad13-e7b5-4acb-b0c4-
b7ad1f23e658> accessed 14 July 2017. 
The RTS and ITS, were then officially implemented by the Commission in December 2016. 
- ‘Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/99 of 16 October 2015 laying down implementing 
technical standards with regard to determining the operational functioning of the colleges of 
supervisors according to Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council’ [2016] 
OJ L 21/21. 
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Namely, subject to the invitation of the consolidating supervisor, members of colleges 
can become: a) the competent authorities responsible for the supervision of institutions 
which are subsidiaries of an EU parent institution or of an EU parent financial holding 
company or of an EU parent mixed financial holding company and the competent authorities 
of host Member States where significant branches as referred to in Article 51 of CRD IV are 
established; b) the ESCB central banks of Member States that are involved in accordance with 
their national law in the prudential supervision of the legal entities referred to in point a, but 
which are not competent authorities; c) the EBA.1400 Also, the consolidating supervisor could 
invite to participate with the status of ‘observers’: a) the supervisory authorities of third 
countries where institutions are authorised or branches are established; b) authorities of third 
countries where institutions are authorised or branches are established to participate; c) the 
ESCB central banks which are not empowered by national law to supervise an institution 
authorised or a branch established in a Member State; d) the public authorities or bodies in a 
Member State, which are responsible for or involved in the supervision of a group entity, 
including authorities responsible for the prudential supervision of the group's financial sector 
entities or competent authorities responsible for the supervision of markets in financial 
instruments, the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money 
laundering and terrorist financing, or consumer protection.1401 
With the creation of SSM, ECB’s has been granted a number of duties within colleges 
of supervisors. Namely, the SSMR provides the ECB with full participation rights within the 
colleges of supervisors.1402 Also, the ECB may act as the chair of colleges of supervisors, when 
qualifies as the consolidating supervisor,1403 and along with NCAs may participate in the 
college of supervisors in case the consolidating supervisor is not in a participating Member 
                                                           
- ‘Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/98 of 16 October 2015 supplementing Directive 
2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical 
standards for specifying the general conditions for the functioning of colleges of supervisors’ [2016] OJ 
L 21/2. 
1400 Commission Delegated Regulation (n 365) Article 3 (1). See also: ‘Report on the Functioning of Supervisory 
Colleges in 2015’ (EBA Colleges Action Plan, 1 March 2016) 14 
<http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1390624/Report+on+the+functioning+of+supervisory+college
s+in+2015.pdf/eafde612-f85d-4ec4-baaf-14db0b03fccd> accessed 14 July 2017. 
1401 Commission Delegated Regulation (n 365) Article 3 (2), (3), (4). See also: EBA Colleges Action Plan (n 1405) 
14. See also: CRD IV (n 1197) Article 116 (6). See also: SSMFR (n 1131) Article 9(1) and 10.   
1402 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (42), Article 4(g) 
1403 SSMFR (n 1131) Article 9. For the meaning of consolidating supervisors see: CRR (n 1158) Recital (41) and 
CRD IV (n 1197) Article 111. 
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State, subject to the requirements of Article 10(a-c), SSMFR. In addition, as outlined in the 
2014 ECB Guide to Banking Supervision, in relation to the significant financial entities, the ECB 
would act as home supervisor for colleges that include supervisors from non-participating 
Member States (European colleges) or from countries outside the EU (international colleges); 
and the host supervisor for colleges in which the home supervisor is from a non-participating 
Member State (or a country outside the EU).1404 
 
4.9.3 The ECB and the ESRB 
As analysed in chapter three, since the creation of the ESRB, the particular position 
that the ECB should occupy within the ESRB has been subject to discussion. Although one 
would expect that the SSMR will address the issue, the latter, however, is not explicit in regard 
to the role of the ESRB within the new supervisory framework. The only reference made to 
the ESRB, is in Recital (31) and Article 3(1) (subparagraph 1), SSMR, both highlighting that the 
ECB would have to perform its supervisory tasks in close cooperation with the ESRB. Also, 
there is another mention made in Article 25(2), where it is stated that the ECB is to perform 
the conferred supervisory tasks without interfering to the ESRB’s tasks. As was discussed in 
chapter three, the ESRB is a part of the ESFS, and is entrusted with the responsibility of macro-
prudential supervision of the EU financial system, and the prevention and mitigation of 
systemic risk.1405 Also, the ESRB in pursuing its tasks can provide warnings and issue 
recommendations.1406 The establishment of SSM did not bring any substantial amendments 
to the operation of ESRB and its macro-prudential mandate. However, the conferral of macro-
prudential responsibilities on the ECB, may prove challenging to the existing powers of the 
ESRB, the cooperation with latter with the ECB and the division of responsibilities between 
the ECB and ESRb. All these combined raise questions as to the balance of powers between 
the ECB and ESRB. Here also becomes relevant the discussion developed in the previous 
chapter regarding the respective roles of ECB and ESRB in macro-prudential supervision.  
Post SSM establishment, apart from its already leading role in the ESRB operation, the 
ECB is provided with the right to request an increase of the requirements for capital buffers 
                                                           
1404 ECB (n 1161) 12. 
1405 ESRB Regulation (n 925) Article 3(1).  
1406 ESRB Regulation (n 925) Article 16.  
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and the right to object decisions of the NCAs as regard macro-prudential matters, regardless 
of whether they are based on the ESRB’s specific recommendations to the NCAs.1407 Thus, 
within this structure, although the NCAs retained their prominent role in macro-prudential 
supervision, the ECB is also granted key responsibilities that may overlap or even create 
conflicting issues with the existing role of the ESRB. This issue is not clearly addressed by the 
SSMR and it leaves space for broad interpretations, including the possibility of centralisation 
of macro-prudential powers at EU level. The latter is positively seen by the supporters of the 
view that the macro-prudential supervision should be explicitly carried out by the ECB in the 
name of stability.1408 A counterargument as to the overlapping issue could be based on the 
wording of Article 25(2), SSMR according to which any interference of ECB’s supervisory tasks 
in the respective ESRB tasks is prohibited. Also, according to Recital (24), SSMR, highlights 
that: “the provisions in this Regulation on measures aimed at addressing systemic or macro-
prudential risk are without prejudice to any coordination procedures provided for in other acts 
of Union law.”  
To this end, Vitor Constancio, the Vice President of the ECB, in an attempt to highlight 
the compatibility between the respective roles of ECB and ESRB in macro-prudential 
supervision, emphasised that the macro-prudential functions of both institutions (ECB and 
ESRB) are expected to be complementary, and: “while the SSM will exclusively focus on 
banking systems, the ESRB has an additional macro-prudential function regarding the 
nonbank parts of the financial sector, and as such will be well placed to address cross-sectoral 
issues.”1409 In addition, as analysed in chapter three, the involvement of the ECB in macro-
prudential tasks through its participation in the ESRB is particularly problematic, given the 
lack of an adequate legal basis. As already highlighted, the ECB is excluded from undertaking 
macro-prudential tasks which do not qualify as specific without Treaty amendment. Macro-
prudential supervision in the EU is still in a relatively early stage of operationalisation, but it 
is certainly interesting to observe how this complex structure of shared macro-prudential 
                                                           
1407 SSMR (n 1101) Article 5.  
1408 Lo Schiavo, Gianni, ‘From National Banking Supervision to a Centralized Model of Prudential Supervision in 
Europe? The Stability Function of the Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (2014) 21 (1) Maastricht Journal of 
European Comparative Law 110, 133.  
1409 Constâncio, Vítor, ‘Implications of the SSM on the ESFS’ (Speech by the Vice-President of the ECB, Public 
Hearing on Financial Supervision in the EU, Brussels, 24 May 2013) 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2013/html/sp130524.en.html> accessed 14 July 2017. 
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supervision tasks and responsibilities between the ECB, ESRB and NCAs, will manage in the 
long run to maintain a balance between the task and responsibility of each actor by 
eliminating any overlapping or conflict of interest issues. 
 
4.10 A strict separation between monetary policy and supervisory tasks 
As has been thoroughly analysed, prior to the establishment of SSM, the ECB from the 
outset of its establishment was designed to operate as a ‘pure’ monetary policy authority with 
primary objective to maintain Eurozone’s price stability. With the advent of the new 
supervisory framework, the ECB’s role has shifted towards a completely different objective: 
in micro-level the safety and soundness of individual credit institutions, and in macro-level 
the stability of the financial system as a whole. However, the combination of these two goals 
(i.e. monetary policy and banking supervision), which were traditionally seen as non-
complementary, received a vast amount of attention, with a plethora of arguments stressing 
issues that may arise as a result, such as conflicting objectives, incentives, accountability and 
independence. At EU level, the willingness to maintain a strict ‘Chinese Wall’ between the 
ECB’s monetary policy and supervision mandate has been highly reflected to the SSMR, in 
which it is explicitly highlighted that monetary policy and supervisory tasks should “be carried 
out in full separation, in order to avoid conflicts of interests and to ensure that each function 
is exercised in accordance with the applicable objectives.”1410 This is often referred to as the 
principle of separation, which is enshrined in 25(2), SSMR, as following “the ECB shall carry 
out the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation without prejudice to and separately from its 
tasks relating to monetary policy and any other tasks. The tasks conferred on the ECB by this 
Regulation shall neither interfere with, nor be determined by, its tasks relating to monetary 
policy.”1411 Furthermore, as outlined in Article 25(1), SSMR, the ECB when acting as supervisor 
should perform only the task explicitly coffered on it by the SSMR and: “shall take all 
necessary measures to ensure separation between the monetary policy and the supervisory 
functions.”1412 The principle of separation is further regulated by the ECB’s Decision of 17 
                                                           
1410 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (65).  
1411 See also: ECB Rules of Procedure (n 1214) 13k(1) and ‘Decision of the European Central Bank of 17 September 
2014 on the implementation of separation between the monetary policy and supervision functions of the 
European Central Bank (ECB/2014/39)’ [2014] OJ L 300/57, Article 1(2) (hereinafter: ECB 2014 Decision).  
1412 ECB Rules of Procedure (n 1214) Article 13k (2).  
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September 2014,1413 which sets out the specific arrangements of the separation between 
monetary policy and supervision.1414  
There are a number of measures introduced with the SSMR that have reshaped the 
operational and structural mechanisms within the ECB, aimed at adequately addressing the 
principle of separation. To this end, as analysed already, under the new supervisory 
framework the Governing Council holds a strong decisive role, which is in line with its status 
as the main monetary policy decision-making body of the ECB. Thus, the first aspect to be 
addressed is the separation between the monetary policy and supervisory operations of the 
Governing Council, with the latter having to: “operate in a completely differentiated manner 
in regard to monetary and supervisory functions. Such differentiation should at least include 
strictly separated meetings and agendas.”1415 For this purpose, a new body was established, 
the SSB, which, as we discussed, constitutes a separate from the Governing Council body and 
is designed to prepare the draft decisions of the Governing Council in regard to supervisory 
matters, but with separate meetings agenda and its own members. Thus, the whole 
composition of the SSB is designed to safeguard the separation principle. Namely, its member 
and other participant in SSB meeting are granted: an independent status; cooling-off periods; 
professional secrecy; should act within the limit of the supervisory task conferred on the ECB 
by the SSMR, and without interfering with the other tasks of the ECB; and have the obligation: 
“to respect the separation of the ECB’s specific tasks concerning policies relating to prudential 
supervision from its tasks relating to monetary policy, as well as other tasks, and shall comply 
with internal ECB rules on the separation of prudential supervision from monetary policy to be 
adopted pursuant to Article 25(3), SSMR.”1416  
The professional secrecy of SSB’s members, is further specified by the ECB 2014 
Decision. The latter requires non-disclosure of any “information covered by the obligation of 
professional secrecy,” from any person involved in supervisory activities, including: “members 
of the Supervisory Board, of the Steering Committee and of any substructures established by 
                                                           
1413 ECB 2014 Decision (n 1421). 
1414 ‘Decision of the ECB of 17 September 2014 on the implementation of separation between the monetary 
policy and supervision functions of the European Central Bank (ECB/2014/39)’ 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_ecb_2014_39_f_sign.pdf> accessed 14 July 2017. 
1415 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (65) and Article 25(3), and ECB 2014 Decision (n 1421) Article 1(3). 
1416 SSB Code of Conduct (n 1260) Article 3.   
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the Supervisory Board, staff of the ECB and staff seconded by participating Member 
States.”1417 The professional secrecy obligation applies during or after the termination of their 
office term and applies to: “persons having access to data covered by Union legislation 
imposing an obligation of secrecy.”1418 The professional secrecy obligation does not apply in 
case of a civil or commercial proceeding that involves a credit institution that: “has been 
declared bankrupt or is being compulsorily wound up”, without implicating third parties; and 
in case the applicable EU Law requires information exchange with EU or national 
authorities.1419 
Another rule that serves the principle of separation, is the inclusion of strict 
restrictions applied in relation to the information exchanged between the monetary policy 
and supervision member of staff, which should be done: “within the limits and under the 
conditions set out in the relevant Union legislation, including with the Commission for the 
purposes of its tasks under Articles 107 and 108 TFEU and under Union law on enhanced 
economic and budgetary surveillance;”1420 and shall not exceed the limits of:  “the information 
necessary for the achievement of ECB and ESCB tasks.”1421 This is reinforced by Article 5(1), 
ECB 2014 Decision, which provides for information exchange only when this is required by EU 
Law. Furthermore, the ECB 2014 Decision regulates thoroughly all forms of information 
exchange between the two functions, setting strict rules. Namely, Article 5(2), ECB 2014 
Decision, requires the exchange of confidential information – excluding raw data – to be 
subject to “governance and procedural rules” and “to a need to know requirement, which shall 
be demonstrated by the requesting ECB policy function”.  
The ‘need to know’ requirement, enables the circulation of information when 
“necessary for the fulfilments of statutory or tasks of the ECB.”1422 The latter specifies even 
further the wording of the SSMR’s provisions and ECB Rules of Procedure that allow for 
disclosure of information between the two functions only when this is required by EU Law.  
The meaning of the term: ‘need to know’ is defined by Article 2(2), ECB 2014 Decision as 
following: “the need to have access to confidential information necessary for the fulfilment of 
                                                           
1417 ECB 2014 Decision (n 1421) Article 4(1) and (2). 
1418 ECB 2014 Decision (n 1421) Article 4 (7). 
1419 ECB 2014 Decision (n 1421) Article 4(5) and (6).  
1420 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (74).  
1421 ECB Rules of Procedure (n 1214) Article 13k(3).  
1422 ECB 2014 Decision (n 1421) Article 2(2). 
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a statutory function or task of the ECB, which in case of information labelled as ‘ECB-
CONFIDENTIAL shall be broad enough to enable staff to access information relevant to their 
tasks and take over tasks from colleagues with minimal delays.” Thus, only upon request on 
a ‘need to know’ basis, except when required otherwise by EU law, the monetary policy and 
supervisory function of ECB are allowed to exchange confidential information between each 
other. Monetary policy, in the form of non-anonymised and supervision in the form of 
anonymised, common reporting and financial reporting.1423  
Also, upon request on a ‘need to know basis,’ when each function operates within the 
limits of its own objectives and when the Executive Board provides authorisation, the ECB’s 
monetary policy function may exchange information, involving assessments or policy 
recommendations, with the ECB’s supervisory function.1424 The monetary policy division of 
the ECB is also, entitled to exchange information with the supervisory function, again upon 
request on ‘a need to know basis,’ when each function acts within the limit of its objectives, 
and there is no information included that involves individual banks or policy-sensitive 
information related to the preparation of decisions.1425 Each function holds the right to 
analyse autonomously and decide upon the confidential information received, in accordance 
to their respective objectives.1426 In any case, the decision for access to the requested 
information should be taken by the respective  function of the ECB (i.e. either monetary policy 
or supervision) that owns the relevant information. In case there is a conflict of interest 
between the two functions, the body to decide about the access to confidential information 
is the Executive Board, yet always in accordance with the principle of separation.1427 Article 
5(3), ECB 2014 Decision takes it a step further by requiring consistency and an obligation to 
record the decisions of the Executive Board concerning the access to information. Lastly, in 
case of the emergency situation of Article 114 of CRD IV, both functions should exchange 
information as long as they act within the limits of this emergency.1428 
                                                           
1423 ECB 2014 Decision (n 1421) Article 6(1).  
1424 ECB 2014 Decision (n 1421) Article 6(2) (subparagraph 1).  
1425 ECB 2014 Decision (n 1421) Article 6(2) (subparagraph 2). 
1426 ECB 2014 Decision (n 1421) Article 6(3). 
1427 ECB 2014 Decision (n 1421) Article 5(3). 
1428 ECB 2014 Decision (n 1421) Article 8. 
287 
 
Among the tools intended to support the separation principle is also the operational 
structure of the Mediation Panel, which is composed by members that would act for the 
interest of the EU as a whole, aiming to create a balance between the two ECB’s function and 
striving to resolve any differences in a balanced way.1429 In addition, the Mediation Panel 
allows the NCAs to resolve differences of their views between the Supervisory Board and the 
Governing Council, arising from both  monetary and supervisory responsibilities of the ECB. 
The same purpose serves the Administrative Board, which is entrusted with the responsibility 
to run internal reviews upon decisions of the ECB, concerning its conferred supervisory tasks. 
Moreover, according to Article 32(1)(l), SSMR, the responsibility of the EU Commission to 
publish reports on the application of SSMR, should include inter alia the: effectiveness of the 
separation between supervisory and monetary policy functions within the ECB and of the 
separation of financial resources devoted to supervisory tasks from the budget of the ECB.  
The ECB Rules of Procedure have been amended accordingly to facilitate inter alia the 
principle of separation, which is reflected especially on the decision-making procedure and 
on the operational arrangements for each body separately and in relation to each other. 
Namely, the Governing Council, as was mentioned already, is entitled to get involved in the 
drafting of supervisory decisions, yet it holds the final saying, since it is the ECB’s main decision 
body according to primary EU law. This raises questions as to the objectivity of its member, 
since the same people that would carry out monetary policy tasks, would be called to decide 
on supervisory matters. This is regulated to a certain degree by the added provisions in the 
amended Rules of Procedure of the ECB, which requires the Governing Council to arrange 
separate meetings for monetary policy and supervisory matters respectively.1430 However, 
the issue of impartiality as to the participation of the same members in both functions’ 
decision-making process, remains still blurry.   
The supervisory function of the ECB does not involve only the Governing Council, but 
it also applies to the Executive Board, which is a logical consequence of its participation in the 
SSB. As discussed already, one of the Executive Board members would be appointed as the 
Vice-Chair of SSB. The selection procedure of the SSB’s Vice Chair was initially criticised, as to 
                                                           
1429 SSMR (n 1101) Recital (73) and Article 25(5). 
1430 ECB 2014 Decision (n 1421) Article 13l(1).  
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the possible implications that this might pose to the independent status of the ECB.1431 For 
this reason the amended ECB Rules of Procedure have addressed this issue, by outlining that 
the “the competence of the Executive Board in respect of the ECB’s internal structure and the 
staff of the ECB shall encompass the supervisory tasks,” but this internal structure should be 
subject to consultation with the Chair and Vice Chair of the SSB.1432  Furthermore, the SSB in 
agreement with the Executive Board, may establish and dissolve: “substructures of a 
temporary nature, such as working groups or task forces,”1433 with the Executive Board placed 
as their managing director.1434  
Furthermore, the SSMR requires organisation separation of staff, and separate 
reporting lines from the staff that operate other ECB’s tasks.1435 In regard to the staff 
operating in the supervision section, the Executive Board will act as their reporting body in 
respect with organisation, human resources and administrative issues, subject to functional 
reporting to the SSB’s Chair and Vice Chair.1436 Also, according to Recital (66), SSMR, the 
organisational separation of staff: “should concern all services needed for independent 
monetary policy purposes and should ensure that the exercise of the tasks conferred by this 
Regulation is fully subject to democratic accountability and oversight as provided for by this 
Regulation.” However, in order to avoid an overlapping in services, there will be areas of 
shared responsibilities, aiming to support both monetary policy and supervision tasks, 
excluding the information exchange restrictions.1437 In addition, Article 3, ECB 2014 Decision, 
provides for the organisational separation between the two functions of the ECB, by requiring 
that there should be two separate and independent from each other decision-making 
procedures for monetary policy and supervisory tasks of the ECB respectively, with the staff 
of the former being organisationally separated from the staff of the latter. 
                                                           
1431 Mersch, Yves, ‘The Banking Union - a European perspective: reasons, benefits and challenges of the Banking 
Union’ (Speech by a Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the seminar “Auf dem Weg zu mehr Stabilität 
– Ein Dialog über die Ausgestaltung der Bankenunion zwischen Wissenschaft und Praxis“ organised by Europolis 
and Wirtschaftswoche, Berlin, 5 April 2013) 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2013/html/sp130405.en.html> accessed 14 July 2017. 
1432 ECB Rules of Procedure (n 1214) Article 13m(1) and ECB 2014 Decision (n 1421) Article 3(2). 
1433 ECB Rules of Procedure (n 1214) Article 13m(2).  
1434 ECB 2014 Decision (n 1421) Article 3(2). 
1435 SSMR (n 1101) Article 25(2) (subparagraph 2).  
1436 ECB 2014 Decision (n 1421) Article 3(3). 
1437 ECB 2014 Decision (n 1421) Article 3(4). 
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However, the SSMR, ECB Rules of Procedure, and ECB 2014 Decision, although stress 
the importance of the separation principle, equally emphasise the need to retain a high level 
of cooperation between monetary policy and supervisory tasks of the ECB. This was expressed 
already by the SSMR and the amended ECB Rules of Procedure within the context of 
information exchange arrangements, but it is further clarified and explicitly defined by the 
ECB 2014 Decision as following: “effective separation between the monetary policy and 
supervisory functions should not prevent the reaping, wherever possible and desirable, of all 
the benefits to be expected as a result of combining these two policy functions in the same 
institution, including drawing on the ECB’s extensive expertise in macroeconomic and financial 
stability issues and reducing double work when gathering information. It is therefore 
necessary to put in place mechanisms that allow an adequate flow of data and other 
confidential information between the two policy functions.”1438  
From the analysis above, it is clear that much emphasis has been paid to separating 
the monetary and supervisory tasks of the ECB, which goes in line with EU law in regard to 
the decision-making procedure and the balance of powers within and outside the ECB 
structure. However, this has resulted in the creation of a complex system, which marries 
coordination and separation within two layers of decision-making and reposting, two groups 
of different staff, and two distinct meeting agendas. The only limit, in regard to the strict 
separation between the supervisory and monetary policy powers of the ECB, is the obligation 
for information exchange.1439 The SSMR, the Amended Rules of Procedure and the ECB 2014 
Decision, were formulated or amended accordingly in order to facilitate such a separation, 
without changing the balance of powers and in accordance to existing Treaty provisions. This 
is reflected on the: organisational arrangements; decision-making process; relationships 
between the various bodies; and the creation of additional bodies.  
However, it is questionable whether these arrangements have created a truly 
separated dual mandate. Namely, the new supervisory framework, whereas includes a 
number of provisions that enable the facilitation of the separation, still retains the decision-
making power of the Governing Council. Practically, the Governing Council will have the final 
                                                           
1438 ECB 2014 Decision (n 1421) Recital (14). 
1439 ECB Rules of Procedure (n 1214) Article 13k(3). 
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word for any decision of the SSB. The latter, although intended to decide on supervisory 
matters, its role remains highly preparatory and consultative. This clearly arises by the 
wording of Article 13h(3), ECB Rules of Procedure, according to which the Governing Council 
is not only empowered with the right to “endorse, object to or amend” proposals of the SSB 
concerning both micro-and macro-prudential tasks and with the right to request the SSB to 
submit a proposal concerning both micro-or macro-prudential matters; but the Governing 
Council is also entitled to adopt decisions on its own when the SSB submits non-proposal on 
the requested issue.1440 This depicts the limited role of the SSB and the willingness to retain 
the prominence of Governing Council.  
A true ‘Chinese Wall’ between monetary policy and banking supervision, requires a 
balance between the two functions and equal prominence of the main bodies of each. In our 
case, equal prominence of the Governing Council and the SSB, is not achievable, since by EU 
law the Governing Council constitutes the main decision body of the ECB, thus, every change 
on this respect would have required a Treaty amendment. However, the possibility of a Treaty 
amendment could be possible and finds legitimate ground in the wording of Recital (85), 
SSMR, which emphasises that there are ‘some legal constrains’ in the SSM design, which could 
be overcome only by Treaty amendment. This also reaffirms the concerns expressed in the 
thesis in relation to ECB’s dual mandate and the tension created between new and existing 
bodies, including the cooperation of their respective tasks, the balance of powers and the 
division of responsibilities.  
Furthermore, Recital (85), SSMR, when referring to possible amendments, points to 
Article 127(6), TFEU, which constitutes the legal basis of the ECB operation, and as we 
discussed already, limits the supervisory powers of the ECB on carrying out only specific task. 
This in turn, unavoidably empowers the NCAs with the supervision of areas that the ECB does 
not or is not permitted to reach. As a result, the created system of banking supervision is far 
from achieving the intended outcome, i.e. a truly centralised system of banking supervision 
for Europe, but it has rather created a complex system of shared responsibilities and 
cooperation between national and supranational level. Lastly, Recital (85), explicitly defines 
where these ‘legal constrains’ occurr within the SSM structure, by making reference firstly, to 
                                                           
1440 ECB Rules of Procedure (n 1214) Article 13h(3). 
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the model of ‘close cooperation’ and the possibility of its enhancement, if certain 
amendments take place, which is equally important and has been analysed already; and 
secondly, to the internal separation of decision-making on monetary policy and supervision. 
Therefore, this indicates that the SSMR acknowledges that there are still legal constrains in 
regard to the separation of monetary policy and supervision, which could only be fixed by 
amending the Treaty. It might therefore take another major financial crisis, to brings us back 
to the realisation that the combination of national and supranational elements within a highly 
integrated financial system of a common currency and common regulatory framework is not 
sufficient in maintaining the soundness of the financial system as a whole.  
 
4.11 Is ECB’s independence adequately safeguarded under the new supervisory 
framework? 
As analysed in chapter one, a price stability-oriented independent central bank was 
considered to be the ultimate central banking orthodoxy of the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
which was based on influential economic theories and empirical evidence. This trend, became 
widely accepted and embedded at both national and international level.1441 At EU level, this 
model was highly reflected to the drafting of the Maastricht Treaty and the establishment of 
the ECB. Hence, the ECB since its creation, was granted a high level of independence in 
pursuing its monetary policy objective, which shielded it from specific national agendas, 
constraints and pressures. At the same time, in order to balance the independence of ECB, 
the latter is also held accountable to the EU Parliament. The independence of ECB is widely 
appraised as one of the reasons that the ECB has been viewed as a strong, reputational and 
credible institution in maintaining spice stability and the value of the common currency. Thus, 
it is hardly surprising that the SSMR strive to safeguard ECB’s independence and 
accountability in respect to its supervisory tasks. To this end, although the main aim of the 
separation principle is to avoid conflicts of interest between monetary policy and banking 
supervision, it also intended to safeguard the independence and accountability of the ECB 
from both angles, i.e. for monetary and supervisory purposes.  
                                                           
1441 See for instance: BCBS, ‘Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision’ Principle 2.  
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However, the operational structure of the ECB, along with its independence and 
accountability, as originally laid down in Treaty, were unambiguously designed and 
formulated to serve a central bank, intended to be focused on the sole mandate of price 
stability. With the advent of the first pillar of Banking Union, i.e. the SSM, the ECB is no longer 
only a price stability-oriented monetary authority, but has become the major supranational 
supervisory authority for the Eurozone. The banking supervision tasks of the ECB cover mainly 
micro-prudential supervision and some limited macro-prudential tasks in the pursuit of 
financial stability. Thus, one might raise the question of whether the same provisions 
regarding the ECB’s monetary policy mandate, including the independent status of its 
operation, apply equally to the ECB’s newly assigned supervisory tasks. To this end, Recital 
(75), SSMR, provides that: “in order to carry out its supervisory tasks effectively, the ECB 
should exercise the supervisory tasks conferred on it in full independence, in particular free 
from undue political influence and from industry interference which would affect its 
operational independence.” Furthermore, as already analysed, the members of the 
Supervisory Board and the Steering Committee are required to act independently and 
objectively in the interest of the Union as a whole, while they are prohibited to seek or take 
any instructions from the institutions or bodies of the EU, or any government of a Member 
State or from any other public or private body, and the latter are obliged to respect their 
independence.1442 In addition, the Members of the Supervisory Board and Steering 
Committee are granted by both the SSMR and the SB Code of Conduct a high level of 
independence, aiming to protect them from any political interference. Likewise, the same 
level of independence applies to the Administrative Board of Review.  
Practically, the functioning of monetary policy and supervision are fundamentally 
different. Namely, monetary policy involves a measurable objective, i.e. achieving price 
stability by keeping inflation rates at a clearly defined range and maintaining low 
unemployment rates. On the contrary, banking supervision involves a wide range of tasks and 
objectives, including financial stability, consumer protection, financial crime etc., and often 
utilises more regulatory tools in pursuing them, and it also requires a combination of financial, 
accounting and legal expertise. The main challenge of banking supervision is that the 
perquisites of achieving these objectives are practically difficult to address and the 
                                                           
1442 SSMR (n 1101) Article 19(1),(2).  
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assessment of whether have been accomplished might prove illusionary. Thus, it could be 
argued that due to the differences with monetary policy in terms of tasks and objectives, 
banking supervisory independence cannot be the same as monetary policy independence. 
Therefore, it is questionable whether the Treaty provisions that are designed to protect the 
independence of ECB’s monetary policy mandate could be adequate in safeguarding the 
independence of its supervision mandate.  
The same applies to the accountability of both functions, provided that for monetary 
policy decisions the only institution accountable is the ECB, whereas for supervisory 
operations the NCAs play also a key role.1443 Thus, remains unclear to whom the NCAs are 
accountable too, both when acting alone or in conjunction with the ECB. It follows that it is 
highly controversial whether political interference is kept away from the functioning of the 
ECB when acting under its dual mandate and how this is to be evaluated. In addition, as 
discussed in earlier in this chapter, the ECB may, by way of instructions and to the extent 
necessary to carry out its supervisory tasks, require the NCAs to exercise their supervisory 
powers in case the SSM Regulation does not confer such powers on the ECB. In case the NCAs 
act in accordance to ECB’s instruction to whom they are accountable to for their actions? 
These are important aspects of the ECB’s accountability that might raise even more serious 
concerns in terms of the legitimacy of ECB’s supervisory powers. The discussion developed in 
chapter one regarding the issue of accountability of non-majoritarian institutions is also 
relevant here.  
The next question to answer is whether the widening of the ECB’s mandate poses a 
challenge to its overall independence. In the monetary policy domain, the ECB has 
traditionally enjoyed a far-reaching independence. In an attempt to address the question of 
whether the same applies to its newly conferred supervisory tasks, it is important to 
understand the legitimacy of ECB’s independence. With regard to monetary policy, as 
discussed earlier the ECB’s independent status derives its legitimacy from EU primary law, i.e. 
from the EU Treaties and the ESCB Statute. To this end, the wording of the EU Treaties 
provisions has equipped the ECB with a high level of discretion when carrying out its monetary 
                                                           
1443 See: Lastra, Rosa M., International Financial and Monetary Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 
Chapters 2 and 3.  
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policy tasks, meaning that the ECB is not directly accountable for its day-to-day decision to 
the EU Parliament, the EU Council, or to any other national or EU body and its decisions are 
not subject to approval. Also, apart from the ECJ, none of the EU institutions or national 
bodies have the power to discharge any of the members of ECB decision-making bodies.1444 
Thus, the ECB retains its legitimacy to make policy decisions, provided only that it operates 
within the limits of its mandate as provided by EU law. When it comes to its supervisory 
powers on the other hand, while the legitimacy of the conferral of supervisory tasks is based 
on the Treaty, the legal instrument that specifies those tasks, i.e. the SSMR, constitutes 
secondary EU law. Thus, it could be argued that by default, as long as the ECB stays within the 
limits of its supervisory mandate, it is legitimate to make supervisory decisions.  
However, experience has shown that for supervision the scenario is different, and a 
mixture of factors might lead to results, which are likely to pose serious risks to the ECB’s 
independence. A good example is the role of ECB during the GFC, especially in relation to 
Greece, when the ECB was faced with the dilemma of whether to cut-off emergency funding 
to Greece provided through the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA). To this end, the ECB’s 
decision to limit emergency funding to Greece in 2015, raised questions in terms of its 
independence. Namely, this move was considered as an act of politicisation of the ECB and as 
an example of central bank dependence, since a decision of ECB to cut-off ELA could have 
amounted as de facto forcing Greece out of the euro, which in itself constitutes a highly 
political decision.1445 This perhaps explains why at the end, the ECB decided to maintain 
emergency funding, albeit at carefully calibrated levels.1446 As Mario Draghi, the President of 
ECB stated: “The ECB is a rule-based institution. It’s not a political institution.”1447 This 
discussion is also related to the role of ECB as lender of last resort, which has not been 
adequately addressed by the SSM Regulation or from any relevant legislative act.  
                                                           
1444 ESCB Statute (n 243) Articles 11(4) and 14(2). 
1445 Wyplosz, Charles, ‘Grexit: The staggering cost of central bank dependence’ (Voxeu, 29 June 2015) 
<http://voxeu.org/article/grexit-staggering-cost-central-bank-dependence> accessed 14 July 2017. 
See also: Jones, Claire, ‘ECB weighs pulling plug on Greek banks’ (Financial Times, 18 February 2015) 
<https://www.ft.com/content/64f6e8d4-b6b8-11e4-95dc-00144feab7de?mhq5j=e3> accessed 14 July 2017. 
1446 ‘ELA to Greek banks maintained at its current level’ (ECB Press Release, 28 June 2015) 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/pr150628.en.html> accessed 14 July 2017. 
1447 ‘Introductory statement to the press conference (with Q&A)’ (Mario Draghi, 5 March 2015) 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2015/html/is150305.en.html> accessed 14 July 2017. 
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From the analysis above, it could be argued that the centralisation of supervisory 
powers, although it does not appear to pose any immediate risk to ECB’s independent status, 
could lead to problems in the future. The detailed provisions on the role, tasks and 
responsibilities of the members that form the ECB’s decision-making bodies in respect with 
micro-prudential supervision, appear to be adequate in shielding their independent 
operation. However, as mentioned earlier, since the means to achieve the objectives of 
monetary stability and banking supervisor are fundamentally different, it is debatable 
whether the same Treaty provisions can be adequate for both.  This becomes more prominent 
in times of crisis, as was depicted by the recent involvement of ECB in emergency liquidity 
decisions. More problematic seems to be the issue of accountability, especially with regards 
to the NCAs. Lastly, the independence of the ECB, seems to be more at risk when it comes to 
macro-prudential supervision in two ways. Firstly, as the experience of the GFC has shown, 
the ECB will eventually get involved in macro-prudential supervision, mainly due to its role as 
lender of last resort. Under the updated supervisory framework, it is not clear how the ECB 
would combine its micro-prudential duties with its lender of last resort duties, which is a 
significant gap on the current legal framework. This seems to be highly problematic, especially 
in times of crisis, and it seems to be as one of the missing elements of the Banking Union 
project and the ECB’s involvement in banking supervision. Secondly, as discussed above, the 
macro-prudential supervisory duties of the ECB, through its cooperation with the ESRB, while 
have been defined as specific, are not clearly outlined and leave space for broad 
interpretations. It follows, that the tasks of the decision-making bodies of the ECB may be 
subject to broader interpretation, which in turn, may prove challenging as according to EU 
law can only be involved into specific banking supervision tasks.  
 
4.12 Conclusion  
 The ECB on November 2014, officially became the micro-prudential supervisor for the 
financial institutions in the Eurozone. Since 2014 a number of legislative initiatives have been 
introduced, aimed to strengthen the ECB’s supervisory function and to define the 
responsibilities between the ECB and the existing bodies. This has resulted in a complex 
system resting an edifice of legislative measures, which complement each other in a peculiar 
manner. Since the inception of the idea to centralise EU banking supervision, the debate on 
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the synergies, legal constrains and its long-term sufficiency has been only increasing. Yet, the 
issues in question, including inter alia, the ECB’s independence, the balance of powers 
between EU institutions, and the conflict of interest between monetary and supervisory 
powers, remain unresolved.  
 As we analysed, the clear distinction between ECB monetary policy and supervisory 
powers is not straightforward, the intended creation of a strong ‘Chinese Wall’ between the 
two functions is not always feasible under the current framework. This becomes more 
prominent when considering the macro-prudential domain of supervision, which blurs the 
lines between the two functions even further. This, as discussed earlier in this chapter, is 
particularly concerning when it comes to the ECB’s independence. These elements combined 
have stretched the role and tasks of ECB beyond the wording of their legal basis i.e. Article 
127(6), TFEU, which requires specific tasks in case the ECB gets involved in macro-prudential 
supervision. However, this expansion of the ECB’s role and purpose is a natural consequence 
of the changes that financial markets have underwent since the drafting of Maastricht Treaty, 
when the ECB’s legal basis was established. The whole structure and operational framework 
of the ESCB has been designed to serve the optimal models as were perceived in the early 
1990. Since then, financial markets due to extensive cross-border activity have become truly 
international, more complex and interlinked, yet, regulation has been slow in reflecting this 
change.  
The GFC experience, however, is the greatest example of the inadequacy of certain 
beliefs of that time, including the national-based model of financial supervision in a financial 
market of a common currency and increased cross-border activity. As we analysed, during the 
GFC the ECB, due to its position as the guardian of the euro, was the best-suited institution 
to act promptly in order to save and restore the EU financial system. As a result, the EU 
financial regulation, which had already entered the era of Europeanisation, become subject 
to a significant reshaping process, with a series of regulatory reform that targeted primarily 
to deepen the EU financial integration. This process reached momentum when the ECB 
assumed banking supervision responsibilities, becoming the supranational supervisor of the 
Eurozone. This decision was based on a mandate given by the existing EU primary law. 
Although this might have been a sensible choice for that time, due to the emergency character 
of the circumstances involved, a careful re-consideration of this role would be advisable.  
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Namely, the stringency of the separation principle which intends to retain the clear 
distinction between the monetary policy and banking supervision responsibilities of the ECB 
it has many lapses and gaps, which are not clearly defined by the SSMR. In addition, the issue 
of accountability is also another major concern, especially in relation to the role of NCAs, 
given their immediate involvement in the supervision domain. In addition, the involvement 
of the ECB in macro-prudential supervision through its participation in the ESRB is also 
concerning, given the lack of legitimacy for the ECB in assuming such responsibilities. It is 
perhaps time to acknowledge that the creation of a truly integrated market for banking 
services centred by a strong supranational supervisor, requires a new approach and a true 
reconstruction of the existing legal framework. This would require a Treaty amendment, 
which is a lengthy process, but the creation of a fully-fledged Banking Union requires a 
stronger legal basis and explicitly defined task and responsibilities that will eliminate current 
conflicts and institutional inefficiencies. 
 
General conclusion 
The main aim of this thesis was to critically examine the broadening of the ECB’s 
mandate and the compatibility of this development with EU Treaty provisions, while exploring 
the nexus between the objectives of monetary policy and banking supervision. In addressing 
this topic, the analysis started with a discussion on the historical evolution of central banks 
and one of the core elements of monetary policy regimes, central bank independence. Having 
presented the historical context of the debate, recent developments and underlying policy 
concerns in the post-GFC era were also considered, drawing some initial conclusions on the 
synergies involved when central banks designed to serve as purely monetary authorities 
undertake supervisory tasks.  
As it was argued in chapter one the marrying of monetary policy and supervision 
objectives under the same roof is likely to endanger central banks’ instrument/operational 
independence, often as a result of the loose monetary policies that central banks often pursue 
in an attempt to prevent (or address) a banking crisis. This was particularly relevant during 
the GFC, when many central banks performed duties that can be classified as highly 
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politicised. One of the most representative examples was, as discussed in chapter four, the 
decision of the ECB to limit ELA provision to the Greek banking system. However, as was 
advocated in chapter one, central bank independence, while constituting an important 
component for effective monetary policy, it should not be considered as an end in itself or a 
constraint on the central bank’s role, especially in times of crisis, when central bank decisions 
are of fundamental importance to systemic stability.  
Central bank independence, as emphasised in chapter one and two, laid at the core of 
price-stability-oriented monetary policy regimes. Thus, chapter two focused on exploring the 
theoretical foundation of this orthodoxy and its evolution throughout the years, which was 
followed by an analysis of the dichotomy between price stability and the financial stability 
objectives of central banks. To this end, while both objectives were traditionally given equal 
importance, the advent of inflation targeting monetary policy regimes and central bank 
independence, gave primacy to the price stability mandate. This implied a neglectful attitude 
towards other financial variables that were not considered to affect inflation, stemming from 
the belief that by maintaining price stability through inflation targeting was enough to 
maintain at the same time financial stability. However, the experience of the GFC has 
decisively challenged the conventional view, with many arguing about the need to strengthen 
the role of central banks in pursuing a more consolidated financial stability mandate. 
In this context, the literature in the aftermath of the GFC, as discussed in chapter two 
and three, has converged on the view that financial stability policy, macro-prudential 
regulation and monetary policy are highly interlinked and complementary, since the 
inadequate performance of one may have negative impacts on the other. Thus, as analysed 
in detail in chapter two the reasons to combine them seem to overweight arguments in favour 
of their separation. In addition, as depicted in chapter two, central banks, regardless of 
whether they are formally assigned with supervisory tasks, will eventually get involved in the 
macro-prudential supervisory domain, especially due to their traditional role as lender of last 
resort. The problem arises when it comes to choosing the optimal institutional framework 
that would facilitate the combination of their tasks.  
As discussed in chapter two, the theoretical basis for the prevalence of the view that 
the combination of both mandates, i.e. price stability and financial stability, triggers the 
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‘conflict of interest’ issue, draws upon the time-inconsistency problem and the Tinbergen 
Rule. Namely, when each objective is addressed with only one instrument, the central bank 
will be highly rule-based but still in line with the Tinbergen Rule and the time-inconsistence 
theory. However, as the evidence brought by the GFC has shown, when the objective of price 
stability is solely pursued by monetary policy instruments, this might lead to neglecting 
macro-prudential implications and as a result, pose a risk to financial stability goals.  On the 
other hand, as discussed in chapter two and four, if the two objectives are combined, 
questions around the central bank’s independence may arise, or conflicts of interests 
between the two objectives, which in turn, might pose a risk to the main objective of price 
stability itself. 
At EU level, the pre-GFC institutional framework of the ECB was highly influenced by 
the aforementioned traditional view and the whole functioning of the ESCB was designed to 
facilitate a pure monetary authority with the sole objective of maintaining price stability 
through explicit inflation targets. In addition, as repeatedly mentioned throughout this thesis, 
the wording of EU Treaty provisions is explicit as to the hierarchy of ECB’s tasks, giving a clear 
primacy on the goal of price stability, while any assignment of supervisory tasks to the ECB 
(beyond of being specific) would require an amendment to the Treaty. As thoroughly 
discussed in chapter three, this primacy given to the price stability objective, considering the 
political considerations to say the least, explains the increased reluctance, for many years, of 
EU policymakers and EU institutions to transfer any supervisory responsibilities to the ECB. 
This reluctance is also evident by the slow pace of the process of financial integration, with 
the transfer of sovereignty with regards to financial matters to the supranational level to have 
been a controversial broader political mission since the EU’s inception. However, starting with 
Lamfalussy Report, the EU supervisory framework slowly began to shift direction towards 
Europeanisation and the innovative 4 Level Committees constituted the basis for the 
subsequent centralisation of banking supervision at EU level.  
The GFC was a ‘waking call’ to a system that had already shown signs of inadequacy, 
reflecting segmentation and fragmentation rather than a truly consolidated integration. As a 
post- GFC regulatory response, the De Larosière Report came to address the loopholes in the 
existing regulatory and supervisory framework. However, although it represented a step 
closer to centralisation, it remained within the limits that the Lamfalussy Report had set. The 
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most innovative part of the amendment was the involvement of the ECB – for the first time – 
in macro-prudential supervision through the ESRB, which was accomplished by activating the 
enabling clause of Article 127(6), TFEU. Meanwhile, the micro-prudential banking oversight 
remained a shared responsibility between the NCAs and colleges of supervisors, coordinated 
through the ESAs. As mentioned in chapter three, at that stage albeit further integration was 
highly desirable, it actual implementation seemed politically unachievable. Indeed, the 
Lamfalussy Report advocated against the creation of a supranational supervisor for Europe, 
while the De Larosière Report explicitly excluded the ECB from assuming micro-prudential 
supervision, by also providing a list of arguments against the ECB’s involvement in micro-
prudential oversight, including the possible risks that this could create for its monetary 
stability mandate and institutional independence. 
From the analysis above, it is evident that the conferral of micro-prudential 
supervisory tasks to the ECB through the establishment of the SSM, represents a radical 
change in how banking supervision is carried out in Europe and one of the most important 
steps towards European integration, albeit a hugely controversial one. From 2014, when the 
SSM became fully operational, the ECB, although originally was conceived as a purely 
monetary authority, was transformed into the supranational banking supervisor for the 
financial institutions of the euro area. The thorough examination of the SSM Regulation and 
the accompanying legislative acts in chapter four identified a number of important gaps that 
give rise to several legal concerns, which are summarised below.  
Firstly, a topic of concern is the division of responsibilities between the NCAs and the 
ECB, which as analysed in chapter four, is not clearly defined by the SSMR. Namely, the NCAs 
remain responsible for macro-prudential supervision, while they are entitled to perform 
micro-prudential duties subject to instructions from the ECB whenever the supervisory tasks 
are deemed non-specific. In the micro-prudential supervision domain, while the SSM 
Regulation intended to centralise micro-prudential supervision at EU level, this seems to have 
not been fully achieved. While the ECB is to perform explicit micro-prudential tasks, many of 
the latter remain subject to coordination and close cooperation with the NCAs. Among these 
tasks are the authorisation of financial institutions, with the NCAs retaining the right to object 
to relevant decisions of the ECB when the resolution is national. The same applies to the 
assessment of acquisitions of qualifying holdings and the ECB’s investigations, including on-
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site inspection tasks, which although they are listed among the exclusive responsibilities of 
the ECB, they remain subject to close cooperation between the ECB and NCAs where 
appropriate. It is important to highlight that these restrictions of the ECB’s discretion to 
perform micro-prudential supervision tasks is primary due to the limit imposed by the 
wording of Article 127(6), TFEU and the required specificity of the relevant supervisory tasks. 
When it comes to macro-prudential supervision, although this remains a key 
responsibility of NCAs, the ECB and the NCAs would have to act in close cooperation and by 
sharing their responsibilities accordingly. This practically means that the NCAs are entitled to 
use all macro-prudential tools available at national level when needed, regardless of their 
inclusion or not in the SSMR. However, the ECB is entitled to reject the relevant decision of 
the concerned NCA and it also holds the right to require higher requirements for the capital 
buffers and stricter measures on its own initiative, but always in close cooperation with the 
NCA. This complex cooperation between the ECB and NCAs might give rise to practical 
implications. For instance, prudential and conduct supervision for many EU countries are both 
to be operated by the same NCA, which may result in confect of interest in times of financial 
instability for the obvious reasons. In addition, the involvement of ECB in macro-prudential 
tasks through the ESRB, complicates even further the already tangled tasks and powers within 
the new supervisory framework, as we discussed in both chapter three and four. To this end, 
it is not clear what is the balance of power between the ECB and NCAs as well as between the 
ECB and the ESRB in relation to macro-prudential supervision. This apart from raising issues 
of legitimacy, it also questions the accountability of the ECB and its independence, as analysed 
in the final chapter of the thesis. Particularly, problematic is the issue of accountability in 
relation to the NCAs. As discussed in chapter four, it remains unclear to whom the NCAs are 
accountable too, both when acting alone or in conjunction with the ECB.  Namely, the ECB 
may require the NCAs to exercise their supervisory powers in case the SSMR does not confer 
such powers on the ECB. Thus, in case the NCAs act in accordance with the relevant instruction 
of the ECB, to whom are the NCA are accountable to for their actions?  
Secondly, the cooperation of the ECB with the other supervisory bodies is also not 
clearly outlined. For instance, although EBA is the main EU body involved in the regulatory 
process, the active participating role of the ECB in the internal procedures of the EBA, i.e. the 
drafting of technical standards, raises questions in regard to the division of responsibilities 
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between regulatory and supervisory powers. Another issue is the participation of the ECB in 
the ESRB, which as discussed in chapter three and four has been subject to criticism. Indeed, 
the composition of the ESRB, which would be chaired by the ECB President, supported by the 
Secretariat of the ECB and composed mainly of the members of ECB/ESCB General Council, 
emphasises the active role of the ECB in macro-prudential supervision. This, in conjunction 
with the power of the ECB to reject the macro-prudential decisions of the concerned NCA and 
the right to require higher requirements for capital buffers and stricter measures on its own 
initiative (but in close cooperation with the NCA), although not being favourable in 
transforming the ECB to a fully-fledged macro-prudential supervisor, leave also space for an 
implicit macro-prudential mandate that exceeds the wording of Article 127(6), TFEU. 
Thirdly, at the core of the new supervisory framework lays the separation principle 
between the objectives of ECB in monetary policy and supervision. The separation principle 
as analysed in chapter three reflects the key theories that constitute the theoretical basis for 
monetary policy-oriented regimes. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the SSMR has placed 
particular emphasis to the institutional separation between monetary policy and banking 
supervision tasks, which is also in line with EU law regarding the decision-making procedure 
and the balance of powers within and outside the ECB structure. However, as highlighted in 
chapter four, this has resulted in the creation of a complex system, which marries 
coordination and separation within two layers of decision-making and reposting, two groups 
of different staff, and two distinct meeting agendas.  
Overall, it is questionable whether the two poles of the dual mandate are truly 
separated. As emphasised in chapter four, the SSMR, the ECB Rules of Procedure, and the ECB 
2014 Decision, although stress the importance of the separation principle, they equally 
emphasise the need to retain a high level of cooperation between monetary policy and 
supervisory tasks of the ECB. In addition, although the SSB was designed to serve as the 
decisive body within the SSM, its role remains highly preparatory and consultative, while the 
Governing Council, which is the main decision-making body of the ECB, will practically have 
the final word for any decision of the SSB. The wording of Article 13h(3), ECB Rules of 
Procedure, provide grounding for this view, by outlining that the Governing Council is not only 
empowered with the right to “endorse, object to or amend” proposals of the SSB concerning 
both micro-and macro-prudential tasks, or with the right to request the SSB to submit a 
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proposal concerning both micro-or macro-prudential matters; but the Governing Council is 
also entitled to adopt decisions on its own when there SSB fails to submit a proposal on the 
requested issue. This depicts the limited role of the SSB and the prominence of the Governing 
Council. Therefore, the connection points between the two mandates (i.e. monetary policy 
and banking supervision) create blurry areas that leave space for broad interpretations.   
As argued in chapter four, a true “Chinese Wall” between monetary policy and 
supervision, requires a balance between the two functions and equal prominence given to 
the main bodies of each. In our case, equal prominence between the Governing Council and 
the SSB is not achievable, since by EU law the Governing Council constitutes the main decision 
body of the ECB, thus, every change on this respect would have required a Treaty 
amendment. This is a possibility that in any case is left open by the SSM Regulation, as Recital 
(85) emphasises that there are “some legal constrains” in the SSM design, which could be 
overcome only by a Treaty amendment. Furthermore, Recital (85), SSMR, when refereeing to 
amendments, highlights Article 127(6), TFEU, which constitutes the legal basis of the ECB, and 
discussed already, limits the supervisory powers of the ECB on carrying out specific tasks. 
Therefore, it could be argued that the SSM Regulation acknowledges that there are still legal 
constrains in regard to the separation of monetary policy and supervision, which could be 
fixed only by amending the Treaty.  
Lastly, having discussed the genesis of the idea of centralisation and the rationale for 
the choice of the ECB as the core institution, the legal basis of the conferral of supervisory 
tasks to the latter has raised several concerns. This is mainly to be attributed to the vague 
wording of Article 127(6), TFEU which as discussed in chapter four leaves space for broad 
interpretation. To this end, based on the historical background of Maastricht Treaty, it was 
argued that the wording of Article 127(6), TFEU was potentially left intentionally vague, since 
the discussion on assigning the ECB with supervisory tasks was well-developed, but the 
relevant proposal failed to attain political agreement at the time. Thus, Article 127(6), TFEU 
serves well as the legal basis for assigning micro-prudential tasks to the ECB. The question is, 
which are the limits of these powers and what are the implication when being stretched 
beyond ‘specific’? Having thoroughly analysed the supervisory powers of the ECB under the 
new regulatory framework, it could be argued that limits are inevitably broad.  
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It is evident from the conclusions drawn in this thesis that the newly established 
regulatory and supervisory framework has stretched the role of ECB beyond its original 
mandate as set by EU primary law, exceeding the wording of Article 127(6), TFEU. This was 
the consequence of challenges that the centralisation decision has placed on the key 
elements of the ECB’s functioning (the notion of accountability and independence of the ECB), 
and the balance of powers between new and existing bodies. This is especially true given the 
vague division of responsibilities between the ECB and the NCAs, as well as the unclear 
relationship between the ECB and EBA, and the assignment of new tasks to the ECB that are 
not clearly defined, i.e. the ECB’s macro-prudential supervision tasks. In addition, the complex 
macro-prudential pillar of supervision, which lays somewhere between the NCAs, ESRB and 
ECB, raises questions as to the division of responsibilities between each of the bodies and the 
legitimacy of their actions, given the specificity requirement of Article 127(6), TFEU regarding 
macro-prudential tasks.  
To this end, the only avenue to transforming the ECB into a truly supranational 
supervisor with full discretion, is the amendment of the Treaty and the empowered of the 
ECB with direct supervisory powers. This conclusion stems from the realisation that the main 
problem in the pre-GFC era (and perhaps one of the reasons for the crisis itself), was that 
banking supervision had remained at national level while financial markets were becoming 
increasingly integrated and highly interlinked. This conclusion was also the practical 
justification of assigning supervisory powers to the ECB. Furthermore, the separation principle 
does not seem adequate to address the aforementioned policy concerns, especially regarding 
the involvement of the ECB in the macro-prudential domain of supervision. The 
empowerment of the ECB with direct supervisory powers by means of EU primary law, is also 
likely to give rise to legitimate policy concerns regarding the ECB’s role in banking supervision. 
Hence, in order to achieve a fully-fledged centralisation of banking supervision, the 
transformation of the ECB into a supranational supervisor should be accompanied by the 
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